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Abstract 
 
 
Investment and trade flows across East Asia during the last three decades have fostered the 
development of production networks and economic integration. However, only since the turn of 
the century, have East Asian countries begun to institutionalize such integration through free trade 
agreements (FTAs). With the exception of Japan, the literature portrays East Asian FTAs as driven 
by political elites on primarily foreign policy motivations and with marginal participation of 
businesses in their formulation and utilization. Most of these narratives have, however, overlooked 
endogenous sources of trade preferences, shortcoming that this Thesis attempted to correct by 
analyzing how FTAs fit within the strategies of states and firms. The project investigated the 
mutual interaction between evolving trends within East Asian production networks and states’ and 
firms’ preferences on FTA liberalization using as case studies the bilateral FTAs negotiated by 
Thailand and Malaysia within the context of key production networks, particularly the automotive 
industry. Research involved extensive process-tracing through semi-structured interviews and 
trade data analyses. The main findings of this dissertation were: 1) Compared to multilateral 
liberalization, greater technical complexity and easier assessment of impacts in bilateral FTA 
negotiations resulted in more intense government-business consultations and corporate lobbying. 
Successive FTA negotiations strengthened the technical capacities of bureaucrats and firms and 
prompted the emergence of new institutional structures for intermediation and coordination among 
all actors; 2) Sectors that had successfully lobbied ex-ante for FTA liberalization and/or benefited 
from unilateral liberalization schemes have made extensive utilization of FTAs; 3) Governments 
and firms in both countries sought and extracted selective rents in FTAs to improve their relative 
position not only with respect to states and firms outside the bloc but also inside, and; 4) The 
interplay between overlapping FTA areas and the investment sunk in them shaped governments’ 
and firms’ positions on further FTA liberalization.  
 
 
 
 4 
Acknowledgments 
 
This has been a long journey, much longer than I originally anticipated. As it is now drawing 
to a closure, I would like to thank to those that helped along the way. 
First of all, I would like to give my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Professor Kenneth 
Shadlen, for his invaluable guidance on the project, making himself always available when I 
needed his critical comments and perceptive suggestions, as well as for his continuous and 
selfless encouragement throughout all these years. Since I was out of London during much of 
this period, I am also very grateful to Professor Shadlen for his patience and generous 
dedication of his time in replying dozens of long emails. 
I would also like to extend my gratitude to all the informants in Thailand and Malaysia for 
their time, hospitality and particularly their openness during very lenghty interviews, sharing 
with me valuable, and often sensitive, information and data. Their help made the field research 
not only the most rewarding part of the entire PhD period but also the easiest. Without all the 
research material they provided me with, only a fraction of which appears in the four Essays, 
this Thesis would not have been possible. 
Last but certainly not least, I would like to express my indebtedness to my parents for their 
caring love and support. At the beginning, they wisely questioned the sensibleness of my plan 
to embark on this undertaking. And throughout this time, they also very judiciously reminded 
me of the need to put a conclusion to it. This Thesis is dedicated to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Table of Contents 
                  Page 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 10 
2. From flying geese to regional production networks .............................................................................. 13 
3. Enter East Asian regionalism ................................................................................................................ 17 
4. Objectives, research questions and general hypotheses ........................................................................ 21 
4.1. Developing governments and FTAs ............................................................................................ 24 
4.2. Private sector and FTAs ............................................................................................................... 33 
5. References  ............................................................................................................................................ 43 
 
Essay 1: Formulation of East Asian Free Trade Agreements: Top-down, bottom-up and across      
Borders ………………………………………………………………………………………………………53 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 55 
2. Specific dynamics in government-business relations in the context of bilateral FTAs ........................ 58 
2.1 Increasing government consultation with the private sector in FTAs .......................................... 61 
2.2 Greater incentives and effectiveness of business lobbying in bilateral FTAs .............................. 63 
2.3 Bilateral FTAs provide unique opportunities for consultation, collective action and lobbying 
within and across borders .................................................................................................................... 65 
2.4 Government and business capacity building and institutional creation by iterative FTAs ........... 68 
3. Thailand FTA policymaking ................................................................................................................. 70 
3.1 Early FTAs: marginal economic benefits and little interest by a mostly reactive private sector . 72 
3.2 FTAs with Australia and Japan: push from sectoral business interests ........................................ 75 
3.3 Later FTAs with the largest partners: businesses taking the initiative ......................................... 81 
4. Malaysia FTA policymaking ................................................................................................................. 86 
4.1 Early FTAs: top-down policymaking and sectoral interests by a mostly reactive private sector . 88 
4.2 FTAs with the largest partners: businesses taking the initiative ................................................... 92 
5. Discussion .............................................................................................................................................. 97 
6. References ........................................................................................................................................... 104 
 
Essay 2: Beyond Trade Creation. Explaining Utilization of Free Trade Agreements by Sectoral 
Interests and Binding of Unilateral Concessions ...................................................................................... 110 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 112 
2. Thai preferential trade regimes with Australia and Japan ................................................................... 117 
3. Malaysian preferential trade regimes with Japan ................................................................................ 119 
4. Analytical framework: Linking FTA utilization to sectoral business interests and binding of  
unilateral preferential tariff schemes ....................................................................................................... 120 
5. Political economy and variables affecting utilization of Thai FTAs ................................................... 127 
5.1 Source of data and methodology ................................................................................................. 128 
5.2. Utilization of TAFTA and JTEPA ............................................................................................. 132 
5.3. Political economy of TAFTA and JTEPA utilization ................................................................ 136 
5.4. Variables affecting utilization of TAFTA and JTEPA .............................................................. 140 
6. Political economy and variables affecting utilization of Malaysian FTAs ......................................... 147 
6.1. Source of data and methodology ................................................................................................ 147 
6.2. Utilization of MJEPA ................................................................................................................ 149 
6.3. Political economy of MJEPA utilization ................................................................................... 151 
6.4. Variables affecting utilization of MJEPA .................................................................................. 152 
7. Discussion ............................................................................................................................................ 158 
8. References ........................................................................................................................................... 165 
 
Essay 3: Creation and Shifting of Rents within Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Blocs ...................... 170 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 172 
2. The automotive production network ................................................................................................... 174 
3. Regionalism and the distribution of rents and power within production networks ............................. 176 
 7 
3.1. National and regional production networks before regionalism ................................................ 176 
3.2. Regional production networks under regionalism ..................................................................... 178 
4. The automotive production network in Thailand before regionalism  ................................................ 188 
5. The automotive production network in Thailand under regionalism .................................................. 190 
5.1. Thai FTAs .................................................................................................................................. 192 
5.2. Use of selective rents and flexibilities in Thai FTAs ................................................................. 195 
5.3. Procurement and technological linkages in Thai FTAs ............................................................. 202 
6. The automotive production network in Malaysia before regionalism  ................................................ 205 
7. The automotive production network in Malaysia under regionalism .................................................. 207 
7.1. Malaysian FTAs ......................................................................................................................... 210 
7.2. Use of selective rents and flexibilities in Malaysian FTAs ....................................................... 210 
7.3. Procurement and technological linkages in Malaysian FTAs .................................................... 211 
8. Discussion ............................................................................................................................................ 216 
8.1 FTAs and lead firms .................................................................................................................... 216 
8.2 FTAs and the state ...................................................................................................................... 218 
8.3 FTAs and suppliers ..................................................................................................................... 221 
8.4 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................................... 223 
9. References ........................................................................................................................................... 226 
 
Essay 4: Negotiating Protection under overlapping Free Trade Agreements ........................................ 230 
1.  Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 232 
2. Protectionism and liberalization in the presence of sunk investment across overlapping FTAs ........ 235 
3.  The Thai and Malaysian automotive sectors in the context of ASEAN ............................................. 244 
3.1 Thailand ...................................................................................................................................... 244 
3.2 Malaysia ...................................................................................................................................... 247 
3.3 ASEAN FTA (AFTA) ................................................................................................................. 249 
4.  The automotive sector in the Thailand-Japan FTA ............................................................................ 251 
5.  The automotive sector in the Malaysia-Japan FTA ............................................................................ 256 
5.  Discussion ........................................................................................................................................... 259 
6. References ........................................................................................................................................... 265 
 
Appendix ....................................................................................................................................................... 268 
1. Thailand ............................................................................................................................................... 268 
1.1 Government ................................................................................................................................. 268 
1.2 Private Sector .............................................................................................................................. 272 
1.3 Academia, Think Tanks and International Organizations .......................................................... 276 
1.4 Civil society ................................................................................................................................ 278 
2. Malaysia .............................................................................................................................................. 278 
2.1 Government ................................................................................................................................. 278 
1.2 Private Sector .............................................................................................................................. 280 
1.3 Academia, Think Tanks and International Organizations .......................................................... 284 
1.4 Civil society ................................................................................................................................ 284 
 
 
 
 
   1. Introduction  
 8 
Introduction  
 
Exploring the interplay between regionalization and regionalism  
in East Asia  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Cross-border flows of investment and trade within East Asia during the last three decades have prompted the 
growth of sophisticated production networks and a de facto regional economic integration (regionalization). 
Distinct from other regions, regionalization in East Asia has occurred in the absence of formal inter-
governmental institutions establishing a de jure regional integration (regionalism). Until the turn of the 
century, East Asia was virtually untouched by the global proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that 
began in the early 1990s. However, since 2002, East Asia has become one of the most active focus of 
regionalism with close to 60 FTAs already implemented, mostly as bilaterals. Dominant accounts in the 
literature on East Asian regionalism argue that, apart from Japan, geopolitical and security motivations have 
primed over economic ones in East Asian FTAs, which have been formulated with little participation of the 
private sector in their formulation or interest in their utilization afterwards. This Thesis will argue for the need 
of a more nuanced analysis of East Asian regionalism that problematizes parsimonious systemic explanations 
and, rather, pays more attention to the structure of incentives and strategies driving state and business actors. 
The research project is concerned on whether and how evolving trends within East Asian production networks 
have influenced states’ and firms’ preferences regarding FTA liberalization and, in turn, whether and how 
particular configurations in FTAs have affected dynamics between and among states and firms in the context 
of production networks. This Introduction provides the background for the four essays to follow. First, it 
outlines the evolution of regionalization and regionalism in East Asia and their interplay from the perspective 
of states and firms. Secondly, it introduces and reasons the choice Thailand and Malaysia as case studies. 
Lastly, it establishes the overall objectives and research questions for the Thesis and brings forth some 
general hypotheses to develop and test in the Essays.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
   1. Introduction  
 9 
Abbreviations:   
 
AFTA: Association of South East Asian nations free trade agreement 
APEC: Asia-Pacific economic cooperation 
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian nations 
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GATT: General Agreement on tariffs and trade 
GSP: Generalized System of preferences 
MFN: Most-favored-nation 
NAFTA: North America free trade Agreement 
NIE: New industrialized economies 
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WTO: World Trade Organization  
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1. Introduction 
The present Thesis is the result of a research project that started in July 2006 and involved 
desk research and two field research trips in 2008 and 2009. Although its content was 
continuously updated with information from personal communications, secondary sources 
and academic literature, the bulk of the research and draft writing was completed in 
September 2010.1 The project aimed to shade light on the reasons why, and the 
circumstances under which, states and firms seek particular forms of trade relations. As 
new and evolving patterns in international investment, production and trade have altered 
power dynamics between and among states and firms, the main concern of this research 
was twofold, to explore: 1) whether/how these changes in power relations have influenced 
states’ and firms’ generic preferences and specific institutional choices regarding trade 
liberalization, and, in turn, 2) whether/how particular configurations in unilateral or 
reciprocal arrangements regulating trade flows have affected inter- and intra- states and 
firms dynamics and existing investment, production and trade patterns. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted from the start that while the project explored the impacts of specific 
configurations in international trade relations, its main focus was on the dynamics of 
institutional creation.2 
Institutions reproduce the power relations that set them in place (Przeworski, 2004) 
with their impacts shaped and distributed according to what Khan (1997:77) referred as 
the political settlement, “the balance of power between the groups affected by the 
institution”. Few cases illustrate better the distributional effects of international institutions 
among states and firms as the regime regulating global trade. A relatively new phenomenon 
in the trade regime has been the rapid proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), most 
as bilaterals (WTO, 2011). By providing preferential tariffs only to members within the 
                                 
1 Essays 1, 3 and 4 were written between July 2009 and August 2010. Essay 2 was written in August 2012. 
2 The reason of this focus is that assessing many of the impacts of trade arrangements requires a long-term analysis that exceeded the 
time frame of this Thesis project.  
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bloc, FTAs constitute an exception to the most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment principle 
that governs trade in goods under the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral 
trading system.3 Compared to the multilateral system, bilateral FTAs, especially those 
between developed and developing countries, accentuate the preponderance of national 
power asymmetries (Shadlen, 2005; Pekkanen et al., 2007).  
Advances in transportation and progressive trade liberalization occurred over the 
last two decades have allowed in many industries the fragmentation of production across 
national and/or firm boundaries (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). Firms undertake 
fragmentation and offshoring of their production process (with or without outsourcing) 
when production costs elsewhere are sufficiently lower to offset service links costs, the 
costs of linking dispersed production blocks.4 Fragmentation has been key in the emergence 
and growth of cross-border production networks, where multinational and domestic firms 
engage in complex intra- and inter-firm linkages. In no other region have these production 
                                 
3 The MFN treatment principle, enshrined in Article II of the General Agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT), establishes that WTO 
members should extend to all members the most favorable tariff treatment granted to any given member. Members to the WTO can claim 
exception to the MFN principle under few circunstances, one of them being the formation of a Regional Trade Agreement that should be 
notified to the WTO under four official categories: (http://rtais.wto.org/UserGuide/RTAIS_USER_GUIDE_EN.html#_Toc201649637, 
last accessed on June 15, 2013): 1) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in “which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce 
[…] are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories” (Article Paragraph 8(b) of Article XXIV GATT). At 
the latest WTO update (August 8, 2013), of the 252 individual Regional Trade Agreements on goods and/or services in force, 214 have 
been notified as FTAs. Of all FTAs notified to the WTO up to date, not necessarily including all FTAs in force, over 85% have been 
implemented since 2000 (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx, accessed on August 11, 2013); 2) Customs Unions, 
referred as “the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce […] are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between [or of products originating within] the 
constituent territories of the union” and when “the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of 
the union to the trade of territories not included in the union” (Paragraph 8(a) of Article XXIV of GATT); 3) Economic Integration 
Agreements, that liberalize trade in services and must have “a substantial sectoral coverage" and eliminate substantially all discrimination 
among the parties (Article V of GATS); and, 4) Partial Scope Agreements, which cover only a limited number of products and are 
notified under Paragraph 4(a) of the Enabling Clause of GATT. Countries may also sign Early Harvest Agreements, that liberalize from 
the start a limited number of items while the full fledge FTA is negotiated. Although, in practical terms, Early Harvest agreements could 
be considered as Partial Scope Agreements under WTO terminology, they are often not notified to WTO and, consequently, they are not 
included in the official Regional Trade Agreements Information System database (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome. 
aspx). In addition to Regional Trade Agreements, countries could breach the MFN principle and unilaterally offer tariff preferences as 
part of what WTO refers as Preferential Trade Arrangements (http://ptadb.wto.org/?lang=1, last accessed on June 15, 2013) such as 
those in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs (see Essay 2). Of these types of trade tariff agreements, this Thesis will 
only examine FTAs and Preferential Trade Agreements (GSP). When appropriate, I will also analyze selected Early Harvest agreements 
(e.g., Thailand-India). Some authors consider the term “Free Trade” in FTAs a misnomer as flexibilities under GATT Article XXIV 
mean that many FTAs maintain significant levels of protectionism. Thus, in the academic literature, FTAs have also been referred to as 
Preferential Trade Agreements (but without the meaning given under WTO terminology; e.g., Scollay, 2001; Bhagwati, 2008:xi) or as 
Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements (but excluding the other three types of Regional Trade Agreements under WTO definition; 
e.g., Shadlen, 2008). Governments themselves have also used names different from FTAs to refer to their agreements such as Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (as in the Australia-New Zealand FTA), Economic Partnership Agreement (most FTAs signed by 
Japan), Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (e.g., India-Singapore FTA), etc. With these caveats in mind, this Thesis will 
adhere to the official terminology by WTO and use the term FTA to refer exclusively to trade agreements classified as such under WTO 
(Article XXIV of GATT), independently of whether they involve two (bilateral FTAs) or several (regional FTAs) countries.  
4 Fragmentation is also referred, inter alia, as “vertical specialization” and “production unbundling”. Moving some production stages 
overseas could reduce production costs due to specific locational advantages (e.g., lower labor costs, physical infrastructure, 
agglomeration economies, policy environment, etc.). Service link costs are mostly related to trade barriers and transportation and logistics 
costs (Kimura, 2006a; Kimura, 2006b).  
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networks achieved greater breadth, depth and sophistication than in East Asia (Jones et al 
2005; Kimura and Ando, 2005; Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; Kimura, 2006a; Kimura 
et al., 2007; Kimura and Obashi, 2011; Baldwin and Okubo, 2012).5  
Cross-border flows of investment and trade within East Asian production networks 
have contributed to the rapid regionalization—de facto but informal economic 
integration—experienced by East Asia, especially since the mid-1990s (Higgot, 1997; 
Borrus et al, 2004; Kim, 2004; Ernst, 2006; Fouquin et al., 2006; Munataka, 2006; Aminian 
et al., 2009). While in other regions regionalization followed government-led functional 
cooperation and formal institutional arrangements, most renderings in the literature argue 
that regionalization in East Asia has resulted from a market-led division of labor across 
countries. Until the turn of the century, East Asia was virtually untouched by the wave of 
regionalism—de jure economic integration through intergovernmental institutions—
sweeping through every other continent since the early 1990s (Soesastro, 2006; Yue and 
Pangestu, 2006; Siddique, 2007). This gap between de facto and de jure integration has 
been, however, rapidly bridged as East Asia has become one of the most FTA-active 
regions in the world. 
This introductory chapter outlines the context and objectives for the rest of the 
dissertation. Sections two and three below briefly examine the emergence and evolution of 
regionalization and regionalism in East Asia. Finally, section four sets up the generic 
research questions of the research project and the overall analytical framework and 
hypotheses of the four essays that follow. 
 
 
 
                                 
5 Throughout this dissertation, and following convention in the literature, East Asia refers to Japan, South Korea, China (including Hong 
Kong), Taiwan and the ten countries integrating the Association of South East Asian nations or ASEAN (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos).  
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2. From flying geese to regional production networks  
The sequential process of industrialization catching up that is taking place in East Asia 
since the Second World War has been often explained by the “flying goose” model 
(Kojima, 2000).6 First, the new industrializing economies (NIEs) of Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong-Kong, afterwards Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines 
(often referred as ASEAN4)7, and more recently China, have replicated the industrialization 
strategies of Japan, entering initially into light industries and moving later to heavier and 
more advanced ones (Hiratsuka, 2006).  
Rapidly increasing wages in Japan since the 1960s and currency appreciation in 
1985 began eroding Japanese comparative advantage in manufacturing, especially for 
labor-intensive industries. Japanese firms responded by fragmenting production and 
establishing plants in ASEAN4, mainly Thailand and Malaysia, to conduct final 
manufacturing stages (Hiratsuka, 2006; Baldwin 2008).8 Japanese foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into ASEAN4 fostered regional trade, rather than replaced it, as these assembly 
operations were initially largely dependent on imported intermediate inputs and capital 
goods from Japan. Final products were eventually destined to domestic markets or exported 
to the United States and Europe as part of a triangular pattern of production and trade 
(Hiratsuka, 2006; Kimura, 2006a; Kimura et al., 2007; Baldwin, 2008).9  
In 1985, Japan provided for almost all of the Asian-originating parts and 
components imported by Japanese subsidiaries in ASEAN4. Firms from the NIEs began to 
offshore operations to ASEAN4 since the 1980s, and their home countries also became an 
important source of parts and components. Eventually, backward linkages to local suppliers 
prompted upstream intra-industry catching-up by latecomers. By the early 2000s, ASEAN4 
                                 
6 See Bernard and Ravenhill (1995) for a critique of the flying-geese model. 
7 These countries are, excluding Singapore, the four most advanced economies of ASEAN (see footnote 5). 
8 Compared to NIEs, lower public and private capabilities in ASEAN4, forced their governments to rely more on foreign direct 
investment for their import-substitution and export-oriented industrialization.  
9 Exports back to Japan from Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia were low or negligible for most sectors and have declined since then 
(Chase, 2005; and see below). 
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and China were not only suppliers of parts and components to each other but also to Japan 
and the NIEs (Kimura et al., 2007; Paprzycki and Ito, 2010; Baldwin and Okubo, 
2012).10  Nevertheless, Japan continues to be, along with Singapore, the main Asian source 
of manufacturing parts and components for assembly plants in ASEAN4, particularly for 
Japanese subsidiaries that, on average across all sectors, import 33% of their inputs from 
home (Baldwin and Okubo, 2012).11    
Compared to networks elsewhere, East Asian production networks span across more 
countries and have higher penetration by local firms at the first-tier supply level (Dyker, 
2006; Athukorala, 2008). Evolving dynamics in the organization and governance of 
production networks (Gereffi, 2013), along with intra-industry catching up and 
technological leapfrogging in upstream production and processes by latecomer firms 
(Hiratsuka, 2006) are transforming traditional models of industrialization and technological 
diffusion in East Asia. FDI and trade in East Asian production networks have become, if 
anything, more intertwined in what Baldwin and Okubo (2012) referred as “networked 
FDI”, particularly prevalent in the electronic equipment, textiles, chemical and machinery 
sectors.12  
In most East Asia countries, the general machinery, electronics and automotive 
industries account for 50-70% of total imports and exports. The emergence and deepening 
of East Asian production networks has been manifested in a sharp increase in the trade of 
parts and components, also referred as input trade, particularly for general machinery and 
transport equipment (Kimura et al., 2007). The share of machinery parts and components in 
                                 
10 The contribution of both Japan and the rest of the world to the intermediate inputs imported by ASEAN4 has progressively declined in 
favor of ASEAN4 itself and, increasingly, China (Paprzycki and Ito, 2010). There has also been considerable technological leapfrogging 
and the quality of many parts and components from ASEAN4 and Chinese suppliers reaches international quality standards (Kimura, 
2006b; Hiratsuka, 2006; METI, 2006).  
11 Using firm-level data, Baldwin and Okubo (2012) computed sectoral patterns of sourcing and sales by Japanese subsidiaries in East 
Asia. Among the sectors analyzed in this Thesis, in 2005, the automotive and iron and steel industries sourced over a third of their parts 
and components from Japan, for 25% in the textiles and garments sector, and less than 5% by processed food firms. 
12 Between 1996 and 2005, pure horizontal (market-seeking) and vertical (efficiency-seeking) FDI have declined in favor of networked 
FDI, where a significant share of the sourcing and exports of Japanese subsidiaries does not involve either the home or host countries 
(Baldwin and Okubo, 2012). 
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intra-regional exports has increased from 30% in 1987 to 53% by the mid-2000s and 
reaches up to 80% in some countries (Ando and Kimura 2005; Kimura et al., 2007).13 
However, East Asian production networks still depend to a large extent on Western markets 
for exports of their final goods (Paprzycki and Ito, 2010; Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 
2012).14    
Production networks have spread geographically as firms untapped new pools of 
labor in successive East Asian latecomers to lower production costs. Regional production 
networks have also expanded due to reductions in service link costs. Lower transportation 
and time costs have been coupled with declining applied tariffs in the wider Asia Pacific 
region since the early 1990s, particularly for parts and components (Kimura et al., 2007; 
Baldwin, 2010; WTO, 2011). Liberalization has been larger in the electrical machinery 
sector, to the point that tariffs have been argued to play a negligible role in current 
fragmentation and organization of the production network (Paprzycki and Ito, 
2010).  Nevertheless, and besides the heavily protected agricultural sector, high multilateral 
tariffs persist on final goods as well as intermediate inputs in a number of manufacturing 
sectors, including the automotive, steel, chemical, textiles and processed food 
industries.15  It is therefore not surprising that some of these sectors have been among the 
major proponents of FTA liberalization (see below).  
Much of the liberalization in East Asia has occurred through unilateral reductions of 
applied tariffs and tariff rebates as part of export-promoting strategies (e.g., duty 
drawbacks, export processing zones) (Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin, 2010).  Unilateral 
liberalization has spurred the development of regional production networks that, in turn, 
have fostered further unilateral liberalization. However, at this point, two aspects of 
                                 
13 East Asia accounted in 2011 for 44.6% of world’s exports and 35.9% of imports of parts and components, up from 26.9% and 19.2% in 
1990, respectively (RIETI-TID database). 
14 In many industries, paramountly in electronics, production networks have also been fostered by the modularization and higher 
standardization of parts and components, facilitating multiple-supplier procurement, offshoring and outsourcing (Ernst, 2004).  
15 The competition faced by Japan-based producers of parts and components from suppliers in ASEAN4 as a result of the technological 
upgrading undergone by the latter is compounded by high tariff barriers still prevailing in these latecomer countries (interviews).   
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unilateral liberalization in regard to production networks merit attention. First, unilateral 
tariff concessions are most often not bound and could be eliminated at the discretion of the 
granting country, as occurred during the 1997 Asian crisis, without violating WTO rules.16 
In the absence of legally binding rules, reversals in unilateral concessions or trade wars 
could threaten the smooth functioning of production networks (Baldwin, 2008). Secondly, 
unilateral liberalization in ASEAN4 countries has not been uniform and has been deeper 
and proceeded faster for lower tariffs, thus leading to higher tariff dispersion and 
concentration of tariff peaks around sensitive sectors (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2007). 
As elaborated in Essays 2 and 3, I will argue in this Thesis that both factors are related to 
the ongoing proliferation of FTAs in East Asia.  
In contrast to other regions, where regionalization has followed or has been fostered 
by intergovernmental institutions, most narratives depicted East Asian regionalization as 
market-driven. Regional production networks flourished in response to FDI and trade flows 
and proceeded independently and in the absence of rule-based institutions (Kawai, 2005; 
Soesastro, 2006; World Bank, 2007).17 These views resonate with neoliberal interpretations 
of East Asian development and overlook the role of government policies and government-
business coordination in East Asia industrialization (MacIntyre, 1994). Starting in the 
1980s, and as part of their individual export-oriented assembly operations, many East Asian 
governments not only introduced unilateral liberalization schemes but also actively 
coordinated upstream and downstream producers. At the regional level, ASEAN 
governments established during the same period cross-border growth zones and 
                                 
16 WTO establishes that members cannot impose import duties above the level tariffs have been bound but they are free to apply lower 
tariffs. The difference between the level at which a tariff on a given item has been bound and the applied tariff is known as binding 
overhang.  
17 Borrowing from Polanyi, East Asian production networks are envisioned as self(un)-regulated entities shaped by the dictates of a 
market-led regional division of labor. 
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complementation programs for regional trade in parts and components, especially in the 
automotive industry  (Yoshimatsu, 1999; Yoshimatsu, 2002; Busser and Sadoi, 2004).18 
 
3. Enter East Asian regionalism 
As preferential tariffs in FTAs apply only to goods traded among members, they could 
potentially divert trade from more efficient producers outside the bloc to less efficient ones 
inside (reviewed in Schiff and Winter, 2003 and in Freund and Ornelas, 2010).19 To limit 
their discriminatory and trade-diverting impacts, GATT Article XXIV establishes that 
FTAs should eliminate trade barriers on substantially all intraregional trade within a 
reasonable period of time and that trade barriers applied to outside countries should not be 
higher than prior to the establishment of trade area.20 Today’s FTAs are often more than 
deals over tariff reductions and include regulatory provisions that expand the concessions 
and/or issue scope under WTO.21  
Qualifying for preferential tariffs in FTAs also requires that goods comply with 
established rules of origin (ROOs), determining whether goods originated and/or underwent 
sufficient transformation within the FTA area.22 Increasing intra-regional trade in parts and 
components has resulted in a decline in the domestic value content in most East Asian 
manufacturing industries (Kuroiwa, 2006).23 Consequently, ROOs are especially relevant in 
bilateral FTAs and for sectors where production fragmentation and input trade are 
                                 
18 For instance, the Brand-to-Brand Complementation the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (see Essay 3). Manuscript in preparation by the 
Author. 
19 Seminal works by Grossman and Helpman (1995) and others (see also Essay 4) contend that only FTAs that provide enhanced 
protection and divert trade are politically feasible. However, theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that formation of a FTA reduces 
incentives for import-competing sectors to lobby in favor of maintaining high external tariffs (Ornelas, 2005a; Ornelas, 2005b; Calvo-
Pardo et al., 2011). Consequently, when external tariffs are endogenously determined, only FTAs that are sufficiently trade-creating are 
likely to be politically viable (Ornelas, 2005a). 
20 In the case of FTAs, this has been often interpreted as liberalizing at least 90% of the existing trade between members within a 
maximum of 10 years. In reality, many FTAs do not fulfill these conditions. 
21 Many FTAs, particularly those anchored around the United States and the European Union, incorporate regulatory provisions beyond 
trade in goods and services as the so-called Singapore issues (investment, government procurement, competition, trade facilitation) 
and/or intellectual property rights (WTO, 2011). These are not only often the most contentious issues at negotiations but they also have 
potentially the largest economic and developmental impacts. This Thesis focuses on trade in goods for two main reasons: first, most East 
Asian FTAs provide limited concessions beyond goods trade and, secondly, the dearth of disaggregated data on beyond trade issues and 
the difficulty in controlling for the impacts of FTAs on them. 
22 ROOs specify that the imported item has a minimum regional value content, classifies under a different tariff code that its parts and 
components, and/or has undergone a specific process within the bloc. Most FTAs establish product-specific ROOs for each tariff code. 
23 For instance, in a survey of Japanese firms based in ASEAN4, only 20-50% could outsource at least 40% of the value content of their 
products from within the host country (Wakamatsu, 2004). 
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prevalent. Although ROOs are included in FTAs for technical reasons, to avoid strategic 
tariff-shopping by exporters outside the area (trade deflection), they could also be 
strategically used for protectionist purposes (Krueger, 1995). ROOs impose procurement 
and administrative costs on exporters that, depending on their restrictiveness and the sector, 
could amount to an ad-valorem tariff of up to 6-10% , eroding by that level (or even 
potentially voiding) the preferential margin afforded by the FTA (Anson et al., 2005; Cadot 
et al., 2006).24 It has been often argued that, at the extreme, disparate ROOs across hubs 
and spokes of overlapping FTAs—the so-called spaghetti or noodle bowl effect—may not 
only impose a large burden on exporting firms but potentially interfere with the functioning 
of cross-border production networks (Bhagwati, 1995).25 
The prospect of failure of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the European 
Community prompted a policy shift in the United States toward regionalism and the signing 
of the North American FTA (NAFTA) in 1994.26 Embracement of regionalism by Western 
economic powers raised fears that a proliferation of FTAs would create stumbling blocks 
for global liberalization. In turn, and around the same time, countries party to the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which includes NAFTA as well as most 
East Asian nations, introduced the concept of “open regionalism”, as opposed to otherwise 
discriminatory regionalism, with the goal of extending multilaterally preferential 
liberalization among themselves.27  
Since the early 1990s, FTAs began to spread across the globe but spared East Asia 
where the only FTA in force by the turn of the century was the Association of Southeast 
                                 
24 To benefit from preferential tariffs, exporters need to adapt their existing procurement and production processes to ROOs. This 
research found that in some sectors, particularly light industries (e.g., textiles, processed food), manufacturers established separate 
production lines based on requirements to comply with different ROOs.  
25 Using FTA preferential tariffs is nevertheless voluntary and our results indicated that ROOs may have had a limited effect in the 
utilization of Thai and Malaysian FTAs (see Essay 2). 
26 The Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) was signed in 1992. In turn, Bergsten and Schott (cited in Freund and Ornelas, 
2010:155) argued that the United States used NAFTA to pressure Europe for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
27 At the 1994 meeting, APEC pledged for full liberalization in developed countries by 2010 and by 2020 in developing ones (Bogor 
goals). However, APEC’s unilateral and voluntary approach to liberalization has reduced its role to that of a mere trade forum and most 
of the liberalization undertook by APEC members has occurred independently of APEC. 
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Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA (AFTA). Still, AFTA was notorious for its slow 
implementation and, lacking enforcing mechanisms, poor compliance (Bowles, 2002; 
Yoshimatsu, 2006a; Ravenhill, 2008). Although signed in 1992, it was not until 2010 that 
AFTA was fully implemented.28 ASEAN members were highly dependent on the United 
States and Europe as export destinations for their final goods. Therefore, departing from 
most other FTAs elsewhere, AFTA was not conceived as a discriminatory bloc to promote 
intra-ASEAN trade but primarily as an open regionalism area and a tool to attract FDI.29 
The signing of the Japan-Singapore FTA in 2002 marked the official start of East 
Asia’s jumping onto the FTA bandwagon. Since then, nowhere else has regionalism 
exploded so dramatically with close to 60 FTAs already implemented, most as bilaterals 
(reviewed in Kawai and Wignaraja, 2013).30 Since desk research for this project began in 
July 2006, a plethora of works have explored the move of East Asia toward regionalism.31 
Most scholarly attention has centered on accounting for its origins (Aggarwal and Urata 
2006; Dent, 2006; Dent, 2007; Dieter, 2007; Aggarwal and Koo, 2008; Katada and Solis, 
2008; Manger, 2009; Solis et al., 2009; Aggarwal and Lee, 2010). FTA proliferation in East 
Asia has been explained on the compound effect of multiple forces, some more generic and 
also driving regionalism elsewhere (e.g., slow progress in multilateral negotiations) and 
other specific to East Asia (e.g., slow implementation of AFTA, 1997 Asian financial 
crisis).  
Nevertheless, in the same manner that regionalization in East Asia is considered to 
have occurred largely independent from intergovernmental actions, for the majority of 
                                 
28Until the mid-2000s, AFTA implementation was fraud with exemption lists and non-tariff barriers. The less developed countries of 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos are allowed for slower implementation. In May 2010, AFTA was superseded by the ASEAN 
Trade in Goods Agreement. 
29 Nesadurai (2003) contends that Malaysia and Indonesia, where domestic capital had closer relationships with the political leadership, 
favored AFTA not only to advance open regionalism but also to privilege local champions through “developmental regionalism”. 
30 As of August 11, 2013, there are 56 FTAs in force in East Asia, 50 of them as bilateral FTAs (Databases from ADB-ARIC, undated 
and WTO-RTAIS, undated). Even regional so-called ASEAN+1 FTAs (FTAs between the ASEAN bloc and a third country) could be 
considered as multiple bilateral FTAs as negotiations and FTA texts include separate schedules for each ASEAN member. ASEAN+1 
FTAs tend to provide for shallower and slower liberalization than corresponding bilateral FTAs as concessions converge on a minimum 
common denominator. 
31 Close to 70% of the academic literature containing “FTA” and “East Asia” in Google Scholar have been published since 2007 
(scholar.google.com). 
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accounts in the literature, ramping regionalism in East Asia over the last decade is 
portrayed has been decoupled from the concurrent regionalization process. Just as earlier 
paucity of regionalism was argued on political rivalries, economic and ethnic diversity and 
American influence in the region (Katzenstein, 1997; Katzenstein, 2005), most analyses of 
East Asian FTAs emphasize the primacy of foreign policy, diplomatic, geopolitical and 
security dimensions over economic ones to explain their present proliferation (e.g., Desker, 
2004; Aggarwal and Urata, 2006; Dieter, 2007; Hoadley, 2007; Aggarwal and Koo, 2008; 
Ravenhill, 2008; Aggarwal and Lee, 2010; Ravenhill, 2010; Lee and Hooi, 2011; Lee, 
2013). Given that bilateral FTAs are second-best options to multilateral liberalization in 
classical economics, their rationale is explained on political and security factors, not 
economic ones (See Essay 1 for further elaboration on this strand of the literature).  
At the policymaking level, according to most scholarly works, East Asian FTAs 
have emerged from a cognitive consensus among political elites in strong states where the 
influence of organized business in FTA formulation has been limited or absent altogether 
(Aggarwal and Koo 2006; Koo, 2006; Sally 2006; Hoadley, 2008; Terada, 2009; Ravenhill, 
2010; Aggarwal and Lee, 2010) (see Essay 1 for further discussion). Some studies have 
taken a constructivist approach, emphasizing the role of shared ideas and identities among 
the political leadership—particularly in the aftermath of the Asian crisis—in the increasing 
de jure East Asia integration (e.g., see Acharya, 1999; Terada, 2003; Calder and Ye, 2004; 
Eaton and Stubbs, 2006; Ravenhill, 2009). Only Japan seem to have departed from this 
regional trend as evidence shows that pressure by Japanese firms and business associations 
were key in the shift of the Japanese government’s stance in favor of FTAs (Solis, 2003; 
Manger, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 2006b; Noble, 2007; Solis and Urata, 2007; 
Katada and Solis 2010; Solis, 2010). At the same time, and given low tariffs covering most 
East Asian trade, firm surveys indicate little interest in FTAs on the part of business 
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(Haddad, 2007; Ravenhill, 2010; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011a; Kawai and Wignaraja, 
2011b).  
 Most of the above-mentioned analyses of East Asian regionalism are unlikely to 
fully capture the rationale and dynamics of FTA formation as they essentialize politicians’ 
ideas and neglect the sources of countries’ preferences in policymaking. At the same time, 
systemic-level variables fail to explain the diversity in outcomes of bilateralism across East 
Asia as well as of sector coverage among FTAs. Postulating strong states and insulated 
bureaucracies, autonomous from interest groups pressures, to explain FTA policymaking 
overlooks the way bureaucracies in East Asian countries engaged business while 
maintaining their “embedded autonomy” (see below). Likewise, inferring the economic 
relevance of East Asian FTAs for business in the region from estimates and firm-level 
surveys on FTA utilization is prone to provide, at best, an incomplete picture of reality. 
Assessing FTA utilization requires instead the collection of administrative records 
certifying compliance of exported items with ROOs. In addition, most accounts do not pay 
sufficient attention to why countries and firms may differentially pursue unilateral, 
multilateral or preferential liberalization paths. Certainly, as their ultimate signatories, FTA 
negotiations are the exclusive prerogative of states, as strategic trade and investment 
decisions within production networks are of firms. However, this could not ignore the 
interdependence of regionalism and regionalization, the way evolving trade patterns 
influence states preferences for FTAs and, in turn, how emerging regionalism affect the 
strategies of firms operating in production networks.  
 
4. Objectives, research questions and general hypotheses 
This research project attempted to address some of the puzzles and questions left open by 
the received literature, arguing for the need of a more nuanced analysis of East Asian 
regionalism that problematizes parsimonious systemic explanations around constructivist 
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and/or geopolitical motivations and, rather, pays more attention to the structure of 
incentives and strategies driving state and business actors. The central theme of this Thesis 
revolves around the interaction between regionalism and regionalization, on why particular 
bilateral FTAs have taken specific configurations and whether and how FTAs fit within the 
generic interests and specific policy preferences of states and firms.  
The project used as case studies the evolution of FTA formation in Thailand and 
Malaysia, the two most FTA-active developing nations in the region, within the context of 
key production networks potentially affecting and affected by regionalism.32 These cases 
were selected because their commonalities and differences on several dimensions (see 
individual Essays) provide a rich empirical ground to test the hypotheses. Primary research 
involved 212 in-depth semi-structured interviews with government officials, private sector 
and civil society representatives and academics in both countries during two independent 
trips in 2008 and 2009 complemented and updated by numerous personal communications 
during 2010-2012 (see Appendix). Some studies on the policymaking of East Asian 
regionalism codified the preferences and preference intensities of actors around FTAs (e.g., 
Aggarwal and Koo, 2006; Dent, 2006). Instead, this Thesis opted not to collapse the rich 
evidence obtained through qualitative research into the few codes of a scale as this would 
have detracted from a nuanced analysis of the forces behind FTAs. Instead, taking 
advantage that Thailand and Malaysia are the only countries in East Asia that collect 
official records on exports using preferential tariffs, this Thesis has quantified FTA 
utilization at a highly disaggregated level as well assessed the variables potentially 
affecting it.  
Among East Asian nations, Thailand was only second to Singapore in start pursuing 
bilateral FTAs and, until 2006, also one of the most prolific. Instead, Malaysia was initially 
                                 
32 As of August 2013, the top 5 countries in East Asia by the number of FTAs participated are: Singapore (17 FTAs, including AFTA and 
ASEAN-centered FTAs), Malaysia (12 FTAs, also including AFTA and ASEAN-centered FTAs), Thailand (11 FTAs, including AFTA 
and ASEAN-centered FTAs), Korea (9) and China (7) (ADB-ARIC, undated; WTO-RTAIS, undated). 
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reluctant to enter bilateral FTAs but has later signed a number of them. Both countries 
belong to the second generation of East Asian industrialized economies although 
controversy remains about their categorization as developmental states (e.g., see Doner and 
Hawes, 1995 versus Jomo, 2001 or Rock, 2001). Both countries pursued more liberal 
policies toward trade and investment than the NIEs and trailed behind them in state 
capacity and bureaucratic coherence and autonomy (Doner and Hawes, 1995; Crouch, 
1996). This technocratic deficit has been more pronounced in Thailand where responsibility 
over economic planning falls across multiple and competing agencies that are not always 
sufficiently coordinated or autonomous from political or business pressures (Abbott, 2004). 
Malaysian bureaucracy enjoys greater capacity, coherence and autonomy from business 
interests than in Thailand although still non-immune to interference from the Cabinet 
(Trezzini, 2001; Abbott, 2004).33 Nevertheless, Thailand and Malaysia have used a panoply 
of state-led targeted policies to promote industrialization, in some instances with significant 
success (Felker, 2001; Rock, 2000; Jomo, 2001; Rock, 2001; Abbott, 2004; Kuchiki 2007; 
Stubbs, 2009; Hayashi, 2010).34 Governments in Thailand but particularly in Malaysia have 
fostered linkages between lead firms in production networks and indigenous firms, 
providing good cases to explore the preferences and influence of upstream and downstream 
producers in FTA policymaking. The project has investigated the most relevant sectors in 
the Thai and Malaysian economies with special attention to the automotive sector, that was 
at the center of many of their FTAs and where both countries present diverging policies, 
trajectories and outcomes. The automotive industry remains one of the most protected and 
                                 
33 Since the late 1960s, economic policymaking in Malaysia has been guided by the goal of achieving developed economy status as well 
as to promote the participation of the ethnic Malay/bumiputera population in the economy.    
34 Contention regarding its characterization as a bona fide developmental state is higher for Thailand. Some narratives argue that 
consistent macroeconomic management was achieved by insulation of the Thai central bank and planning agencies but that inefficient 
line ministries were dominated by competitive clientelism (Doner and Hawes, 1995; Doner and Ramsay, 2001; Kohpaiboon, 2006; 
Doner, 2009). Instead, Rock (2000, 2001) found evidence of highly targeted microeconomic intervention “mirror[ing] that in Korea” 
(2001:194). In their industrialization strategies, Thailand and Malaysia have relied in multinational firms more heavily than their 
Northeastern neighbors, although Malaysia has nurtured national champions in strategic sectors, often through government-linked 
companies. 
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influential in Thailand and Malaysia but while the former has relied exclusively in 
international firms, Malaysia has pursued the creation of national carmakers (see recent 
accounts in Natsuda and Thoburn, 2013 and Natsuda et al., 2013).   
However, despite differences between both countries in their policymaking setting 
and national trade and industrial strategies, here it was found a significant convergence in 
the formulation of Thai and Malaysian FTAs as well as in the engagement of the private 
sector in the process. Thus, comparison of both case studies has served in many instances to 
confirm findings across both countries (Essays 1, 2 and 3), while in other allowed us to 
contrast them (Essay 4). 
4.1. Developing governments and FTAs  
As advanced earlier, the extant literature highlights foreign policy and security motivations 
as key determinants of recent East Asian FTAs, which have been formulated by the 
political leadership in each country with little involvement of businesses. In the context of 
bilateral treaties, governments certainly use economic diplomacy to pursue non-economic 
interests.35 However, it is this author’s contention that foreign policy and security 
determinants have stronger power informing why some FTAs did not materialize than why 
others are formed.36  In other words, the like-mindedness among domestic political elites 
argued by those defending the primarily geopolitical nature of East Asian regionalism is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of an FTA. Neither shared ideas 
nor foreign policy arguments could explain existing variability in liberalization coverage 
and sequencing within and among FTAs. The potential economic impacts of FTA 
                                 
35 Interpretation of FTAs through a security prism has also been made for United States FTAs (e.g., Higgott, 2004). See Phillips (2007) 
for a rebuttal of the argument. History provides countless examples on the use of economic diplomacy for foreign-policy objectives in 
peace as in war. But, as Bayne and Woolcock (2007:4) put it: “economic diplomacy […] is sensitive to market developments [… and] 
will not succeed if the market offers a more attractive alternative”. 
36 For instance, foreign policy issues help explaining the paucity of FTAs by Taiwan or the lack of a China-Japan FTA, despite the strong 
and explicit interest of Japanese firms in surveys for the latter. 
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liberalization do not evade negotiation teams as if FTAs were signed mostly for foreign 
policy considerations, discussions will not drag on for years, as it is most often the case.  
Research for this Thesis found that initiatives for some early FTAs in Thailand and 
Malaysia may have indeed originated in the context of intergovernmental summits and 
involved only limited formal consultations with organized business. However, eventually, 
negotiations on FTA proposals that lacked clear economic rationale and business support— 
even if only narrowly sectoral—died in early round talks or dragged on for years (Essay 1). 
Beyond finding evidence for the economic rationale of Thai and Malaysian bilateral FTAs 
(see below and Essays 2 and 3), this dissertation also attempted to provide an analytical 
framework that helps explaining why developing governments enter bilateral FTAs as well 
as other key questions, namely: a) whether (and why) trade officials engage businesses in 
consultations during bilateral FTA negotiations (Essay 1), b) whether (and how) FTAs offer 
developing states options, not available at other trade fora, to achieve their economic 
objectives and strategies (Essay 3), and c) whether (and how) the FTAs that a country has 
signed in the past impinge on its negotiation preferences and strategies in subsequent FTAs 
(Essay 4). Some general hypotheses to address these three questions are outlined below and 
further developed in the corresponding Essays.  
Contrary to FTAs anchored around the United States or the European Union, FTAs 
in most East Asian countries do not respond to set templates and displayed significant 
variance (Solis et al., 2009; Dent, 2010). Even a cursory look at the legal texts of bilateral 
FTAs reveals great level of specification with long lists of tariff schedules and ROOs, 
suggesting that highly sectoral motivations have been at play beyond the generic utility 
function of politicians to improve overall terms of trade, let alone simply nurturing 
diplomatic relations.  
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This Thesis will argue that, even if/when FTAs emerged primarily from the 
initiative of governments, in an increasingly democratic East Asia, trade officials need to 
engage the private sector in FTA formulation, not only to secure its support to government 
trade policies or to heed its preferences, but also because of factors intrinsic to bilateral 
FTAs. Essay 1 will contend that, compared to unilateral or multilateral liberalization (or 
even regional FTAs), bilateral FTAs involve, inter alia, wider issue coverage and greater 
technical complexity. These features pose greater sectoral and technical information 
demands on trade officials, particularly those in developing countries, that should 
encourage them to engage in more frequent and intense consultations with other 
government agencies and business associations with sectoral technical expertise. As 
countries negotiate more FTAs, sometimes simultaneously, trade officials should find 
incentives to invest in building their own technical capabilities and institutionalizing 
consultations with the private sector. Essay 1 provides empirical evidence supporting these 
arguments and shows that successive FTA negotiations compelled Thai and Malaysian 
officials to intensify consultations with businesses to fill gaps in sectoral and technical 
expertise and led to the creation of institutional arrangements to reduce transactions costs in 
FTA consultations and negotiations.  
 
Background 1: Dominant narratives on East Asian regionalism argue that 
prevalence of strong states and insulated bureaucracies have resulted in FTAs 
being top-down formulated without significant involvement of the private 
sector. In turn, it will be argued in this Thesis that, compared to other forms of 
trade negotiation, bilateral FTAs involve wider issue coverage and greater 
technical complexity that pose greater information demands on trade officials.  
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Question 1: How do trade officials access sectoral information to negotiate 
bilateral FTAs? Has the engagement (or lack of) of the private sector during 
FTA formulation evolved over time? 
General Hypothesis 1: In bilateral FTAs, trade officials are compelled to 
intensify their consultations with the private sector not only to secure their 
support but also to solve sectoral and technical information gaps. Over time, 
as governments negotiate more FTAs, institutions would be created to reduce 
transaction costs in FTA consultations and negotiations. 
 
Any form of trade liberalization necessarily has distributional economic effects 
among nations. If the weaker position of developing countries at multilateral rounds has led 
to concessions in their economic sovereignty (Gallagher, 2008), the asymmetry is 
heightened in North-South bilateral FTAs where they often surrender significant policy 
space still available under WTO (Shadlen, 2005; Pekkanen et al., 2008).37 This begs the 
recurrent question on the economic reasons that prompt developing countries to seek 
bilateral FTAs with industrialized economies. The query is especially puzzling in the case 
of East Asia where, to different degrees, states have actively used their policy space to 
advance developmental goals. Following the Asian crisis, regional economies embarked in 
economic reforms that prioritized liberal markets over sectorally targeted state-driven 
policies. Independently of whether or not the developmental state model still exist or is 
longer viable (Park, 2006; Stubbs, 2009; Hayashi, 2010), the transformation undergone by 
states and firms in East Asia over the last two decades has reduced the capacity of the 
former to steer industrialization while integration of national and foreign firms into regional 
production networks has increased their autonomy vis-à-vis the state (Yeung, 2013). 
                                 
37 Although none of the FTAs implemented by Thailand and Malaysia up to date involves important concessions beyond trade and 
services, aborted bilateral FTA negotiations by both countries with the United States (or ongoing ones with the European Union or the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership grouping) could have entailed significant regulatory concessions.  
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A large body of scholarly works has explored the economic rationale behind the 
move by many developing nations to seek FTAs with developed countries. They may look 
for the Vinerian returns of larger markets and improved terms-of-trade or for non-
traditional gains such as signaling commitment to liberal markets to attract investment 
(Ethier, 1998; Fernandez and Portes, 1998). Developing countries may also enter FTAs 
even when these are not their preferred trade liberalization option as part of “domino 
effect” or “fear of exclusion” dynamics: as other nations form an FTA, the cost of non-
participation for outsiders with similar comparative advantage rises, changing their utility 
function, and prompting them to enter the bloc or create a new one (Baldwin 1995; 
Shadlen, 2008; Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012).  
These generic motivations inform about economic grounds for developing countries 
in bilateral FTAs but leave out the question of whether and how they fit with the economic 
preferences and strategies of these countries. East Asian countries have pursued their trade 
preferences through multilateralism, unilateral liberalization, open regionalism and, more 
recently, FTAs, each offering different opportunities and limitations. Essay 3 will submit 
that the nature of FTAs and the legal basis that support them present developing countries 
with options, not available through other liberalization paths, to pursue their national 
economic interests, not only with respect to other states but also in relation to multinational 
lead firms organizing production networks.  
First, bilateral FTAs provide governments with flexibility in regard to the choice of 
partner, sectoral coverage and sequencing of liberalization not available under multilateral 
rounds. Unilateral liberalization in ASEAN has had only limited impact on tariff peaks still 
existing around sensitive sectors. Essay 3 will argue that, facing increasing concentration of 
sectoral interests and uncertainty about the impacts of multilateral liberalization, 
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developing states, like firms (see below), should favor bilateral FTA liberalization because 
of the flexibility offered by FTAs.38 
Second, for developing countries, integration of local suppliers into knowledge-
intensive and high value-added segments of production networks offer possibilities for 
technological transfer and spillovers to the rest of the economy. As FDI does not 
necessarily generate backward linkages from multinational lead firms to local suppliers, 
developing countries introduced localization and technology transfer requirements. 
Although the former are not longer allowed under WTO, Essay 3 will posit that FTAs 
could be designed to promote local procurement in ways resembling WTO-illegal local 
content requirements. 
Lastly, while technology transfer requirements and horizontal subsidies for research 
and development are still permitted under WTO, they are difficult to enforce and monitor, 
particularly by developing country governments. It will be contended here that FTAs offer 
opportunities—not available at other trade fora—to target sector-specific assistance. A 
common feature in many North-South bilateral FTAs, including Japanese FTAs with 
ASEAN, is the inclusion of cooperation provisions that go beyond government-to-
government capacity building in trade-related issues and target funds and capacity building 
to specific sectors. Essay 3 will argue that if so designed by a motivated developing 
government, cooperation chapters in North-South bilateral FTAs could amount to sector- 
(even firm-) specific subsidies. 
Empirical data obtained in this project show that the Thai and Malaysian 
governments were well aware of these options in bilateral FTAs. Both countries facilitated 
or restricted the operations of sectors and firms through selective liberalization or exclusion 
as well as fostering procurement and technical linkages with local suppliers.  In some 
                                 
38 In addition to the single-undertaking approach in WTO negotiations (items in a negotiation package cannot be agreed separately), the 
ongoing Doha Round proposes reducing high tariffs more rapidly than lower ones (Gallagher, 2008), while bilateral FTAs allow tariff 
peaks to be reduced gradually or excluded altogether. 
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instances, the Thai and Malaysian governments have later identified these options as 
explicit policy goals. Obviously, this is not to say that the above arguments are driving 
developing countries into North-South bilateral FTAs. But, as bilateral FTAs narrow (or 
close) some developmental options still available under WTO, they could potentially open 
others and, in an increasingly rule-based regime, developing countries may want to set 
precedent in FTAs for future WTO negotiations.39 
 
Background 2: The WTO has limited some of the developmental options 
previously available to developing countries, whose policy space has been 
further restricted in their bilateral FTAs with developed economies. 
Globalization has also decreased the capacity of states to steer 
industrialization and their leverage over multinational lead firms organizing 
production networks.  
Question 2: Do (and how) bilateral FTAs fit with the economic interests and 
strategies of developing countries? Do FTAs offer developing countries 
alternative options to achieve their economic preferences?  
General Hypothesis 2: Bilateral FTAs offer developing countries 
opportunities, not available under the multilateral regime, to pursue their 
economic objectives not only with respect to other states but also in relation to 
lead firms. FTAs offer states opportunities to selectively protect sensitive 
sectors and promote the integration and upgrading of the local supply base 
into international production networks. 
 
                                 
39 Confronted with overlapping institutions, countries engage in strategic forum-shopping to resolve trade disputes (Busch, 2007). In 
regard to trade liberalization, developed countries must balance the trade-off between their maximization of economic gains (higher at the 
WTO) and their capacity to control the agenda (higher in FTAs) (Pekkanen et al., 2007). Shadlen (2004) presented a similar argument 
regarding intellectual property rights where developing nations may be willing to sacrifice policy space in exchange for the predictability 
afforded by WTO agreements. 
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As discussed earlier, the formation of an FTA spurs the creation of new ones by 
those outside the trade bloc as part of the domino effect logic. FTAs also affect multilateral 
liberalization although the net impact remains an unresolved debate between those scholars 
that see them as obstacles for multilateral liberalization (e.g., Levy, 1997; Panagariya, 
2000; Limão, 2006) and those that consider FTAs as stepping-stones toward it (e.g., 
Ornelas, 2005b; Ornelas, 2005c; Ornelas, 2008; Calvo-Pardo et al., 2011). But what is the 
impact of the FTAs that a country has signed on its own negotiation options in subsequent 
FTAs? Essay 4 will argue that the interaction between and among the FTAs that a country 
has signed in the past and the FDI sunk in those FTA areas could restrict its bargaining 
options and alter its preferences in future FTAs.  
When a government is protecting a sensitive sector, the FDI sunk into that sector in 
the territory of partners from previous FTAs opens the sector in the first country to direct 
competition from third countries and could preempt the protectionist position of its 
government when it negotiates FTAs with the FDI source countries. Put simply, once a 
country A has liberalized a sector as part of an FTA with country B, FDI into country B 
could facilitate the opening of the sector in country A’s future FTAs, thus acting as a 
stepping stone for further FTA liberalization.  
Preferential tariffs granted in an FTA could be eroded (or even lost) if the partner 
later offers similar (or better) FTA concessions to a third country (Ethier, 2001). To avoid 
preference erosion some FTAs incorporate a MFN clause deterring the FTA partner from 
granting better access to third countries. Countries may also refuse to liberalize a sensitive 
sector, independently of the competitiveness of the FTA partner, in order to avoid creating 
a precedent for future FTAs and to prevent the preempting effect of FDI mentioned earlier. 
In that way, the shadow of existing and future FTAs could act as a stumbling block for 
further FTA liberalization.  
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Empirical evidence in Essay 4 confirmed these arguments and supports the 
contingent nature of the impact of FTAs on subsequent FTA liberalization.40 Thailand 
resisted liberalization of the automotive sector in its FTA with Japan, not only to protect 
existing investment but also to prevent similar demands from other automotive-producing 
countries also negotiating FTAs with Thailand at the time. In turn, Malaysia’s attempt to 
protect its national automotive industry from Japanese imports in its FTA with Japan was 
preempted by the previous existence of AFTA and the FDI sunk by Japanese firms in other 
AFTA members.  
 
Background 3: Creation of an FTA could prompt countries outside to form a 
new FTA. However, controversy remains on how FTAs affect the stand of 
countries inside and outside FTA blocs toward multilateral liberalization.  
Question 3: In the context of increasingly overlapping FTAs, how the FTAs 
that a country has signed affect its own preferences in future FTAs? 
General Hypothesis 3: When a country has liberalized a sector in an FTA, 
the investment made into that sector in the FTA partner by other countries 
could preempt the first country from protecting the sector in future FTAs. In 
turn, a government could refuse to liberalize a sensitive sector in an FTA, 
even to non-competitive partners, in order to prevent extending similar 
preferences to other countries by either creating a precedent or through the 
effect of investment by third countries. 
 
                                 
40 Since FTA liberalization has been argued to trigger a reduction in external MFN tariffs (Ornelas, 2005a), enhanced or reduced 
liberalization in subsequent FTAs could eventually impact on multilateral liberalization (see Essay 4). 
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4.2. Private sector and FTAs  
As other areas of policymaking, trade policy is a function of the preferences of actors with 
interest on its outcomes and the institutional setting that determines how preferences are 
aggregated and which actors are favored. A large body of literature in endogenous trade 
theory has modeled trade policy as a competitive political process between the interests of 
firms and those of the government (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995). Numerous scholars have questioned the applicability of these theoretical 
models of economic policymaking to “East Asia’s authoritarian and quasi-democratic 
polities” that formulate FTAs with little engagement or “resistance” by the private sector 
(Ravenhill, 2010:187-191 and references therein). Nevertheless, while East Asian states 
have certainly been less concerned for the median voter, business associations in East Asia 
are less developed and autonomous and their lobbying may take different forms that in 
Western policymaking, in an increasingly democratic East Asia and in the context of 
globalization, business groups cannot longer be sidelined from policymaking, as the crucial 
test case of China testifies (Kennedy, 2008; see also Essay 1). 
The preferences of firms regarding protection or liberalization in FTAs are 
determined not only by variables internal to firms and the market where they operate but 
also by the actions of the host government and the institutional context.  The institutional 
setting shapes businesses options for collection action (Schneider, 2002) or their access to 
policymaking (Thacker, 2000) but, by determining which options are available, it could 
also influence firm’s interests and preferences themselves and their specification into 
specific policy strategies (Crystal, 2003; Woll, 2008). Limited or no involvement of 
business groups in the formulation of East Asian FTAs has been attributed not only to their 
low engagement by host governments but also to private sector’ own apathy toward 
regionalism (Sally, 2006; Dieter, 2007; Sally, 2007; Hoadley, 2008; Terada, 2009; 
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Ravenhill, 2010). In contrast, the key influence of businesses on FTA policy has been 
empirically documented at great extent in other regions (Avery, 1998; Mayer, 1998; 
Woolcock, 2005). In East Asia, only in Japan has the private sector participated in FTA 
formulation, in some cases proactively, and affected government’s position on regionalism 
(Solis, 2003; Manger, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 2005). However, evidence from a not so distant 
past indicates that the private sector was also instrumental in the decision of other East 
Asian governments to proceed with unilateral and multilateral liberalization. Demands by 
Japanese and Western firms on ASEAN governments were central in the liberalization of 
trade in parts and components during the 1980s and 1990s (Yoshimatsu, 1999; Yoshimatsu, 
2002), and in the elimination of tariffs in the electronics industry in ASEAN (and the rest of 
East Asia) during the 1990s (Baldwin, 2008).  
Considering the economic impacts potentially entailed in any form of trade 
liberalization, this Thesis was originally set to understand the puzzle of why businesses in 
East Asian countries other than Japan had purportedly not mobilized around recent bilateral 
FTAs and/or utilized their preferences once implemented.  
Finding evidence of lobbying by a given sector for specific policy choices in an 
FTA does not necessarily mean that these get translated into the final FTA text, and vice 
versa, concessions (or the lack of them) in an FTA do not imply that ex-ante lobbying 
pressures to that effect had existed. Ex-ante preferences by a firm could be modulated (or 
cancelled out) by the opposing preferences of other actors as well as by cross-sectoral 
concessions. The final text of an FTA is the result of domestic and international bargaining 
that include, à la Putnam (1988), not only the interests of firms but also of negotiation 
teams, bureaucrats and politicians.41 In this Thesis, private sector’s preferences regarding 
                                 
41 As actors’ preferences are not directly observable, scholars have to deduce or induce them, each approach fraught with its own 
dilemmas. In regard to economic issues, preferences are frequently deduced from existing theories. However, although firms’ underlying 
preferences could be derived from their goal of profit maximization (Frieden, 1999:62), these do not inform us about their specific policy 
preferences (Crystal 2003:408). Deriving preferences from actors’ behavior risk conflating preferences with the strategic response to 
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FTAs and evidence of its lobbying pressure and success in affecting FTA policy have been 
assessed and cross-validated through semi-structured in-depth interviews (Essays 1 and 3). 
This information has been later confronted with concessions in FTA texts and highly 
disaggregated data on FTA utilization (Essay 2). 
In contrast to dominant renderings in the literature, this project yielded empirical 
evidence that business groups in Thailand and Malaysia have indeed participated in the 
formulation of FTAs and subsequently utilized them to a larger extent than firm surveys 
seemed to indicate. In fact, for some trade partners, the private sector took the lead and 
pushed governments for establishing an FTA. While these findings contribute to correct 
common narratives of East Asian regionalism, they would be hardly surprising to students 
of trade policymaking and regionalism elsewhere or suffice to justify this research project. 
Thus, like for states, this Thesis also aimed at developing a framework to help 
understanding why firms support or resist bilateral FTA liberalization by addressing the 
following subsidiary questions: a) whether (and how) bilateral FTAs generate incentives for 
business collective action and lobbying that are different from those in other forms of 
liberalization (Essay 1), b) which specific business sectors (and why those) have made 
higher use of FTA preferences (Essay 2), and c) why firms seek particular bilateral FTA 
configurations and how FTAs fit with their interests and strategies (Essay 3). Addressing 
these three questions requires to problematize the interaction between regionalization and 
regionalism by accounting for current organizational structures in East Asian 
manufacturing, and disaggregate the interests of firms within the value chain. To address 
                                                                                                  
environment (Frieden, 1999:60). Thus, although deriving firms’ policy choices in FTAs from final outcomes in FTA treaties is a common 
methodology in the study of trade preferences (e.g., Chase, 2003; Chase, 2005; Milner and Kubota, 2005), caution should be exercised 
when the strategic environment (e.g., domestic institutions, inter-governmental bargaining) varies across industries. In turn, in regard to 
inducing firms’ preferences from interviews, Crystal (2003:412) warns that “lobbying groups have myriad incentives to misrepresent 
their true preferences”. Indeed, in some interviews for this Thesis, key business sectors and firms have downplayed their otherwise 
proved influence over government policies, while others boasted about their leverage. Thus, conclusions presented here involved a 
thorough cross-validation of all information through in-depth interviews with a large number and a wide range of actors. 
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these questions, some general hypotheses have been generated and are briefly introduced 
below before they are explored at length in the corresponding Essays.  
The vast literature on the political economy of trade has emphasized the role of 
factor endowments (capital versus labor) and industry (import-competing versus exporting 
industries) cleavages as key determinants of trade liberalization preferences among non-
state actors (Rogowski, 1989; Hiscox, 2001). Multilateral liberalization maximizes the 
possibilities of exporters to expand markets and scales. However, firms with unexploited 
economies of scale and that have fragmented and relocated their production regionally 
could actually favor FTAs over multilateral liberalization, precisely because FTA’s 
discriminatory effects over firms outside the bloc (Milner, 1997; Chase, 2004).  
Essay 1 will argue for the existence of specific features in bilateral FTAs that should 
generate greater interest within the private sector to affect their formulation than do other 
forms of liberalization. Business groups are more likely to mobilize, in favor or against, 
around reforms with clear and immediate impacts (Schneider, 2010). While unilateral and 
multilateral liberalization have unambiguous negative impacts for import-competing 
sectors, gains for exporters are uncertain. Instead, bilateral FTAs allow for a clearer 
assessment of impacts and greater access to policymakers and should increase incentives 
for business lobbying by both winners and losers.42  
 As it was argued for government agencies, bilateral FTAs pose higher information 
demands on the private sector than other forms of liberalization. Trade officials are more 
likely to consult with business associations if the latter are able to intermediate unified 
positions among their members and assist them with technical information needed at 
                                 
42 In contrast to unilateral and multilateral liberalization, bilateral FTAs offer exporters explicit gains and, therefore, incentives to lobby. 
Import-competing sectors would also be expected to pressure host governments to exploit ambiguities and flexibilities in FTAs to 
accommodate long tariff phase out or outright exclusions.  
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negotiations, thus creating incentives for business associations to invest in their institutional 
and technical capacities (Essay 1).  
 
Background 4: Most academic works indicate that, outside Japan, the private 
sector in East Asia has neither been involved nor interested in FTA 
formulation. In contrast, evidence indicates that, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
business groups successfully lobbied countries in the region for unilateral and 
multilateral liberalization. 
Question 4: Does bilateral FTA liberalization generate different lobbying 
incentives for business than unilateral and multilateral liberalization? 
General Hypothesis 4: Compared to unilateral and multilateral 
liberalization, more explicit impacts in bilateral FTAs should elicit stronger 
incentives for business lobbying. Greater coordination and information 
demands on the private sector during the formulation of bilateral FTAs should 
encourage businesses to organize and invest in their institutional and 
technical capacities. 
 
Low engagement of the private sector in FTA formulation has been compounded, 
according to most accounts, by little interest on the part of firms to utilize FTAs once 
implemented. By the standards of FTAs elsewhere, utilization of East Asian FTAs is 
reported to be very low (Ravenhill, 2010). Only 5% of the trade within ASEAN is 
estimated to use AFTA preferences (Haddad, 2007) and, in a 2007 survey among Japanese 
subsidiaries in East Asia, only 13.3% of firms used or planned to use any of the then 
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existing East Asian FTAs (JETRO, 2007).43 This low FTA utilization is reasoned on two 
main grounds (Ravenhill, 2008; Ravenhill, 2010): the prevalence of low applied tariffs 
across the region, largely due to unilateral schemes (e.g., duty drawbacks), and the 
geographical asymmetry between regional production networks and mostly bilateral FTAs. 
However, as submitted earlier, unilateral liberalization has left many tariff lines unbound or 
with large binding overhangs. In addition, for firms in production networks, bilateral FTAs 
provide specific and selective benefits (see below and in Essay 3).  
Starting from the obvious proposition that FTAs are used by those benefiting the 
most from them. Essay 2 will contend that business sectors that succeeded in lobbying for 
FTA liberalization should make high use of FTA preferential tariffs. In the same line, it will 
be argued that sectors that profit from unilateral tariff reduction schemes would lobby for 
binding these privileges under an FTA and make high use of FTA preferences afterwards. 
Consequently, only highly disaggregated sectoral data on FTA utilization would inform 
about the potential relevance of FTAs for business. However, the above-mentioned studies 
rely on estimates of unspecified methodology or on firm-level surveys not weighted by 
trade values and are referred only to overall or highly aggregated utilization.44 Calculation 
of the real utilization of an FTA requires instead gathering of preferential certificates of 
origin (PCOs), administrative records certifying that traded goods comply with ROOs.  
Research for this Thesis gained access to PCO data in Thailand and Malaysia for 
trade flows under FTAs, Generalized System of Preferences (see footnote 3) and duty 
drawbacks and at a very high level of specification (close to 5,500 tariff lines per trade 
regime, trade direction, country, and year). Analysis of these official records confirmed my 
arguments. With some exceptions, overall utilization of most FTAs has been low but has 
                                 
43 Although later JETRO surveys reported increasing FTA utilization over time, data for 2008 onwards is aggregated for all Japanese 
FTAs and includes utilization of FTAs with countries outside East Asia. 
44 Some published surveys disaggregate responses on FTA utilization but for a very limited number of sectors (three in Wignaraja et al., 
2010; sixteen in JETRO, 2009).  
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hidden large sectoral variability with high utilization concentrated in sectors that lobbied 
earlier for FTA liberalization. Results also showed correlation between sectoral utilization 
of unilateral liberalization schemes in the past and subsequent sectoral utilization of FTAs, 
indicating that the latter have replaced trade previously undertaken under the former. 
 
Background 5: The low utilization of East Asian FTAs reported by estimates 
and surveys has been explained on the prevalence of low applied tariffs across 
the region. However, unilateral liberalization in East Asia has left many tariffs 
with large binding overhangs. In addition, estimates and surveys do not 
necessarily reflect real FTA utilization and overlook large sectoral variability. 
Question 5: Have FTAs created new trade opportunities? Have ex-ante 
sectoral business preferences for FTA liberalization translated into ex-post 
higher utilization of FTAs? Did FTAs bind existing unilateral tariff 
reductions? 
General Hypothesis 5: Overall FTA utilization rates could hide significant 
sectoral variability. Only highly disaggregated data of official records could 
assess the real relevance of FTAs for East Asian business. Sectors that 
succeeded in lobbying for FTA liberalization and/or benefited from unilateral 
tariff reduction schemes should make high use of FTA preferences.  
 
Central to any bilateral FTA is improving market access in the partner. Milner 
(1997) argued that industries with increasing returns-to-scale favor FTAs over multilateral 
liberalization in order to benefit from tariff reductions while displacing outside competitors. 
Other accounts have also stressed the gains offered by discriminatory FTAs for firms inside 
the FTA area but incorporated the role of FDI and production fragmentation (e.g., Ethier 
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1998; Chase 2005). In a number of insightful and influential works, Chase (2003, 2004, 
2005, 2008) found that producers characterized by unexploited economies of scale and that: 
a) have fragmented production and relocated some stages overseas and b) are involved in 
intense two-way intra-industry/firm trade, support regional blocs not only to liberalize trade 
flows but also because the possibility to discriminate against outside firms through 
preferential tariffs and ROOs. These arguments help explain why firms would favor 
regional FTAs but not necessarily bilaterals, the majority of FTAs nowadays. Manger 
(2009, 2012) uses the same arguments to explain several bilateral FTAs, including those of 
Japan with ASEAN countries. Reverse exports by Japanese subsidiaries based in Thailand 
in sectors like the automotive industry are argued to have been at the heart of its 
liberalization in the Japan-Thailand FTA while opposition by domestic carmakers 
hampered it in Malaysia (Manger, 2009; Manger, 2012). However, reverse imports from 
Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia have been traditionally low across most manufacturing 
sectors, being the lowest in the automotive industry and have, if anything, declined over 
time (Chase, 2005; Baldwin and Okubo, 2012).45 In fact, given low levels of two-way intra-
industry/firm trade between Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia and Japan and high 
dependence of East Asian exporters on extra-regional markets, Chase (2005:236,254) 
wrongly predicted that regionalism would not emerge in East Asia over the near term.46  
 Firms not simply attempt to improve their overall efficiency but they strive to gain 
comparative advantage with respect to other competing firms or sway in lead 
firms/suppliers relationships. To that effect, firms seek to acquire intrinsic resources and 
capabilities and use them more efficiently than other in order to provide a superior or 
                                 
45 Exports back to Japan of final goods assembled at Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia have been low outside optical instruments and 
precision apparatus and have been negligible in vehicles (Chase, 2005). In fact, reverse exports of automobiles to Japan have declined 
since the mid-1990s, representing in 2005 only 15% of the production of Japanese subsidiaries in the region (Baldwin and Okubo, 2012). 
In addition, as argued in Essays 3 and 4, contrary to Manger (2009, 2012), while Thailand barely opened its automotive sector to Japan, 
Malaysia fully liberalized it. Manger’s (2009) argument still holds well for services where FTA liberalization could provide a first-mover 
advantage that is followed by defensive FTAs by other countries (see also Montout and Zitouna, 2005 for a similar proposition). 
46 One has to assume that the original draft of Chase’s (2005) was written before the rapid proliferation of FTAs in East Asia since 2001. 
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unique good or service at a given price. But firms also attempt to enhance their comparative 
advantage vis-à-vis other firms and states by using their internal sources of leverage to 
lobby and capture rents available through the institutional setting. Essay 3 will posit that a 
firm could favor a specific FTA to secure selective benefits not only with respect to firms 
outside the FTA—discrimination inherent to any FTA—, but also in relation to others 
already inside the bloc. Possibilities for flexibility and selectivity in GATT Article XXIV 
mean that FTAs could be designed as to generate asymmetric benefits among members 
within the bloc. It will be argued that these selective rents are not necessarily distributed 
according to the firm’s home country but rather to its procurement patterns and the 
geographical distribution of its production blocks. Liberalization of particular trade flows 
through bilateral FTAs asymmetrically benefits firms than depend to a higher degree on 
inputs from the FTA partner or that have plants in both countries.  
In turn, Essay 4 explores why a foreign firm that has relocated production in a 
developing country could paradoxically opt out from exploiting the selective benefits of an 
FTA between its home and host countries and rather accept the status quo. It will be 
contended that if that firm holds a dominant position in the host country, it could 
potentially relinquish (or soften) its demands to prevent that future FTA partners of the host 
country could get similar concessions, especially if the FTA incorporates assurances (a 
MFN clause) that no other country will ever obtain better treatment from the host.  
Essays 3 and 4 provide empirical evidence for these arguments using the automotive 
industry in Thailand and Malaysia as case study. Individual carmakers and first-tier 
suppliers in both countries pushed for bilateral FTAs that fit their unique existing patterns 
or future strategies for procurement and production. In other circumstances, when firms 
could not secure their first-best preferences in an FTA, they sought to prevent that the 
privileges they enjoy could be extended to competing firms in future FTAs.  
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Background 6: A number of works have shown that firms with unexploited 
economies of scale and that have fragmented production may favor regional 
FTAs over multilateral liberalization as to liberalize two-way trade while 
discriminating against outside firms. But these arguments could not account 
for the development of bilateral FTAs in East Asia. 
General Question 6: Why firms seek specific bilateral FTAs? How bilateral 
FTAs fit with the interests and strategies of firms that operate in regional 
production networks?  
General Hypothesis 6: FTAs could be designed to generate asymmetric rents 
that are distributed among firms within an FTA area based on their specific 
procurement patterns and location of production blocks. 
 
The above questions and hypotheses are explored and tested in the following four 
Essays. Essay 1 examines the political economy of Thai and Malaysian FTAs over time. 
Essay 2 analyzes the utilization of selected Thai and Malaysian FTAs in the context of 
unilateral liberalization schemes. Essay 3 studies how firms and states seek particular 
configurations in bilateral FTAs that suit their specific preferences and strategies and 
discriminate not only against firms and states outside the FTA area but also inside. Finally, 
Essay 4 explores how interplays between and among existing investments and previous 
FTAs shape the preferences and strategies of governments and firms regarding future 
FTAs.  
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Essay 1 — Formulation of East Asian Free Trade 
Agreements: Top-down, bottom-up and across  
      Borders 
 
         Government-Private Sector Consultations and Business Lobbying in the    
                  Policymaking of Thai and Malaysian Bilateral Free Trade Agreements 48 
 
 
Abstract  
 
During the last decade, East Asia has become one of the most active sites of regionalism worldwide with 
close to 60 free trade agreements (FTAs) implemented, mostly as bilaterals. With the exception of Japan, the 
extant literature presents East Asian FTAs as driven primarily by political and security motivations and 
emerged from the political leadership with marginal involvement of the private sector. Instead, this Essay 
contends that, compared to multilateral trade rounds, bilateral FTA negotiations entail greater sectoral and 
technical information demands on government officials that should encourage consultations with business 
associations. At the same time, clearer identification of impacts and greater chance to affect policymaking in 
bilateral FTAs should generate stronger incentives for businesses to lobby governments for their preferences. 
Trade officials are more likely to heed business associations that intermediate unified positions among 
members and assist them with technical information needed at negotiations. Lastly, the coordination and 
technical information demands engendered by successive bilateral FTAs should prompt government agencies 
and organized business to invest in their capacities, spurring institutional change and creation.  To test these 
hypotheses, the policymaking of Thai and Malaysian bilateral FTAs was examined. It was found that, over 
time, government officials in both countries have intensified consultations with the private sector, not just to 
attend to their trade preferences but also to gather complex technical information needed for negotiations. 
FTAs have stimulated domestic and cross-border collective action and lobbying by the private sector that has 
become more pro-active, and, for some key partners, it has taken the initiative and pressed governments to 
establish certain FTAs. Iterative FTA negotiations have not only strengthened the technical and institutional 
capacities of government agencies and business associations but has also led to the emergence of new 
institutional structures for inter-agency coordination, private sector collective action and government-business 
intermediation.  
 
                                 
48 Essay 1 was originally written in March 2010. Tables 1 through 3 were updated in August 2013 to 
reflect recent developments. In addition to its critical evaluation by Professor K. Shadlen, this Essay 
was reviewed by Professor J. Ravenhill (Australian National University, Canberra, Australia) in 
February 17, 2011 and Professor M. Solis (American University, Washington D.C., USA) in 
February 2, 2011.  
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Abbreviations:  
 
AFTA: ASEAN FTA 
APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian nations 
FTA: Free trade agreement 
FMM: Federation of Malaysian manufacturers 
FTI: Federation of trade industries 
JSCCIB: Joint Standing Committee of commerce, industry and banking  
JTEPA: Japan-Thailand economic partnership Agreement  
JTF: Japan Textile Federation  
MEUFTA: Malaysia-European Union FTA 
MFN: most-favored nation 
MITI: Ministry of International Trade and Industry [of Malaysia] 
MJEPA: Malaysia-Japan economic partnership Agreement 
MOC: Ministry of Commerce [of Thailand] 
MOI: Ministry of Industry [of Thailand] 
MTMA: Malaysian textile manufacturers Association 
MUSFTA: Malaysia-United States FTA 
NGO: non-governmental organization 
PCO: Preferential certificate of origin 
ROO: Rules of origin 
TAFTA: Thailand-Australia FTA 
TCC: Thai chamber of commerce 
TFFA: Thai frozen food Association 
TFPA: Thai food processors’ Association 
TGMA: Thai garments manufacturers Association 
TPP: Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
TTMA: Thai textile manufacturers Association 
TUSFTA: Thailand-United States FTA 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
 
 
   2. Essay 1  
 55 
1. Introduction 
The proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia since the turn of the century 
constitutes one of the most significant developments in the region’s political economy 
during the last decade. Except for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
trade bloc, East Asia initially eschewed the global wave of FTAs that began in the mid-
1990s. However, nowhere else has regionalism exploded so rapidly with close to 60 FTAs, 
mostly bilaterals, implemented since 2001.  
Prevailing analyses of East Asian FTAs have downplayed their economic relevance 
and emphasized foreign relations and/or security motivations as their main thrust and 
rationale (e.g., Desker, 2004; Aggarwal and Urata, 2006; Dent, 2006; Dieter, 2007; 
Aggarwal and Koo, 2008a; Ravenhill, 2008a; Ravenhill, 2010; Aggarwal and Govella, 
2013; Lee, 2013).49 From a political economy perspective, and with the exception of Japan 
(see below), these narratives have portrayed FTAs in East Asia as driven by shared ideas 
and identities among political elites in the context of strong states, with interest groups 
being sidelined and “play[ing] a relatively minor role in the politics of new bilateralism” 
(Aggarwal and Koo, 2006:295; Lee 2006; Sally, 2006; Terada, 2009; Lee and Hooi, 2011). 
At the same time, and in line with low tariffs covering most intra-regional trade, surveys 
indicate little interest among East Asian firms to utilize existing FTAs (Ravenhill, 2010; 
Kawai and Wignaraja, 2009; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011a).  
 Of note, although often overlooked in the literature, the initiative for some FTAs in 
Latin America is reported to have originated from governments that engaged business 
associations only at the implementation stage as to enroll their political support for the 
agreement (Schneider, 2004; Gardini, 2006; Fairbrother, 2007).50  
                                 
49 The primacy of security motivations in the FTA policy of the United States has also been the subject of intense debate (e.g., see 
Higgott, 2004 versus Phillips, 2007). 
50 For instance, the integration accord between Brazil and Argentina that preceded Mercosur or Mexico’s decision to seek an FTA with 
the United States were driven by their respective government elites without prior business consultation. Business in these countries 
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 It will be contended here that many of these constructivism and security-based 
interpretations of East Asian FTAs have essentialized the role of autonomous states and 
politicians’ ideas at the cost of a deeper analysis of private sector preferences. Instead, this 
Essay will argue that, compared to other forms of liberalization, a number of specific 
features in bilateral FTAs should foster government-private sector consultations and 
increase incentives for business lobbying.  
Formulation of bilateral FTAs imposes greater sectoral and technical information 
demands on government agencies and business associations than do multilateral rounds, 
and therefore necessitates of more intense consultations within and between both actors. At 
the same time, compared to unilateral and multilateral liberalization, bilateral FTAs allow 
for clearer identification of impacts, thus increasing incentives for interest groups to 
influence policymaking, and create favourable conditions for government-business 
consultation and lobbying across borders. Government officials are more likely to consult 
and heed the preferences of business associations that intermediate unified positions among 
their members and that assist them with technical information needed during bilateral FTA 
negotiations. These coordination and information demands placed on government and 
organized business during the course of successive FTAs should encourage all actors to 
invest in developing their capabilities, spurring institutional change and creation. 
To test these hypotheses, I conducted an extensive process-tracing analysis of the 
bilateral FTAs negotiated by Thailand and Malaysia, the two developing countries in East 
Asia that have implemented more FTAs.51 Thailand was one of the first and originally more 
prolific East Asian nations seeking FTAs, while Malaysia, initially reluctant to embark into 
                                                                                                  
initially reacted with indifference to the government proposal for market integration (Schneider, 2004, Gardini, 2006; Fairbrother 2007). 
This parallelism in the policymaking of East Asian and Latin American FTAs was also recently noticed by Solis (2013:93). 
51 Primary research for this Thesis involved 212 in-depth semi-structured interviews with government officials, private sector and civil 
society representatives and academics in Thailand and Malaysia during two independent trips in 2008 and 2009 complemented and 
updated by numerous personal communications during 2010-2012 (see Appendix at the end of this dissertation). Among government 
officials, interviews were conducted with members of trade negotiation teams and officials at ministries and technical supporting 
agencies relevant to the study. Within the private sector, interviewees included peak and sectoral business associations as well as 
individual firms, both domestic and foreign, across a wide range of sectors and levels within the value chain.  
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bilateral FTAs, has later implemented a number of agreements. Empirical evidence 
confirmed my initial arguments revealing a more nuanced picture of the roles played by 
government and private sector in the formulation of East Asian FTAs than the one depicted 
in most of the extant literature. Despite different institutional and policymaking settings in 
Thailand and Malaysia, findings and conclusions in these case studies substantiate each 
other and, for the most part, evolution of FTA policymaking in both countries has followed 
a similar pattern.  
Although many Thai and Malaysian FTAs, especially earlier ones, may have 
responded to government initiatives, their economic rationale, even if only narrowly 
sectoral, has been essential because whenever this was missing, negotiations eventually 
faltered. Over time both governments intensified their consultations with the private sector 
during the formulation of FTAs, not just to attend to its preferences but also to access 
technical information needed at negotiations. In turn, organized business and individual 
firms have progressively taken greater interest in influencing FTA policymaking—whether 
in favor or against and to secure gains or reduce losses—to the point that, for some key 
partners, it was the private sector that took the initiative and pressed governments to launch 
FTA negotiations. As business associations in Thailand and Malaysia grew stronger during 
the 1980s and 1990s, formalized mechanisms were introduced to channel private sector 
inputs into policymaking (Laothamatas, 1992; Laothamatas, 1995). This research found 
that bilateral FTAs created new configurations of business collective action and lobbying. 
More intense interactions between and among government agencies and business 
associations in the context of FTA formulation have contributed to better specification of 
actors’ preferences, strengthened their technical capacities and institutionalized the 
consultative process.  
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The rest of the Essay is organized as follows. Next section briefly outlines the 
current literature on East Asian FTA policymaking and develops the hypotheses. Sections 
three and four present empirical evidence of the evolution of FTA formulation in Thailand 
and Malaysia. Section five discusses findings and concludes. 
 
2. Specific dynamics in government-business relations in the context of bilateral FTAs  
Worldwide expansion of FTAs has been attributed, inter alia, to a number of systemic-level 
factors, such as the slow progress of multilateral talks at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), or the need for countries to attract foreign investment (e.g., Fernandez and Portes, 
1998; Ravenhill, 2003).52 FTAs have also proliferated on the so-called “domino” or “fear of 
exclusion” effects—the trade diversion engendered by an FTA prompts outside firms to 
lobby their governments to enter the FTA or create a new one (Baldwin, 1995; Shadlen, 
2008). 
The lack until recently of institutional arrangements regulating reciprocal trade 
relations in East Asia was not an obstacle for countries in the region to achieve significant 
economic integration through the development, since the mid-1990s, of sophisticated 
regional production networks.53 Thus, when East Asian countries began to enter into FTAs 
from 2001 onwards, most scholarly analyses dismissed the economic dimensions of these 
FTAs and emphasized their foreign policy and security motivations (e.g., Desker, 2004; 
Aggarwal and Urata, 2006; Hoadley, 2007a; Aggarwal and Koo, 2008b; Ravenhill, 2008a; 
Ravenhill, 2009; Aggarwal and Lee, 2010; Ravenhill, 2010; Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; 
Lee, 2013).54 The “explosion [of FTAs in East Asia] has been driven by a ‘political domino 
                                 
52 In turn, WTO multilateral liberalization rounds prompts countries to form FTAs (Freund, 2000; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003). 
53 The ASEAN FTA (AFTA), the only FTA in East Asia before the turn of the century, was signed in 1992 but implementation was poor 
and initially allowed exclusion of long lists of sensitive sectors (Yoshimatsu, 2006; Ravenhill, 2008b). Only in 2003 were intra-ASEAN 
tariffs capped at 5% (see below in Section 3).  
54 In Dent (2006), “strengthening diplomatic relations” or “consolidating security alliances” ranked the highest among the motivations 
for entering FTAs in all five East Asian countries studied except for Japan. By enhancing economic ties among like-minded partners, 
FTAs set “the context for regional security institution building rather than the other way around” (Aggarwal and Koo, 2008b:302-303). 
External shocks like the end of the Cold War, the 1997 Asian crisis, September 11 or the Japan/China rivalry for regional hegemony have 
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effect’”, by “governments unhappy at the prospect of missing out on new diplomatic 
opportunities” (Ravenhill, 2010:199,200).  
From a political economy perspective, and in line with the reported lack of 
economic rationale of East Asian FTAs, dominant narratives of East Asian regionalism 
outside Japan have downplayed the importance of business lobbying in FTA formation. In 
Putnam’s (1988) classic two-level game—establishing that a government’s position in 
international negotiations is determined by the interplay between the stance of the 
counterpart government (level I) and its strategic interaction with interest groups at home 
(level II)—, interactions at level II in East Asian FTAs have been limited or missing. FTAs 
in East Asia are portrayed as top-down deals, driven primarily by the constructivism forces 
of shared ideas and identities among political elites and with little involvement or interest 
on the part of business (e.g., Calder and Ye, 2004; Aggarwal and Urata, 2006; Aggarwal 
and Lee, 2010).55  
The minor role accorded to interest groups in the formulation of East Asian FTAs is 
interpreted as these countries’ being “strong states relatively free from societal pressures” 
(Aggarwal and Koo, 2006:292,295). Thus, South Korea’s shift toward FTAs was shaped by 
changes in the political leadership and bureaucracy rather than by economic actors (Koo, 
2006). FTA policy in Singapore is defined as technocratic and “almost entirely 
government-led and planned, [with] little concrete evidence on business pushing for or 
against FTAs” (Sally, 2006; Terada, 2009; Lee and Hooi 2011:125). The influence of 
businesses on FTA formulation in other Southeast Asian countries was characterized as 
“limited or unidentified” (Nagai, 2003; Kiyota, 2006; Sally, 2006; Hoadley, 2007a; 
                                                                                                  
provided impetus for emerging East Asian economic institutionalization (Desker, 2004; Aggarwal and Koo, 2008a; Ravenhill, 2008a; 
Ravenhill, 2010; Lee, 2013). 
55 Aggarwal and Koo’s (2006:292,295) analysis of the forces behind bilateral FTAs in seven East Asian countries found that 
“institutional setting” and “ideas” topped each country, except for China and Taiwan, while “influence of interest groups” scored among 
the lowest. Calder and Ye (2004) derive East Asia FTAs from decision-makers’ choices—autonomous from the institutional context—in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis. Embracing of FTAs by the United States and the European Union would have helped to create a 
cognitive consensus among the East Asian leadership to accept regionalism as a complementary approach to unilateral and multilateral 
liberalization in the pursue of national interests.  
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Hoadley, 2007b; Hoadley, 2008; Terada, 2009:165). As Terada summarized  (2009:165): 
“interest group politics is neither necessarily an important factor for the proliferation of 
FTAs in Southeast Asia, nor directly relevant to the FTA diffusion in the region”. This lack 
of engagement of the private sector by East Asian governments in FTA policymaking has 
been compounded by apathy of businesses toward FTAs, both during negotiations and after 
implementation. For Ravenhill (2003:303) “the supply or regionalism often exceeded the 
demand for it”. Only Japan departs from this regional trend as evidence shows that the 
private sector took an active role and pressed the government to embrace regionalism and 
launch a number of FTAs (Solis, 2003; Manger, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 
2006; Solis and Urata, 2007; Manger, 2009; Katada and Solis 2010; Solis 2010).56  
Until 2006, Thailand was second only to Singapore in East Asia in the number of 
FTAs negotiated. The extant literature presents Thai bureaucrats as lacking sufficient trade 
negotiation expertise and to have eschewed formal consultations with the private sector 
during FTA formulation (Sally, 2006; Sally, 2007). Consequently, Thai FTAs have been 
launched in a rush, with no clear economic strategy but with “foreign policy aspirations 
loom[ing] large”, and are rather “the result of tourism by Thai leaders” and closely linked 
to the personalized decision-making style of Prime Minister Thaksin (Nagai, 2003; Kiyota, 
2006; Hoadley, 2007a; Hoadley, 2007b; Sally, 2007:1606; Hoadley, 2008:111; Sally and 
Sen, 2011).57  
Malaysia has taken a more cautious approach, being initially opposed to bilateralism 
and only jumping on the bandwagon under the threat of trade diversion from other FTAs 
(Okamoto, 2006). The driving force of Malaysian FTAs has also been linked to changes in 
the political leadership, namely the stepping down of Prime Minister Mahathir, while their 
                                 
56 The leading role of Japanese businesses in Japan’s FTA policy has been downplayed by Ravenhill (2010) that considered it rather as 
reactive. 
57 The 1997 Thai Constitution centralized power in the executive and away from the bureaucracy, which lost further influence over the 
allocation of rents after the 2002 bureaucratic reform that allowed Thaksin to appoint businessmen to senior bureaucratic posts (Ockey, 
2004; Phongpaichi and Baker, 2004; Prasirtsuk, 2007; Chaiwat and Phongpaichit, 2008). See also below in footnote 69. 
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formulation is reportedly confined to the top rank bureaucracy (Okamoto, 2006; Hoadley, 
2008).58  
Of the two levels in Putnam’s model (state-state and state-society), this Essay is 
particularly interested in the latter, how domestic win-sets for FTAs were formed in each 
country. However, postulating the existence of strong states to account for low involvement 
of the private sector in FTA formulation overlooks the different ways in which East Asian 
bureaucracies, including those in Thailand and Malaysia, have traditionally engaged 
organized business in policymaking (Laothamatas, 1995; MacIntyre, 1995; Doner and 
Schneider, 2000). In that line, unilateral liberalization in East Asia during the 1980s and 
1990s, key in the emergence of production networks, was shaped by pressures from the 
private sector (Yoshimatsu, 2002; Baldwin, 2006).59 In addition, as argued below and 
compared to other forms of liberalization, bilateral FTAs offer greater incentives for 
government and business groups to increase their interactions through consultations and 
lobbying.  
2.1 Increasing government consultation with the private sector in FTAs 
It is argued here that even when FTAs emerge from the initiative of governments, trade 
officials need to engage the private sector in their formulation, not only to gather business 
support for the country’s trade policy or to heed its preferences, but also as a result of 
several features that are inherent to bilateral FTAs. As compared to unilateral or 
multilateral liberalization, bilateral FTA negotiations present government officials with 
specific challenges regarding issue coverage, technical complexity, timeframe, and 
potential bargaining asymmetries, all of which should encourage enhanced consultation 
                                 
58 In fact, it could be argued that Malaysia’s decision to launch its first and most important FTA so far, with Japan, occurred during 
Mahathir’s tenure (1991-2003) and his long-time trade minister Rafidah oversaw the negotiation and implementation of several FTAs 
until her removal from office in 2008.  
59 Lobbying by Japanese and Western firms was key for the regional liberalization of electronics and information technology products 
(Baldwin, 2006) and of parts and components, mostly in the automotive industry, within Southeast Asia (Yoshimatsu, 2002; Yoshimatsu, 
2008). 
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with the private sector. Expansion of the WTO trade regime to areas beyond tariffs led 
some scholars to distinguish classical pressure lobbying from a new form referred as 
regulatory lobbying (Woll and Artigas, 2007; Woll, 2008) In the former, firms support 
governments with some reward in return for implementing trade policies that benefit them. 
Instead, in regulatory lobbying, governments engage businesses in the formulation of 
regulatory regimes in exchange for technical information. 
 Technical complexities and information demands are even greater in most bilateral 
FTAs as even less comprehensive ones bundle tariff reduction schedules with provisions 
covering areas beyond WTO’s agenda. While East Asian FTAs with partners other than the 
United States or the European Union tend to take on fewer disciplines, most include 
provisions on investment and complex regulatory frameworks (e.g., standards recognition, 
technical cooperation) requiring that negotiation teams have appropriate technical 
expertise. Even when FTAs are exclusively (or mostly) focused on tariff liberalization, 
broader product coverage in FTAs than in multilateral rounds calls for the involvement of 
government agencies that do not normally participate in trade formulation. Also departing 
from WTO, all FTAs establish rules of origin (ROOs) that in most bilateral FTAs are 
product-specific and therefore require from trade officials a very precise understanding of 
the production process for each tariff line.60 These sectoral and technical information 
demands are compounded by the reduced timeframe of FTA negotiations as compared to 
multilateral rounds. During the negotiation of bilateral FTAs, technical gaps in government 
officials’ expertise should be more severe in disciplines outside the WTO where officials 
have less experience. Finally, in the context of bilateral negotiations, developing countries 
face capacity asymmetries when confronting well-prepared teams of American, European 
                                 
60 ROOs determine where a product originates and, consequently, whether it qualifies for preferential tariffs based on compliance with a 
minimum level of transformation within the FTA bloc. Although included in FTAs to avoid trade deflection, strict ROOs could also be 
used for protectionist purposes. ASEAN-centered FTAs adopt universal ROOs across lines but most bilateral FTAs establish product-
specific rules.  
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or Japanese officials. Altogether, it could be argued that bilateral FTAs, more so than 
multilateral rounds, should induce government officials to seek more intense and frequent 
consultations with business representatives (Figure 1).61 
 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to other forms of trade liberalization, government 
officials should be compelled to involve the private sector more frequently and 
intensely in the formulation of bilateral FTAs—especially with large 
developed partners—in order to fill gaps in their technical expertise. 
 
2.2 Greater incentives and effectiveness of business lobbying in bilateral FTAs 
In certain circumstances, firms could favor FTAs over multilateral liberalization. Firms 
with unexploited economies of scale and that have fragmented and relocated their 
production overseas would support FTAs to reduce tariff barriers in the partner country or 
to introduce investment provisions outside WTO purview while discriminating against 
firms outside the FTA area (Milner, 1997; Chase, 2005).  
Low or no involvement of the private sector by East Asian governments in FTA 
formulation has reportedly been compounded by a limited interest for FTAs on the part of 
business. Thus, earlier apathy among businesses toward ASEAN FTA (AFTA) and other 
regional initiatives such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Okamoto, 
2004; Ravenhill, 2008b; Yoshimatsu, 2008), seems to have also been mirrored in bilateral 
FTAs (Sally, 2006; Ravenhill, 2008a; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011).62 Geographical 
                                 
61 The above arguments have been recently supported by Solis (2013:95) who also contends on the importance of the technical expertise 
provided by business associations during FTA negotiations.  
62 Much of the driving force behind early ASEAN complementation programs and later of AFTA itself came from foreign firms rather 
than from indigenous businesses. The effectiveness of ASEAN-wide business organizations (ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, ASEAN Business Advisory Council) as interest groups was limited by their broad representation and modus operandi based on 
consensual decisions, when not by their cooptation by governments. This led former ASEAN Secretary General Severino to lament in 
2002 that: “the call for regional economic integration has come particularly from the business sectors of Japan and the United States […] 
what we need is pressure from the ASEAN business community […]” (as quoted in Yoshimatsu, 2008:55). Nevertheless, our interviews 
found that some indigenous firms, like the influential Thai conglomerate Charoen Pokhand Group, has been a strong supporter of intra-
ASEAN liberalization and of many other Thai bilateral FTAs (see footnote 77). As AFTA liberalization proceeded, its preferences have 
been used not only by foreign firms but also by ASEAN indigenous ones (see Essay 2). 
   2. Essay 1  
 64 
inconsistency between regional production networks and (mostly bilaterals) FTAs, along 
with the prevalence of low tariffs and import duty exemptions schemes covering much of 
East Asian trade, have tamed down business enthusiasm for FTAs (Ravenhill, 2008a; 
Ravenhill, 2010). Such business indifference about FTAs has been correlated with, when 
not inferred from, firm-level surveys showing low utilization of existing East Asian FTAs 
(e.g., Haddad, 2007; JETRO, 2009; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2009; Wignaraja et al., 2010; 
Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011).63 
Interest groups are more likely to mobilize, for or against, around reforms with clear 
and immediate impacts than on those that are diffuse, uncertain or longer-term (Schneider, 
2010). First and foremost, unilateral and multilateral liberalization focuses the attention of 
import-competing sectors, because tariff reduction to every potential exporter in the world 
has unambiguously negative consequences for them. In contrast, in the context of global 
competition, gains for export-oriented firms from unilateral, multilateral, and even regional 
liberalization are uncertain at best, which reduces their incentive to lobby. 
It is contended here that bilateral FTAs should attract greater interest from firms 
than do other forms of liberalization. Bilateral FTAs allow for a clearer identification and 
assessment of impacts, which should increase incentives for businesses, winners and losers, 
to influence their formulation. Compared to multilateral and regional liberalization, 
bilateral FTAs generate more explicit gains for exporters while they could accommodate 
long tariff phase-out periods or even exclusions for import-competing sectors.64 
Additionally, since bilateral FTAs are negotiated over shorter periods and provide firms 
                                 
63 These estimates and surveys are prone to misrepresent real FTA utilization (see Essay 2 for discussion). Calculation of real FTA 
utilization requires compilation of official records, known as Preferential Certificates of Origin (PCOs), certifying that the exported 
product complies with ROOs. Most East Asian countries do not collect PCOs but research for this Thesis was able to obtain PCOs for 
selected FTAs and other preferential regimes in Thailand and Malaysia (see below and in Essay 2). 
64 In addition to discriminatory tariffs and ROOs, ambiguities in Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—
regulating FTAs involving at least one developed country—and flexibilities in the Enabling Clause—regulating FTAs among developing 
countries—leave room for governments to carve out from FTAs some sensitive sectors. FTAs should liberalize substantially all trade 
within a reasonable period. This has been most commonly interpreted as liberalizing at least 90% of existing trade within a maximum 
period of 10 years. In the same of line of argument, Solis (2013:96) posits that business groups are more likely to mobilize around FTAs 
that amend or avoid economic losses than with respect to FTAs that maximize gains. 
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more readily access to policymakers, the private sector has a greater chance to effectively 
affect policymaking in a bilateral context than in multilateral rounds. In sum, both exporters 
and import-competing sectors should have stronger incentives to lobby and assert their 
policy preferences in bilateral FTAs than in other forms of liberalization (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Policymaking of bilateral FTAs 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Clearer assessment of impacts and the possibility of protecting 
sensitive items in bilateral liberalization provide both exporters and import-
competing firms with stronger incentives to influence the formulation of 
bilateral FTAs than in other forms of liberalization. 
 
2.3 Bilateral FTAs provide unique opportunities for consultation, collective action and 
lobbying within and across borders 
Although clientelist channels persist, strengthening of business associations in Thailand and 
Malaysia during the 1980s introduced formal and cooperative mechanisms for government-
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business consultation and lobbying in both countries (Laothamatas, 1988; Laothamatas, 
1995; Doner and Schneider, 2000). 
A major contention of this Essay is that FTAs create different possibilities for 
business collective action and influence than unilateral or multilateral liberalization. 
Consider a firm FA from country A seeking to export a final product from its factory in A 
(FA-A) to country X, which imposes high-tariffs on the product (Figure 2). Under the 
multilateral regime, FA could pressure directly the government in X for unilateral and 
universal reduction of most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs on that product in X or could 
lobby indirectly through its own government in A. However, as argued above, in the 
context of global competition, gains to FA from unilateral or multilateral liberalization by X 
are uncertain. In addition, it would be difficult for FA to recruit other firms to take 
collective action and lobby the government of X when firms are dispersed across multiple 
countries. As per Chase (2005), independently of whether FA produces only at its factory in 
A (FA-A) or has fragmented production and relocated some stages to X (subsidiary plant FA-
X), FA would favor an FTA between A and X that reduces all tariffs in X (on both final and 
intermediate inputs coming from A) and, at the same time, discriminates against firms 
outside the A-X bloc. Arguably, a firm FB from country B would oppose any liberalization 
by X of final goods coming from A that are perfect substitutes for its own products (Figure 
2). This opposition by FB to FTA A-X would occur independently of whether FB is based 
only in B (plant FB-B) or also has production stages in X (subsidiary plant FB-X). However, 
if FB-X procures inputs from A, FB could potentially favor—and even jointly lobby with 
FA—for liberalization by X of intermediate inputs coming from A through FTA A-X.  
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Figure 2: A bilateral FTA between A and X opens distinct possibilities for collective action and lobbying 
than multilateral liberalization and which would depend on the organization of production among firms (see 
main text for details).  
 
In these scenarios, FTAs provide for different configurations of business collective 
action and influence than multilateral or unilateral liberalization. In addition to stronger 
incentives for business lobbying at each level II (Hypothesis 2), bilateral FTAs should also 
foster business collective action and lobbying between levels across borders, namely, 
between levels II of each country and between level II in one country and level I in the 
other (Figures 1 and 2).  
The possibility that both governments (level I) reach a deal increases when 
negotiators at both sides are presented with similar proposals from their respective levels II. 
Cross-border coordination of positions between businesses in A and X (e.g., input suppliers 
in A and producers of final goods in X) would therefore improve the possibility of both 
governments agreeing during negotiations. Likewise, firms with a presence in both 
countries [e.g., FA with plants in A (FA-A) and X (FA-X)] would be able to present their 
preferences from levels II in both A and X.  
Of note, joint lobbying by businesses at both levels II could occur not only in 
vertically integrated producer-driven industries but also through collective action between 
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producers and buyers in buyer-driven commodity chains—e.g., textile and garment 
producers in country X and wholesale buyers and trading companies in country A. Lastly, 
compared to unilateral and multilateral liberalization, bilateral FTAs could also encourage a 
government to consult with private sector actors in the partner country (between levels I 
and II but across borders) to find out about positions and potentially to seek alliances. 
  
Hypothesis 3: Bilateral FTAs provide unique opportunities for governments 
and business in their relations within and across borders. Bilateral FTAs 
should encourage collective action between private sectors in both countries 
(between both levels II) as well as consultation and lobbying between 
government and businesses across borders (between level I in one country 
and level II in the other).  
 
2.4 Government and business capacity building and institutional creation by iterative 
FTAs 
Regulatory lobbying depends on government officials soliciting information from private 
sector representatives (Woll and Artigas, 2007; Woll, 2008). By allowing businesses to 
participate in policymaking, governments create incentives for firms to organize, overcome 
collective action problems and invest in the institutional capacity of business associations 
(Schneider, 2004; Schneider, 2010). To get invited by the government in consultations, 
business associations have to compete in credibility as sources of knowledge to the 
government. Cohesion is required for business associations to achieve collective action in 
pressure lobbying. As illustrated by the case studies below, in regulatory lobbying only 
associations with strong technical capabilities and that contribute to the public good beyond 
particularistic interests intermediating unified positions of their members would be reliable 
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for their government.65  
 It is posited here that, as for government agencies, FTAs and particularly bilateral 
FTAs generate greater information demands on business associations than do multilateral 
negotiations. If in the context of unilateral and multilateral liberalization, import-competing 
industries simply lobby for sectoral exclusion, in FTA negotiations they need to learn about 
additional restrictive measures available to them, such as stringent ROOs or long tariff 
phase out periods. Likewise, exporters would not only lobby for tariff reductions in the 
FTA partner, but they would also need to make themselves aware of existing regulatory 
obstacles in the destination market and pressure trade officials for their removal and for the 
use of relaxed ROOs. 
 Negotiation and formulation of successive and simultaneous FTAs constitutes a 
learning process for officials and the private sector alike. At the least, FTAs contribute to a 
better specification of preferences and positions by actors but, potentially, could also 
strengthen their respective institutional capacities. For trade officials, complex FTA 
negotiations should provide incentives to gain further expertise, to coordinate inputs from 
other agencies and consult more often with business. In turn, FTAs should encourage 
business associations to improve their capabilities to fulfill government’s information 
requests. As these exercises are repeated over time with successive FTAs, the information 
and coordination costs entailed should spur institutional change and creation within 
government agencies and business associations as well as in the channels of 
communication among them (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
                                 
65 As noted in footnote 61, Solis (2013:106) also came to very same conclusion as she recently argued on the role that business 
associations play in the context of trade negotiations serving government officials in intermediation of preferences and as source of 
technical expertise.  
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Hypothesis 4: Demands on governments and the private sector by the 
negotiation of iterative FTAs should improve their specification of preferences 
and generate incentives for both actors to invest in their respective capabilities, 
spurring institutional change and creation.  
 
 These four hypotheses will be tested empirically in the FTAs negotiated by 
Thailand and Malaysia describe in turn below. Findings confirmed the initial arguments 
and show that government-business consultations and lobbying in the context of FTA 
policymaking in both countries have evolved in similar manner, serving as further 
corroboration of the hypotheses. 
 
3. Thailand FTA policymaking 
Trade policymaking in Thailand is fragmented across several agencies but the main actors 
are the Ministries of Commerce (MOC), of Finance, of Industry (MOI) and of 
Agriculture.66 At the cabinet level, the Committee on International Economic Relations 
Policy provides guidelines on international trade and investment.67 Peak business 
associations in Thailand, namely, the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce/Board of Trade (TCC), and the Thai Bankers Association, are 
collectively represented by the Joint Standing Committee of Commerce, Industry and 
Banking (JSCCIB) and all four participate in consultative committees within government 
                                 
66 Our field research found evidence that, in broad terms, the MOC’s Department of Trade Negotiations holds a liberal stance on trade 
liberalization, and it is the main focus of influence by foreign multinationals and Thai companies with international ties. Meanwhile, 
domestically-oriented manufacturers find greater leverage within MOI’s Office of Industrial Economics.  
67 In 2002, a Trade Representative Office was created directly under the Primer Minister Office to promote trade opportunities abroad. 
The Office has not played a major role in the formulation of most Thai puview of the FTAs except in the ongoing Thailand-European 
Union FTA, where it is leading the Thai negotiation agency. 
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agencies.68 The Joint Public-Private Sectors Consultative Committee is the highest-level 
government-business forum, but it has played a lesser role since the mid-1990s.69  
The participation of Thailand at the Uruguay Round, that led to the creation of the 
WTO, and at APEC’s most important attempt of sectoral liberalization in 1998 was 
hampered by the limited expertise of Thai officials and the low capability and interest of 
the private sector (Okamoto, 2004; Sally, 2004; Rothgeb and Benjamas, 2007; Yoshimatsu, 
2008; interviews). Thai positions originated from MOC senior officials who barely 
consulted businesses, apart from for peak and a few other well-organized associations. It 
was only in 1999 that the JSCCIB established the Joint WTO Committee to organize private 
sector participation in multilateral negotiations. However, sluggish progress at the Doha 
Round has slowed down government’s involvement in WTO matters and abated business 
interest.70  
Thailand is founding member of ASEAN, whose agenda, including launching of the 
AFTA, has historically been largely driven by high-level political summitry with limited 
business input (Ravenhill, 2008b). During the 1990s, and especially after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, ASEAN governments accelerated liberalization in response to pressure 
from Japanese and Western firms established in the region (Yoshimatsu, 2002; Yoshimatsu, 
2008). However, it was only after 2003 that intra-AFTA tariff barriers were significantly 
reduced and eventually eliminated in 2010.71 In Thailand, AFTA liberalization has been 
supported, and to a significant extent driven, by key benefiting sectors like automotive, 
                                 
68 In addition to its function as peak association, FTI serves as umbrella to 40 sectoral associations (“Clubs”) spanning all industrial 
sectors. The TCC encompasses about 100 associations in the primary sector, services but also some manufacturing industries.  
69 An analysis of the political leadership and the bureaucracy in Thailand and Malaysia is outside the scope of this Thesis. Thai 
policymaking before 1973 has been described as a bureaucratic polity, where macroeconomic policy was controlled by an autonomous 
bureaucratic elite (Laothamatas, 1988; Ockey 2004). Business associations started emerging as influential policy actors in the 1980s and 
the creation of the Joint Public-Private Sectors Consultative Committee in 1981 has been hailed as the beginning of a new era of group-
based business lobbying and corporatist policymaking in Thailand (Laothamatas, 1988; Laothamatas, 1992; Laothamatas, 1995). 
Nevertheless, clientelistic networks persisted and during Thaksin’s tenure many business tycoons enter politics as members of parliament 
or the Cabinet (Prasirtsuk, 2007; Bowornwathana, 2011). See also footnote 57. 
70 Involvement of Thai businesses in WTO issues is greater in the context of litigations, where the private sector not only often exceeds in 
expertise to officials´ but also hires foreign legal experts (Rothgeb and Benjamas, 2007; interviews). 
71 AFTA was replaced in 2010 by the ASEAN trade in Goods Agreement. Full implementation of the Agreement in the less developed 
ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) will occur in 2015, when ASEAN countries have scheduled the creation of 
the ASEAN Economic Community with the goal of achieving full economic integration.  
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food, and textiles and garments. Utilization of AFTA by Thai exporters increased from 
10.7% in 2002 to 31.5% in 2010 (data provided by MOC). 
None of the FTAs explored by Thailand immediately after the Asian crisis at the 
initiative of the bureaucracy progressed into negotiations. Slow progress at WTO and 
AFTA prompted Singapore to embark on bilateral FTAs after 2000, a move followed by 
Thailand where much of the initiative came from Prime Minister Thaksin (2000-2006) 
himself.72 As of August 2013, in addition to AFTA and five bilateral agreements analyzed 
below, as member of ASEAN, Thailand is also party to five ASEAN-centered (also known 
as ASEAN+1) regional FTAs (Table 1).73 
3.1 Early FTAs: marginal economic benefits and little interest by a mostly reactive 
private sector  
Before negotiating with its larger partners, Thailand approached some small and distant 
economies such as Bahrain or Peru (Table 1). Research for this Essay confirmed that 
proposals for these early agreements originated from Thaksin himself and that, given their 
weak economic basis, negotiations proceeded with little involvement or interest by the 
private sector. In line with the existing literature (Sally, 2007; Phongpaichit and Baker, 
2004), it was also found that Thai bureaucrats initially had little choice but to follow on 
Thaksin´s initiatives. However, interviews also revealed that, despite their declined 
policymaking power, trade officials questioned certain FTA proposals and often succeeded 
in persuading Thaksin about their lack of economic rationale so some proposals or even 
                                 
72 FTAs assumed a central position in Thai economic policy during Thaksin’s tenure, being associated with his highly personalized 
decision-making style, often proposed in the context of state visits and summits (Hoadley, 2008).  
73 ASEAN has FTAs with China, Japan, Korea, Australia/New Zealand and India. The bilateral early harvest agreement between 
Thailand and China was subsumed into the ASEAN-China FTA. Thailand also participates of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation FTA. As for other ASEAN members, Thai bilateral FTAs tend to be more comprehensive 
and provide for faster liberalization than their respective ASEAN-centered FTAs that have aroused limited interest by business. 
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negotiations, such as those with Bahrain and Peru, were postponed or abandoned 
altogether. 74 
Table 1: Thai Bilateral FTAs * 
 
 
Official Name** 
 
 
Coverage*** 
 
Timeline 
 
Status 
 
Thailand-Bahrain 
CEPA 
EHS of 626 
lines at HS6 
Negotiations started in early 2002. EHS signature and 
implementation: Dec 2002. FTA Negotiations: started in 2003-
suspended in 2005  
Abandoned 
Thailand-China  
EHS 
EHS of 188 
agricultural lines 
at HS6 
EHS implementation: Oct 2003. Superseded by ASEAN-China 
FTA 
Bilateral FTA 
Subsumed into 
ASEAN-China FTA 
Thailand-India EHS 
& FTA 
EHS for 84 lines 
at HS6 
Joint Study: May-Dec 2002. EHS negotiations: Dec 2002-Oct 
2003. EHS signature: Oct 2003. Implementation: Sept 2004.  
 
FTA negotiations: abandoned and resumed several times. 
Resumption of talks on services liberalization in late 2013. 
Signing of the agreement projected for Dec 2013 or early 2014 
EHS active.  
 
 
Negotiations 
abandoned/resumed 
multiple times 
Thailand-Australia 
FTA 
Comprehensive  Joint study: July 2001-May 2002. Negotiations: June 2002-Oct 
2003. Signature: July 2004. Implementation: Jan 2005 
Active 
Thailand-Peru  
CEPA 
EHS/FTA on 
4000 lines at 
HS6 
Joint Study: July 2002. Framework signed in Oct 2003. 
Negotiations: Jan 2004-Nov 2005. Protocols on ROOs signed 
in Oct 2009 and 2010. Implementation: Jan 2012 
Abandoned between 
Nov 2005-Oct 2009 
Active  
N. Zealand-Thailand  
CEPA 
Comprehensive 
 
Negotiations: April-Nov 2004. Signature: April 2005. 
Implementation: July 2005 
Active 
Japan-Thailand  
EPA 
Comprehensive 
with exclusions 
Joint Study: Dec 2003. Negotiations: Feb 2004-Aug 2005. 
Signature: April 2007. Implementation: Nov 2007 
Active 
Thailand EFTA  
FTA  
Comprehensive Negotiations: Oct 2005-Jan 2006. Abandoned Abandoned  
Thailand-US  
FTA & TPP!
Comprehensive Proposal: Oct 2002. Impact study: Oct 2003. Negotiations: July 
2004-Jan 2006. Abandoned 
 
Government expressed interest in TPP in Dec 2012!
Bilateral FTA 
abandoned 
 
Pending decision by  
Parliament on TPP 
Thailand-Chile 
FTA 
Comprehensive Impact study: March 2006. Negotiations: April 2011-Aug 2012. 
Endorsed by the Thai Parliament in May 2013. Signature 
expected for Oct 2013 and implementation for early 2014 
Pending signature 
(expected for Oct 
2013) 
Thailand-EU 
FTA 
Comprehensive Negotiations for ASEAN-EU FTA started in May 2007 and 
abandoned in early 2010 
 
Bilateral Thailand-EU negotiations were endorsed by the 
Cabinet (Dec 2012) and Parliament (Jan 2013). Negotiations: 
launched March 2013. First round: May-June 2013 
Regional FTA 
abandoned 
 
Bilateral FTA under 
negotiation 
Source: Governments’ websites complemented with information in local press (updated as of August 2013) 
 * Only bilateral FTAs that have reached negotiation status are included 
** Abbreviations in this Table: CEPA: Closer Economic Partnership; EHS: Early Harvest Scheme; EFTA: European Free Trade 
Association (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein); EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement; TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership 
*** HS6 level refers to the 6-digit level of specification under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, which is the 
international nomenclature for goods developed by the World Customs Organization. HS6 includes around 5,500 items.  
 
 
 
In November 2002, ASEAN and China signed an FTA to be realized over eight 
years but Thaksin, eager to gain a first-mover advantage in China, struck a separate 
bilateral Early Harvest Scheme (EHS) covering fruits and vegetables with plans for a fully-
fledge Thailand-China FTA to follow. The import surge of produce from China prompted 
by the EHS adversely impacted Thai farmers, who had not been consulted on the deal 
                                 
74 Thailand and Bahrain signed an Early Harvest Scheme—liberalizing from the start a reduced number of items—but negotiations for the 
full-fledge FTA were eventually abandoned. Thailand and Peru agreed on an FTA in 2005 but it was never implemented and it was only 
in 2009, because of the renewed interest of some sectors, that talks were resumed (see below). 
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(interviews). The EHS brought FTAs into the public eye for the first time and sparked the 
creation of FTA Watch, a coalition of NGOs that has become instrumental in channeling 
civic opposition to FTAs.75 
Likewise, ahead of FTA negotiations between ASEAN and India, Thailand signed a 
bilateral EHS with India and started negotiations for a comprehensive FTA. Research for 
this Thesis confirmed that overall consultation with organized business in this EHS was 
superficial, mostly at the peak level. However, interviews uncovered evidence that some 
firms in the automotive and electronics sectors strongly supported the EHS. Over the last 
decade, Thailand has become the hub for multinational carmakers in Southeast Asia and 
beyond. The automotive industry is the country’s second largest source of export revenue 
and, consequently, politically very influential. Some carmakers based in Thailand lobbied 
for the EHS as to integrate India into their Thai/ASEAN procurement network.76 Japanese 
producers of consumer electronics were keen to level the playing field with Korean firms 
established in India. Reflecting these business interests, over 85% of the early utilization of 
EHS by Thai importers was concentrated in automotive components, despite representing 
only 3% of the items included in the EHS. In turn, over 40% of the EHS utilization by Thai 
exporters corresponded to electrical appliances (data provided by MOC). Persisting 
reluctance by India to liberalize other sectors has damped the interest of Thai officials and 
businesses in concluding FTA negotiations, which have dragged on for over a decade 
(Table 1). 
    Having failed to engage the European Union in a bilateral FTA, Thaksin approached 
the smaller European Free Trade Association (Table 1). The marginal economic benefits to 
be realized in this small FTA grouping and the opposition by FTA Watch to WTO-plus 
                                 
75 FTA Watch claimed that the EHS benefited contract-farming operators like the Charoen Pokhand Group (Bangkok Post, August 13 
2006; interviews), with links within Thaksin’s cabinets like Wattana Muangsuk, then Minister of Industry and Commerce (interviews). 
76 Toyota, which accounts for 40% of Thai automotive production, lobbied for the EHS that eliminated import duties on components 
from a factory it had established in India a year earlier.  
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provisions on intellectual property rights resulted in the suspension of negotiations after 
only two rounds. 
 In line with my initial arguments, these early FTAs demonstrate that political 
willingness, even at the highest level, is not a sufficient condition to conclude an FTA when 
it is not accompanied by clear and certain economic impacts, even if these are limited to a 
small number of economic sectors. 
3.2 FTAs with Australia and Japan: push from sectoral business interests  
The Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) was Thailand’s first comprehensive FTA with a 
developed nation and to include provisions on investment and services and product-specific 
ROOs. These features posed unprecedented demands on Thai officials that, as revealed by 
interviews and in line with Hypothesis 1, had to rely on technical expertise from business 
associations. The FTI and the TCC collected highly detailed sectoral data on the production 
structure in Thailand and elaborated the Thai proposal regarding ROOs in TAFTA. To 
agree on particular tariff and ROO levels, peak and sectoral associations also had to 
coordinate the often opposing positions of upstream and downstream producers within and 
across sectors. In turn, FTI clubs, TCC and many individual sectoral associations had the 
chance to present their preferences to trade officials although smaller groupings could not 
participate on equal terms.77 
As advanced by Hypothesis 2, sectors anticipating large impacts from TAFTA tried 
to influence its formulation.78 At the time, Thai textiles and garments faced strong 
competition in Australia from producers of other developing countries. Accordingly, the 
proactive and well-organized textile (TTMA) and garment (TGMA) manufacturers 
                                 
77 A number of sectoral associations outside the FTI complained that they were not given enough time by trade officials to consult back 
with their members while other lacked the expertise required to participate efficiently (interviews). FTA Watch criticized TAFTA 
negotiations for their lack of transparency and the alleged collusion of interests of some cabinet members with the Thai conglomerate 
Charoen Pokphand Group (see footnote 75) (The Nation, July 12, 2004 and February 1, 2005; interviews). 
78 Although small-scale farmers and dairy producers in Thailand were projected to lose from TAFTA, they lacked the needed 
organization and leverage, and their interests were defended by FTA Watch (interviews). 
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associations lobbied in favor of Australian liberalization of their sector in the agreement. 
But the key sponsor of TAFTA was the automotive industry. International carmakers based 
in Thailand have always opposed any unilateral or multilateral liberalization that would 
expose them to competition from outside ASEAN. However, a bilateral FTA with 
Australia—historically, the single largest market for Thailand-made vehicles, which 
accounted for over a quarter of total exports—would help many Japanese and American 
carmakers with plants in both countries to rationalize their procurement and production 
activities. Indeed, my research found that automotive firms lobbied the Thai government in 
favor of TAFTA as soon as both countries launched a joint feasibility study. The Australian 
Ambassador to Thailand and the President of General Motors (GM) Thailand paid a visit to 
the Thai Industry Minister and pressed for the speedy opening of negotiations. The 
Automotive Industry Club at FTI—representing all carmakers—and the two auto-parts 
manufacturers’ associations in Thailand lobbied the MOC and Thaksin himself for total and 
reciprocal liberalization of vehicles and auto-parts. In Australia, carmakers also made 
submissions to the government in support of the deal (Parliament of Australia, 2004).79 
With the automotive sector in both countries (both levels II)—actually the same firms—
pushing for TAFTA, negotiating teams (level I) found it easy to conclude the agreement. 
The final treaty provided for the full and reciprocal opening of the Thai and Australian 
automotive industries—the first and only time Thailand has done so outside ASEAN 
(DFAT, undated). Thailand also gained improved access in Australia for its textiles and 
garments.80 
In contrast to the reported lack of interest on FTAs by the private sector in Thailand, 
my analysis of official preferential trade records shows that overall utilization of TAFTA 
                                 
79 Production of vehicles and automotive parts in both countries were largely complementary and the Australian Federal Chamber of 
Automotive Industries supported the agreement ([sic], www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/J7814.pdf, accessed on July 25, 2009; 
not longer accessible at that link but available upon request). 
80 See Table 3 in Essay 4 for details on Thai and Australian concessions in the automotive sector. Thailand obtained up to twenty years to 
liberalize its dairy sector. 
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among exporters has been high from the start, averaging 62.3% in 2005-2011 (data 
provided by MOC). The active role played by the automotive industry in the formulation of 
TAFTA is illustrated by its disaggregated sectoral utilization. In early years, well over half 
of all Thai exports using TAFTA preferences were vehicles and automotive parts, for 
which utilization is virtually complete (data provided by MOC).81 Within days of 
concluding TAFTA negotiations, Thailand started talks with New Zealand, eager to cancel 
out trade diversion of its dairy industry by TAFTA. Interest on the Thailand-New Zealand 
FTA among businesses in Thailand was much reduced compared to TAFTA although 
preferences were distributed along similar sectoral lines. Eventually, concessions in this 
FTA closely followed those in TAFTA.82  
Specific sectoral business interests also drove the Japan-Thailand Economic 
Partnership Agreement (JTEPA). As the main investor, first source of imports and a major 
export destination, Japan was a natural FTA partner for Thailand.83 According to my 
interviews, the main goals in JTEPA for Thai businesses were improving access in Japan to 
food, and textile and garment products and attracting further investment. JTEPA also 
ranked as one of the most sought-after FTAs for Japanese firms that hoped to reduce Thai 
tariffs on automobiles and steel, better integrate Japanese and Thai/ASEAN textile and 
garment producer chains and extract Thai concessions in investment and services (MOFA-
JTEPA 2003; interviews).  
Negotiation teams for JTEPA aimed not only at the liberalization of bilateral goods 
trade but also of investment and services and to incorporate in the agreement sectoral 
cooperation. The broader scope of the agreement with respect to previous FTAs meant the 
                                 
81 Since implementation, exports of Thailand-made vehicles have trebled. As TAFTA preferential tariffs have been progressively reduced 
and eliminated in most sectors, the relative share of automotive products in total exports under TAFTA have slightly declined. 
Nonetheless, utilization of TAFTA for Thai exports of vehicles continues to be close to 100%.  
82 There are no data on the utilization of the Thailand-New Zealand FTA utilization because application for certificates of origin is not 
required. 
83 At the start of negotiations and until 2009, Japan was the second export market for Thai products after the United States. Since 2009, 
continues to occupy the second position but behind China (Trade Map database). 
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participation at JTEPA negotiations of government agencies that are not normally involved 
in multilateral rounds.84 In line with Hypothesis 1, field research found that during the 
formulation of JTEPA the government conducted more ex-ante impact studies and more 
frequent and effective consultations with the private sector than in previous FTAs. As in 
TAFTA, JTEPA establishes product-specific ROOs and the government depended again on 
the information provided by FTI and TCC to prepare a proposal. Likewise, formulation of 
mutual recognition agreements for the removal of the technical and standards barriers faced 
in Japan by key Thai exports (e.g., electrical appliances, food products), required detailed 
feedback from business associations and, in turn, from their members. The peak and main 
concerned business associations were engaged throughout JTEPA negotiation rounds and 
inter-round meetings.85 Still, sectoral associations or individual firms seeking to secure 
their influence on JTEPA formulation had to take a proactive role, preparing impact reports 
and using their contacts within peak associations, ministries, or even the cabinet.  
Greater and more efficient participation by the private sector during JTEPA 
negotiations was helped by improved capacity among officials and business associations. 
As contended by Hypothesis 4, after several FTAs both actors had improved their internal 
capabilities and some channels of communication became institutionalized (see Table 4 in 
the Discussion). Thus, in mid-2004, soon after the start of JTEPA negotiations, FTI and 
TCC established their respective Committee on FTAs as well as a separate Subcommittee on 
JTEPA (and on other ongoing FTAs at the time) to coordinate inputs from members and 
serve as focal points for government officials. Individual FTI clubs and sectoral 
                                 
84 Agencies like the Ministry of Education, of Science and Technology, and of Information and Communications also participated in 
JTEPA. Talks were led and coordinated by the JTEPA Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but negotiations around market access 
were responsibility of the MOC. 
85 Nevertheless, some smaller associations interviewed indicated that consultations with them were part of cross-sectoral and mostly 
informative gatherings and lamented the lack of time to prepare positions and/or of government receptiveness to them. FTA Watch 
recognized that, compared to previous FTA negotiations, consultations with businesses and civil society increased in JTEPA but the civic 
grouping declined to attend some of these meetings arguing that the government only sought to get the NGO stamp of approval 
(interviews). The private sector is not allowed to attend official FTA negotiations but our interviews found that representatives from peak 
and key sectoral associations but also some influential individual firms were present in the “next room” (a common phenomenon in trade 
negotiations; Jordana and Ramio, 2003) and consulted along the process when needed, even travelling with Thai negotiators when rounds 
took place in Japan (interviews). FTA Watch claimed that while negotiations were kept outside the scrutiny of the Thai Parliament, 
representatives from some firms were occasionally embedded within the Thai negotiation team (interviews). 
   2. Essay 1  
 79 
associations also created their own FTA Taskforces. In November 2004, in the midst of 
negotiations with Japan and just after the second round of the Thai-United States FTA, the 
Thai government established the cabinet-level National Committee on FTA Strategy and 
Negotiations to provide direction and coordination across multiple FTAs.  
In Thailand, JTEPA got the support of the influential textile and garment, food, and 
jewelry industries and of Japanese carmakers. For Thai garment manufacturers, Japan has 
traditionally represented the second largest market after the United States and their 
associations lobbied to improve market access to their products in Japan via JTEPA.  On its 
part, the Japan textile Federation (JTF) favored the establishment of FTAs with ASEAN 
members as a way to break Japanese dependence on Chinese imports. Japan is also one of 
the top destinations for the competitive Thai food processing industry. Interviews found 
that the Thai frozen food (TFFA) and food processors producers (TFPA) associations 
pressed the Thai government to negotiate the elimination of barriers in Japan not only 
through scheduled consultations but also proactively via more direct channels within the 
MOC and the cabinet. 
Business efforts to influence JTEPA were more public and intense in the 
automotive sector. Japanese carmakers sought to eliminate Thai tariffs on passenger cars, 
automotive parts and steel. Liberalization of vehicles produced in Japan was strongly 
opposed by American and European assemblers and automotive parts manufacturers based 
in Thailand.86 Japanese and Western firms lobbied the Thai government and strategically 
went to the media to air their strongest positions.87   
                                 
86 Even though Japanese carmakers produce locally about 90% of the vehicles sold in Thailand, Japanese firms sought liberalization of 
vehicles made in Japan in order to increase flexibility for future production strategies and to gain free access for large-engine luxury 
models, which are still manufactured in Japan. The Automotive Industry Club opposed liberalization of small and medium-size engine 
vehicles made in Japan but accepted some tariff reduction on vehicles over 3000 cc. Liberalization of automotive parts and steel was 
naturally opposed by parts manufacturers but had partial support from American assemblers that import some inputs from Japan. 
Automotive part manufacturers eventually accepted a long tariff phase-out so to avoid confrontation with their mostly Japanese clients. 
87 Thai officials met not only with automotive business associations based in Thailand but also with individual companies. Some 
carmakers, especially highly influential Toyota, also proactively lobbied cabinet ministers and Thaksin himself (interviews).  
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In support of Hypothesis 3, JTEPA also illustrated the possibilities in bilateral FTAs 
for business collective action and lobbying across borders (between levels II of both 
countries). Field research revealed that, even before negotiations had started, JTF 
dispatched representatives to Thailand to discuss with Thai counterpart associations 
(mainly TTMA and TGMA) on potential tariff reductions and ROOs to be included in 
JTEPA. Interestingly, Japanese government officials often participated in these meetings. 
Similar cross-border business collective action occurred in the food sector; TFFA and 
TFPA contacted wholesale buyers and trading companies in Japan to consolidate positions 
to be passed to their respective governments.  
The Thai government was concerned that JTEPA could make redundant existing 
investment (or jeopardize future one) in the automotive sector. Accordingly, Thailand 
accepted the progressive liberalization of automotive parts from Japan but refused 
liberalization of vehicles, except for a tariff reduction from 80% to 60% on larger-engine 
cars, which represent less than 0.5% of the total market. In turn, Japan reduced tariffs on 
garments and textiles, footwear, jewelry, and processed food (METI-JEPA, undated). The 
official treaty signing was postponed indefinitely due to the political instability in Thailand 
that eventually led to a coup d’état that ousted Thaksin in September 2006. Far from 
remaining passive, Thai businesses proactively and openly pressed the new interim 
government to sign and implement JTEPA. After some reticence, the government yielded 
to business pressure and ratified the agreement.88  
Since being implemented in November 2007, the overall utilization of JTEPA has 
stood low, at around 25% for exports, which could be partly explained because many items 
                                 
88 Immediately after the coup, Thai businesses requested the military-backed government (October 2006-January 2008) to ratify JTEPA 
(The Nation, October 20, 2006). When a few months later, in February 2007, the government signalled that all pending FTAs would be 
put on hold until after elections—at least a year later—TCC and 16 business associations publicly urged the government to sign JTEPA 
and resume negotiations for other FTAs (Matichon, February 15, 2007). The government eventually signed JTEPA two months later. 
Among the associations that pushed the interim government for JTEPA ratification were sectors likely to benefit from it such as jewelry, 
processed food, textiles and garments, and footwear. 
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are still covered by long tariff phase-out periods.89 In addition, as further elaborated in 
Essay 2, low overall utilization hides significant sectoral variability. Utilization of JTEPA 
by Thai exporters of processed food, jewelry and textiles and garments items exceeds 70% 
(data provided by MOC; see below in Essay 2).90 
Of note, proactive cooperation and lobbying across borders between the Thai and 
Japanese private sectors did not end with the enforcement of the agreement. The all-
encompassing Thai JSCCIB and Japanese peak Keidanren associations met in February 
2011 to publicly demand from their respective governments a review of JTEPA to expand 
coverage and accelerate liberalization schedules (Bangkok Post, February 19, 2011). 
3.3 Later FTAs with the largest partners: businesses taking the initiative 
For decades and until just 2010, the United States was the single largest market for Thai 
exports. Establishing a bilateral Thailand-United States FTA (TUSFTA) was therefore 
fundamental to improve access to the United States for Thai agricultural products, 
processed food, textiles and garments, commercial vehicles and jewelry.91  
Thai officials had to confront teams of experienced American negotiators, opening 
for discussion issues Thailand had never dealt with at the WTO or in previous FTAs (e.g., 
labor and environmental standards, financial liberalization, competition policy). Although 
the multiple dimensions of the accord meant that some chapters of the negotiation were 
assigned to less trade-savvy ministries (e.g. Ministry of Labor, of Natural Resources and 
Environment, etc.), the newly established National Committee on FTA Strategy and 
                                 
89 Nevertheless, this low overall utilization of JTEPA for exports should be put into context since over half of Japanese tariffs are set at 
zero. When use of JTEPA is calculated only for tariff lines where Japanese MFN is set above zero, corrected JTEPA utilization for 
exports in 2011 is 71.2%. 
90 Our interviews also revealed that JTEPA implementation encountered some minor problems that may reflect a lack of understanding 
and/or communication between officials and business associations during consultations and formulations. 
91 Since 2010 the United States has been surpassed by China and Japan as main destinations for Thai exports (Trade Map). In contrast to 
Japan or Australia, United States’ key interests in TUSFTA fell squarely around services liberalization and stricter intellectual property 
rights rather than on trade in goods. 
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Negotiations helped with overall coordination.92 As predicted by my initial arguments, the 
complexity of these negotiations prompted the Thai government to consult more frequently 
with concerned peak and sectoral business associations that, in turn, established dedicated 
TUSFTA Committees to coordinate members’ inputs and talks with trade officials 
(interviews). 
Importantly, field interviews also revealed that the American and Thai private 
sectors took the lead over their respective governments in TUSFTA. Organizations 
representing some American businesses sectors (or firms with activities in the United 
States) with interests in Thailand (e.g., Thailand-United States Business Council, American 
Chamber of Commerce, United States-ASEAN Business Council) mobilized promptly and 
commissioned a TUSFTA impact study as early as mid-2003 (interviews).93 In March 
2004, before negotiations started, the United States-ASEAN Business Council launched the 
United States-Thailand FTA Business Coalition, to lobby both governments for a 
comprehensive agreement on behalf of the largest American multinationals.94  
Likewise, contrary to the reported apathy about FTAs among Thai-owned 
businesses (Hoadley, 2007a; Sally, 2007; Hoadley, 2008), my field research found that key 
economic sectors in Thailand acted proactively in TUSFTA (in favor of or against) and 
lobbied not only Thai but also American authorities. With the United States absorbing then 
over half of Thai garment exports and a similar share of processed seafood, the 
corresponding Thai associations urged the Thai government to launch negotiations long 
before they were initiated. Strong support for TUSFTA also came from the jewelry 
sector—which at the time accounted for about a quarter of all Thai exports under the 
                                 
92 According to some American-related business groupings, and despite the experience gained through previous FTAs, Thai negotiators 
may have approached TUSFTA not fully aware of all of its regulatory implications and the need for prior legislative reforms. The same 
sources also stated that the Thai team lacked expertise on regulatory issues like labor and environmental standards (interviews). At the 
time, the President of the United States G.W. Bush had so-called “Trade Promotion or Fast Track Authority”, allowing him the 
negotiation of FTAs that the United States Congress could only approve or reject but not amend.  
93 Mindful of the resistance to TUSFTA among the Thai general public, the study was assigned to an independent Thai think tank.  
94 American sectoral business associations in the pharmaceutical industry, logistics, software and other services also lobbied in favor of 
TUSFTA. 
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United States Generalized System of Preferences—and the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers Association, representing multinational pharmaceutical firms in Thailand 
(interviews). In turn, the Thai Bankers Association pressed the government to resist 
financial liberalization, but the opposition mounted by other Thai-based businesses was not 
so effective, reflecting limited leverage and problems organizing collective action.95 Of all 
FTAs that Thailand had negotiated until then, TUSFTA stirred the strongest popular 
opposition, especially by civil society groups resisting broadening of WTO´s Agreement on 
trade-related intellectual property rights (interviews).  
TUSFTA also confirmed my initial contention (Hypothesis 3) that bilateral FTAs 
offer greater possibilities for business collective action and for government-business 
consultation and lobbying across borders than other forms of liberalization. Even before 
negotiations started, Thai business associations representing garment (TGMA), and 
processed food (TFPA) producers, with high stakes in TUSFTA, lobbied directly American 
officials (interviews; official records).96 Field interviews also revealed that during its visits 
to Thailand, the American negotiation team met with key Thai business associations to 
exchange views.  
Although talks were suspended in early 2006 on continuing political instability in 
Thailand, prospects for an accord were nevertheless low because of the lack of progress on 
key American demands, opposition by civic groups in Thailand and changes in the political 
landscape in both countries.97 Malaysia was also involved in bilateral negotiations with the 
United States and several Thai sectors (e.g., processed food, garments) kept lobbying the 
                                 
95 The Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the logistics sector, fragmented in three separate associations, also opposed 
the agreement (interviews). The interests of small-scale farmers, expected to lose from TUSFTA, were represented by FTA Watch 
(interviews). 
96 As early as June 2004 and throughout 2004-2006, TGMA hired lobbying firms in the United States to pressure the United States Trade 
Representative in favor of TUSFTA. TFPA also contracted American lobbyists during 2005-2006 for the same purpose (interviews; 
Clerk US House of Representatives, http://disclosures.house.gov/ld/ldsearch.aspx and Office of Public Records, United States 
Senate, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/ Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm, accessed on August 29, 2009).  
97 Invalidation of the April 2006 snap elections, forced Thaksin to continue as “Caretaker Primer Minister” but new elections were 
eventually frustrated by the September 2006 coup d’état. Thaksin, attending a United Nations summit in New York at the time of the 
coup, had met a few days earlier with American businesses and ensured them that all remaining obstacles in TUSFTA, particularly in the 
area of intellectual property rights protection, would be solved after elections (interviews). 
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post-coup interim government, and successive elected ones, to reopen TUSFTA talks 
(interviews). However, in 2008, the United States discontinued its bilateral approach in 
Asia in favor of joining the existing Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). 
With the admission into TPP negotiations of Vietnam—the second largest garment exporter 
to the United States—in late 2008, of Malaysia in 2010, and the possibility of Indonesia 
following suit over the near future, Thai exporters have maintained their pressure on the 
government to join TPP (The Nation, September 20, 2010 and April 9, 2013).98 
Slowdown in FTA activity in Thailand since 2006 that has to do not only with the 
persisting political instability but also with procedural changes introduced by the 2007 
Constitution. Under its Article 190, drafted by FTA Watch, international agreements 
having a significant economic or social impact must not only get parliamentary approval 
before negotiations are launched and after once are concluded, but the government is also 
obliged to consult all stakeholders including the public.99 Aware of public’s reluctance 
about FTAs with the United States and the European Union, the Thai private sector has 
repeatedly asked for changes in Article 190 (e.g., Bangkok Post, December 8, 2012).100 
In 2007, the European Union proposed to ASEAN the creation of an FTA between 
both blocs. The European Union is also major market for Thai exporting sectors (e.g., 
textile and garments, processed food, jewelry, electrical appliances, commercial vehicles), 
and my interviews found that between 2007 and late 2009 these industries pressed the Thai 
government to negotiate for the liberalization of their products in the European Union.101 In 
2010, the European Union abandoned its regional approach and started bilateral 
                                 
98 For the short-lived cabinets after the interim government—Thailand had five Prime Ministers during 2008—political survival, not 
FTAs, was the only priority. Although Yingluck’s current government has been receptive to private sectors demands about TPP, and 
officially expressed interest in the trade bloc (The Nation, November 20, 2012), significant opposition needs to be overcome first. As for 
TUSFTA, TPP is rejected by a number of Thai service providers, small farmers and NGOs working on access to medicines. 
99 In addition, it also requires fair compensation to those negatively affected by FTAs. Although Article 190 puts Thailand at a 
disadvantage with respect to countries where FTAs are approved through executive order (e.g., Malaysia), it could also arguably 
strengthen the bargaining position of Thai negotiators. 
100 In April 2013, the government initiated parliamentary proceedings to amend Article 190 but has so far encountered significant 
political and civic resistance (The Nation, April 4, 2013).  
101 Sectors potentially adversely affected by an ASEAN-European Union FTA—mainly small firms in the dairy, logistics and 
communications sectors—opposed the agreement but their leverage and policy influence was limited (interviews). 
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negotiations with selected ASEAN countries, beginning with Singapore, Malaysia and 
Vietnam.102 Earlier preferential access to the European Union by these countries could put 
Thai exporters at a disadvantage, especially as 700 Thai exports are expected to lose 
preferential treatment under the European Union Generalized System of Preferences in 
2015. As in TUSFTA and TPP, the European Union-Thailand FTA has been decried by 
civic groups.103 Following Article 190’s mandate, during 2010 the MOC set in place an 
unprecedented process of hearings with businesses, small-farmers, civil society and well as 
other public agencies, whose opinions were forwarded to the Cabinet and Parliament.104 In 
line with Hypothesis 1, at these hearings, government agencies acknowledged the complex 
regulatory framework in the European Union and the need for trade officials to gain 
detailed information on production processes before negotiating ROOs with the European 
Union.105 Over the last couple of years, peak business associations in Thailand have 
publicly urged the government to speed up the launching of negotiations to avoid losing 
ground vis-à-vis other ASEAN members (The Nation, January 25, 2013). Bilateral talks 
officially began in May 2013 (Table 1).106 
Some FTA negotiations with small trading partners, and at different stages of study 
or negotiation since the Thaksin’s administration, remain in a limbo in light of lack of 
substantial economic rationale, while others have been abandoned. Increased awareness 
                                 
102 At the time, two major obstacles to the ASEAN-European Union FTA were the difficulty for the European Union of embracing a non-
democratic Myanmar as a trade partner and the convergence of ASEAN countries on their least common denominator. Negotiations for 
the European Union-Singapore FTA concluded in December 2012. Our interviews indicated that Thailand was initially second only to 
Singapore in the priorities of the European Union. However, political instability during 2009-2010 and the difficulties posed by Article 
190 have slowed down progress in the bilateral FTA. 
103 The bilateral FTA has been condemned by the Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the Minister of Health himself for 
its potential implications for access to medicines (Nation, August 25, 2009; Bangkok Post, July 12, 2012). On December 2012, a 
coalition of NGOs and consumer groups urged the European Union Parliament to press the European Commission to forgo WTO-plus 
features on intellectual property rights in the FTA (personal communication). 
104 Between April and July 2010, the MOC commissioned an impact study and established a dedicated Thai-European Union FTA 
Committee that conducted consultations with 161 business associations, 455 small-scale farmers, 445 civic groups and 80 government 
agencies (mimeos, available upon request).  
105 Another recommendation from these consultations was the creation of a centralized organization, with business and civil society 
participation, to conduct cross-sectoral impact analysis on previous and future FTAs (mimeos, available upon request). 
106 In December 2012, the Thai cabinet approved the issues for negotiation, later endorsed by the Parliament (Bangkok Post, December 5, 
2012; The Nation, June 2, 2013). In Thailand, negotiations for this FTA will be lead by the Thailand Trade Representative Office.  
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about FTAs has prompted some Thai-based export-oriented sectors to reconsider some of 
these older proposals and proactively lobby for those that could benefit them (Table 1). 107 
After several years of rapid cabinet turnover, a relatively more stable political 
environment has allowed the last two Prime Ministers to subscribe new FTAs with mid-size 
partners.108 Over time, Thai officials and organized business have gained greater expertise 
on FTA-related issues and developed new institutions to communicate and coordinate 
between and among themselves. Constitutional checks have improved accountability in 
FTA policymaking although, given political fragmentation and a highly mobilized civil 
society, they could block progress on FTAs containing WTO-plus provisions, such as the 
TPP or Thailand-European Union FTAs.  
 
4. Malaysia FTA policymaking  
By developing country standards, Malaysia has a liberal trade and investment regime 
outside those sectors related to the promotion of the ethnic-Malay/bumiputera population 
like government procurement, strategic services and some manufacturing industries, most 
notably the automotive.109  
In contrast to the more disperse policymaking process in Thailand, international 
trade and industrial policies in Malaysia are formulated within a single agency, the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI).110 MITI bears most responsibility for FTA 
policymaking and coordinates inputs from other agencies and from the private sector before 
                                 
107 FTAs between Chile and several key competitors (e.g. Malaysia, China, Korea) mobilized Thai-based firms in the automotive, 
electrical appliances, processed food and plastic sectors, who pressed the government to rescue a proposal from 2003 and start 
negotiations for an FTA in 2011. Likewise, following an increase in automotive exports to Peru by 800% during 2004-2008 (reaching 
two thirds of total exports), in 2009, carmakers in Thailand lobbied to resume negotiations for the Thai-Peru FTA, on hold since 2004. 
108 As of July 2013, in addition to a pending decision on TPP, Thailand is holding exploratory talks with South Korea, Canada and 
Turkey (personal communications). 
109 For the last four decades Malaysian economic policy has been guided by two overarching goals: achieving developed nation status and 
fostering participation of the local ethnic-Malay/bumiputera population in the economy. In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, the 
government launched several national automotive brands, most notably PROTON and PERODUA, that it has sheltered from internal and 
external competition.  
110 Malaysia policymaking is highly centralized, especially when compared to Thailand. Policy proposals emerge primarily from the 
Prime Minister Department and are formulated by the bureaucratic elite largely outside the public debate (Leong, 1992:204; Siddiquee, 
2013). Highest levels in the Malaysia bureaucracy have been portrayed as closely linked with the political leadership (Chin, 2011:148; 
Siddiquee, 2013).  
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agreements are passed to the cabinet for sanction, not requiring of parliamentary 
approval.111 Peak business associations in Malaysia comprise the influential Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) and the three smaller ethnic chambers of commerce, all 
jointly integrated into a national chamber. These associations, especially FMM but also 
some key independent sectoral groupings, are represented on the advisory boards of 
government agencies participating in regular consultations with economic ministries.112 
Interviews with government officials attested to the reliability of the technical intelligence 
provided by FMM that, despite its privileged access to Malaysian policymaking, has 
avoided cooptation. Compared to FMM’s strong secretariat, the weaker Malay, Indian and 
Chinese Chambers have limited technical capacity and are mostly integrated by small and 
medium firms. In line with the more centralized and behind doors policymaking process, 
Malaysian business associations rarely use the media either to pressure or praise the 
government on specific policies as Thai associations openly do. 
Malaysia is a member of the WTO, APEC and ASEAN. Private sector consultation 
and participation in WTO and APEC liberalization rounds were mostly restricted to MITI’s 
Annual Dialogue (Okamoto, 2004; interviews). Until only recently, Malaysia was a laggard 
within ASEAN as it resisted early programs for intra-regional liberalization of intermediate 
inputs and excluded the automotive sector from AFTA schedules in the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis (Yoshimatsu, 2002).  
                                 
111 Other important players are the investment and export promotion agencies (Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, MIDA, and 
the export promotion agency, MATRADE, respectively), under the aegis of MITI, and the Economic Policy Unit, within the Prime 
Minister Office. Ministries frequently contributing inputs on trade policymaking include Finance, Agriculture and Agro-based industries 
and Plantation Industries and Commodities.  
112 Inspired by Japan, in 1983 Malaysia introduced the concept of Malaysia Inc, in reference to the collaboration and consultation 
between private and public sectors on economic policymaking. The model has often blurred boundaries between the private sector, the 
state and the ruling party (Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Gomez, 2009). In resource-based sectors, including the largely influential palm oil 
industry, which has significant participation by government-linked companies and government schemes, business associations are 
integrated within government-sponsored boards and councils that develop most of the sectoral intelligence and represent their interests at 
trade fora. 
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Although initially reluctant to enter into bilateral FTAs, fear of exclusion from the 
FTAs of competing nations prompted Malaysia to start negotiating its own. In addition to 
five regional ASEAN+ FTAs, Malaysia already has six bilateral FTAs in force (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Malaysian Bilateral FTAs* 
 
 
Official Name** 
 
 
Coverage*** 
 
Timeline 
 
Status 
Malaysia-
Japan 
EPA 
Comprehensive Proposal: January 2002. Joint Study: Feb-Dec 2003. Negotiations: Jan 2004-
May 2005. Signature: Dec 2005. Implementation: July 2006 
Active  
 
Malaysia-
Pakistan 
CEPA 
EHS of 125 lines at 
HS6 level 
CEPA comprehensive 
EHS signature: December 2005. Implementation: January 2006.  
CEPA negotiations: April 2005-Sept 2007. Signature: Nov 2007. 
Implementation: Jan 2008 
Active 
Malaysia-New 
Zealand 
FTA 
Comprehensive Negotiations: May 2005-May 2009. Signature: Oct 2009. Implementation: 
August 2010 
Active 
Malaysia India 
CECA 
Comprehensive Proposal: Dec 2004. Joint study: Jan 2007. Negotiations: 2008-2010. 
Signature: Feb 2011. Implementation: July 2011 
Active 
 
Malaysia-Chile 
FTA 
Trade in Goods  Proposal: Nov 06. Negotiations: June 2007-May 2010.  
Signature: Nov 2010. Implementation in Feb 2012  
Active  
Malaysia-
Australia FTA 
Comprehensive Negotiations: April 2005-March 2012. Implementation: Jan 2013 Active 
Malaysia-US 
FTA & TPP 
FTA comprehensive 
 
 
TPP comprehensive 
Bilateral Negotiations: June 2006-July 2008 (eight rounds). Suspended 
 
 
Malaysia joined TPP in Oct 2010. Latest round (17th) in May 2013 
Bilateral 
suspended 
 
TPP under 
negotiation 
Malaysia-EU 
FTA 
 
Comprehensive 
ASEAN-EU negotiations: Abandoned in early 2010 
Bilateral negotiations: Dec 2010-ongoing (last round in Sept 2012) 
Under 
negotiation 
Malaysia-
Turkey FTA 
Trade in goods Negotiations: May 2010-ongoing (latest round in Jan 2012) Under 
negotiation 
Source: Governments’ websites (updated as of August 2013) 
 * Only FTAs that reached negotiation status are included. 
 ** Abbreviations in this Table: CECA: Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement; CEPA: Closer Economic Partnership; EHA: 
Early Harvest Agreement EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement; TIFA: Trade and Investment Framework Agreement; TPP: Trans-
Pacific Partnership 
*** HS6 level refers to the 6-digit level of specification under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, which is the 
international nomenclature for goods developed by the World Customs Organization. HS6 includes around 5,500 items.  
 
 
4.1 Early FTAs: top-down policymaking and sectoral interests by a mostly reactive 
private sector 
During negotiations for the ASEAN-China FTA, the first for Malaysia after AFTA, 
consultation with the private sector was limited to FMM and key sectoral associations 
(interviews). ASEAN-China FTA was beneficial for Malaysian producers of palm oil and 
rubber and negotiation on behalf of these sectors was conducted by their respective 
government-linked boards. Field interviews found that some relevant sectors, like the steel 
industry, were not consulted, resulting in the liberalization of some sensitive products under 
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normal track. This reversal incensed the Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry Federation and 
prompted it to take a more active role in successive FTAs.  
Malaysia initiated its bilateral liberalization approach negotiating an FTA with one 
of its largest trading partners, Japan. Consequently, it did not have the chance to hone its 
negotiating skills with smaller partners as Thailand did. With the Malaysia-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement (MJEPA), Malaysia sought not only to expand market access in 
Japan for some key exports, but also to enhance its position as an investment destination. 
On its part, Japan’s main interest laid in eliminating tariffs on automobiles, steel, and 
electrical machinery as well as easing non-tariff barriers and restrictions in services 
(MOFA-MJEPA, 2003; interviews). In contrast to Thailand, FTA impact studies conducted 
directly by MITI or commissioned to other government agencies or think tanks are never 
disclosed to the public. Although the initiative for MJEPA rested with the political 
leadership and top bureaucratic ranks, interviews indicated that business consultation was 
wider than in ASEAN-China FTA and that MITI gathered technical intelligence from 
relevant government agencies and a number of business associations. Coordination of 
MJEPA fell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but MITI dealt with the market access 
component. Some business associations claimed that the Malaysia government negotiated 
early FTAs—including MJEPA but also FTAs with Pakistan and New Zealand—using 
template models and simple trade statistics (interviews) 
Outside a few sectors, MJEPA elicited limited enthusiasm among a mostly 
defensive local business community. Interviews found that support for MJEPA came 
mainly from the palm oil, plastics, and textiles and garments industries. The Malaysian 
Plastics Manufacturers Association was consulted but did not take a leading role while the 
Palm Oil Board and Council conveyed the positions of business associations. Among the 
most proactive associations in MJEPA were the Malaysian Textile Manufacturers 
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Association (MTMA) (see below) and Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry Federation. As 
postulated by Hypothesis 2, the Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry Federation learned from 
its exclusion during the formulation of the ASEAN-China FTA and pressured the 
government for adopting its position during MJEPA. 
In line with Hypothesis 3, MJEPA fostered cross-border collective action between 
organized business groups and firms in both countries. As in Thailand, even before 
negotiations between both governments had started, representatives from the Japan Textile 
Federation met with their counterparts of MTMA to negotiate on a common proposal to put 
forward to their respective governments. Again, Japanese officials often attended these 
meetings. Business collective action and lobbying and government-business consultations 
across borders also occurred in the steel sector. Interviews discovered that the Japan Iron 
and Steel Federation contacted the Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry Federation to find 
areas of agreement. Steel producers in Japan lobbied for liberalization in Malaysia not only 
through the Japanese government, but also directly on the Malaysian government. It is 
worth noting that Japanese officials also contacted the Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry 
Federation to learn on its position and offered it support in pushing for domestic reforms 
(interviews).113  
Negotiations stumbled over liberalization of the highly protected Malaysian 
automotive sector. At the time, Malaysian carmaker PROTON was seeking further delays 
in AFTA implementation, all the while facing financial losses and strong competition from 
Japanese firms at home. Naturally, PROTON opposed liberalization under MJEPA. 
MJEPA was endorsed by the Malaysian Automotive Association, which encompasses all 
foreign assemblers and distributors. The government consulted not only with national 
carmakers and the Malaysian Automotive Association, but also individual Japanese firms 
                                 
113 The Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry Federation eventually succeeded in obtaining the phase out of tariffs on sensitive ítems by 
2015. 
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(interviews).114  Some consultations with the automotive industry involved the MITI 
Minister or Prime Minister Abdullah himself. Some of the informants for this research 
indicated that Japanese carmakers threatened to move all their assembly to Thailand if 
liberalization demands were not met. 
In the final text, Malaysia agreed to open its automotive and steel sectors to Japan 
fully by 2015 (METI-MJEPA, undated). Japan, on the other hand, eliminated tariffs on 
chemicals, plastics and textiles and garments, and offered technical cooperation in several 
areas (see Essays 3 and 4). Since implementation in July 2006, overall utilization of 
MJEPA by Malaysian exporters has been low, at slightly over 10% of total exports. 
However, reflecting initial lobbying interests, sectoral utilization has been heavily 
concentrated with palm oil and plastics alone accounting for about half of the value of all 
Malaysian exports to Japan under MJEPA. Producers in the palm oil, plastics, chemicals, 
and garments sectors use MJEPA preferences in almost 100% of their exports to Japan 
(data from MITI and Essay 2). In turn, Malaysian imports of Japanese automotive parts 
have trebled and constitute now the main import item under MJEPA preferences. 
After MJEPA, the Malaysian government stepped up its FTA activity and 
entertained proposals for FTAs with smaller trading partners and that originated more often 
from these countries than from its own initiative or Malaysian businesses (Table 2).115 In 
2007, Malaysia signed an FTA with Pakistan, the second single largest export destination 
for Malaysian palm oil during the early 2000s and that accounted for 65% of total exports 
to that country. Consultation with the Malaysian private sector was limited to peak 
associations and the Palm Oil Board and Council. Proposals for bilateral FTAs between 
Malaysia and India, New Zealand and Australia emerged from the partner side, soon after 
                                 
114 Automotive parts suppliers for PROTON and PERODUA (through their respective Vendors associations) strongly opposed any 
liberalization, whether through AFTA or bilateral FTAs. By contrast, the Malaysian Automotive Component Parts Manufacturers 
Association, was content with a sufficiently long phase-out of tariffs.  
115 The rationale for some of these FTAs laid primarily in the partners’ interest in gaining access to ASEAN and/or in very specific 
sectoral preferences. Nevertheless, fostering common Islamic roots has been also a factor in many of these FTAs.  
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similar FTAs with ASEAN. Only the negotiations for the Malaysia-Chile and Malaysia-
Turkey FTAs were launched without being preceded by regional accords. As advanced by 
my initial argument, minor economic benefits and limited private sector interest in some of 
these smaller bilateral FTAs have dragged on negotiations.116 The Malaysia-India FTA is 
expected to benefit large and politically influential infrastructure sector firms that lobbied 
for the agreement.117 My interviews found that support for the other four FTAs was 
concentrated in Malaysian garments, rubber and electrical goods producers. Expertise 
gained during previous negotiations helped MITI officials deal with technical issues and 
beyond-border disciplines in the FTAs with New Zealand, Chile and Australia.   
4.2 FTAs with the largest partners: businesses taking the initiative 
The United States has traditionally been Malaysia’s largest market and source of foreign 
investment.118 For Malaysia, a bilateral FTA was therefore important to ease access in the 
United States to its main exports, some like footwear and textiles and garments facing steep 
duties of up to 48%.  In turn, the United States was only interested in a comprehensive FTA 
that could liberalize Malaysian government procurement and services, introduce labor and 
environmental standards and enforce stricter competition policy and intellectual property 
rights. 
 When bilateral talks started in June 2006, Malaysia was not longer a novice at 
negotiating FTAs, but the level of complexity involved in the Malaysia-United States FTA 
(MUSFTA) was far beyond that of any previous FTA. My interviews found that, in line 
with Hypothesis 1, such complexity compelled MITI officials to conduct not only more ex-
                                 
116 In 2009, Malaysia accepted an FTA proposal from Turkey that has attracted limited business interest in Malaysia. Consequently, 
negotiations have been slow. 
117 During interviews, trade negotiators confirmed that political drive for the FTA came from the Indian side. Given Indian resistance to 
opening up key sectors, Malaysia gave low priority to these negotiations. 
118 The importance of the United States as an export destination has declined in recent years. Until 2008, the United States absorbed 
around 20% of all Malaysian exports for 8.3% in 2011, behind China, Singapore and Japan.  
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ante impact analyses but also more consultations with the private sector and other 
government agencies, some of them new to trade negotiations.119 
In the United States, MUSFTA received support from firms in the pharmaceutical 
and services sectors (e.g. logistics, software, finance). On December 2005, before the start 
of negotiations, American multinationals party to the United States-ASEAN Business 
Council created the United States-Malaysia FTA Business Coalition, which along the 
American Chamber of Commerce and other pressure groups lobbied the United States 
Congress and the Trade Representative for a comprehensive deal in MUSFTA.120  
As anticipated by the theoretical framework, the relevance of the United States 
market for Malaysian exporters meant that the push for MUSFTA in Malaysia emerged not 
from the government—in fact, reluctant to open for negotiation key government-controlled 
sectors—but from the private sector itself. Interviews found that FMM and MTMA were 
concerned about the progress in trade negotiations between the United States and other 
ASEAN countries and urged the Malaysian government to seek its own FTA. The FMM, 
which traditionally maintains a behind-the-scenes lobbying approach, took an 
unprecedented active and public position in favor of MUSFTA.121 With the impending loss 
of Trade Promotion Authority by the United States President (see footnote 92), FMM 
pressed for the rapid conclusion of talks that could have put Malaysia several years ahead 
of competing countries.122 At the time of negotiations, the United States accounted for 
almost two thirds of all Malaysian garment exports and, accordingly, MTMA took a 
                                 
119 Liberalizing government procurement and services required changes in highly-sensitive domestic laws favoring ethnic 
Malay/bumiputeras. Agencies involved in an FTA for the first time in MUSFTA included the ministries of Human Resources, of Natural 
Resources and Environment, of Energy, Green Technology and Water, of Information, of Communication and Culture, and of Science, 
Technology and Innovation as well as the Attorney General’s Office.   
120 In May 2006, the American Chamber of Commerce in Malaysia (representing firms with interests in United States-Malaysia relations) 
prepared a report on key areas for liberalization in Malaysia as part of MUSFTA (mimeo).  
121 FMM issued several public statements in support of MUSFTA (e.g., The Edge Daily, March 12, 2007; The Star, March 23, 2007; New 
Straits Times, August 22, 2006).  
122 For FMM, TUSFTA (and now the TPP) was also a tool to open up and make more transparent Malaysia’s government procurement 
system (interviews). 
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proactive position and lobbied the Malaysian government in favor of TUSFTA.123 Another 
key sponsor of MUSFTA was the Pharmaceutical Association of Malaysia, representing 
multinational pharmaceutical firms operating in the country. In turn, the three ethnically-
based chambers and generic drug producers in the Malaysian Organization of 
Pharmaceutical Industries opposed the FTA (interviews; New Straits Times, February 28, 
2007).124  
As predicted by Hypothesis 3, research found that MUSFTA fostered business 
collective action and lobbying across borders. As early as July 2006, MTMA hired 
lobbying firms in the United States to pressure its Trade Representative in favor of 
liberalization of the textile/garment sectors in MUSFTA. Lobbying to American trade 
authorities by MTMA continued until late 2009, more than a year after the last negotiation 
round had stalled (interviews; official records).125 In turn, the United States-Malaysia FTA 
Business Coalition and the American Chamber of Commerce in Malaysia pressured MITI 
officials for the liberalization of services and government procurement (interviews). Field 
interviews also revealed that business communities in different sectors in both countries 
arranged ad-hoc bilateral meetings (between both levels II) to jointly exhort both 
governments for a comprehensive deal.  
As Malaysia embarked on more and more relevant FTAs, the private sector created 
institutions to reduce the transaction costs entailed in collective action and lobbying. 
Coinciding with the start of MUSFTA negotiations, FMM led the creation of the Private 
Sector Task Force on FTAs, with the goal of coordinating positions across business 
associations and provide feedback to MITI officials, who also attend these meetings. 
                                 
123 As in Thailand, the share of the United States market in Malaysian garment exports has progressively declined to an average of 45.3% 
during the 2010-2012 period (Trade Map). 
124 In Malaysia, civil society mobilization against MUSFTA was limited compared to that in Thailand. 
125Clerk of the US House of Representatives, http://disclosures.house.gov/ld/ldsearch.aspx, Office of Public Records, United States 
Senate, http://www.senate.gov/legislative /Public_Disclosure/ LDA_reports.htm, accessed on August 29, 2009).   
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Bilateral negotiations stalled in July 2008 due to Malaysia’s resistance to the 
liberalization of government procurement and services and the change in American FTA 
policy in the region in favor of TPP. Still, interviews found that the Malaysian private 
sector kept pushing both governments for a bilateral FTA until late 2009. FMM and 
MTMA favored a MUSFTA over TPP because the former enhances their leverage during 
negotiations and discriminates against firms from other ASEAN countries. However, when 
the United States made it clear that it would only pursue regional talks, both associations 
started lobbying the Malaysian government to join TPP, pressure that proved key in 
Malaysia’s decision to eventually entering TPP talks in October 2010 (interviews).126  
Among members of the Malaysian private sector and civil society, only an FTA 
with the European Union evokes as much interest, in favor or against, as MUSFTA or TPP. 
Once again, Malaysian exporters favored a bilateral FTA with the European Union that 
could discriminate against other ASEAN competitors while the government preferred an 
ASEAN-European Union FTA, more amenable to exclusion of the sensitive automotive 
and services sectors (interviews). European Union’s abandonment in 2010 of a deal with 
ASEAN in favor of separate bilateral FTAs was welcomed by the FMM and MTMA.  
Bilateral negotiations for the Malaysia-European Union FTA (MEUFTA) started in 
December 2010 (Table 2). European Union’s main priorities in MEUFTA are the 
liberalization of government procurement and services, followed by the opening up of the 
automotive sector. The greatest beneficiaries and supporters in Malaysia of MEUFTA are 
palm oil producers—as a group, Europe is their second largest market of Malaysian palm 
                                 
126 In February 2010, at a meeting between the Malaysian private sector representatives and the Deputy United States Trade 
Representative, the FMM expressed support for TPP and admitted “to be in a position to push the [Malaysian] government toward 
participation in the TPP” (Leaked cable from the United States Embassy in Malaysia, accessed at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/ 
10KUALALUMPUR96.html, accessed on November 25, 2011). Despite strong support for TPP by MTMA, some modelling studies have 
questioned the benefits of TPP for the textile sector (The Edge, September 11, 2012). The Malaysian private sector has also supported 
TPP by way of its participation in the APEC Business Advisory Council. As in MUSTFA, TPP has encountered resistance from generic 
drug producers and civic groups concerned that provisions in intellectual property rights in TPP would hinder access to medicines, an 
argument backed by the Malaysian Health Minister himself (Sun Daily, August 6, 2012). TPP has also spurred government-business 
consultation across borders. In his visit to Malaysia, the United States Trade Representative not only met with Malaysian officials and 
American firms in Malaysia but also with the FMM (Bernama, April 25, 2012). 
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oil—and the machinery, electrical appliance and textile/garment industries.127 By contrast, 
MEUFTA is viewed with special concern by automotive firms, generic drugs 
manufacturers and those that could be adversely affected by the liberalization of 
government procurement and services (e.g., government-linked companies, small and 
medium firms, and civil society groups).  
FMM and MTMA have taken a proactive role in MEUFTA and pushed the 
government to speed up negotiations, especially since Thailand and Indonesia are lagging 
behind in their own deals with the European Union. In a country where consultations with 
the private sector and civil society and pressures to influence policymaking are not aired to 
the public arena, MITI took the unusual move of issuing a public statement to dispel 
NGOs’ concerns about the health, environmental and food security implications of 
MEUFTA.128  
Although initially reluctant to FTAs, Malaysia has already signed or is negotiating a 
number of FTAs and in East Asia is now only second to Singapore in the number of FTAs 
implemented. Like in other areas of Malaysian policymaking, the content and conclusions 
of government consultations with stakeholders in the context of FTA formulation have 
remained closely guarded. Still, field research found that MITI officials have expanded and 
deepened their consultation process and that the preferences and intelligence provided by 
key business associations have been crucial to the development of Malaysia’s FTA 
negotiating positions. In the case of FTAs with potentially significant economic impacts 
(e.g., MUSFTA, TPP, MEUFTA), the private sector, particularly FMM and MTMA, has 
taken an increasingly proactive role. Over time, trade officials and business associations 
have gained greater expertise in FTA negotiation and formulation. Although the level of 
                                 
127 Although European Union tariffs on palm oil products are relatively low, Malaysian exporters face significant non-tariff barriers in the 
form of environmental standards. 
128 Accessed on April 3, 2011 at: http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/contentEmail.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_ebc576cd-c0a8156f-
6f346f34-b884ab1a 
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institutional change and creation spurred by FTAs has not reached (at least yet) that 
occurred in Thailand, new institutional settings to reduce government and business 
coordination, collective action and consultation costs have also emerged in Malaysia.  
 
5. Discussion  
Realist renderings in the FTA policymaking literature contend that systemic constrains and 
power asymmetries at the international level push developing countries, helplessly one after 
another, to enter bilateral FTAs with developed nations. This unidirectional determination 
of national strategies by the international context has often come at the cost of overlooking 
endogenous sources of trade preferences in developing countries. Under the legacy of 
statist models and regional political-military rivalries, common understandings of East 
Asian regionalism have portrayed recent bilateral FTAs as a) driven from political elites 
and with scant participation or interest of the private sector in the formulation of FTAs first 
or in their utilization afterwards and, b) launched primarily for foreign policy and/or 
security motivations rather than economic ones (reviewed in Ravenhill, 2010).129 Only in 
Japan has the private sector been reported to have proactively lobbied its government in 
favor or against FTAs and a clear economic rationale of its FTAs been recognized (e.g., 
Solis, 2003; Manger, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 2005). 
The present study was intended to examine the evolution of bilateral FTA 
policymaking in the two most FTA-active middle-income countries in ASEAN, Thailand 
and Malaysia, and analyze how FTAs have shaped government-business relations. 
Prevailing narratives about East Asian FTAs have emphasized the primacy of political, 
diplomatic, and security motivations over economic ones. With the exception of Japan, 
                                 
129 Literature on policymaking in Thailand and, particularly, Malaysia after the Asian crisis has been highly influenced by statist models 
and reinforced by the personalized and centralized decisionmaking styles of Prime Ministers Thaksin and Mahathir, respectively (Gomez 
and Jomo, 1999; Beeson, 2000; Slater, 2003; Ockey, 2004; Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004; Chaiwat and Phongpaichit, 2008; Siddiquee, 
2013). These views may have led to downplay (or dismiss) the role of the private sector in FTA policymaking. While firms in both 
countries have historically sought to advance particularistic interests through clientelist connections, business associations have gained 
increasing policy influence. Of note, several studies on FTA formulation in Thailand and Malaysia were based on secondary research. 
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these FTAs have reportedly emerged from a cognitive consensus among national political 
leaderships and with little involvement or interest on the part of business. Instead, this 
Essay contended that, compared to multilateral liberalization, the information demands 
posed by bilateral FTA negotiations on trade officials should compel them to intensify 
consultations with the private sector to fill gaps in expertise (Hypothesis 1). At the same 
time, easier assessment of impacts in bilateral FTAs should generate stronger incentives for 
firms to influence their policymaking (Hypothesis 2) as well as greater options for business 
consultations, collective action and lobbying across borders (Hypothesis 3). Information 
and coordination demands by successive FTAs on government and businesses associations 
should encourage both actors to invest in their trade expertise and create institutions to 
reduce transaction costs in FTA formulation (Hypothesis 4). 
Field research for this Thesis confirmed all the initial hypotheses. However, and 
despite differences in their institutional and policymaking frameworks, the evolution of 
FTA formulation in Thailand and Malaysia has followed similar patterns. While the 
formulation of some FTAs in both countries, particularly early ones, may have indeed 
originated from their political leadership, neither constructivism nor foreign policy and 
security arguments provide a sufficient model to explain sectoral variability in 
liberalization within or across FTAs. In fact, it was found that whenever the economic 
argument was weak or unclear, negotiations dragged or were eventually abandoned. This is 
not to say that the preferences of the private sector have exclusively determined Thai and 
Malaysian FTA policymaking or that the political and institutional configurations in these 
countries have not played a critical role. On the contrary, the translation of firms’ generic 
preferences into particular policy choices (e.g. specific levels of tariffs or ROOs, etc) is 
influenced by factors beyond firms such as the institutional setting that, as in other areas of 
policymaking, not simply accepts or rejects preferences but determines what options are 
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available, thus influencing firms’ policy preferences in the first place (Crystal, 2003; Woll, 
2005). The institutional framework and the contextual interactions between government 
and business have influenced FTA policymaking. For instance, a more direct policymaking 
process, a more subdued style of business lobbying and lower civil society contestation 
against FTAs, has placed Malaysia ahead of Thailand in its FTA negotiations with the 
European Union and the TPP.  
At the same time, as argued throughout this Thesis, FTAs have also fed back to the 
institutional setting. As more FTAs were negotiated, consultations by trade officials with 
the private sector and other government agencies became more frequent and formalized—
now a constitutional mandate in Thailand, being particularly intense in demanding FTA 
talks with large developed partners. These government-business consultations were set not 
only to attend private sector preferences (classical pressure lobbying), but also for Thai and 
Malaysian trade officials to gain access to complex technical information needed during 
bilateral FTA negotiations (regulatory lobbying in Woll and Artigas’ [2007] and Woll’s 
[2008] terminology). Nevertheless, interviews found that not all sectors were able to 
participate and not all associations consulted took part on an equal footing.130 Both case 
studies illustrated Schneider’s (2004) argument on how business collective action and 
mobilization is influenced by the way governments engage the private sector in 
policymaking—e.g., exclusion, conflict or cooperation.131 Lack of engagement of some 
economic sectors in early FTAs prompted affected firms and business associations, 
especially peak and more efficient ones, to organize and mobilize, reactively or proactively, 
in subsequent FTAs. For instance, exclusion of the Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry 
Federation in the formulation of the ASEAN-China FTA prompted this association to take 
                                 
130 Small and medium firms, farmers and some services subsectors often lacked representation, either independently or within peak 
associations, and/or did not have the organization, expertise or influence to affect policymaking. When sectors and associations faced 
internal conflicts or in the case of large firms that could leverage their investment, Thai and Malaysian officials directly involved (and/or 
were approached by) individual firms. 
131 Business groups react to the way governments engage them in policymaking, being more likely that they mobilize when they are 
excluded or when their relation with government is marked by conflict (Schneider, 2004).  
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a more active stand in successive FTAs. Conflict between the Thai government and 
Japanese automotive firms in JTEPA increased mobilization by the latter. Lastly, 
cooperation of Thai and Malaysian officials with peak associations strengthened and 
consolidated the consultation process. 
In any case, and independently of the original motivation of an FTA proposal, its 
text must specify the barriers to be removed or maintained, arguably eliciting preferences 
among concerned firms in favor or against. The private sector in both countries has been 
mostly unenthusiastic about previous multilateral and regional liberalization rounds. But 
clearer ex-ante assessment of impacts in bilateral liberalization fostered the involvement in 
FTA policymaking of business associations and firms that remained passive in other forms 
of liberalization. The private sector in both countries participated not only through the 
invited consultation process but, for the most influential and capable associations and firms, 
also proactively. Contrary to the reported apathy of East Asian business about FTAs, it was 
found here that for some sectors and high-impact FTAs, the initiative did not originate from 
the political leadership, but rather from businesses that pushed their host government, and 
sometimes also the partner’s, to initiate and speed up (or delay) talks.  
Field research found that Thai and Malaysian FTAs have largely responded to 
sectoral (even firm-specific) economic interests (see also Essays 2 and 3).132 During the 
1980s and 1990s, multinational firms invested across ASEAN were key supporters of early 
schemes for regional liberalization of intermediate inputs and AFTA itself (Yoshimatsu, 
2002; Yoshimatsu, 2008). As East Asian production networks have expanded and deepened 
over the last two decades, multinationals based in Thailand and Malaysia and operating 
within these networks have pressed host governments to enter into bilateral FTAs. But 
much of the support and push for FTAs in both countries has also originated from domestic 
                                 
132 As benefits from bilateral FTAs could asymmetrically accrue to some firms over others also inside the bloc (Essay 3), private sector 
lobbying regarding FTAs has not only involved business associations intermediating sectoral positions but also individual firms, as 
evidenced in our field research (see Essay 3). 
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exporters involved in traditional one-way horizontal trade (e.g., textiles and garments, 
processed food) seeking easier access to large destination markets.  
Nevertheless, interviews also found that some small firms, including potential 
beneficiaries, did not use FTAs, nor were they even aware about their benefits because their 
associations did not inform them, found FTAs too complex or, simply, were not interested 
in the first place. Whether due to uninterested members, insufficient time to consult them, 
lack of internal coordination capabilities or capture by the most influential firms, interviews 
revealed that, in some instances, business associations’ position on FTAs may have only 
reflected the views of their executive committees.  
Bilateral FTAs offer business groups incentives and options to influence trade 
policymaking in ways that have been overlooked by the extant literature and are missing in 
multilateral negotiations. In any case, increasing private sector involvement in FTA 
formulation over time does not necessarily mean that it will mobilize in any future FTA as 
the limited enthusiasm raised by some recent proposals demonstrates. Nevertheless, firms 
have become increasingly aware of FTA impacts and the institutional setting for business 
collective action and government-business relations is already in place. It could be 
therefore expected that businesses that could be potentially affected by prospective FTAs 
will mobilize, in favor or against, to influence its sectoral formulation.  
Both case studies confirmed the initial proposition (Hypothesis 3) that bilateral 
FTAs foster business collective action and lobbying across borders (Table 3). Likewise, 
empirical evidence showed that bilateral FTAs facilitate cross-border consultation by a 
government with business sectors in the partner country  (Table 3).  
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Table 3: Hypothesis 3: Business collective action and lobbying and government-business 
consultations across borders * 
 
 
FTA 
 
 
Relationship Type 
 
Example 
 
Period** 
JTEPA Business collective action across 
borders (between both levels II) 
Meetings between Japanese and Thai textiles/garments 
associations to negotiate a common position. Also participated by 
Japanese officials 
Before and during 
of negotiations 
JTEPA Business collective action across 
borders (between both levels II) 
Business associations representing Thai processed food 
producers contacted wholesale buyers and trading companies to 
consolidate lobbying positions 
Before and during 
negotiations 
JTEPA Business lobbying across 
borders (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
Japanese automotive firms lobbying Thai and Japanese 
governments 
Before and during 
negotiations 
JTEPA Business collective action  
(between both levels II) and 
lobbying (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
across borders 
Thai and Japanese peak business associations coordinated 
demands to the Thai and Japanese governments to expand FTA 
coverage and accelerate liberalization schedules 
After 
implementation 
(February 2011)*** 
TUSFTA Business collective action  
(between both levels II) and 
lobbying (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
across borders 
American multinationals sponsored United States-Thailand 
Business Coalition to lobby both governments for a comprehensive 
FTA 
Before and during 
negotiations 
TUSFTA Cross-border government-
business consultation and 
lobbying (between level I in one 
country and level II in the other) 
The United States negotiation team met with Thai business 
associations during visits to Thailand 
During 
negotiations 
TUSFTA Business lobbying across 
borders (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
Thai garment and processed food associations contracted 
lobbyists in the United States to pressure the United States Trade 
Representative for American liberalization of their sectors 
Before and during 
negotiations. 
Continued after 
talks stalled 
MJEPA Business collective action across 
borders (between both levels II) 
Meetings between Japanese and Malaysian textiles/garments 
associations to negotiate a common position. Also participated by 
Japanese officials 
Before and during 
of negotiations 
MJEPA Business collective action across 
borders (between both levels II) 
Meetings between Japanese and Malaysian iron and steel 
associations to negotiate a common position. 
Before start of 
negotiations 
MJEPA Business lobbying across 
borders (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
Japanese steel producers lobbied directly to Malaysian authorities During 
negotiations 
MJEPA 
 
 
Cross-border government-
business consultation and 
lobbying (between level I in one 
country and level II in the other) 
Japanese officials contacted the Malaysian steel association to 
learn about its position and offered support in pushing for domestic 
reforms 
During 
negotiations 
MUSFTA 
 
 
Business lobbying across 
borders (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
Malaysian textiles and garments producers contracted lobbyists in 
the United States to pressure the United States Trade 
Representative for American liberalization of their sectors 
Before and during 
negotiations. 
Continued after 
talks stalled 
MUSFTA 
 
 
Business lobbying across 
borders (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
American multinationals sponsored the United States-Malaysia 
FTA Business Coalition to lobby to both governments for a 
comprehensive FTA 
Before and during 
of negotiations 
MUSFTA 
 
 
Business lobbying across 
borders (level II in one country 
lobbying level I in the other) 
American interest groups based in Malaysia lobbied Malaysian 
officials for Malaysian liberalization in MUSFTA 
Before and during 
of negotiations 
MUSFTA 
 
Business collective action across 
borders (between both levels II) 
Malaysian and American business communities arranged bilateral 
meetings to find consensus points on MUSFTA 
Before and during 
of negotiations 
Source: Field research interviews except for *** (Bangkok Post, February 19, 2011) 
*  See text for details. Collective action and lobbying across borders also occurred for civil society groups. Thai civic groups urged the 
European Union Parliament to avoid that the Thailand-European Union FTA includes provisions beyond the WTO on intellectual 
property rights. 
** Evidence obtained for the indicated period. It cannot be excluded that these relationships also occurred before and after then. 
 
 
 
 As noted earlier, the opportunity for business associations to be consulted by 
governments depends on their reliability as sources of information as well as on their 
capacity to deliver consensual positions. Frequently, as many as 4-5 bilateral and regional 
FTAs are being negotiated simultaneously, so business associations in Thailand and 
Malaysia have had to collect more often their members’ positions and coordinate them both 
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internally and with other business groupings. Associations with strong secretariats and that 
have developed strong technical capabilities and achieved internal collective action (e.g., 
FTI, TCC, TTMA/TGMA, TFFA/TFPA in Thailand or FMM and MTMA in Malaysia) 
have had more chance to be heeded by governments. However, this is not to say, as 
discussed earlier, that individual firms do not have direct access to the new FTA 
policymaking process or that unintermediated clientelist channels have all but entirely 
disappeared.133 
 
Table 4: Hypothesis 4: Institutional creation and change by iterative FTAs 
 
 
FTA 
 
Institution 
 
Sponsor 
 
Functions Served 
 
 
Period 
JTEPA and 
successive   
FTAs 
 
Overarching committee on 
FTAs 
Dedicated subcommittees on 
JTEPA and ulterior FTAs  
 
 
Thai peak (FTI, 
TCC) and 
sectoral 
business 
associations  
* Business collective action and coordination of 
inputs from members 
* Business collective action and coordination of 
positions with other associations in Thailand and 
FTA partners 
* Focal point for government officials  
* Lobbying Thai and FTA partner governments 
Mid-2004 
onwards 
JTEPA and 
successive 
FTAs 
National Committee on FTA 
Strategy and Negotiations 
Thai 
government 
(Cabinet level) 
* Government inter-agency consultation and 
coordination at the cabinet level 
* Provide direction and coordination among 
government agencies and across multiple FTAs 
November 
2004 onwards 
Thai FTAs 
launched 
after 2007 
 
 
Institutionalization of 
consultations with business 
and civil society in Thai 
FTAs: Article 190 of the 2007 
Thai Constitution 
Sponsored by 
the NGO FTA 
Watch and 
adopted by the 
government and 
constituent 
parliament 
* Mandatory consultations by the government with 
business groups and civil society 
* Mandatory approval of FTA negotiations and 
final texts by the Thai Parliament  
* Mandatory compensation of sectors negatively 
affected by FTAs 
2007 onwards 
Malaysian 
FTAs after 
mid-2006 
 
Private Sector Task Force on 
FTAs 
Malaysia peak 
business 
association 
(FMM) 
* Business collective action and coordination of  
positions across business associations  
* Feedback and lobbying to government officials 
also attending meetings  
Mid-2006 
onwards 
  Source: Field research interviews 
 
Field research confirmed that successive FTA negotiations have been a formative 
process for politicians, bureaucracies and businesses (Hypothesis 4). At the least, FTA 
negotiations have enhanced the technical trade expertise and institutional capacity of 
government agencies and organized business. But as more FTAs have been pursued (often 
simultaneously), and interactions within and among agencies and business associations 
became more frequent, the information, consultation and coordination costs entailed in such 
iterative process have spurred the creation of ad-hoc and permanent institutions for 
                                 
133 In both countries, influential and proactive individual firms used any channel available to them to affect FTA policymaking.  
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government inter-agency coordination, private sector collective action and government-
business intermediation (Table 4). 
Broader and more frequent consultations with stakeholders, mainly businesses but 
also civil society, in the course of FTAs negotiations have helped government and firms in 
both countries to better define their preferences and resulted in a more accountable trade 
policymaking process. More importantly, and without entering into normative debates 
about the economic or developmental merits or demerits of FTAs, strengthening of the 
technical capacities of all stakeholders could potentially be transferred to other areas of 
policymaking while the institutional structures created for FTA formulation may endure to 
provide similar functions during WTO rounds. 
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Essay 2 — Beyond Trade Creation. Explaining  
Utilization of Free Trade Agreements by Sectoral     
             Interests and Binding of Unilateral Concessions 
 
       Utilization of Free Trade Agreements and unilateral liberalization     
       schemes in Thailand and Malaysia 134 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Much of the literature on East Asian regionalism downplays the economic rationale of recent free trade 
agreements (FTAs) that, accordingly, have been barely used by the private sector in the region. However, 
evidence published elsewhere for Japan and reported in Essay 1 for Thailand and Malaysia indicate that some 
business groups in these countries actively pushed governments in support of FTA liberalization. To solve 
this apparent paradox, this Essay contends that analysis of FTA utilization needs to be conducted at the 
sectoral level and put into the context of both the political economies that originally set FTAs in place and 
existing unilateral liberalization schemes. Analysis of highly disaggregated preferential trade records in 
Thailand and Malaysia—the two most FTA-active developing countries in East Asia—revealed that overall 
utilization of most bilateral FTAs has been indeed low but hid significant sectoral variability. Sectors that 
used FTA preferences to the greatest extent included those that successfully lobbied for FTA liberalization 
during negotiations. It was also found that utilization of Thai and Malaysian FTAs displayed stronger 
correlation with the previous use of unilateral liberalization schemes (e.g., Generalized System of Preferences 
and duty drawback programs) than with the preferential tariff margin afforded by FTAs. FTAs should be 
therefore evaluated not only for their capacity to create new trade flows but also for legally binding tariffs that 
were unbound (or bound with large overhangs) at the multilateral level and/or were previously offered 
unilaterally and therefore subject to removal at the discretion of the granting country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
134 Essay 2 was originally written in August 2012. It was updated in early 2013 with analysis of trade 
flows between Thailand and Malaysia and their FTA partners for the period ending in December 
2012.  
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Abbreviations: 
 
APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
DDE: duty drawback or exemption 
FDI: foreign direct investment 
FTA: free trade agreement 
GSP: generalized system of preferences 
JTEPA: Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement 
MFN: Most-favored-nation 
MJEPA: Malaysia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
PCO: Preferential certificate of origin 
ROO: Rules of origin 
TAFTA: Thailand-Australia FTA 
UR: utilization rate 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
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1. Introduction 
Until the turn of the century, and with the single exception of the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) bloc, East Asia was the only region untouched by the worldwide 
proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) that started in the mid-1990s.135 However, 
East Asian countries are now among the most active embracing FTAs, with close to 60 
already implemented since 2002, most of them as bilateral treaties.136 
Most scholarly works on East Asian FTAs have pointed to their lack of economic 
relevance and emphasized instead political, strategic, and/or security rationales as primary 
motivations (e.g., Desker, 2004; Aggarwal and Koo, 2006; Dent 2006; Sally, 2006; Dieter, 
2007; Aggarwal and Koo, 2008; Ravenhill, 2008b; Ravenhill, 2010; Lee, 2013). These 
narratives portray East Asian FTAs as emerging from political elites in strong states and 
without significant participation by interest groups (Aggarwal and Koo, 2006; Lee, 2006; 
Sally, 2006; Terada, 2009; Ravenhill, 2010). The only exception to this pattern of top-down 
FTA formulation seems to have been Japan, where the private sector has played an 
important role in the evolution of FTA policy (Solis, 2003; Manger, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 
2005; Yoshimatsu, 2006b; Solis and Urata, 2007; Manger, 2009; Katada and Solis 2010; 
Solis 2010; Manger, 2012).137 Field research for this Thesis (Essay 1) found evidence that 
the private sector in Thailand and Malaysia has not only participated in FTA formulation 
but that in FTAs with significant sectoral economic impacts it actually took the initiative 
and pushed governments to start negotiations. On the other hand, whenever the ex-ante 
                                 
135 Although the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) was signed in 1992, it did not achieve much liberalization until recently. In addition to long tariff 
phase-out periods, its implementation was poor as many countries moved their sensitive items to exclusion lists (Yoshimatsu, 2006a; 
Ravenhill, 2008a; Ravenhill, 2009). It was not until 2003 that tariffs were eventually reduced to 0-5% (with the exception of the 
Malaysian automotive sector) and fully eliminated in 2010. The less developed countries of Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam are 
allowed longer implementation periods. 
136 As of August 11, 2013, East Asian countries have already signed 56 FTAs with partners inside and outside the region (Databases from 
ADB-ARIC, undated and WTO-RTAIS, undated). 
137 Some authors in the first camp have downplayed the driving role of business groups in Japanese FTAs and considered them as reactive 
to earlier initiatives by the Japanese government (Ravenhill, 2010).  
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economic rationale of Thai and Malaysian FTAs, even if only narrowly sectoral, was 
missing or unclear, negotiations dragged on for years or suspended altogether. 
In addition to question the ex-ante economic rationale and engagement of the 
private sector in the formulation of East Asian FTAs, a majority of academic works in the 
subject emphasize the ex-post indifference by businesses and low overall utilization of 
ASEAN and bilateral FTAs already in place (Sally, 2006; Sally, 2007; Baldwin, 2008; 
Manchin and Pelkmans, 2008; Ravenhill, 2008a; Ravenhill, 2010). The utilization of 
ASEAN FTA (AFTA) preferences has been estimated at 5% (Haddad et al., 2007; Baldwin, 
2008) and, in a 2007 survey among Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia, only 13.3% of 
exporters used or planned to use existing FTAs in the region (JETRO, 2007).138  
Low levels of FTA utilization by businesses in East Asia have been reasoned on 
several accounts (Sally, 2006; Baldwin, 2008; Ravenhill, 2008b; Ravenhill, 2010). First, 
the geographical inconsistence between region-wide production networks and mostly 
bilateral FTAs. Secondly, the fact that a large share of intra-East Asian trade is comprised 
by parts and components—29.4% of total exports in 2011 (RIETI-TID database)—, that 
tend to attract low applied multilateral tariffs, making unnecessary the use of FTAs. Lastly, 
low utilization of FTA preferences has been charged to strict and inconsistent rules of 
origin (ROOs) across FTAs.139 As countries sign into multiple FTAs, exporters must adapt 
their production process to diverging ROOs and the costs imposed by them could reduce 
(or even cancel out) the preferential margin granted by an FTA and, consequently its appeal  
(Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2006).140  
                                 
138 Although successive firm level surveys by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) have reported an increase in the use (or 
intention to use) of East Asian FTAs, utilization remained low at 37.7% in 2012, despite this figure also includes FTAs with partners 
outside the region (e.g., India, Mexico, Chile, Switzerland) (JETRO, 2013). 
139 ROOs determine whether a product has undergone a minimum level of transformation within the FTA bloc. ROOs also apply to other 
preferential tariff arrangements such as GSP. ROOs are included in FTAs and GSP to avoid trans-shipment across countries with lower 
external tariffs or that benefit from unilateral preferential treatment, respectively.  
140 This process is often referred as the spaghetti or noodle bowl effect (Bhagwati, 1995; Baldwin, 2008). In addition to the restructuring 
costs involved in adapting production structure to ROOs, exporters often must submit an application for the use of FTA preferences 
(preferential certificates of origin, see below), which involves additional fee and logistic costs, sometimes outside the possibilities of 
smaller firms. 
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However, this and other Essays in this Thesis provide evidence that counter the 
three arguments above. First, bilateral FTAs provide specific benefits to firms involved in 
regional production networks (see Essay 3). Secondly, while tariffs on a large share of parts 
and components have indeed been reduced, much of this liberalization has occurred 
through unilateral preferential arrangements such as duty exemptions and drawback 
schemes (DES/DDS), often linked to export and investment promotion strategies (see 
below). Most developing economies in the region also benefit from reduced tariffs on some 
of their exports to developed countries through the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) programs. But the unilateral nature of DES/DDS and GSP makes them potentially 
removable at the discretion of the granting country. And third, as quantitative and 
qualitative research for this Essay found, ROOs in East Asian FTAs may not have had the 
highly restrictive effect on FTA utilization anticipated by some studies (see below).  
In addition, accounts of low FTA utilization in most studies are grounded on 
estimates of unspecified methodology or on firm-level surveys that, besides the limitations 
inherent to any survey, do not weight the share of surveyed firms in trade flows (JETRO, 
2007; Hiratsuka, 2008; JETRO, 2009; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2009; Wignaraja et al., 2010; 
Wignaraja et al., 2011). Proper calculation of FTA utilization requires gathering of official 
administrative records, so-called Preferential Certificates of Origin (PCOs), administrative 
records certifying that the product to be exported complies with the ROOs established by 
the FTA, or Customs records for preferential treatment of imports at the point of entry. In 
East Asia, these administrative records are only collected and/or accessible in Thailand and 
Malaysia and reported publicly only for exports and at the aggregate level.141  
                                 
141 In most East Asian countries, exporters could self-report compliance with ROOs so PCOs are not issued or collected. In countries 
where PCOs are issued, they are granted by government authorities in the exporting country, usually the trade ministry or a surrogate 
(e.g., a peak business association). Thailand and Malaysia publish overall FTA utilization rates for exports, never for imports. In the case 
of Malaysia, public data on overall FTA utilization for exports covers only a few years. Disaggregated data on exports and imports under 
preferential regimes (PCOs and Custom records, respectively), as used in this Essay, are only rarely made available (see below).  
3. Essay 2 
 115 
It is contended here that collection and analysis of FTA utilization data need to be 
put into a sectoral context. As East Asian countries have progressively liberalized their 
tariffs multilaterally, high tariffs and tariff peaks on final products but also on some parts 
and components have become increasingly concentrated on a reduced number of sensitive 
sectors. Therefore, only highly disaggregated data on preferential trade and a sectoral 
analysis of FTA utilization could evaluate the impact and economic relevance of FTAs. To 
the best of my knowledge, only two publications have made use of disaggregated 
preferential trade records for Thai bilateral FTAs (Kohpaiboon, 2010; Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon, 2011), but none for Malaysian FTAs.142 Both works conclude that supply 
factors are more important that tariff savings in FTA utilization. Kohpaiboon (2010) 
conducts an econometric analysis of variables affecting the use of Thai FTAs (see below).  
This Essay will analyze the utilization of FTAs in Thailand and Malaysia, the two 
most FTA-active developing countries in East Asia, in the context of other preferential 
trade schemes. As indicated above, Thailand and Malaysia are the only countries in the 
region that collect administrative records for trade flows under FTAs, GSP and DES/DDS. 
Of note, Thailand and Malaysia rank among the largest users of the Japanese GSP program 
for the period immediately before negotiations for JTEPA and MJEPA started (Komuro, 
2009). The main aims and arguments of this Essay are two. First, to analyze data on 
utilization of selected Thai and Malaysian FTAs at a high level of disaggregation and 
confront them with qualitative data on the domestic and international political economies of 
their formulation (as reported in Essay 1). It will be posited that economic sectors that 
lobbied for FTA liberalization and saw their preferences embodied in the final FTA 
treaties, should make high use of FTA preferences. Secondly, sectoral utilization of FTAs 
will be examined in relation to utilization of GSP and DES/DDS preferences. The 
                                 
142 In his study of Thai FTAs, Chirathivat (2007) draws only on overall utilization rates and shortly after implementation (2005-2007) 
when many tariffs had not been reduced yet. 
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possibility of unilateral removal of GSP and DES/DDS preferences by the granting country 
creates uncertainty for firms using these schemes. In this line, it has been found that, other 
things equal, the greater the political trade dependence of a developing country on the 
United States and European GSP schemes, the higher the likelihood that the developing 
country enters an FTA with its Northern partners (Shadlen, 2008; Manger and Shadlen, 
2013).143 Consequently, this Essay will argue that goods covered by unilateral tariff 
reduction schemes are more likely to be included in FTAs and to be liberalized faster, and 
that producers that benefit from GSP or DES/DDS are also more likely to use FTAs 
preferential tariffs later. 
Despite some sectoral differences between Thailand and Malaysia and among 
FTAs, analysis of official preferential trade records in both countries rendered similar 
findings and conclusions. It was found that overall utilization of Thai and Malaysian FTAs 
is higher than the projected by estimates and surveys, although in most cases still low by 
the standards of well-established FTAs in other regions. However, low overall FTA 
utilization rates hide significant sectoral variability and sectors that lobbied for FTA 
liberalization and/or use GSP and DES/DDS have made higher utilization of Thai and 
Malaysian FTAs.  
The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows. Next two sections will briefly 
outline the Thai and Malaysian FTAs object of the study. Section four develops the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses that would be confronted with empirical evidence 
presented in sections five and six. Section seven discusses findings and concludes.  
 
 
 
                                 
143 Most of these North-South bilateral FTAs are highly asymmetrical with developing countries surrendering policy space in exchange 
for securing market access provided by the GSP (Shadlen, 2005; Shadlen 2008). 
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2. Thai preferential trade regimes with Australia and Japan   
In addition of being party to WTO, Thailand is founding member of AFTA. In East Asia, 
Thailand was only second to Singapore to jump into the FTA bandwagon although its 
initial rush for FTAs has slowed down since 2006. As of August 2013, Thailand has 
implemented five bilateral trade agreements plus, as member of ASEAN, five regional 
ASEAN+1 FTAs (see Table 1, Essay 1).144 Of these, the most relevant bilateral FTAs for 
Thailand in terms of trade value are those with Australia and Japan.  
Australia has historically ranked among the main trading partners for Thailand. 
Trade flows with Australia are highly concentrated, dominated by petroleum and mineral 
resources in the import side, and by automobiles and jewelry among exports (Trade Map 
database). Thailand is eligible to preferential tariffs under the Australian GSP program but 
there is no information on its utilization as Thai exporters are not required to file PCOs (see 
footnote 141). The Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) was the first comprehensive FTA 
signed by Thailand with a developed country. Businesses potentially affected by the accord 
tried to influence its formulation (Essay 1). Thai textiles and garments producers, facing at 
the time strong competition in the Australian market from other developing countries, 
proactively lobbied for the agreement.145 Field research also found strong support for the 
TAFTA among the jewelry and food processing sectors. Conversely, Thai dairy producers 
and small-scale farmers, expected to lose from TAFTA, opposed it. But the key sponsors of 
TAFTA were automotive firms. Since the late 1990s, Thailand has become the Southeast 
Asian hub for international carmakers and the Thai government has protected the 
automotive industry, dominated by Japanese firms, behind high import tariffs (reviewed in 
Natsuda and Thoburn, 2013). Carmakers based in Thailand supported liberalization of the 
sector within ASEAN as to rationalize procurement and production strategies but they have 
                                 
144 ASEAN+1 refer to FTAs anchored around ASEAN. ASEAN has FTAs with China, Japan, Korea, Australia/New Zealand and India 
and tend to be less comprehensive and provide for slower liberalization than their respective bilateral agreements.  
145 Least-developed countries enjoyed lower tariffs from the Australian GSP program. 
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always opposed any liberalization by Thailand outside ASEAN. However, being Australia 
the single largest market for Thailand-made vehicles and having presence in both countries, 
Japanese and American carmakers lobbied both governments for reciprocal liberalization of 
vehicles and automotive parts in TAFTA. The final TAFTA treaty, which entered into 
effect in 2005, established the progressive but full opening of the automotive sector in both 
countries, granted improved access in Australia to Thai textiles and garments and provided 
the Thai dairy sector with up to twenty years to fully liberalize (DFAT, undated).  
For Thailand, Japan has traditionally been not only its main investor and source of 
imports but also a major export market.146 Although some key Thai exports are not covered 
by the Japanese GSP (e.g., many agricultural products, some sensitive textiles and 
garments, footwear) and others receive only partial tariff reduction (e.g., processed food) 
(UNCTAD, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011; Japanese Customs, undated), around 10% of all Thai 
exports to Japan in 2005 took place under this scheme (data provided by the Thai Ministry 
of Commerce: Japan Customs, undated; see below).147 
Through the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA), Thailand 
hoped to improve access in Japan for its agricultural and processed food products, textiles 
and garments and jewelry items as well as attract further investment (Essay 1). JTEPA was 
also sought by Japanese businesses looking to reduce high tariffs prevailing in the Thai 
automotive and steel industries, to integrate the textile and garment industries at the 
ASEAN level and to extract concessions from Thailand in investment and services (MOFA, 
2003). Consequently, Japanese textile and food producers and their trading companies 
favored the agreement. But, as in TAFTA, it was the automotive sector where business 
efforts to influence JTEPA were more intense (Essay 1). Japanese carmakers produce in 
Thailand a wide range of automobiles and dominate local sales and exports but, at the time 
                                 
146 Japan is the second export destination for Thailand, behind the United States until 2009 and China since then (Trade Map database). 
147 Between 2000 and 2005, Thailand accounted for 8-10% of all Japanese imports under GSP preferences and was second only to China 
as beneficiary of the program (Komuro, 2006). 
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of negotiations, they still imported from Japan higher-engine luxury cars, 30% of all 
automotive parts and 80% of the flat rolled steel used by the industry. The Thai government 
did not want that JTEPA could make redundant existing or future investment by 
international carmakers. Therefore, in the final agreement, implemented in November 
2007, Thailand accepted the progressive liberalization of automotive parts and steel but 
only a reduction from 80% to 60% in the tariffs on luxury vehicles and left unchanged 
those on smaller-engine cars. In turn, Japan eliminated tariffs on Thai garments and 
textiles, footwear, jewelry, plastics, processed food and established within quota tariff 
reductions on some agricultural products (METI-JTEPA, undated). 
 
3. Malaysian preferential trade regimes with Japan   
As Thailand, Malaysia is also founding member of WTO and AFTA. Although initially 
reluctant to enter into bilateral FTAs, fear of exclusion from those signed by competing 
countries prompted Malaysia to initiate FTA negotiations with some of its key trade 
partners. In addition to AFTA and the five regional ASEAN+1 FTAs, as of August 2013 
Malaysia has six bilateral FTAs in force. However, only for the oldest, the Malaysia-Japan 
economic partnership Agreement (MJEPA), implemented in 2006, there is disaggregated 
historical data on PCOs for exports. (Table 2, Essay 1).148 
 Historically, Japan has been the main source of imports for Malaysia and a major 
export market.149 Around 12% of Malaysian exports to Japan during the mid-2000s 
benefited of the Japanese GSP, being these highly concentrated in palm oil, wood and 
furniture and plastics and chemicals that receive full exemption or highly reduced tariffs 
(data provided by the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry; Japan 
                                 
148 When field research for this Thesis started, Malaysian only had bilateral FTAs with Japan and Pakistan, the latter just implemented 
and with a small trading volumes. On recent years, Malaysia has signed bilateral FTAs with New Zealand (August 2010), India (July 
2011), Chile (February 2012) and Australia (January 2013). 
149 Only since 2008 has Japan been surpassed by China and, more recently, by Singapore as largest source of imports. On the export side, 
Japan has been only behind Singapore, and since 2009 also to China, as the main destination (Trade Map database). 
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Customs, undated; see below).150 Support for MJEPA among Malaysian businesses was 
centered among producers of palm oil, textiles and garments, chemicals and plastics that 
faced high tariffs and non-tariff barriers in Japan (Essay 1). On its part, Japan sought the 
elimination of all type of trade barriers on the highly protected automotive sector as well as 
those existing on steel and electrical machinery.151 As in Thailand, negotiations stumbled 
around the automotive sector, as the Malaysia government sought to protect its national car 
manufacturers from Japanese imports. By the final text, which entered into effect in June 
2006, MJEPA established the full opening of the Malaysian automotive and steel sectors by 
2015 while Japan would progressively eliminate tariffs on palm oil, chemicals, plastics and 
textiles and garments (METI-MJEPA, undated; MITI, undated) (Essay 1). 
 
4. Analytical framework: Linking FTA utilization to sectoral business interests and 
binding of unilateral preferential tariff schemes 
A number of studies have questioned the economic relevance of recent East Asia FTAs 
(e.g., Sally, 2006; Ravenhill, 2008b; Ravenhill, 2010). This Essay started off from the 
obvious proposition that FTAs are selectively used by those exporters that benefit from 
them. Consequently, overall FTA utilization rates provide little information about the 
relevance of an FTA to a given economic sector and that could only be assessed through 
analysis of disaggregated utilization data.  
During the course of this Thesis, two studies analyzing disaggregated data on the 
utilization of East Asia FTAs have been published, both for Thai FTAs (Kohpaiboon, 2010; 
Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2011). The former examines the utilization of AFTA, TAFTA 
and JTEPA by Thai exporters in 2008 and finds that utilization was concentrated in highly 
                                 
150 During 2000-2005, Malaysia was either the  third or fourth largest user of the Japanese GSP program, representing 6.6-7.2% of all 
Japanese imports under the scheme (Komuro, 2006). 
151 Malaysian producers of iron and steel also active during MJEPA negotiations but not so much as to expand their market in Japan as to 
avoid sudden liberalization of sensitive ítems as it had occurred in previous FTAs (see Essay 1). 
3. Essay 2 
 121 
traded items. Through an econometric analysis, it also shows that FTA utilization positively 
correlates with the tariff savings provided by the FTA and inversely with ROOs (see 
below). The study estimates that ROOs in these FTAs amount to an excess tariff between 
2% and 10%.152 Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2011) examines the top ten most traded items 
under TAFTA and compares their share in total trade flows before and after 
implementation of the agreement. Interestingly, these authors found that TAFTA has not 
significantly altered previous bilateral trade patterns except for an increase in the share of 
cars exported by Thailand (see below). The study downplays the trade-creating effects of 
FTAs and concludes that the largest users of FTAs are already established exporters and 
that supply factors and ROOs may be more important than tariff savings in FTA utilization.  
While these studies are illuminating, several issues are worth discussing here. First, 
the trade creation effect of an FTA may be difficult to ascertain when trade flows are very 
concentrated on a small number of goods, as occurs for many countries. Second, FTAs 
should be valued not only for their trade creation effects but also for establishing a legal 
commitment to bind preferential tariffs at or below the multilateral applied tariff level (see 
below). Third, utilization of a particular FTA should be related to evolving dynamics in 
general and preferential trade flows over time. Fourth, as important as what sectors are the 
main overall users of an FTA is to investigate what sectors use FTA preferences to the 
fullest extent, independently of trade value, placing FTA utilization into context with the 
political economies at the origin of that FTA. Lastly, and related to the second point, FTAs 
should also be considered for their capacity to replace existing unilateral preferential tariff 
schemes. I will now take these arguments in turn.  
As advanced in the Introduction, much of the liberalization in East Asia over the 
last two decades has taken place through unilateral reductions in applied tariffs, often 
                                 
152 The restricting effect of ROOs in the utilization of Thai FTAs in Kohpaiboon (2010) is corroborated by other econometric studies 
(Intaravitak et al., 2011) and is in line with the excess tariff equivalent of ROOs in other FTAs (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004). A 
more detailed discussion of the variables specified in Kohpaiboon’s (2010) model is described below.  
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linked to export promotion strategies (e.g., DES/DDS). In fact, East Asian unilateral 
liberalization has been put forward as an argument for the dispensability of ongoing FTAs 
(Ravenhill, 2010). However, in addition to the uncertainty about their potential removal by 
the granting country inherent to any unilateral preferential scheme, pockets of high tariffs 
and tariff peaks on both finished good and parts and components still exist in many East 
Asian countries. A substantial share of tariffs are either not bound or bound at a higher 
level than the applied tariff, creating binding overhangs.153 Independently of how low 
applied tariffs in East Asia may have gone over time, FTAs create legal commitments that 
bind tariffs below the bound tariff level at WTO, thus increasing predictability in trade 
exchanges. An illustration of the value that developing countries attach to their control over 
binding overhangs is found in the concession schedules offered by Thailand and Malaysia 
in their FTAs. Research for this Essay found that for a small share of tariff lines, the initial 
tariff granted by the FTA is above the applied most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff (DFAT; 
METI-JTEPA; METI-MJEPA) (see below).  
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade establishes that FTAs 
should fully liberalize a significant share of trade within a reasonable period. While these 
requirements are most often interpreted as 90% of existing trade and 10 years, respectively, 
sensitive items in some FTAs are liberalized over longer periods or excluded altogether. 
When negotiating FTA concessions on sensitive items—which tariffs are either not bound 
under WTO or bound with large overhangs—it would be expected that a motivated 
government, one that attaches value to its control over binding overhangs, would 
strategically use FTA flexibilities regarding coverage and sequencing. 
 
                                 
153 Tariff binding refers to a country’s commitment under WTO rules not to increase the duty on a given item over the specified rate once 
it has been bound. In 2006, at the time when the FTAs examined in this Essay were negotiated, the average MFN tariff on non-
agricultural products applied in Thailand was 3.1 times higher (25.5% versus 8.2%) than the average bound tariff, 1.8 times in the case of 
Malaysia (14.9% versus 7.9%) (WTO, 2006). Some developed countries also have significant tariff overhang. For instance, for the same 
year, the average applied tariff on non-agricultural goods in Australia tripled the average bound tariff (11.0% versus 3.9%) (WTO, 2006). 
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Hypothesis 1: Governments would strategically negotiate FTAs to ensure 
that sensitive goods—with unbound tariffs or large binding overhangs at the 
multilateral level—are excluded, phased out over long periods and/or 
receive FTA duties that are initially above applied tariffs. 
 
Most FTAs establish several tracks for liberalization. An initial group of tariff 
codes, mostly products that attract low multilateral tariffs—or as found in this research, 
items that benefit from unilateral preferential treatment (see below)—receive immediate, 
often complete, liberalization. For the bulk of goods, tariffs are reduced progressively, 
frequently with a lag time before any liberalization occurs, until they reach certain level or 
are completely eliminated. Finally, in some FTAs, a small set of highly sensitive products 
is excluded from any tariff liberalization. It could be therefore expected that: a) FTA 
utilization should increase over time, often with a lag and in successive waves, and b) as 
more items are progressively liberalized, concentration in FTA utilization should decline. A 
force in the opposite direction could potentially counter the last proposition. Empirical 
evidence indicates that FTA liberalization prompts members of the bloc to reduce their 
external MFN tariffs (Ornelas, 2005a; Ornelas, 2005b; Calvo-Pardo et al., 2011). In that 
regard, FTAs could be considered as a mere accelerated track with respect to multilateral 
liberalization. As the members of an FTA bind their external MFN tariffs at the level 
previously established by the FTA, the preferential tariff margin granted by the FTA is 
progressively eroded and, consequently incentives for FTA utilization decrease while 
concentration of its use increases.154  
 
                                 
154 In an FTA and for a given good code and point in time, preferential tariff margin refers to the difference between the MFN applied 
tariff and the preferential tariff granted by the FTA (same applies for GSP or DES/DDS preferences, see below). These opposing trends 
make falsifiability of the hypothesis more difficult and highlight the need for analyses on FTAs utilization that consider how the 
preferential tariff margin for any given good evolves over time. 
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Hypothesis 2: Sequencing of liberalization in FTAs should translate into 
low but concentrated FTA utilization at initial stages of implementation. As 
tariffs are phased out, FTA utilization should increase and concentration of 
its use decline. On the other hand, a subsequent multilateralization of FTA 
preferences should reduce incentives for FTA utilization and increase 
concentration of its use. 
 
Although numerous studies question the participation of the private sector in the 
formulation of East Asian FTAs (e.g., Ravenhill, 2010 and references therein; see also 
Essay 1) other works, including research for this Thesis, have argued for the important role 
played by business groups in the initiation and policymaking of many FTAs in the region 
(Solis, 2003; Manger, 2005; Yoshimatsu, 2005; Essay 1). Empirical evidence in Essay 1 
indicates that selected sectors (and firms) pressured government in support or against 
specific policy choices (e.g., tariffs, ROOs) in FTAs and that, in many instances, these 
preferences were eventually reflected in FTA treaties.155   
 It could be argued that sectors and firms that saw their ex-ante interests embodied in 
FTAs, should make high utilization of FTAs once these are implemented.156 However, two 
considerations are in order here. First, the fact that a sector accounts for a high absolute 
share in the utilization of an FTA does not necessarily mean that that sector uses FTA 
preferences to the full extent. Conversely, sectors accounting for small volumes of trade 
under an FTA could potentially use its preferential tariffs for most or all of their exports. 
Even if FTA utilization by these sectors is not revealed by a ranking of top overall users 
                                 
155 Finding evidence of lobbying by a given sector (or firm) for specific policy choices does not necessarily mean that it gets translated 
into the final FTA text as preferences and lobbying pressures could be modulated (or cancelled out) by the opposing preferences and 
pressures of other actors as well as by cross-sectoral concessions. In this Thesis, actors’ preferences, evidence of lobbying and success in 
affecting FTA policy have been assessed and cross-validated through extensive semi-structured interviews of a wide range of elite actors 
(Essay 1). 
156 Accordingly, one would expect high utilization of TAFTA among automotive firms or of JTEPA by Thai exporters of processed food, 
textiles and garments and jewelry. Likewise, it could be projected a high use of MJEPA by exporters of palm oil, plastics, chemicals and 
garments. 
3. Essay 2 
 125 
(Kohpaiboon, 2010; Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2011), the FTA could be even more 
relevant for these lower-volume exporters. Therefore, political economy analyses of FTA 
utilization should pay attention to sectors beyond the largest absolute users and trace back 
utilization of an FTA to the economic actors that participated in its formulation, 
independently of overall trade volumes. Second, official records gained for this research 
provide data on preferential trade flows for each tariff code but does not identify which 
firms used FTA (or GSP and DES/DDS) preferences, precluding us from a firm-level 
analysis of FTA utilization.157 This is relevant because, as it will be argued in Essay 3, 
FTAs could grant selective rents to specific firms within a sector and an FTA area.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Independently of trade volumes, business sectors that 
succeeded in affecting FTA formulation toward greater or faster 
liberalization should make high use of FTA preferences. 
 
In addition to regional trade agreements, breach of WTO’s principle of non-
discrimination is also allowed for GSP and related schemes by which developed countries 
grant unreciprocated preferential tariffs to selected items originating from developing 
countries. To benefit from GSP preferential tariffs, that range from zero to just below MFN 
applied tariffs, products must comply with established ROOs. Most GSP programs also 
incorporate product- and/or country-specific export ceilings, above which preferential 
tariffs no longer apply (UNCTAD, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011). Beneficiary countries could 
also be delisted (graduated) once they reached a certain development status.  
Although very different in their nature and purpose, DES/DDS represent another 
widely used unilateral tariff exemption scheme. They grant full rebate of import duties on 
                                 
157 Although contained in PCO applications, Thai and Malaysian trade authorities did not make this information available to us alleging 
that would violate confidentiality regarding firms’ procurement patterns.  
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specified capital goods and/or on intermediate inputs that are later incorporated into final 
goods destined to exports. DES/DDS are often offered as part of export- and investment-
promotion strategies.158 Some DES/DDS, particularly those linked to investment in a 
specific economic activity or geographical area, are subject to expiration.  
In addition to ceilings and expiration in their use, GSP and DES/DDS are subject to 
removal at the discretion of the granting country. FTAs offer the possibility to make GSP 
and DES/DDS tariff reductions permanent and non-removable. For the GSP programs 
offered by the United States and the European Union, it has been demonstrated that the 
larger is the share of exports that developing country trades under GSP preferences, and 
therefore its political dependence on them, the higher the likelihood of that country signing 
an FTA with the United States or the European Union (Shadlen, 2008; Manger and 
Shadlen, 2013).  
It is well accepted that economic actors are more likely to mobilize to avoid losses 
from liberalization that to secure gains from it (Baldwin, 1995). It is therefore posited here 
that business sectors in Thailand and Malaysia that benefit from GSP and DES/DDS will 
support FTA liberalization, especially if suffering from product- or country-specific 
ceilings and/or as the deadline for graduation approaches. Once the FTA is implemented, 
those sectors would be expected to be among the first to use its preferences and to use them 
to a high degree.  
It could also be argued that when the country granting GSP preferences negotiates 
an FTA with one of the beneficiaries, products covered by the GSP program will be 
liberalized deeper and faster.159 Nevertheless, because of the argument in Hypothesis 1, 
FTA liberalization of these products could still take some time to reach the preferential rate 
granted under GSP, particularly for items subject to product- and country-specific GSP 
                                 
158 DES/DDS are part of the policy toolkit of many countries around the world but they have been particularly prevalent in East Asia. 
159 This is less likely to occur in the case of DES/DDS given the more limited nature of these programs. 
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ceilings. In any case, as FTA liberalization progresses, utilization of GSP and DES/DDS 
schemes would be expected to decline and their use to concentrate on fewer items. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Sectors that had previously benefitted from unilateral tariff 
reduction schemes would be expected to support FTA liberalization ex-ante 
and to make early and high use of their preferences upon implementation. 
Utilization of GSP and DES/DDS programs by these sectors would decline 
as FTA liberalization progresses. 
 
To test these hypotheses, I analyzed data on trade flows using the preferences 
provided by selected Thai and Malaysian FTAs and related them to: a) variables potentially 
affecting FTA utilization, including trade under GSP and DES/DDS programs, and b) 
qualitative information on the policymaking of these FTAs obtained in the course of semi-
structured interviews with government officials and private sector representatives in both 
countries (Essay 1).160 Although results in both case studies follow a similar pattern, they 
will be taken in turn for simplicity of exposition. 
 
5. Political economy and variables affecting utilization of Thai FTAs 
As advanced earlier, Kohpaiboon (2010) found that utilization of AFTA, TAFTA and 
JTEPA by Thai exporters in 2008 is directly correlated with the preferential tariff margin 
and inversely with ROOs. The study also found positive correlation between utilization of 
these FTAs and factors that lower administrative costs in the application of PCOs. Thus, 
factors increasing economies of scale in processing PCOs (e.g., trade volume before the 
FTA) or variables associated with higher administrative expertise (e.g., foreign presence as 
                                 
160 In addition to preferential trade records (see below), primary research involved 212 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
government officials, private sector representatives, academics and civil society in Thailand and Malaysia during two independent trips in 
2008 and 2009 (see Essay 1 for further details).  
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output share and share of conglomerate firms in a sector) correlate with higher FTA 
utilization. In contrast, by hindering compliance with ROOs, a high share of trade in parts 
and components in a sector has a negative impact on FTA utilization (Kohpaiboon, 2010).  
5.1 Source of data and methodology 
The following primary data were obtained for this research: 
a) Value of bilateral trade flows between Thailand and either Australia or Japan. 
Data was retrieved from the Trade Map database (Trade Map, undated), mostly at four-digit 
level of specification (HS4, around 1,300 lines per year and for each trade direction) in the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, although some analyses were 
also performed at six-digit level (HS6, around 5,700 lines per year and for each trade 
direction). 161 Data collected covered from January 2004 to up to July 2013.162 
b) Trade values for Thai exports under TAFTA and JTEPA. Data on PCOs were 
provided by the Thai Ministry of Commerce at the HS6 level of specification. Export 
values under both FTAs were then collapsed into HS4 level to allow a better comparison 
with data on Thai imports from Japan (under TAFTA, JTEPA or DES/DDS) and with 
available preferential trade data from Malaysia, both provided at HS4 level (see below). For 
TAFTA and JTEPA, PCOs covered from their implementation date (January 2005 for 
TAFTA and November 2007 for JTEPA) up to December 2011.  
c) Trade values for Thai exports under Japanese GSP. Data were provided by the 
Thai Ministry of Commerce at the HS6 level and collapsed to HS4 for the reasons stated 
above. PCOs for exports under Japanese GSP covered from January 2004 until December 
                                 
161 The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System is a tariff nomenclature established by World Customs Organization 
(www.coomd.org). It classifies products in 99 chapters (2-digits, HS2, 96 general chapters plus three special chapters), which are 
subclassified in headings (4-digits, HS4) and subheadings (6-digit, HS6). All countries must use the same nomenclature for HS2 through 
HS6 but could also adopt additional subdivisions at higher level of specification (8- and 10-digit). The nomenclature is periodically 
revised, the latest in 2012. Throughout this Thesis, the 2007 version was used as all data provided by trade authorities were in that 
version. 
162 Although preferential trade data for Thai imports and exports were only available until October 2009 and December 2011, respectively 
(see below), overall trade flows have been examined up to July 2013. 
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2011. Of note, although for a very small number of tariff lines, Japanese GSP preferences 
were still used during 2011. No information is available regarding the use of the Australian 
GSP scheme as compliance with ROOs involves automatic self-reporting. 
d) Trade values for Thai imports under TAFTA and JTEPA. Data were provided by 
the Thai Customs Department (Ministry of Finance) at the HS4 level. Records covered 
from January 2005 to October 2009 for TAFTA, and from November 2007 to October 2009 
for JTEPA.  
e) Trade values for Thai imports from either Australia or Japan under DES/DDS. 
Data were provided by the Thai Customs Department at the HS4 level. Records included 
imports under the two main unilateral tariff exemption schemes, namely, the privileges 
granted by the Board of Investment and the Customs Department.163 Despite their different 
nature, for simplification of analysis, data on imports under both schemes were combined. 
Records covered from January 2004 to October 2009 for imports from Australia and from 
January 2007 to October 2009 for imports from Japan.  
f) Applied and bound multilateral tariffs in Thailand, Japan and Australia. Data 
were retrieved from the WTO’s Integrated Data Base (WTO-IDB, undated) at HS6 level 
(around 5,500 lines per year) and aggregated down to HS4 level (around 1,300 lines per 
year) for the reasons stated above. Tariff data was collected for the period between January 
2004 and December 2011. 
g) Tariff schedules under TAFTA and JTEPA. Data were retrieved from the 
respective FTA treaties, available from government websites (DFAT, undated; METI-
JTEPA, undated). Tariff schedules in these FTAs texts are specified at HS8 and HS6, 
                                 
163 The Board of Investment provides incentives to firms, foreign or Thai, investing in the country in selected activities and regions. 
Incentives include exemption of import duties on capital equipment and parts and components and varying widely depending on the 
sector and geographical location. These privileges are given for a limited period post-establishment and although could be reactivated by 
further investment in the same productive location, as time passes, they tend to phase out. Section 19bis of the Thai Customs Act (1939) 
establishes the refund of duties paid on imported goods that are used in the production, mixing, assembling or packing of goods destined 
for export. In contrast to Board of Investment privileges, tariff reductions under Section 19bis have no deadline although they are 
susceptible to restrictions or cancellation by the Thai government without breaking WTO rules.  
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respectively, and were aggregated down to HS4 in order to match them with trade flows 
data. Tariff schedules in both FTAs were collected from their implementation date (January 
2005 for TAFTA and November 2007 for JTEPA) up to December 2011. 
g) Preferential tariffs under Japanese GSP. Data were retrieved from the website of 
Japan’s Customs and Tariff Bureau (Ministry of Finance) for the period between January 
2004 and December 2011 (Japanese Customs, undated). As for previous data, tariff rates at 
HS8 level was aggregated down to HS4 for every year analyzed.  
h) Rules of origin in TAFTA and JTEPA. Data were retrieved from the respective 
FTA treaties, available from government websites (DFAT, undated; METI-JTEPA, 
undated). 
 To analyze utilization of FTAs—as well as of GSP and DES/DDS—and the 
variables affecting it, primary data were computed to construct and calculate the following 
variables:  
a) Preferential trade value: value of trade under the preferences granted by TAFTA, 
JTEPA, Japanese GSP or DES/DDS using PCOs and Customs records. 
b) Utilization rate (UR): Ratio, expressed as a percentage, between the value of 
exports or imports of a given item (coded at HS4 or HS6 level) under the preferences 
granted by TAFTA, JTEPA, Japanese GSP, or DES/DDS and the value of total exports or 
imports flows for that item. In some instances, only items for which FTAs or GSP provide 
a tariff margin larger than zero were computed (see below).164  
Two methodological considerations are worth noting here. First, a significant share 
of the tariffs applied by any country, especially developed ones, is set at zero. For instance, 
in 2008—a middle year for the period of this study—Japan and Australia applied no tariff 
to 53.7% and 48.8% of lines, respectively. The same year Thailand and Malaysia applied a 
                                 
164  Contrary to FTAs and GSP, were tariffs may be reduced but not eliminated, DES/DDS provide full exemption/drawback of import 
duties. 
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tariff of zero to 18.3% and 57.3% of their lines (WTO, 2009).  It could be therefore argued 
that, in fairness, the UR of an FTA (or GSP) should be calculated only for lines where the 
FTA (or GSP) offers a preferential margin above zero with respect to applied multilateral 
tariffs. In fact, recent reports by the Thai Ministry of Commerce on overall UR have shifted 
to this calculation method. However, in strict sense, applying this methodology would 
require estimating, for each tariff code, the minimum preferential tariff margin that exceeds 
the cost of complying with ROOs, information that is not available. In addition, this is not 
the methodology applied for calculating URs of FTAs in other regions. Therefore, to allow 
comparison and unless otherwise indicated (e.g., selected cells in Tables 3 and 14), in this 
and other Essays of this Thesis, URs were computed with respect to total trade flows.  
Second, as noted by Kohpaiboon (2010), UR calculated out of PCOs could sometimes 
exceed 100%. This occurs because PCOs are requested before the good is actually traded 
and exporters could request PCOs for a volume of trade slightly higher than final actual 
trade. Whenever this occurred UR was adjusted to 100%. 
c) UR rank. Ranking of good codes at HS4 (or when appropriate, also at HS6) in 
descending order of their UR.  
d) UR rank in reverse order: As the UR rank but codes are ranked in ascending 
order of UR. 
e) Utilization share: Share, expressed as percentage, of the trade value for a given 
code and year (or period) under a preferential regimes (TAFTA, JTEPA, GSP, DES/DDS) 
with respect to the total value of goods traded under that regime during that year (or 
period). 
f) Utilization share rank: Ranking of codes at HS4 (or when appropriate, also at 
HS6) in descending order of their utilization share. 
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g) Utilization share in reverse order: As the utilization share rank but the ranking of 
codes is run in ascending order of utilization share. 
h) Preferential tariff margin: As defined earlier, preferential tariff margin refers to 
the difference between the MFN applied tariff and the preferential tariff granted by the 
FTA, GSP or DES/DDS for a given good code and year. 
i) ROO restrictiveness index. ROOs were obtained from the official FTA treaties 
and aggregated from H6 to HS4 level, always maintaining the highest level of restriction. 
ROO restrictiveness was then codified in a 1 to 7 scale as per Cadot et al (2006).165  
5.2. Utilization of TAFTA and JTEPA 
Since its implementation in January 2005, Thai exporters have made a high overall use of 
TAFTA preferences, most often exceeding 60% (Table 1). Considering that at the time 
Australia had bound as duty-free 20.9% of its lines and applied zero tariffs to 49.8%, 
TAFTA UR could be considered virtually complete. In contrast, utilization of TAFTA for 
imports of Australian products has been much lower and, at least for the period for which 
data are available, has shown a declining trend (Table 1).166  
 
Table 1:  Utilization rates (%) of preferential trade regimes in Thai exports and  
imports to/from Australia 
 
 
Regime* 
 
Trade  
Direction 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
TAFTA 
(Jan 2005) 
EXPORTS  67.11 63.00 70.76 62.50 50.29 59.90 62.94 
TAFTA 
(Jan 2005) 
IMPORTS  21.94 33.84 
 
22.82 
 
11.19 
 
8.36** N/A N/A 
DES/DDS 
Australia 
IMPORTS 15.92 17.25 20.56 17.84 
 
14.71 6.48** 
 
N/A N/A 
                  Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
                  * TAFTA was implemented in January 1, 2005 
                  ** Only for January-October 2009 
                                 
165 Many analyses of the impact of ROOs in American or European FTAs (Productivity Commission, 2004; Cadot et al., 2006; Portugal-
Perez, 2009) code ROO restrictiveness into an ordinal index, often derived from the one originally constructed by Estevadeordal (2000) 
and Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006).  
166 Of note, whereas TAFTA URs for Thai exports in Athukorala and Kohpaiboon  (2011) correspond with those calculated for this 
Essay, these authors reported lower values for TAFTA URs for imports. The reason for this discrepancy is unknown. In any case, 
Athukorala and Kohpaiboon  (2011) also found declining URs of TAFTA for Thai imports. Contrary to our initial expectation, this 
decline in TAFTA utilization for Thai imports occurred despite a parallel decline in the use of DES/DDS (see below). 
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 As in Athukorala and Kohpaiboon  (2011), I found that utilization of TAFTA, for 
both exports and imports, is highly concentrated as the top 20 items at HS4 level—which 
comprises around 1,300 items—accounted for around 80% of all trade under TAFTA 
(Table 2). Concentration was even higher among the top 20 imported items from Australia 
that used DES/DDS  (see below). However, it is important to note that overall bilateral 
trade is equally concentrated (Table 2), even after petroleum products, one of the main Thai 
imports from Australia, are excluded (see also below). In line with Hypothesis 2, there has 
been a decline in the concentration of TAFTA utilization for exports and imports over the 
period studied (Table 2). Concentration of overall exports to Australia has also declined but 
overall imports have experienced the opposite trend (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Share of Top 20 items in Thai exports and imports to Australia  
(total and preferential trade flows) * 
 
 
Regime 
 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
Top 20 overall exports 
(% total exports) 
64.13 64.36 70.39 70.77 74.15 78.79 74.78 64.69 
Top 20 exports under TAFTA  
(% total exports  under TAFTA) 
 85.56 80.14 83.34 80.70 80.55 81.34 66.86 
Top 20 overall imports  
(% total imports) 
81.95 86.08 84.09 84.79 85.34 84.39 88.16 87.32 
Top 20 imports under TAFTA  
(% total imports under TAFTA) 
 88.92 88.08 81.66 74.69 78.03** N/A N/A 
Top 20 imports under DES/DDS 
(% total imports under DES/DDS) 
94.20 90.31 92.74 92.04 91.67 86.73** N/A N/A 
         Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
        * Top 20 items at HS4 level 
        ** Only for January-October 2009 
  
Although Japan has bound 100% of its tariffs and binding overhangs are small, 
average bound and applied tariffs in the agriculture sector in 2006 were 28.4% and 24.3%, 
respectively. In line with Hypothesis 1 and reflecting its historical protectionist stand on 
agricultural items, Japan excluded rice and sugar from its concessions to Thailand in 
JTEPA, two products that do not receive tariff reductions in the GSP program. In turn, 
Japan provided full elimination of tariffs within five years of fruits and vegetables, fresh 
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and processed seafood and processed chicken, all key Thai exports that already benefited 
from GSP preferential treatment.  
In the case of Thailand, and also confirming Hypothesis 1, I found that for some 
goods with unbound tariffs or with significant binding overhang, Thailand initially offered 
in JTEPA preferential tariffs that were above the applied MFN tariff. For instance, of the 
top 20 items at HS6 that Thailand imported from Japan in 2005 (before JTEPA 
implementation), sixteen were either unbound or bound at two to six times the applied 
tariff. Interestingly, Thai concessions in JTEPA for seven of these sixteen items initially 
exceeded by 25-100% the applied tariff and only reached the applied tariff level several 
years after implementation.  
Utilization rates of JTEPA have been significantly lower than for TAFTA in both 
directions (Table 3). In the case of Thai exports, it is worth noting again that in 2006, a year 
before JTEPA entered into force, Japan had 55.1% of its tariffs bound as duty-free. When 
the UR is calculated only for items for which the FTA offered Thai exporters a preferential 
tariff margin greater than zero, UR of JTEPA for exports during the period 2007-2011 
stood at around 60% (see figures inside parentheses in Table 3). 
 
Table 3:  Utilization rates (%) of preferential regimes in Thai exports and  
Imports to/from Japan * 
 
 
Regime** 
 
Trade  
Direction 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007*** 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
JTEPA 
(Nov 2007) 
EXPORTS    20.27 
 (59.68) 
21.30 
(52.12) 
25.37 
(61.64) 
23.24 
(60.94) 
25.08 
(63.83) 
Japanese 
GSP 
EXPORTS 12.28 
(38.37) 
9.67 
(30.58) 
8.17 
(25.81) 
7.13 
(23.12) 
0.66 
(1.76) 
0.57 
(1.56) 
0.52 
(1.56) 
0.19 
(0.74) 
JTEPA 
(Nov 2007) 
IMPORTS    3.25 7.72 3.50**** N/A N/A 
DES/DDS  
Japan 
IMPORTS N/A N/A N/A 44.3 28.94 8.27**** N/A N/A 
     Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official record 
     * Overall ulization rates for JTEPA and GSP for Thai exports were calculated for all tariff codes (figures outside parentheses) or       
     only for tariff codes where JTEPA and GSP offered preferential tariff margins above 0 (figures inside parentheses) 
     ** JTEPA was implemented in November 1, 2007 
     *** Utilization of JTEPA (exports, imports) corresponds to the first two months since implementation (November-December 2007) 
     **** Only for the period January-October 2009 
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On the import side, I only obtained information of JTEPA utilization for the first 23 
months (Table 3). Despite surveys indicating the eagerness of Japanese subsidiaries in 
Thailand for an FTA that liberalize imports of parts and components (JETRO, 2007), 
utilization of JTEPA preferences for import of Japanese products was very low during this 
period. This could be explained on the fact that Thailand liberalization schedules take 
longer than Japanese ones to provide significant preferential tariff margins as well as on the 
higher use of DES/DDS (Table 3 and see below).167 
Although overall trade flows between Thailand and Japan are not as concentrated as 
for Thailand-Australia bilateral trade, utilization of JTEPA is also highly concentrated 
within the top 20 items at HS4, especially for imports (Table 4). For the short period for 
which data are available, concentration in the utilization of JTEPA for imports has declined 
(Hypothesis 2). Utilization of unilateral schemes for both exports (GSP) and imports 
(DES/DDS) is also highly concentrated (see below). 
 
Table 4: Share of Top 20 items in Thai exports and imports to Japan  
(total and preferential trade flows) * 
 
 
Regime 
 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007** 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
Top 20 overall exports  
(% total exports) 
45.80 46.44 47.21 45.50 47.60 44.44 44.00 43.39 
Top 20 exports under JTEPA  
(% total exports under JTEPA)  
   71.74 72.90 73.21 67.34 N/A 
Top 20 exports under Japanese 
GSP (% total exports under 
Japanese GSP) 
61.04 67.08 64.00 61.90 90.76 96.10 100 100 
Top 20 overall imports  
(% total imports) 
50.73 49.77 44.63 46.70 43.90 45.10 44.99 45.39 
Top 20 imports under JTEPA  
(% total imports under JTEPA) 
   96.42 91.70 80.29*** N/A N/A 
Top 20 imports under DES/DDS 
(% total imports under DES/DDS) 
N/A N/A N/A 60.53 59.42 55.64*** N/A N/A 
      Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
     * Top 20 items at HS4 level 
     ** Utilization of JTEPA (exports, imports) corresponds to the first two months since implementation (November-December 2007) 
     *** Only for the period January-October 2009 
 
                                 
167 Utilization of DES/DDS significantly declined after implementation of JTEPA in November 2007 although this has not been 
translated into sustained use of JTEPA for imports, JTEPA UR for imports increased in 2008 but declined in 2009. The reason for this 
discrepancy is not known. 
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5.3. Political economy of TAFTA and JTEPA utilization  
Empirical evidence indicates that over time the private sector in Thailand has been 
increasingly involved in the formulation of Thai FTAs. For some economic sectors and 
FTAs, businesses have actually taken a proactive leading role and pushed the government 
to initiate negotiations (Essay 1). Hypothesis 3 postulates that sectors that succeeded in 
their lobbying efforts in favor of FTA liberalization should make high use of preferential 
tariffs once the FTA enters into force. To test this hypothesis, quantitative data on 
disaggregated sectoral utilization of TAFTA and JTEPA were confronted with qualitative 
evidence of previous lobbying by those sectors in favor of these agreements. 
As elaborated at length in Essays 1 and 3, the main supporters of TAFTA were 
Japanese and American carmakers seeking to integrate Australia within the Thailand and 
ASEAN automotive network. Interestingly, between 2005 and 2011, out of the over 1,300 
items tradable at HS4, just two codes, 8704 (pickup trucks) and 8703 (passenger vehicles), 
jointly accounted for 43-62% of TAFTA utilization by Thai exporters (Table 5). In line 
with Athukorala and Kohpaiboon  (2011), it was found that virtually 100% of Thai exports 
of vehicles to Australia in the period 2005-2011 took place under TAFTA preferences.  
Important to the argument is to distinguish between the relative weight that 
preferential trade of a given item (or sector) has in overall FTA utilization—referred here 
as UR share—and the extent to which importers/exporters of that item (or sector) have used 
FTA preferences—UR itself—, independently of whether this utilization translated into 
high overall trade volumes. Besides automotive products, TAFTA has also been critical for 
Thai export of other goods that, despite accounting for a small share in total utilization of 
TAFTA, have made almost complete utilization of preferential tariffs. Thus, during 2005-
2011, Thailand-made goods at HS6 exported to Australia that used TAFTA preferences for 
more than 80% of their value include refrigerators and air conditioners, precious stones and 
3. Essay 2 
 137 
jewelry, glass products, processed flour, fruits, and footwear, representing some of the 
sectors that pushed in favor of TAFTA during its formulation stage (Table 5 and Essay 
1).168 In contrast, while Thai garment producers proactively pushed for the liberalization of 
the Australian market and eventually got their preferences embodied in TAFTA, their UR 
has averaged 44.3%. The reason for this relatively low UR by Thai garment exporters is to 
be found in the fact that in 2005, coinciding with the entry into force of TAFTA, Australia 
multilaterally reduced its applied MFN tariffs on textiles and garments, thus eroding the 
preferential margin granted by TAFTA. This example supports Hypothesis 1 and illustrates 
how preferential FTA liberalization is often accompanied by subsequent (or parallel) tariff 
reductions at the multilateral levels (Ornelas, 2005a; Ornelas, 2005b). On the import side, 
use of TAFTA has been highly concentrated on importers of metal products and vegetables 
(Table 5).  
As TAFTA liberalization schedules proceeded, the number of goods that utilized its 
preferences increased. However, high concentration in bilateral trade flows has meant that 
the largest users off TAFTA have barely changed over time. For the period analyzed, the 
ranking of the top 20 items at HS4 by utilization share include 34 items in the export side 
and 35 in for imports (Table 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
168 This analysis was conducted at HS6 level, in addition to the HS4 shown in Table 5, to increase specification in UR. 
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Table 5:  Top 20 items in Thai exports and imports under TAFTA and evidence of lobbying 
 
Top 20 items in Thai exports  
under TAFTA 
January 2005-December 2011 * 
 
 
Evidence of  
lobbying *** 
 
Top 20 items in Thai imports 
under TAFTA 
January 2005-October 2009 ** 
 
 
Evidence of 
lobbying *** 
Vehicles and automotive parts (8704, 8703, 
8409,4011) + Metals, metal ores slag and articles thereof (2608,2609,7204,7208,7225,7403, 
7601,7606, 7801,7901) 
+ 
Air conditioners, washing machines, 
refrigerators, vacuum pumps and general 
machinery (8415, 8450,8418,8413,9414, 
8419,8421,8409,8481) 
+ Dairy products (0402,0406) + 
Preparation of fish (1604) + Edible fruits and nuts (0802,0805,0806, 0808)  
Articles of iron and steel (7306, 7308,7312) + Cereals and milling industries and preparations of cereals (1001,1003,1107, 
1109,1901) 
+ 
Jewelry (7113) + Automotive parts (8708)  
Plastics and components (3920,3923,3901, 
3902,3907,3920)  Wool (5101)  
Furniture (9401,9406)  Dyes and pigments (3206)  
Electrical machinery and parts (8544,8501)  Animal feed (2301, 2309) + 
Cosmetics and toilet products (3305,3306)  Pharmaceutical products (3004)  
Paper (4802,4818)  Edible vegetables (0704,0706,0712) + 
Light boats (8905)   Wood and pulp of wood (4407,4707) + 
Optical equipment (9001)  Wine (2204)  
  Inorganic chemicals (2818)  
  Coal (2701)  
  Bovine meat (0201) + 
Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records (* and  **) and semi-structured interviews (***) 
* Top 20 items at HS4 exported by Thailand to Australia under TAFTA preferences  
** Top 20 items at HS4 imported by Thailand from Australia under TAFTA preferences  
*** Evidence of lobbying by producers of the indicated items, as described in Essay 1, is coded by a “+” sign.  No symbol indicates that 
field research could not find evidence of business lobbying, although it cannot be excluded that it actually existed 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 is also supported in the case of JTEPA. Utilization of JTEPA by Thai 
exporters has been highly concentrated among sectors whose business associations 
proactively pushed for the deal before and during negotiations (Table 6). For instance, in 
2011, exports of seafood, processed food, plastics and textiles and garments jointly 
accounted for 70% of all Thai exports under JTEPA. Equally relevant, these Thai sectors 
made use of JTEPA in most of their exports to Japan. 
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Table 6:  Top 20 items in Thai exports and imports under JTEPA and evidence of lobbying 
 
Top 20 items in Thai exports 
under JTEPA  
November 2007-December 2011 * 
 
 
Evidence of  
lobbying *** 
 
Top 20 items in Thai imports 
under JTEPA 
November 2007-October 2009 ** 
 
 
Evidence of 
lobbying *** 
Preparations of meat, fish and crustaceans 
(1602,1604,1605) + Iron and steel and articles thereof (bars and tubes) for non-automotive use (7228,7304) + 
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs (0304,0305, 
0306,307) + Vehicles, automotive parts and iron and steel for the automotive industry (4011, 
7208,7209,7210,7219,8702,8703,8704, 
8708,8482,8483) 
+ 
Dextrins (3505)  Machinery and mechanical appliances (8421,8427,8429)  
Polyethers, expoxides and polyesters 
(3907), plastic plates, sheets and films 
(3920), plastic containers and other 
miscellaneous (3923,3926) 
 Synthetic filaments and fibers (5402,5503) and worn clothing (6309) + 
Springs of iron and steel (7320)  Non-crude oil from petrol (2710)  
Jewelry (7113) + Automatic control instruments and parts (9032)  
Organic chemicals (2931,2940)  Dyes and pigments (3212)   
Miscellaneous aluminium articles (7610)  Organic chemicals (2930), miscellaneous chemicals (3815,3817)   
Frozen vegetables (0710) and preparations 
of fruits and nuts (2008) + Electrical machinery and equipment (8504, 8528,8536) 
 
+ 
Miscellaneous edible preparations, sauces 
and condiments (2103) + Glues and adhesives (3506)   
Toilet products (3307)  Apples (0808)  + 
Synthetic filaments (5402) and nonwovens 
(5603) + Lubricants and antirust preparations (3403)  
Apparel and clothing accessories knitted or 
crocheted, underwear items (6109,6115) +   
Inorganic chemicals of carbon (2803)    
Float glass (7005)    
Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records (* and  **) and semi-structured interviews (***) 
* Top 20 items at HS4 exported by Thailand to Japan under JTEPA preferences  
** Top 20 items at HS4 imported by Thailand from Japan under JTEPA preferences  
*** Evidence of lobbying by producers of the indicated items, as described in Essay 1, is coded by a “+” sign.  No symbol indicates that 
field research could not find evidence of business lobbying, although it cannot be excluded that it actually existed 
 
As described elsewhere in this Thesis, Thailand made very few concessions in 
JTEPA to liberalize its automotive industry despite strong pressure from Japanese 
carmakers. Still, and reflecting the strong original interest of these firms in the FTA, in 
2009—the latest year for which data were made available to us—rolled steel and vehicles 
and automotive parts represented 46.1% and 21.1%, respectively of Thai imports under 
JTEPA (Table 6).169  
                                 
169 These figures are relatively high when it is considered that Thai tariffs on automotive products will be phased over several years (see 
Table 4 in Essay 4).  
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As in TAFTA, the items (and sectors) accounting for the largest utilization share in 
JTEPA have maintained fairly constant over time and, for the period for which data were 
obtained, the top 20 items at HS4 included just 27 and 32 items in the export and import 
sides, respectively (Table 6). 
5.4. Variables affecting utilization of TAFTA and JTEPA  
This section, and the corresponding for Malaysia below, sought to expand the analysis of 
variables affecting FTA utilization conducted by Kohpaiboon (2010). It was found here that 
the value of preferential trade conducted under TAFTA and JTEPA correlated with all 
other variables related to FTA utilization, namely, FTA UR, UR rank, UR rank reverse, 
utilization share, utilization share rank and utilization share rank reverse (not shown). As 
expected, results indicated that these six variables significantly correlated with the 
preferential tariff margin granted by each of these FTAs for both export and import flows 
(Table 7 for UR of JTEPA for exports, not shown for the rest). 170 
Hypothesis 4 projected that Thai producers that benefited from GSP and DES/DDS 
before an FTA would actively lobby to make reduced tariffs in these schemes non-
removable as part of the FTA and that they would also make early and high use of FTA 
afterwards. To test these arguments, I first explored the utilization of DES/DDS before 
implementation of TAFTA and of GSP and DES/DDS before entering into force of JTEPA. 
As expected—although to the best of my knowledge not previously reported—all seven 
utilization variables for the Japanese GSP correlated with the preferential margin offered by 
the program (Table 8 for UR, not shown for the rest). All variables associated to the 
utilization of DES/DDS for imports from Australia and Japan were also significantly 
correlated to the preferential tariff margin (data not shown). 
                                 
170 No correlation existed between the six utilization variables for TAFTA and JTEPA and the absolute preferential tariff level they 
offered. If an FTA applies a relatively low tariff on a particular item but there is only a small or no difference with the MFN applied 
tariff, there is no incentive to use the FTA. Only the preferential tariff margin is relevant to the utilization of FTAs. 
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Table 7:  Correlation between JTEPA UR for Thai exports and  
JTEPA preferential tariff margin * 
 
 PTM  
MFN-JTEPA 
2007 
PTM  
MFN-JTEPA 
2008 
PTM  
MFN-JTEPA 
2009 
JTEPA UR  
for Thai exports 
2007 
0.213 (< 0.001)   
JTEPA UR 
for Thai exports 
2008 
 0.208 (< 0.001)  
JTEPA UR 
for Thai exports 
2009 
  0.215 (< 0.001) 
                              Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
                             Abbreviations: JTEPA UR: JTEPA utilization rate. PTM MFN-JTEPA: preferential  
      tariff margin  MFN-JTEPA 
                                * Values refer to the Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level) 
 
 
Table 8:  Correlation between Japanese GSP UR for Thai exports and  
GSP preferential tariff margin * 
 
 
 GSP UR 
2004 
GSP UR 
2005 
GSP UR 
2006 
GSP UR 
2007 (Jan-Oct) 
PTM MFN-GSP 
2004-2007 
0.206 (< 0.001) 0.192 (< 0.001) 0.222 (< 0.001) 0.217 (< 0.001) 
      Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
      Abbreviations: GSP UR: Japanese GSP utilization rate. PTM MFN-GSP: preferential tariff margin between  
      MFN and GSP tariffs 
                        * Values refer to the Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level) 
       
 
Before JTEPA implementation, utilization of the Japanese GSP program by Thai 
exporters amounted to around 10% of total exports to Japan (Table 3). As discussed earlier, 
given that Japan has about half of its tariffs bound as tariff free, when I computed only 
tariff codes for which GSP offered preferential tariff margins above zero, over a quarter of 
all Thai exports to Japan (and up to 38.3% in 2004) were conducted under GSP preferences 
(figures inside parentheses in Table 3). Likewise, and in keeping with the high number of 
Japanese subsidiaries in Thailand, the UR of DES/DDS privileges for Thai imports of 
Japanese products before JTEPA was much higher, in fact higher than JTEPA has ever 
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reached—in 2007, 44.3% of all imports from Japan benefited from DES/DDS (Table 3).171 
Utilization rates of DES/DDS for imports of Australian goods before TAFTA 
implementation were lower but still relevant at around 16% (Table 1).172  
As in their corresponding FTAs, utilization of these unilateral schemes has been 
highly concentrated, particularly in the case of Thai imports from Australia under 
DES/DDS (Tables 2 and 4). For instance, close to 40% of all Thai exports under the 
Japanese GSP before JTEPA corresponded to plastic and processed food. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 4, utilization of Japanese GSP preferences has declined as JTEPA liberalization 
has proceeded (Table 3) while its utilization has become increasingly concentrated (Table 
4).173 The fact that in 2011, four years into the agreement, some exporters still used GSP 
preferences points to the resistance by Japan to bind into JTEPA some of the preferences it 
extends unilaterally under the GSP.  
Next, I compared the most traded items under GSP and DES/DDS preferences 
before FTA implementation with the most traded items under the corresponding FTA 
(Tables 9, 10 and 11). While there are no data available for the Australian GSP, Thai 
imports from Australia under DES/DDS in 2004 showed a high overlap with the products 
imported by Thailand from Australia under TAFTA during 2005-2009 (Table 9, shadowed 
cells indicate product overlap across both sides of the table). Once again, this overlap 
between the top 20 most traded items under both regimes is particularly striking when it is 
considered that HS4 covers over 1,300 items. Likewise, a high degree of product overlap 
was found between Thai exports to Japan under GSP in the period 2004-2007, before 
JTEPA implementation, and Thai exports under JTEPA afterwards (Table 10). Some level 
                                 
171 The higher use of DES/DDS compared to JTEPA is explained by the fact that, although limited to selected products, firms and 
geographical areas, DES/DDS offer full exemption of import duties whereas tariffs concessions by Thailand in JTEPA may take many 
years to reach tariff free rate.  
172 Contrary to FTAs, that during the phasing out period provide only partial tariff relief, DES/DDS grant complete remission or 
drawback of import duties.  
173 Also in support of our arguments, utilization rates of DES/DDS for imports from Australia and Japan slightly declined with a lag of 
several years after TAFTA and JTEPA implementation, although concentration among their users remains high (Tables 1 and 3). 
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of concurrence was also observed between the top 20 Thai imports from Japan under 
DES/DDS before JTEPA implementation with the pattern of most imported products under 
JTEPA (Table 11, see also below). Altogether, these data confirm Hypothesis 4, users of 
GSP and DES/DDS not only lobbied governments to secure these tariff reductions in an 
FTA (Essay 1) but they have also made a high use of FTAs once implemented (this Essay).  
 
Table 9:  Top 20 items in Thai imports from Australia under DES/DDS and TAFTA 
Top 20 items in Thai imports from Australia 
under DES/DDS 
January 2004-December 2004 * 
Top 20 items in Thai imports from Australia under  
TAFTA  
January 2005-October 2009* 
Articles of cooper (7403,7408), of zinc (7901), of lead 
(7801) 
Aluminium (7601,7606) 
Iron and Steel (7201,7204,7208,7209,7210, 7214,7216, 
7217,7228) 
Wool (5101) 
Aluminium (7601,7602,7606) Edible fruits and nuts (0802,0805,0806,0808) 
Metal ores slag (2603,2608,2609,2614,2615) Metal ores slag (2608,2609) 
General machinery (8419,8420,8424,8479,8481) 
centrifuges (8421), engines, pumps & turbines 
(8407,8411,8414) 
Cereals and milling industries and preparations of cereals 
(1001,1003, 1107,1109, 1901) 
Air conditioning machine (8415), dishwashes (8422) Dairy products (0402, 0406) 
Automotive parts (8708) Automotive parts (8708) 
Wool (5101,5105) Iron and Steel (7204,7208,7225) 
Dairy products (0401,0402,0403,0404,0405) Articles of cooper (7403), of lead (7801), of zinc (7901) 
Inorganic chemicals (2804,2808,2818) Animal feed (2301,2309) 
Paper and articles of paper (4803,4804,4805) Edible vegetables (0704,0706,0712) 
Plastics and articles of thereof 
(3907,3919,3921,3923,3926) 
Pharmaceutical products (3004) 
Automatic data processing machines (8471,8479,8481) Dyes and pigments (3206) 
Electrical machinery and equipment (8515), 
electronic integrated circuits & related (8537,8542, 8544) 
Wood and pulp of wood (4407, 4707) 
Mineral fuels and oils (2707) Wine (2204) 
Cereals and milling industries and preparations of 
cereals (1001,1101,1901) 
Inorganic chemicals (2818) 
Miscellaneous chemical products (3810,3811,3816) Bovine meat (0201) 
Animal feeding (2309) Coal (2701) 
Dyes (3206)  
Optical and photographic equip. (9001,9032)  
Oil seeds and grains (1209,1210)  
Bovine meat (0202)  
Wood and articles of wood (4411) and furniture (9405)  
Albumin and starches (3501)  
Textiles (5811,6005, 6006)  
   Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
   * Top 20 items at HS4 level for the indicated regime and period. Shadowed cells refer to product overlap across both sides of the table 
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Table 10: Top 20 items in Thai exports to Japan under Japanese GSP and JTEPA  
Top 20 items in Thai exports to Japan 
under Japanese GSP 
January 2004-October 2007 * 
Top 20 items in Thai exports to Japan 
under JTEPA 
November 2007-December 2011 * 
Processed seafood (1604,1605) Processed seafood (1602,1604,1605) 
Polyethers,expoxides and polyesters (3907) 
Plastic plates, sheets and films (3920) 
Plastic containers and other miscellaneous (3923,3926) 
Fish and crustaceans (0304,0306,0307) 
 
Float glass (7005) and safety glass (7007) 
 
 
Polyethers,expoxides and polyesters (3907) 
Plastic plates, sheets and films (3920) 
Plastic containers and other miscellaneous (3923,3926) 
Dextrins (3505) Dextrins (3505) 
Sauces and condiments (2103) Springs of iron and steel (7320) 
Hats and headgear (6505) Jewelry (7113) 
Organic chemicals (2916,2917,2922,2940) Inorganic chemicals of carbon (2803) 
Miscellaneous metals (8301) Preparations of fruits and nuts (2008) 
Jewelry (7113) Nonwovens (5603) 
Screws and bolts of iron and steel (7318) Frozen vegetables (0710) 
Miscellaneous aluminium articles (7610,7616) Miscellaneous aluminium articles (7610) 
Toys (9503) Organic chemicals (2931,2940) 
Insulated wire and cable (8544) Sauces and condiments (2103) 
Wood (4409) Toilet paper (3307) 
Paper  (4802) Float glass (7005) 
Vacuum flasks (9617) Underwear items (6109,6115) 
Nonwovens, knotted net of twine (5603,5608) Synthetic filament yarn (5402) 
Inorganic chemicals of carbon (2803)  
Synthetic filament yarn (5402)  
  Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
  * Top 20 items at HS4 level for the indicated regime and period. Shadowed cells refer to product overlap across both sides of the table 
 
Table 11:  Top 20 items in Thai imports from Japan under DES/DDS and JTEPA  
Top 20 items in Thai imports from Japan 
under DES/DDS  
January 2007-October 2007* 
Top 20 items in Thai imports from Japan 
under JTEPA 
November 2007-October 2009* 
Automotive parts (7318,8708) including engines, 
transmissions and parts thereof (8408,8409,8483,8511) 
Flat rolled steel for the automotive industry 
(7208,7209,7210,7219) 
Flat rolled steel for the automotive industry 
(7208,7209,7210 7219,7225) 
Passenger and commercial vehicles (8702,8703,8704)  
 
Bars and tubes (7213,7227,7228,7304) and 
miscellaneous articles (7326) of iron and steel 
Automotive parts (4011,8482,8483,8708) 
 
Parts for TV and radios (8529), electrical switches (8536), Bars and tubes from iron and steel (7228,7304) 
Electrical integrated circuits (8542), printed circuits 
(8534), boards and panels with electrical switches (8537), 
semiconductors (8541) 
Fork-lift trucks, bulldozers other work trucks (8427,8429) 
 
Plastics and articles thereof (3907,3919,3923,3925, 
3926) and synthetic rubber (4002) Synthetic filaments and fibers (5402,5503)  
Parts for regulating and control instruments (9032) and 
miscellaneous precision machines (9031) 
Non-crude oil from petrol (2710) 
 
Miscellaneous electrical machines with indicating 
functions (8543). Parts for electrical machines (8538) 
TV receivers (8528), electrical switches (8536), electrical 
transformers (8504) 
Insulating fittings (8547) Glues and adhesives (3506) 
Air or vacuum pumps (8414) Centrifuges (8421) 
Machines for working plastic and rubber (8477), molding 
boxes for metal foundry (8480), miscellaneous machines 
(8479), interchange folds (8507) 
Miscellaneous chemicals (3815,3817) 
 
Inorganic chemicals (2843,2846) Dyes and pigments (3212) 
Turbojets and other gas turbines (8411) Organic sulfur compounds (2930) 
Unrecorded media for sound (8523) Parts for regulating and control instruments (9032)  
Phenols (2907) Lubricants and antirust preparations (3403) 
Parts for typewriters and office machines (8473) Apples (0808) 
Motorcycles (8711) Worn textiles and clothing (6309) 
Seats (9401)  
Synthetic filaments (5402)  
Cooper and articles thereof (7403,7409)  
Batteries and cells (8506)  
  Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
  * Top 20 items at HS4 level for the indicated regime and period. Shadowed cells refer to product overlap across both sides of the table 
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The overlap between the products that benefited from unilateral regimes (GSP and 
DES/DDS) and FTAs was then tested statistically for all items traded at HS4, not just the 
top 20 most traded items. It was found a significant positive correlation between the UR of 
Japanese GSP in 2007 and the UR of JTEPA since then (Table 12). The strength of this 
correlation has decreased over time, probably reflecting parallel reductions in external 
MFN tariffs by Japan and in line with the arguments by Ornelas (2005a, 2005b). Similar 
correlation between GSP and JTEPA was found for the rest of utilization-related variables 
(UR rank, UR rank reverse, utilization share, utilization share rank, utilization share rank 
reverse) (not shown). There has also been a decline over time in the correlation between the 
utilization share of GSP and JTEPA that could be explained on the fact that, in support of 
Hypothesis 4, a significant share of the initial utilization of JTEPA corresponded to Thai 
products previously exported under GSP, share that diminished over time as JTEPA 
schedules have progressively extended to cover more sectors.  
     
Table 12:  Correlation between URs of JTEPA and Japanese GSP for Thai exports  
 
 GSP UR 
2004 
GSP UR 
2005 
GSP UR 
2006 
GSP UR 
Jan-Oct 2007 
JTEPA UR  
for Thai exports 
Nov-Dec 2007 
0.531 (< 0.001) 0.533 (< 0.001) 0.557 (< 0.001) 0.595 (< 0.001) 
JTEPA UR  
for Thai exports 
2008 
0.533 (< 0.001) 0.508 (< 0.001) 0.511 (< 0.001) 0.563 (< 0.001) 
JTEPA UR  
for Thai exports 
2009 
0.569 (< 0.001) 0.528 (< 0.001) 0.531 (< 0.001) 0.546 (< 0.001) 
JTEPA UR  
for Thai exports 
2010 
0.396 (< 0.001) 0.399 (< 0.001) 0.424 (< 0.001) 0.442 (< 0.001) 
      Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records.  
      Abbreviations: JTEPA UR: JTEPA utilization rate. Jap GSP UR: Japanese GSP utilization rate. 
      * Values indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level) 
  
 
In line with Table 11, there was also a significant positive correlation between 
DES/DDS and JTEPA when the items imported by Thailand from Japan under both 
3. Essay 2 
 146 
regimes ranked by their share in overall utilization (utilization rank share and utilization 
share rank reverse) was compared (Table 13 and data not shown).174  
 
Table 13:  Correlation between utilization share rank (in reverse order)  
of JTEPA and DES/DDS for Thai imports  
 
 DES/DDS utilization share 
rank reverse 
for Thai imports from Japan 
January-October 2007 
JTEPA utilization share rank reverse  
for Thai imports 
November-December 2007 
0.271 (< 0.001) 
JTEPA utilization share rank reverse  
for Thai imports 
2008 
0.427 (< 0.001) 
JTEPA utilization share rank reverse  
for Thai imports 
2009 
0.477 (< 0.001) 
     Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records.  
   * Values indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level) 
  
 
It would be expected that once producers that previously benefited from GSP or 
DDS/DDS start using FTAs, their utilization of these unilateral schemes will decrease and 
concentration among users increase (Hypothesis 4). Indeed, it was found that the UR of 
Japanese GSP declined from 7.13% of total Thai exports to Japan during 2007 to just 
0.66% in 2008, once JTEPA entered into force in November 2007, while concentration in 
its use increase (Tables 3 and 4). These results reinforce the argument as JTEPA liberalized 
completely and from the start most items for which Japan offered tariff reductions through 
GSP (Hypotheses 1 and 4). Nevertheless, as also posited by Hypothesis 1, as FTAs involve 
non-removable binding of concessions, liberalization of relatively more sensitive items, 
even if included in the GSP regime, have been phased out over long periods. Thus, 
although utilization of GSP in 2011 represented less than 0.2% of total Thai exports to 
Japan, GSP was still used for the export of 21 codes at HS6 levels. Most of these items 
correspond to processed fish products—that will be liberalized under JTEPA during 
                                 
174 However, there was not statistically significant correlation between the absolute level of utilization (UR) of JTEPA and DES/DDS for 
Thai imports from Japan (not shown). 
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2013—but also processed cereals and some chemicals that, remarkably, are excluded from 
liberalization under JTEPA but continue to be eligible under GSP. The resistance of Japan 
to liberalize in JTEPA items already benefiting from GSP attest to the relevance that 
developed countries attach to the unilateral character of GSP schemes and their exclusive 
discretion to maintain or remove these concessions.  
Next, it was also examined the impact of ROOs in the utilization of Thai FTAs. 
Econometric analysis in Kohpaiboon (2010) estimated that in 2008 the cost imposed by 
ROOs restricted the use of Thai FTAs by the equivalent of an excess tariff of 2-10%. To 
my surprise, I did not find a negative correlation between the restrictiveness index of ROOs 
in TAFTA and JTEPA at HS4 level and the URs of these FTAs (not shown). Several 
arguments trying to account for this paradoxical result are provided in the concluding 
section of this essay. 
 
6. Political economy and variables affecting utilization of Malaysian FTAs 
Next, it was analyzed the utilization of MJEPA and the variables affecting it. Malaysian has 
five more bilateral FTAs but they have been implemented very recently, so there is no 
sufficient historical data about their utilization, and/or they involve relatively small partners 
(see footnote 148). MJEPA also offers the possibility to compare its utilization with that of 
the Japanese GSP. 
6.1. Source of data and methodology 
The following primary data were obtained for this research: 
a) Value of bilateral trade flows between Malaysia and Japan. Data were retrieved 
from the Trade Map database (Trade Map, undated). Data were collected mostly at the HS4 
level (around 1,300 lines per year and for each trade direction) although some analyses 
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were also performed at HS6 level (around 5,700 lines per year and for each trade direction). 
Data collected covered from January 2003 to up to July 2013.175 
b) Trade values for Malaysian exports under MJEPA. Data on PCOs for MJEPA 
were provided by the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry. All the trade 
data was at HS4 level in the 2007 version of the Harmonized System. Collected PCOs 
covered exports under MJEPA from its implementation in July 2006 up to December 
2010.176  
c) Trade values for Malaysian exports under Japanese GSP. Data on PCOs were 
provided at HS4 level by the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry. PCOs 
for exports under Japanese GSP covered from January 2003 until December 2010. In 2010, 
GSP preferences were still used for the export of a very small number of items.  
d) Applied and bound multilateral tariffs in Malaysia and Japan. Data were 
retrieved from the WTO’s Integrated Data Base (WTO-IDB, undated) at HS6 level of tariff 
specification (around 5,500 lines per year) and aggregated down to HS4 level (around 
1,300 lines per year). Tariff data were collected for the period between January 2003 and 
December 2010. 
 e) Tariff schedules under MJEPA. Data were retrieved from the MJEPA treaty, 
available from government websites (METI-MJEPA, undated; MITI, undated). Tariff 
schedules in MJEPA are specified at HS6 but collapsed to HS4 for comparison with PCO 
data. Tariff schedules were collected from its implementation date up to December 2010. 
f) Preferential tariffs under Japanese GSP. Data were retrieved from the website of 
Japan’s Customs and Tariff Bureau (Ministry of Finance) (Japan Customs, undated) for the 
                                 
175 Although preferential trade data for Malaysian exports to Japan cover only until December 2010 (see below), overall trade flows have 
been examined up to July 2013. 
176 This research was unable to obtain administrative records for Malaysian imports from Japan under MJEPA preferences. 
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period between January 2003 and December 2010. Tariff data at HS8 level were 
aggregated down to HS4 for every year analyzed.  
h) Rules of origin in MJEPA. Data were retrieved from the MJEPA treaty, available 
from government websites (METI-MJEPA, undated; MITI, undated). 
To analyze the utilization of MJEPA and Japanese GSP preferences for the export 
of Malaysian products to Japan, I defined and computed the same variables described for 
the Thai case, namely: a) Preferential trade value, b) UR, c) UR rank, d) UR rank in 
reverse order, e) Utilization share, f) Utilization share rank, g) Utilization share rank in 
reverse order, h) Preferential tariff margin, and i) ROO restrictiveness index. 
6.2. Utilization of MJEPA  
Since its implementation in July 2006, utilization of MJEPA preferences for Malaysian 
exports to Japan has been even lower than for JTEPA, with URs around 10% (Table 14).  
As in JTEPA, the same disclaimer regarding the high level of Japanese tariffs bound as 
duty-free applies. As in JTEPA, this low level of overall utilization could be partly 
explained by the high level of Japanese tariffs bound as duty-free as well as the existence of 
long phase out periods.177 When the UR is calculated only for tariff codes for which 
MJEPA offered a positive preferential tariff margin, UR of MJEPA for exports during the 
period 2006-2010 stood at around 20% (see figures inside parentheses in Table 14).  
 
Table 14:  Utilization rates (%) of preferential trade regimes in Malaysian exports to Japan * 
 
Regime** 2003 2004 2005 Jan-June 
2006 
July-Dec 
2006 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
MJEPA UR 
for Malaysian 
exports 
(July 2006) 
    11.61 
(22.58) 
12.22 
(22.24) 
11.66 
(18.64) 
11.53 
(19.60) 
 
8.14 
(17.30) 
Japanese 
GSP UR 
10.51 
(20.44) 
12.18 
(24.73) 
12.48 
(25.03) 
14.20 
(22.45) 
0.37 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
 Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
 * Overall ulization rates of MJEPA and GSP were calculated for all tariff codes (figures outside parentheses) or only for tariff codes 
 where MJEPA and GSP offered preferential tariff margins above 0 (figures inside parentheses) 
 ** MJEPA was implemented in July 2006 
                                 
177 In 2006, the year before JTEPA entered into force, Japan had 55.1% of its tariffs codes bound at zero. 
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MJEPA, the first FTA implemented by Malaysia, did not gather from the local 
private sector the enthusiasm and support of later FTA negotiations with the United States 
(and TPP) or the European Union (Essay 1 and below). I was unable to obtain official 
records for imports under MJEPA, although considering that: a) Malaysian tariff schedules 
in MJEPA take longer to achieve complete liberalization than Japanese ones and b) 
Malaysia also provides DES/DDS, one could speculate that utilization of MJEPA 
preferences for the import of Japanese products could be also low.  
As in the Thai case, utilization of MJEPA by Malaysian exporters has been highly 
concentrated among the top 20 codes at HS4 level that account for over 70% of total FTA 
utilization (Table 15). Of note, just four HS4 codes, namely, palm oil (1511) and plastics 
(3907, 3920, 3923) represent almost half of the value of all Malaysian items exported to 
Japan under MJEPA. Similar level of product concentration is observed for overall 
Malaysian exports to Japan (Table 15). Contrary to the initial proposition, concentration in 
MJEPA utilization has not declined in the first four and half years since implementation 
although since most tariffs phase out in waves, it could still decline in coming years. 
Alternatively, it is possible that Malaysian producers are using MJEPA mainly to export to 
Japan products previously traded under the Japanese GSP so the pattern has barely changed 
once GSP preferences were subsumed into MJEPA (see below). For the period preceding 
MJEPA implementation, utilization of GSP was also highly concentrated (see also below). 
Table 15: Share of Top 20 items in Malaysian exports to Japan  
(total and preferential trade flows) * 
 
 
Trade regime 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
Jan-
June 
2006 
July-
Dec 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Top 20 overall exports  
(% total exports) 
73.60 71.72 72.22 71.92 73.82 77.72 74.23 75.58 
Top 20 exports under MJEPA  
(% total exports under MJEPA)  
    71.20 70.91 72.78 72.12 73.38 
Top 20 exports under Japanese 
GSP (% total exports under 
Japanese GSP) 
67.10 73.20 77.34 79.59 71.45 100 100 100 100 
        Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
        * Top 20 items at HS4 level 
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6.3. Political economy of MJEPA utilization  
In Malaysia, MJEPA was supported mainly by producers of palm oil, plastics, chemicals, 
and textiles and garments that eventually received lower tariffs in Japan thanks to MJEPA. 
In line with Hypothesis 3, these items were among the top 20 exports to Japan under 
MJEPA preferences at HS4 level (Table 16). Firms in the wood and furniture, and metals 
industries also accounted for a large share of MJEPA utilization. Palm oil and plastics alone 
represented 45% of all Malaysian exports to Japan that used MJEPA preferences in 2011 
(data from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry). It is worth noting that the list 
of the top 20 largest users of MJEPA in absolute terms has remained very homogeneous 
over time including only 28 items—out of 1,300 items traded at HS4—during the 2006-
2010 period. 
 
Table 16:  Top 20 items in Malaysia exports to Japan under MTEPA and evidence of lobbying 
Top 20 items MJEPA exports 
July 2006-December 2010 * 
 
 
Evidence 
lobbying ** 
 
Palm oil and its fractions (1511) and palm kernel, coconut and babassu oil (1513), cocoa butter, 
fat and oil (1804) + 
Plastics plates, sheets and films (3920), plastic containers (3923), polyethers, exposides, 
polyesters and polymers of vinyl chloride in primary forms (3904,3907) + 
Organic chemicals (acyclic alcohols and halogenats, acyclic nonocarbox acids and halogens and 
polycarboxylic acids and anhydrous, halogenats and sulfurs, etc.) (2905,2915,2917) + 
Wood and articles thereof (wood sawn or chipped, wood continuously shaped, fileboard, 
veneered panels and similar laminated wood) (4407,4409,4411,4412) and furniture (9403)  
Miscellaneous chemical products (insecticides, industrial moncarboxylic fatty acid oils from 
refining, blinders for foundry moulds or cores (3808,3823,3824) + 
Wadding, felt and nonwovens and clothing accessories (gloves and mittens, nonwovens) 
(5603,6116) + 
Electric transformers, static converters and inductors (8544) 
 + 
Cooper products (7410) 
  
Crustraceans live (0306) 
 + 
Vacuum flasks and vessels (9617) 
  
Automotive parts (8708) 
  
Miscellaneous articles of base metal (8302) 
  
Toilet paper (4818) 
  
Refractory bricks and other ceramic construction articles (6902) 
   
Handtools and tools used in agriculture (8001) 
  
 Sources: Calculations by the Author using data from official records (*) and semi-structured interviews (**) 
* Top 20 items at HS4 exported by Malaysia to Japan under MJEPA preferences during the period July 2006-December 2010 
** Evidence of lobbying by producers of the indicated items, as described in Essay 1, is coded by a “+” sign.  No symbol indicates that 
field research could not find evidence of business lobbying, although it cannot be excluded that it actually existed 
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6.4. Variables affecting utilization of MJEPA  
To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies on the utilization of Malaysian FTAs 
using official records. Therefore, I investigated whether or not the variables determining 
FTA utilization for Thai FTAs also apply to MJEPA. First, correlations among MFN, 
MJEPA and GSP tariffs at HS4 level were run. Importantly, it was found a strong 
correlation among tariffs in all three regimes, suggesting that, in line with Hypotheses 1 
and 4, items protected behind high tariffs at the multilateral level receive higher tariffs in 
preferential regimes (Table 17). Or, in other words, preferential regimes, whether unilateral 
or reciprocal, tend to liberalize faster and more those items that already receive low MFN 
tariffs. 
Table 17:  Correlation between tariffs under MFN, MJEPA  
and Japanese GSP regimes * 
 
 MJEPA 
tariffs 
2006 
MJEPA 
tariffs 
2007 
MJEPA 
tariffs 
2008 
MJEPA 
tariffs 
2009 
MJEPA 
tariffs 
2010 
MFN tariffs 
2007-2010 ** 
GSP tariffs 
2003-2005 ** 
Japanese  
GSP Tariffs 
2003-2005 ** 
852  
(<0.001) 
0.852 
(<0.001) 
0.849 
(<0.001) 
0.815 
(<0.001) 
0.844 
(<0.001) 
0.884 
(<0.001) 
 
MFN tariffs 
2007-2010 ** 
0.844 
(<0.001) 
0.841 
(<0.001) 
0.836 
(<0.001) 
0.829 
(<0.001) 
0.824 
(<0.001) 
 0.884 
(<0.001) 
            Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
            * Values shown indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level) 
            ** For most items, MFN and Japanese GSP tariffs suffered relatively small changes during the indicated periods. MFN and  
           GSP tariffs used to calculate correlations were the average of the duty applied for each code at HS4 level during the  
           indicated period  
 
 
Next, it was examined the potential correlation between the six utilization variables 
for MJEPA and the tariff savings afforded by the FTA for each HS4 code over the 2006-
2010 period. As for Thai FTAs, it was found that the UR of MJEPA correlated, although 
only at moderate strength, with the preferential tariff margin (Table 18 for UR and not 
shown for the rest of utilization variables).178 Interestingly, although the MJEPA UR has 
not increased since implementation (Table 14), its correlation with the preferential tariff 
margin did (Table 18), probably indicating that Malaysian exporters that make use of 
                                 
178 As in the case of TAFTA and JTEPA, there was no correlation between the utilization variables for MJEPA and the absolute 
preferential tariff level. 
3. Essay 2 
 153 
MJEPA preferences started using them early on and that the progressive increase in the 
preferential margin has not enticed higher utilization.  
 
Table 18:  Correlation between MJEPA UR for Malaysian exports and 
MJEPA preferential tariff margin * 
 
 PTM  
MFN-MJEPA 
2006 
PTM   
MFN-MJEPA 
2007 
PTM  
MFN-MJEPA 
2008 
PTM  
MFN-MJEPA 
2009 
PTM  
MFN-MJEPA 
2010 
MJEPA UR  
for Malaysian exports 
July-Dec 2006 
0.126 (< 0.001)     
MJEPA UR  
for Malaysian exports 
2007 
 0.225 (<0.001)    
MJEPA UR 
for Malaysian exports 
2008 
  0.253 (<0.001)   
MJEPA UR 
for Malaysian exports 
2009 
   0.267 (<0.001)  
MJEPA UR 
for Malaysian exports 
2010 
    0.268 (<0.001) 
   Source: Calculations by the Author of data from official administrative records 
   Abbreviations: MJEPA UR: MJEPA utilization rate; PTM MFN-MJEPA: preferential tariff margin MFN-MJEPA 
   * Values shown indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level).  
 
 
.   
Next, it was tested if, as projected by Hypothesis 4, utilization of MJEPA relates to 
previous use of Japanese GSP.179 In the four years previous to the implementation of 
MJEPA, over 10% of Malaysian exports to Japan used the preferences granted by the 
Japanese GSP program (see figures outside parentheses in Table 14). It was found that 
utilization (UR and related utilization variables) of Japanese GSP by exporters in Malaysia 
correlated, although only weakly, with the preferential tariff margin between GSP and the 
applied MFN tariffs (Table 19). When only items for which GSP offered preferential tariff 
                                 
179 This research was unable to obtain official records for the utilization of DES/DDS for imports from Japan as it is considered sensitive 
information. Section 93 of the 1976 Malaysia’s Customs Act establishes that firms could claim drawback of 90% of the duties charged on 
inputs used in the manufacturing of goods for exports. The Malaysian Investment Development Authority also provides exemption of 
import duties on intermediate goods based on fulfillment of different criteria (e.g., export, research and development, etc.). In contrast to 
Thailand, import privileges in DES/DDS are often negotiated with firms on a case-by-case basis (interviews). 
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margins above zero were computed, around a quarter of all Malaysian exports to Japan 
used the GSP program (see figures inside parentheses in Table 14).  
 
 
Table 19:  Correlation between Japanese GSP UR and  
GSP preferential tariff margin * 
 
 GSP UR 
2003 
GSP UR 
2004 
GSP UR 
2005 
GSP UR 
2006 (Jan-June) 
PTM MFN-GSP 
2003-2006 
0.193 (< 0.001) 0.151 (< 0.001) 0.050 (< 0.001) 0.152 (< 0.001) 
         Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
         Abbreviations: PTM MFN-GSP: preferential tariff margin MFN-GSP; GSP UR: Japanese GSP utilization rate.  
                      * Values shown indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level) 
 
 
Examination of the top 20 items by trade value exported under GSP during the 
period immediately before to MJEPA implementation revealed a highly constant and 
concentrated pattern of exports. Palm oil, wood and furniture, plastics, and chemicals 
account for over 70% of Malaysian exports under GSP (Table 20). There was also a 
remarkable overlap, even higher than in Thailand, between the top 20 Malaysian exports 
conducted under GSP preferences before June 2006 and under MJEPA after then (Table 
20). This comparison was then extended to all tariff codes at HS4 level and it was found a 
positive statistical correlation between exports under both preferential regimes (Tables 21, 
22 and 23, not shown for the rest of utilization variables). Altogether these results confirm 
Hypothesis 4 and indicate that, to a significant extent, Japanese concessions in MJEPA 
have replaced preferential tariffs offered unilaterally through its GSP program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Essay 2 
 155 
Table 20:  Top 20 items in Malaysian exports to Japan under Japanese GSP and MJEPA  
 
Top 20 items in Malaysian exports to Japan 
under Japanese GSP 
January 2003-June 2006 * 
Top 20 items in Malaysian exports to Japan 
under MJEPA 
July 2006-December 2010 * 
Palm oil and its fractions (1511) and palm kernel, 
coconut and babassu oil (1513), animal or vegetal oils 
chemically modified (1516), glycerol (1520) 
Palm oil and its fractions (1511) and palm kernel, coconut 
and babassu oil (1513), cocoa butter, fat and oil (1804) 
 
Plastics plates, sheets and films (3920,3921), plastic 
containers (3923), polymers of styrene, polyethers, 
expoxides, polyesters and polyamides (3903,3907,3908) 
Plastics plates, sheets and films (3920), plastic containers 
(3923), polyethers, exposides, polyesters and polymers of 
vinyl chloride in primary forms (3904,3907) 
Organic chemicals (2905,2915,2917) Organic chemicals (2905,2915,2917) 
Industrial moncarboxylic fatty acid oils and alcohols 
(3823) 
Wood and articles of wood (wood sawn, shaped, fileboard 
or laminated wood) (4407,4409,4411,4412), and furniture 
(9403) 
Wood and articles of wood (wood sawn, shaped, 
fileboard or laminated wood) (4407,4409,4411,4412) 
Miscellaneous chemical products (insecticides, industrial 
moncarboxylic fatty acid oils and alcohols, blinders for 
foundry moulds or cores (3808,3823,3824) 
Synthetic filament (5402) Wadding, felt and nonwovens and clothing accessories 
(gloves and mittens, nonwovens) (5603,6116) 
Cooper products (7410) 
 
Electric transformers, static converters and inductors 
(8544) 
Nonwovens (6116) Cooper products (7410) 
Pigments and dyes (3206) Crustraceans live (0306) 
 
Electric transformers, static converters and inductors 
(8544) 
Vacuum flasks and vessels (9617) 
 
Vacuum flasks and vessels (9617) 
 
Automotive parts (8708) 
 
Handkerchiefs (6213) Miscellaneous articles of base metal (8302) 
Screw, bolts and nuts of iron and steel (7318) Toilet paper (4818) 
Miscellaneous articles of base metal (8302) 
 
Refractory bricks and other ceramic construction articles 
(6902)  
Miscellaneous articles of aluminium (7616) Handtools and tools used in agriculture (8001) 
Bread and pastry cakes (1905)  
  Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
  * Top 20 items at HS4 level for the indicated regime and period. Shadowed cells refer to product overlap across both sides of the table 
 
 
Table 21:  Correlation between URs of MJEPA and Japanese GSP  
for Malaysian exports * 
 
 GSP UR 
2003 
GSP UR 
2004 
GSP UR 
2005 
GSP UR 
Jan-July 2006 
MJEPA UR  
for Malaysian exports 
Jan-June 2006 
0.453 (< 0.001) 0.444 (< 0.001) 0.317(< 0.001) 0.421 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR  
for Malaysian exports 
2007 
0.652 (< 0.001) 0.523 (< 0.001) 0.309 (< 0.001) 0.570 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR  
for Malaysian exports 
2008 
0.633 (< 0.001) 0.499 (< 0.001) 0.292 (< 0.001) 0.509 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR  
for Malaysian exports 
2009 
0.589 (< 0.001) 0.454 (< 0.001) 0.229 (< 0.001) 0.489 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR  
for Malaysian exports 
2010 
0.547 (< 0.001) 0.471 (< 0.001) 0.278 (< 0.001) 0.449 (< 0.001) 
 Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
 Abbreviations: MJEPA UR: MJEPA utilization rate; GSP UR: Japanese GSP utilization rate. 
 * Values shown indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p value, significance level) 
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Table 22: Correlation between UR rank reverse of MJEPA and GSP  
for Malaysian exports * 
 
 GSP UR 
rank reverse 
2003 
GSP UR 
rank reverse 
2004 
GSP UR 
rank reverse 
2005 
GSP UR 
rank reverse 
Jan-June 2006 
MJEPA UR rank reverse 
for Malaysian exports 
July-December 2006 
0.643 (< 0.001) 0.664 (< 0.001) 0.751 (< 0.001) 0.748 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR rank reverse 
for Malaysian exports 
2007 
0.672 (< 0.001) 0.677 (< 0.001) 0.733 (< 0.001) 0.758 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR rank reverse 
for Malaysian exports 
2008 
0.647(< 0.001) 0.629 (< 0.001) 0.700 (< 0.001) 0.715 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR rank reverse 
for Malaysian exports 
2009 
0.615 (< 0.001) 0.594 (< 0.001) 0.689 (< 0.001) 0.678 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA UR rank reverse 
for Malaysian exports 
2010 
0.572 (< 0.001) 0.590 (< 0.001) 0.654 (< 0.001) 0.640 (< 0.001) 
             Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
             Abbreviations: MJEPA UR rank reverse: MJEPA utilization rate rank reverse; GSP UR rank reverse: Japanese GSP utilization   
             rank reverse. 
             * Values shown indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p significance level).  
 
 
Table 23:  Correlation between utilization share rank (in reverse order)  
of MJEPA and Japanese GSP for Malaysian exports * 
 
 
 GSP utilization 
share rank 
2003 
GSP utilization 
share rank 
2004 
GSP utilization 
share rank 
2005 
GSP utilization 
share rank 
Jan-June 2006 
MJEPA utilization share rank 
for Malaysian exports 
July-December 2006 
0.452 (< 0.001) 0.512 (< 0.001) 0.551 (< 0.001) 0.611 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA utilization share rank 
for Malaysian exports 
2007 
0.425 (< 0.001) 0.492 (< 0.001) 0.522 (< 0.001) 0.541 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA utilization share rank 
for Malaysian exports 
2008 
0.392 (< 0.001) 0.418 (< 0.001) 0.447 (< 0.001) 0.460 (< 0.001) 
MJEPA utilization share rank 
for Malaysian exports 
2009 
0.394 (< 0.001) 0.437 (< 0.001) 0.499 (< 0.001) 0.518 (< 0.0 01) 
MJEPA utilization share rank 
for Malaysian exports 
2010 
0.339 (< 0.001) 0.425 (< 0.001) 0.449 (< 0.001) 0.461 (< 0.001) 
       Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records. 
       * Values shown indicate Pearson correlation coefficient (p significance level).  
 
If MJEPA preferences have replaced GSP, use of the latter should have declined as 
MJEPA was implemented (Hypothesis 4). Indeed, the UR of GSP dropped drastically from 
14.20% of total exports during the first semester of 2006 to just 0.37% in the second half 
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after MJEPA entered into force in July 2006 (Table 14). In 2010, GSP preferences were 
used by just five tariff lines at HS4 (0.05% of total exports), mostly processed food items 
for which MJEPA did not offer liberalization yet. As in Thailand, the fact that some items 
liberalized under GSP remained protected five years into MJEPA reflects the importance 
that Japan attaches to the irreversibility of concessions under FTAs, compared to the 
discretion of those granted unilaterally under GSP. 
Analysis of Thai FTAs here failed to find an inverse correlation between their 
utilization and the restrictiveness of their ROOs and I sought to investigate whether this 
also occurred for MJEPA. The ROO restrictiveness index of each HS4 code in MJEPA was 
computed for correlation with all utilization variables. As for Thai FTAs, no significant 
negative correlation was found (not shown and see below for discussion).  
Since there are no econometric studies on the variables affecting MJEPA utilization, 
I run a linear regression analysis with the UR of MJEPA in 2007 as the dependent variable 
and GPS UR in 2003 and the preferential tariff margin between MFN tariffs and MJEPA 
tariffs for 2007 as independent variables. It was found that the explanatory value of GSP 
was much larger than that of the preferential tariff margin, GSP UR in 2003 explained 
42.6% of the UR of MJEPA in 2007 (Table 24). When the regression analysis was repeated 
for MJEPA UR in 2010 using as independent variables GPS UR in 2003 and the 
preferential margin afforded by MJEPA in 2010, GSP UR explained 29.9% of MJEPA UR 
(Table 25). One reason for the declining explanatory valuable of GSP could be due to 
changes in the pattern of Malaysian exports to Japan between 2003 and 2010 that were not 
revealed in the period 2003-2007. However, the contribution of GSP did not increase when 
MJEPA UR in 2010 was regressed using as independent variable the UR of GSP in the first 
semester of 2006 (not shown). Instead, the lower weight of GSP in the UR of MJEPA in 
2010 could be related to changes in the composition of trade using MJEPA between 2007 
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and 2010. Despite that concentration among the top 20 codes exported under MJEPA 
(Table 15) and correlations in Tables 21 to 23 remained stable over that period, it is still 
possible that more recent exports under MJEPA have started to diverge from those under 
GSP earlier as tariff schedules in MJEPA are liberalized and its UR for less-traded items 
increased. Alternatively, the sharp drop in MJEPA UR in 2010 (Table 14) may have 
affected its correlation with GSP utilization. Regression analyses of MJEPA UR over a 
longer period would be therefore needed. 
 
Table 24:  Estimated coefficients for linear regression models  
for MJEPA UR 2007 * 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
GSP UR 2003 0.627 [0.021] 
(p < 0.001) 
 0.609 [0.020] 
(p < 0.001) 
PTM MFN-MJEPA 2007  2.543 [0.311] 
(p < 0.001) 
1.586 [0.240] 
(p < 0.001) 
Constant 3.903 6.577 1.267 
R2 0.426 0.051 0.445 
   Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
   * For each model the regression coefficient is followed by the estimated standard error  
    (in square brackets) and the p-value for t-tests of the coefficients (in parenthesis) 
 
 
Table 25:  Estimated coefficients for linear regression models  
for MJEPA UR 2010 * 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
GSP UR 2003 0.536 [0.023] 
(p < 0.001) 
 0.509 [0.023] 
(p < 0.001) 
PTM MFN-MJEPA 2010  3.142 [0.298] 
(p < 0.001) 
2.409 [0.253] 
(p < 0.001) 
Constant 5.801 5.832 1.402 
R2 0.299 0.081 0.346 
  Source: Calculations by the Author using data from official records 
  * For each model the regression coefficient is followed by the estimated standard error  
  (in square brackets) and the p-value for t-tests of the coefficients (in parenthesis) 
 
 
7. Discussion 
Most works on the political economy of East Asian regionalism argue that recent FTAs 
have been driven primarily for political motivations rather than economic ones and were 
formulated by the political leadership in these countries with little participation or interest 
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on the part of the private sector (e.g., Aggarwal and Koo, 2006; Lee, 2006; Sally, 2006; 
Terada, 2009; Ravenhill, 2010). In addition, a number of estimates and surveys indicate 
that firms in East Asia have made very low utilization of existing FTAs (Haddad, 2007; 
Ranvehill, 2008; Ravenhill, 2010; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011a). Only two studies, both on 
Thailand, involved analysis of official records on FTA utilization, concluding that FTAs 
have not made significant impact in terms of trade creation but mainly served to liberalize 
highly traded goods (Kohpaiboon, 2010; Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2011).  
Empirical evidence in this Essay and elsewhere in this Thesis has countered most of 
those arguments. Essay 1 found that the private sector in Thailand and Malaysia played an 
important role in FTA policymaking, in some cases pushing governments to launch 
negotiations. This Essay analyzed the utilization of Thai and Malaysian FTAs in the 
context of both the political economies that originally set them in place and the utilization 
of existing unilateral tariff reduction schemes. It was found that utilization of FTAs in both 
countries was larger than most estimates and survey projected but, with the exception of 
TAFTA, it was nevertheless low. However, low overall utilization hid significant sectoral 
variability with some sectors making virtually complete utilization of FTA preferences, 
independently of trade volumes. Sectors that used FTAs to the greatest extent were often 
among the strongest ex-ante supporters of FTA liberalization during negotiations and/or 
that benefited from GSP and DES/DDS unilateral schemes. 
Primary data on preferential trade in both countries were computed to test four main 
arguments, namely: 1) FTAs establish legally binding commitments on tariff reduction. 
Consequently, goods for which tariffs are unbound or bound with large overhangs at the 
multilateral level and/or that are excluded from unilateral schemes would be more likely to 
receive longer phase out periods in FTA liberalization schedules; 2) Sequencing in FTA 
liberalization would determine the evolution and sectoral concentration of FTA utilization. 
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As FTA liberalization schedules are progressively implemented, overall utilization should 
increase and involve more items. 3) Quantitative analyses of the utilization of FTAs should 
be coupled with the political economy determinants involved in their formulation. It would 
be expected that sectors that successfully lobbied for FTA liberalization will make high use 
of FTA preferences (in absolute and/or relative terms); 4) Producers that benefit from GSP 
or DES/DDS programs should support the inclusion of these unilateral tariff reductions into 
binding and non-removable FTA concessions. If they eventually succeeded, their utilization 
of unilateral schemes should decline in favor of the use FTAs. Analysis of trade 
administrative records confirmed all four hypotheses that will be discussed in turn.  
Overall utilization of TAFTA by Thai exporters exceeds 60% of total exports, 
which is in line with that of well-established FTAs elsewhere.180 However, overall 
utilization of TAFTA for Thai imports and of JTEPA (and probably MJEPA) for both trade 
directions has been low. As argued earlier, low utilization of JTEPA and MJEPA 
preferences by Thai and Malaysian exporters should be put into context with the large share 
of duty-free tariff lines, around half, applied by Japan. When utilization is calculated only 
for goods for which FTAs provide a preferential tariff margin, utilization of JTEPA by Thai 
exporters was around 60%.181  On the other hand, the low utilization of TAFTA and JTEPA 
by Thai importers (and probably of MJEPA by Malaysian importers) could be reasoned on 
longer FTA liberalization schedules in Thailand (and Malaysia) compared to Australia and 
Japan. Meantime Thailand and Malaysia progressively implement FTA tariff schedules, 
eligible importers in both countries use DES/DDS privileges.  
For the three FTAs examined, just 20 items, out of the over 1,300 codes at HS4 
level, accounted for between 67.3% and 96.4% of all trade using their preferences. In 
                                 
180 In 2000, overall UR of the North-American Free Trade Agreement, between the United States, Canada and Mexico, was 64% (Anson 
et al., 2005). 
181 Applying the same methodology to TAFTA would put its utilization by Thai exporters close to 100%. In Australia, the share of 
applied tariffs set at zero is only slightly lower than in Japan. Dominance of automotive products, 63.5% of total Thai exports under 
TAFTA in 2011, helps explaining the greater utilization of TAFTA vis-à-vis JTEPA (see Essay 1 and 3).  
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addition, the identity of these top 20 items has remained fairly constant over time. Such 
extreme concentration in the overall share of FTA utilization has two important 
consequences. First, focus on the largest users by overall utilization share overlooks the 
high UR, often close to 100%, incurred in the export or import of some goods with lower 
trade volumes and outside the top 20. Arguably, for the exporters and importers of these 
goods, FTAs could have large economic impacts that escaped studies centered on overall 
FTA URs (Ravenhill, 2010; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011) or exclusively on sectors 
accounting for the largest share of overall utilization (Kohpaiboon, 2010; Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon, 2011). Second, the capacity of Thai FTAs to foster trade creation has been 
questioned (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2011). Indeed, high concentration in overall 
utilization share—that, incidentally, also occurs in overall trade flows—limits the 
possibilities of FTAs to drastically change bilateral trade patterns and for overall trade 
creation. But, while trade creation in less traded sectors would be more difficult to identify, 
it cannot be excluded that it actually occured.182 
Concentration in FTA utilization shows a small declining trend in TAFTA and 
JTEPA but not in MJEPA. Nevertheless, considering that much of the initial FTA 
utilization simply replaces use of unilateral schemes and that liberalization of many tariff 
lines phases out over 5-10 years period, a longer timeframe would be required to assess 
how concentration in FTA utilization evolves. 
This Essay was able to link evidence of business support and lobbying in the 
formulation of FTAs described in Essay 1 with their sectoral utilization afterwards. In line 
with the initial argument, it was found that FTAs were used heavily (as a share of total 
trade under the FTA) and to a large extent (relative to total trade flows for a given item) by 
sectors that benefit from larger FTA preferential tariff margins and that often corresponded 
                                 
182 In any case, it would be naïve to expect that FTA liberalization, or any other form of liberalization for that matter, would 
automatically result in trade creation, as this involves more than eliminating tariffs and requires establishing customer and logistic links 
(see below in the  main text). 
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to those initially lobbying for FTA liberalization. For instance, the leading role of 
carmakers pushing for TAFTA and JTEPA was reflected in the large FTA utilization and 
share of automotive products in Thai exports under TAFTA or of steel and automotive 
products in Thai imports under JTEPA. Likewise, lobbying by key Thai and Malaysian 
exporters (e.g., processed food, plastics, chemicals, palm oil, textiles and garments, steel) in 
favor of JTEPA and MJEPA translated later into high URs and UR shares. Nevertheless, 
while this Essay is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to unearth these links, further and 
more detailed analyses of the data and over longer periods would be needed. 
A wealth of studies have analyzed and quantified the trade restricting effects of 
ROOs in FTAs (e.g., Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2006), including in Thai FTAs 
(Kohpaiboon, 2010; Intaravitak et al., 2011). Econometric simulations in the two latter 
works calculated that ROOs in Thai FTAs amount to a tariff equivalent of 2-10% and that 
relaxation of ROOs may have greater impact on FTA utilization that tariff liberalization per 
se. Surprisingly, this Essay found that utilization of Thai and Malaysian FTAs was not 
inversely correlated with ROOs restrictiveness. Although calculation of the ROO 
restrictiveness index involved collapsing tariff codes from HS6 to HS4 level, aggregation 
maintained the highest level of restriction so any restrictive effect of ROOs should have 
been even amplified. Further analyses would be required to account for the lack of effect of 
ROOs in my analyses, but two explanations could be advanced. First, the scale of the 
restrictiveness index used here (Cadot et al., 2006) is potentially too small to capture 
variability in ROO restrictiveness in Thai and Malaysian FTAs. In that regard, for most 
tariff lines, the index fell within three out of the seven scores possible.183 Although 
controversial, another potential explanation is that ROOs are not as restrictive as the above-
mentioned econometric models predict. In support of such argument, Kawai and Wignaraja 
                                 
183 Nevertheless, scales in other ROO restrictiveness indexes are similar. 
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(2011b) found that only 26% of the firms surveyed in Thailand indicated that ROOs added 
costs to their business or affected their current or future use of FTAs. Anecdotal evidence 
from my own qualitative field research also points in this direction.184  
The low utilization of FTAs has been attributed inter alia to the prevalence of 
DES/DDS programs in many East Asian countries that, by reducing tariffs for firms 
operating within regional production networks, make redundant (when not harmful) the 
creation of FTAs (e.g., Ravenhill, 2010). In turn, this Essay found that firms’ dependence 
on these unilateral tariff reduction schemes have in fact fostered the formation first and 
utilization later of FTAs. Being preferential tariffs in GSP and DES/DDS unilaterally 
given, they are potentially removable at the discretion of the granting country. In addition, 
their use is restricted at multiple levels. Utilization of GSP preferences is not only subject 
to product- and country-specific export ceilings but countries lose their eligibility to GSP 
once they reach certain development status. Likewise, utilization of DES/DDS privileges is 
usually limited within a time period, physical location, economic sector and/or to inputs 
incorporated into export-bound goods.  
During the 2000-2005 period, just before JTEPA and MJEPA were implemented, 
Thailand and Malaysia ranked only after China as the world’s largest beneficiaries of the 
Japanese GSP program. And my analysis found that a sizeable share of Thai imports from 
Australia and Japan takes places through DES/DDS privileges—15.9% and 44.3% before 
implementation of their respective FTAs. Economic actors are more likely to mobilize to 
avoid losses with respect to the status quo than to secure new gains (Baldwin, 2006). 
Accordingly, producers in Thailand and Malaysia that benefitted from GSP and DES/DDS 
                                 
184 Most firms and business associations interviewed for this Thesis indicated that, independently of whether or not they were using FTAs 
at the time, they did not find ROOs as a critical factor restricting FTA utilization and that other factors are more important. In Thailand, 
application to PCOs requires that firms provide information about their cost structure and interviews found that some firms, especially 
small ones, were hesitant to use FTAs because the potential tax consequences derived from reporting such information. For large firms, 
an often-mentioned reason for not using FTAs was that they obtained larger tariff savings from DES/DDS privileges, particularly those 
offered by the Board of Investment, whose application procedures are easier. 
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sought to integrate these unilateral liberalization schemes into legally binding agreements 
and were among those sectors more actively lobbying in favor of FTAs. Once FTAs were 
implemented, these producers were also more likely to be among the first and largest (in 
absolute or relative terms) users of FTAs, not only because they sought to keep benefiting 
from preferential tariffs but also because these firms already had in place all the 
procurement/export linkages as well as the logistics associated to documenting and 
applying for PCOs. My analyses showed that utilization of Thai and, especially, Malaysian 
FTAs was highly correlated with the previous use of GSP or DES/DDS. In fact, FTA 
utilization correlated with greater strength to the utilization of these programs than with the 
preferential tariff margin that, after all, is at the essence of FTAs. For instance, during the 
first year of MJEPA, 42.5% of its utilization for Malaysian exports to Japan was explained 
by previous utilization of the Japanese GSP. This result is in line with evidence showing 
that the higher the political trade dependence of countries on American and European GSP 
programs, the highest the likelihood of those countries sought an FTA with the Northern 
partner (Shadlen, 2008; Manger and Shadlen, 2013).185  
FTAs should be therefore evaluated not only for their capacity to create and expand 
new trade flows but, even more importantly, for binding tariffs at two levels. First, in their 
FTA concessions, Thailand and Malaysia have bound (and even eliminated) tariffs that 
were either unbound or bound with large overhangs at the multilateral level. Second, FTAs 
served to bind unilateral tariff concessions in GSP and DES/DDS, which have started to 
progressively replace. Current utilization of Japanese GSP preferences by Thai and 
Malaysian exporters has been reduced to a handful of goods not covered yet by JTEPA and 
MJEPA. The still large utilization of DES/DDS to import goods from Australia and Japan 
to Thailand is related not only to slow liberalization schedules by Thailand but also to the 
                                 
185 Of note, both studies take a country-level analysis, not an intra-country sectoral approach as in this Essay. They use the concept of 
political trade dependence as “the degree to which developing countries rely on such programs [GSP and GSP-related programs] and  
[…] [their] market access is subject to political idiosyncrasies in concession-granting developed countries” (Manger and Shadlen, 2013). 
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fact that DES/DDS eliminate tariffs completely while FTAs may take several years to grant 
duty free.186 However, given the above-mentioned restrictions attached to the use of 
DES/DDS it could be predicted that FTA preferences would also eventually replace them. 
FTA liberalization reduces the incentives of import-competing sectors to lobby for 
high external tariffs—phenomenon known as rent destruction—so FTA preferential tariffs 
are eventually multilateralized and extended to countries outside the bloc (Ornelas, 2005a; 
Ornelas, 2005b).187 Just as JTEPA and MJEPA eroded Japanese GSP preferences, FTA 
preferential margins would eventually shrink and disappear as multilateral tariffs are also 
progressively reduced. My analysis found that goods attracting the highest tariffs at the 
multilateral level are also more likely to receive high tariffs in FTAs (and unilateral 
regimes). As multilateral liberalization progresses, either via WTO rounds or through FTA-
induced rent destruction, utilization of FTAs would decline and eventually concentrate 
around a small set of goods. It could be therefore hypothesized that as FTA liberalization is 
eventually exhausted, elimination of remaining tariff peaks will only take place at 
multilateral trade negotiations.  
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Essay 3 — Creation and Shifting of Rents within 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Blocs 
  
                  Firms, States and the Redistribution of Power within Production   
                  Networks under Regionalism 188 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Starting in the 1980s, trade and investment flows by lead firms organizing production networks in East Asia 
have led to significant regional economic integration. In contrast to other regions, it has only been since the 
turn of the century that East Asian countries have begun to institutionalize their integration through free trade 
agreements (FTAs). By their nature, FTAs discriminate against firms and states outside the bloc. However, 
bilateral FTAs could also create and shift rents within the bloc and selectively improve the leverage of some 
firms and states vis-à-vis other firms and states also inside the FTA area. To the extent that FTAs could be 
designed to provide asymmetric market, procurement and restructuring advantages to some firms but not 
others, they could redistribute power among firms within a production network and an FTA area. At the same 
time, and despite erosion of the policy space and power of states over production networks, compared to other 
forms of liberalization, FTAs could provide governments with additional sources of leverage over lead firms. 
FTAs offer greater flexibility in liberalization coverage and sequencing and could be designed to selectively 
foster procurement and technical linkages between lead firms local suppliers. To test these hypotheses this 
Essay analyzed the automotive production network in Thailand and Malaysia in the context of recent bilateral 
FTAs. In pursuing their corporate and national objectives, firms and governments in both countries have 
made use of FTAs to create and capture selective rents that improved their relative position within national 
and regional automotive production networks. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
188 Essay 3 was originally written in August 2010. Figures 3 and 4 and Tables 2 and 3 were updated 
to reflect recent developments. In addition to its critical evaluation by Professor K. Shadlen, it also 
received review comments from Professor K.A. Chase (Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA) 
in May 25, 2011. 
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Abbreviations: 
APC: automotive parts and components 
AFTA: ASEAN FTA 
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations 
ATIGA: ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement 
DES/DDS: duty exemption schemes / duty drawback schemes 
FTA: free trade agreement 
GATT: General Agreement on tariffs and trade 
GM: General Motors 
JTEPA: Japan-Thailand economic partnership Agreement 
LCR: local content requirement 
MAJAICO: Malaysia Japan Automotive Industries Cooperation 
MFN: most-favoured nation 
MJEPA: Malaysia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
OEM: original equipment manufacturer  
ROO: rules of origin 
TAFTA: Thailand-Australia FTA 
TIEHS: Thailand-India Early Harvest Scheme 
 WTO: World Trade Organization 
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1. Introduction 
Introduction in East Asia of export-oriented strategies and unilateral liberalization during 
the 1980s led to the rapid emergence of production networks where parts and components 
are traded across national and firm boundaries (Kimura and Ando, 2005; Baldwin, 2008; 
Hiratsuka and Kimura, 2008; Hiratsuka and Uchida, 2010). During the last two decades, 
these cross-border production networks have unleashed a significant level of market-driven 
regional economic integration (regionalization). However, and in contrast to other regions, 
institutionalization of economic integration in East Asia by means of free trade agreements 
(FTAs) (regionalism) is only a recent phenomenon (Hiratsuka, 2007). With the exception 
of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian nations) trade bloc, and until the early 
2000s, East Asian countries did not participate in the worldwide proliferation of 
regionalism but today they stand among the most active signatories of FTAs. 
A wealth of works in the global commodity/value chain and global production 
network literatures has elegantly mapped the distribution of power and value between lead 
firms, organizing production, and their suppliers, both nationally and across countries 
(reviewed in Hess and Yeung, 2006). However, most studies in these traditions remain 
firm-centered, leaving out the way governments’ policies influence and are influenced by 
inter-firm power dynamics.  
Much of the scholarly attention around FTAs has focused on how firms inside an 
FTA area benefit from expanded market access at the expense of outside firms (trade 
diversion), which consequently increases their power within the cross-border production 
network (Schiff and Winters, 2003). This Essay delves into why firms and states seek FTAs 
and how they exploit unique features in them to gain selective advantages. To that end, it 
will explore the organization of cross-border production networks under regionalism 
through the conceptualization and analysis of power relations between and among firms 
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and states, examining the ways FTAs could have altered these power configurations. This 
Essay contends that FTAs offer opportunities for firms and states to enhance their 
comparative advantage selectively, not only with respect to firms and states outside the 
bloc, but also vis-à-vis to others already inside. By expanding market and procurement 
options for lead firms, FTAs increase their power over suppliers and the government in the 
host country. But, to the extent that FTAs could be designed to provide these benefits 
asymmetrically, FTAs could also selectively enhance the position of some lead firms in 
relation to others also inside the bloc. In turn, a state could use FTAs to affect lead firms’ 
operations selectively and foster their procurement and technology linkages with local 
suppliers. By offering asymmetric distribution of rents (selective rents), FTAs foster 
competition or collaboration among lead firms, suppliers and states within a production 
network to affect their formulation.   
To test the above arguments, I analyzed the Thai and Malaysian automotive sectors 
in the context of recent FTAs. The automotive industry is one of the most protected 
manufacturing sectors, having often been at the center, when not at the origin, of 
regionalism initiatives worldwide (Carrillo et al., 2004). As a grouping, ASEAN represents 
the world’s sixth largest automotive producer, historically led by Thailand and Malaysia.189 
Back in the 1960s and until the early 1980s, the automotive industries of both countries 
were relatively similar but diverging government policies and corporate strategies 
engendered different power dynamics between and among firms and the state that have 
eventually resulted in different outcomes.190 Thailand and Malaysia also are the two 
developing countries in East Asia that have implemented more FTAs (see footnote 32). 
                                 
189 In 2012, Thailand accounted for 57.8% and 41.3% of all vehicles produced and sold in ASEAN, respectively. The corresponding 
figures for Malaysia were 13.4% and 18.0%, respectively (OICA database). In 2009 and 2010-2012, Indonesia surpassed Malaysia as 
ASEAN’s second largest producer (data from OICA database).  
190 Comparison of the evolution of the Thai and Malaysian automotive industries has been object of intense academic research, much of it 
published since research for this Thesis started  (e.g., Abdulsomad, 1999; Abbott, 2004; Doner, 2009; Wad, 2009; Wad and Govindaraju, 
2011; Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich, 2013; Natsuda and Thoburn, 2013; Natsuda et al., 2013). 
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Empirical evidence obtained through extensive sectoral and firm-level research 
confirmed the initial arguments.191 Despite differences in their institutional and 
policymaking environments and in the structure of their automotive sectors, governments 
and automotive firms in Thailand and Malaysia sought specific configurations in FTAs that 
enhanced their leverage vis-à-vis other states and firms outside as well as inside the FTA 
area. As a result, FTAs signed by both countries have altered the organization and 
distribution of power within their respective automotive industries 
The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows. The next section sketches key 
features of the automotive production network. Section three outlines the analytical 
framework for the study. Sections four and six analyze the Thai and Malaysian automotive 
industries prior to regionalism. Section five and seven present empirical data on both 
industries in the context of FTAs. Section eight discusses findings and offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The automotive production network  
In producer-driven chains, like the automotive industry, the lead firm (e.g., Toyota, Ford) is 
also the brand-bearing and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that makes all key 
decisions regarding design and production strategies and conducts most of the assembly 
and distribution of final goods (Sturgeon et al., 2008; Sturgeon et al., 2009). To 
manufacture a vehicle (also referred as a completely built-up unit), assembly plants could 
independently produce and/or outsource all automotive parts and components (APCs) or, 
when manufacturing capabilities or scales are limited, start instead from a completely 
knocked-down kit that contains most of the elements of a vehicle. 
                                 
191 The Essay focuses exclusively on the automotive sector but draws on many of the 212 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted 
for this Thesis with private sector representatives and government officials in Thailand and Malaysia during two independent trips in 
2008 and 2009, which were complemented with numerous personal communications and secondary research during 2010-2012.  
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Because of its multiple spillovers, the automotive industry has been often promoted 
and protected. During the 1970s and 1980s, Western and Japanese carmakers established 
independent assembly plants in multiple East Asian countries as a way to jump over high 
tariffs on vehicles (Doner, 1991; Staples, 2008). Although gradual liberalization across the 
region since the early 1990s prompted these firms to initiate a rationalization of their 
procurement and production strategies, technical and logistic factors inherent in the 
industry prevent the adoption of global sourcing and production patterns prevalent in 
sectors like electronics (Sturgeon et al., 2009).192 Consequently, automotive production 
tends to take place within national and regional networks “nested into the organizational 
structures” of global suppliers and OEMs (Sturgeon, 2008:302; Sturgeon et al., 2009:10). 
The way these global business structures are in turn nested within national, regional and 
global institutional contexts remains understudied.  
The structure of the APC supplier base varies by OEM and host country but, 
especially in Japanese firms, is often organized in tiers, where only the first-tier suppliers 
serve OEMs directly (Humphrey, 2003; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Since the 1990s, OEMs 
have been transferring responsibilities in design of key APCs and module pre-assembling 
to first-tier global suppliers mostly Western and Japanese multinationals (e.g., Denso, 
Delphi), that follow OEMs worldwide.193 Local suppliers acquire technological know-how 
from more advanced foreign suppliers or directly from carmakers.194 Competition among 
OEMs is passed on to suppliers that are continuously pressured to reduce costs and improve 
                                 
192 In addition to many APCs being costly to transport, lean manufacturing and just-in-time logistics force suppliers to cluster around 
OEMs. This strong national/regional orientation in the automotive sector results in higher domestic/regional value content than in other 
industries. 
193 Based on the complexity of inter-firm transactions and suppliers’ capability, the global commodity/value chain literature distinguishes 
five modes of governance in lead firm-supplier relations that in an increasing scale of power asymmetry range from market linkage 
(governed by price) to modular, relational, captive and hierarchical (within the firm) (Gereffi et al., 2005). Although it varies according to 
the OEM’s country of origin, the increasing assumption of responsibilities by global suppliers has made OEM-supplier linkages more 
relational. Relational links make more costly for OEMs to switch suppliers. Our interviews with Thai and Malaysian suppliers found that, 
although Japanese OEMs are more supportive (e.g., transferring process engineering knowledge), over time, both Japanese and Western 
OEMs have reduced their assistance. 
194 For critical APCs, OEMs maintain design and production in-house or import them from their regional headquarter (intra-firm trade). 
Our research in Thailand and Malaysia found that procurement decisions by suppliers are most often determined by the standards 
specified by OEMs rather than price. Most APC exports and replacement market sales are indirect through OEMs. 
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quality standards and delivery. Western carmakers, particularly American firms, favor 
shorter-term, market relations with their suppliers. In contrast, even when relocated abroad, 
Japanese OEMs rely more on closer and longer-term links with their suppliers (Humphrey, 
2003; Sturgeon et al., 2008). 
 
3. Regionalism and the distribution of rents and power within production networks  
In the late 1980s, most of East Asia initiated a process of unilateral liberalization, often 
reinforced multilaterally, that fostered regional economic integration and the emergence of 
cross-border production networks (Hiratsuka, 2010). However, with the sole exception of 
the ASEAN FTA (AFTA), East Asia escaped to the worldwide wave of FTAs that started 
in the early 1990s.195 It was not until the turn of the century that East Asian countries 
started institutionalizing their integration; now close to 60 FTAs have been implemented, 
most of them as bilateral agreements (reviewed in Kawai and Wignaraja, 2013).  
 Contrary to previous analysis by the global commodity/value chain literature, global 
production network theory incorporates non-firm actors into its analysis of production 
networks, but most of its empirical elaborations share the firm-centric focus of global 
commodity/value chain studies (Henderson et al., 2002; Coe et al. 2008; Gereffi, 2013). 
Even when the institutional context is considered, only its unidirectional influences on 
firms are examined, leaving out how it came about in the first place and the way inter-firm 
dynamics feedback to the institutional context and shape governmental policies.196 
 The dependent variable explored in this Essay is the distribution of power among 
actors (lead firms, suppliers and states) in the Southeast Asian automotive production 
                                 
195 AFTA was launched in 1992 but it was only in 2003 that intra-ASEAN tariffs began to be significantly reduced. Still, Malaysia 
excluded its automotive sector from AFTA liberalization schedules until 2005 (see below). 
196 In fact, the few studies about the impact of regionalism on the organization of production emerged from the global commodity/value 
chain strand rather than the GPN theory (e.g., Gereffi et al., 2002). 
   4. Essay 3 
! 177 
network in the context of recent bilateral FTAs.197 It will be argued that this is not simply a 
function of inter-firm governance structures (Gereffi et al., 2005; footnote 193), but also of 
the mutual interactions between: a) the corporate strategies (domestic, regional, global) of 
lead firms and suppliers, and b) the domestic regulations and international trade and 
investment policies of states or, more specifically here, of the interactions between 
regionalization and regionalism.  
 The primary concern is to understand why lead firms in a given country and 
production network seek specific FTAs. The Essay will try to ascertain: a) whether and 
how FTAs create opportunities for a selective redistribution of rents, power, and value, 
between and among firms and states operating in production networks and, b) whether and 
how actors have tried to shape FTAs to their advantage, creating and capturing these 
selective advantages.  
 In chain and global production network theories, power in a production network is 
bestowed on the lead firm as a structural capacity, while suppliers are only at the receiving 
end of the lead firms’ strategies. But, as a relational concept, the power of a firm (or a state) 
within a national/regional/global production network is exercised with respect to other 
firms and states. Likewise, power and value are never static, but subject to constant 
reconfiguration. Inter-firm relations and network governance evolve not only with 
modifications in technology, suppliers’ capabilities and/or lead firms’ strategies—as 
posited by Gereffi et al., (2005:96)—but, arguably, also when market and institutional 
environments change and firms and states react strategically to the actions of other firms 
and states.  
 Firms attempt to build their comparative advantage over competitors or leverage in 
lead-supplier relationships through the acquisition of specific intrinsic resources and 
                                 
197 Global production network theory also includes in production networks non-firm actors beyond states like trade unions or non-
governmental organization. Our interest here is limited to firms and states. 
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capabilities, but also by seeking, lobbying for and capturing rents available in the 
institutional setting. For suppliers in developing countries, linkages to lead firms offer 
opportunities for contracts and technology transfer. In the global commodity/value chain 
literature suppliers are only at the receiving end of lead firms’ strategies. It is contended 
here that suppliers could not only often develop their own strategies, but could also try to 
influence policymaking to gain power with respect to lead firms. In that regard, suppliers’ 
source of leverage within a production network is not so much intrinsic, as for lead firms 
and states, but rather it emanates from a supportive regulatory framework. 
 Developing states often engage in race-to-the-bottom competitions to offer lead firms 
the best incentives, so as to attract their investment and host high technology and value-
added activities within the production network. Multinationals could leverage their capital 
and technological assets to extract rents from states but they still depend on the evolving 
regulatory environment. 
 In exploring whether, why and how dynamics within the automotive network shaped 
and have been shaped by FTAs, I will first briefly examine their configuration before 
regionalism. 
3.1. National and regional production networks before regionalism 
Under import substitution, governments enhance the comparative advantage of selected 
firms (foreign or local) by offering them oligo/monopolistic conditions domestically and 
trade protection from external competition. To jump over high tariffs, multinational lead 
firms establish independent plants in multiple countries, producing similar products, 
initially primarily for local consumption. Except in large markets, production is conducted 
at suboptimal economies of scale, which added to the simultaneous protection of upstream 
inputs results in high production costs, eventually passed on to domestic consumers. Once 
lead firms have sunk investment their leverage vis-à-vis the state declines.  
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Since foreign investment by lead firms does not necessarily generate backward 
linkages, many governments introduced regulations that forced lead firms to transfer 
technology and outsource inputs locally through technical transfer and local content 
requirements (LCR). Local automotive parts suppliers in Thailand and Malaysia lobbied for 
their establishment and maintenance (Abdulsomad, 1999).198 In 2000, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) outlawed the use of LCRs although technical transfer requirements 
are still permitted. 
Competition for investment and limitations inherent in import substitution prompted 
developing countries to turn toward exports and progressively ease trade and investment 
restrictions, mostly unilaterally. When import substitution is pursued simultaneously with 
export-oriented strategies, states faced the dilemma of protecting upstream input producers 
without undermining the international competitiveness of downstream exporters. To that 
end, governments introduced tariff rebates for imported inputs that are incorporated into 
goods for exports through duty exemption/drawback schemes (DES/DDS) and export 
processing zones.  
Export orientation coupled with DES/DDS increase production scales and access to 
inputs at world prices raising the x-efficiency of lead firms. Contrary to LCRs, DES/DDS 
enhance the power of lead firms over the state and local suppliers. Export promotion 
exposes local suppliers to external competition, but it could potentially benefit more 
efficient suppliers. 
3.2. Regional production networks under regionalism 
Exporting lead firms could use DES/DDS to import inputs tariff-free, but they may still 
face high tariffs on their final products at destination markets. For these firms, both 
                                 
198 LCRs promote contracts with and transfer of know-how to local suppliers but not necessarily indigenous ones as local content could 
be achieved by outsourcing from relocated foreign affiliates. The ability of LCRs to upgrade local suppliers in Thailand has been 
questioned (Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich, 2013), although they fostered a growth in their numbers in Thailand and Malaysia 
(Abdulsomad, 1999). 
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multilateral and FTA liberalization grant easier access for their final goods in other 
markets, at the same time that liberalize input procurement without the export 
conditionality of DES/DDS. Lead firms that (over)invested across multiple countries under 
import substitution regimes would oppose any sudden multilateral liberalization of trade 
barriers on final goods that could lead to redundancy and/or overcapacity. Although 
multilateral liberalization maximizes scales for exporters, firms may favor FTAs because of 
their discriminatory effect against competitors outside (Chase, 2003; Chase, 2005). It is 
posited in this Essay that, in addition to generate rents to exporters inside the bloc, FTAs 
could also shift selective rents among lead firms already within the bloc. Accordingly, 
firms and states will support FTA configurations that strengthen their power with respect to 
other actors within the production network and FTA.  
Use of FTAs’ preferential tariffs requires that exported goods comply with rules of 
origin (ROOs) that specify whether a product has undergone sufficient transformation 
within the bloc. Most often, ROOs establish that the item contains a minimum value 
content from within the FTA area or that has undergone a change in the tariff line 
classification. Since final goods could contain inputs from multiple countries, some outside 
the FTA area, ROOs are particularly relevant in cross-border production networks.199  
Consider a model in which A and B represent two developed countries and X a 
developing country. LFA and LFB are lead firms producing similar final goods in a given 
production network.  LFA has its base and a production plant in country A (LFA-A) and 
LFB has home and a plant in B (LFB-B). If A and X sign an FTA, LFA (LFA-A) would be able 
to export its final products to X free of tariffs, as opposed to lead firm LFB (LFB-B) since 
country B has no FTA with X (Figure 1). Trade diversion created by FTA A-X generates 
“market rents” for LFA-A that could expand its production scales and overall power vis-à-vis 
                                 
199 ROOs are included in FTAs to avoid trade deflection, but could be used strategically for protectionist purposes. Disparity in ROOs 
across overlapping FTAs could have distorting effects in the functioning of production networks, referred as the “spaghetti or noodle 
bowl effect” (Bhagwati, 1995, Cadot et al., 2006; Baldwin, 2008). 
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LFB-B.  LFB-B could neutralize trade diversion by setting production within the A-X bloc or 
by lobbying its government to join FTA A-X (or create FTA B-X) triggering the classical 
domino of FTAs (Baldwin, 1995; Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Trade diversion inherent to any FTA creates rents for firms within the FTA area (see text for 
details). 
 
 For trade in final goods, firms’ preferences regarding FTA liberalization are 
determined by their import-competing or export-oriented nature (Milner, 1999). In East 
Asia, were production networks have developed to greater extent than in any other region 
(Kimura and Obashi, 2011), the way production fragmentation influences preferences for 
FTAs as well as the impact that FTAs have on production strategies merit consideration 
and analysis. 
 It is posited here that certain FTA configurations could increase the relative power of 
some lead firms with respect to other also inside the bloc (Figure 2). In the example above, 
consider now that LFA has fragmented its production and moved some stages (e.g., labor-
intensive assembly) to country X (e.g., plant LFA-X). LFA-X would be engaged in the import 
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of parts and components and the export of final goods (reverse imports) with country A. An 
FTA A-X would allow LFA-X to export both items tariff-free. Although subsidiaries of lead 
firms from other countries that are also present in X (e.g., a subsidiary of LFB from country 
B based in X, LFB-X) could also export to A using FTA A-X, this FTA is likely to benefit 
LFA-X  more than LFB-X  (“reverse imports rents”).200 
 Higher-tariff country X not only applies high tariffs on final goods but also on 
intermediate inputs. In the absence of FTA A-X, lead firms producing in X could either: a) 
pass on to consumers the higher costs of protected local intermediate inputs incorporated 
into goods for domestic consumption or b) use DES/DDS to import intermediate inputs free 
of duty if these are incorporated into final goods for exports. Therefore, for lead firms 
producing in X, FTA A-X does not provide additional procurement gains over DES/DDS.  
 However, the above argument would only hold if procurement patterns were the same 
among all lead firms, which usually are not. This opens the door for FTAs to generate 
asymmetric rents in the import of intermediate inputs—“procurement rents”—among lead 
firms inside the bloc. Under FTA A-X, LFA-X would be able to import inputs from A tariff-
free and independently of the destination of the final good. The possibility for other foreign 
(e.g., LFB-X) and local (e.g., LFX-X) lead firms in X to benefit from liberalization of inputs 
from A would depend on their procurement pattern (Figure 2). To the extent that LFA-X is 
likely to depend on inputs from A more than other firms based in X, FTA A-X would 
generate selective procurement rents to LFA-X. For instance, in East Asian production 
networks, Japanese subsidiaries naturally tend to have stronger procurement links with 
Japan than Western firms do. Procurement rents will increase the relative power of LFA 
within the production network, not only versus lead firms outside the bloc (e.g., LFC-C) but 
                                 
200 In East Asia, the relevance of these reverse imports rents is limited since exports back to Japan by Japanese subsidiaries in the region 
are low outside electronics and photographic equipment and are the lowest for the automotive sector (Chase, 2005).  
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also with respect to others within it (e.g., LFB-X, LFX-X) (Figure 2).201 Following principal-
agent theory, by expanding procurement choices for LFA-X, FTA A-X allows LFA-X to 
squeeze suppliers in X.202 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: When lead firms fragment production and move some stages to other countries, certain FTA 
configurations could generate asymmetric rents (reverse import, procurement, restructuring), not only with 
respect to firms outside the bloc but also among those inside. See text for details.  
 
 It is contended here that procurement rents would be more important in at least four 
scenarios. First, in cross-border intra-firm procurement, as this type of trade is captive and 
less sensitive to price for switching sources. Second, when lead firms have invested in 
long-term relationships with suppliers. Third, when domestic-bound production, ineligible 
for DES/DDS, represents a large share of total production. Lastly, in sectors with less 
standardized intermediate goods (e.g., the automotive industry), which cannot be procured 
from multiple sources and countries. Arguably, firms under these circumstances will have 
stronger incentives to lobby for FTAs that selectively liberalize their main offshore 
                                 
201 In industries with limited global outsourcing, LFB-X may depend more on inputs from the regional hub A than from distant home B. 
Likewise, not all firms from country A with plants in X have the same procurement dependence on intermediate goods from A. 
Therefore, the distribution of procurement rents could be firm-specific and cannot be predicted by the lead firms’ home country requiring 
for its assessment of firm-level research. 
202 This should either reinforce market forms of lead firm-suppliers relations or, at the other extreme, hierarchical intra-firm outsourcing. 
   4. Essay 3 
! 184 
outsourcing flows.  
 
Hypothesis 1: When lead firms in a country have different sourcing 
patterns, an FTA between the host country and one of the input source 
countries could generate asymmetric procurement rents among lead firms 
inside the FTA bloc. 
  
 For lead firms inside an FTA, liberalization offers the possibility to link dispersed 
production units and progressively restructure production from the national to the FTA bloc 
level while being protected from outside competitors by external multilateral tariffs (Chase, 
2003; Chase, 2005). It is argued here that efficiency gains from restructuring would also be 
selective (amounting to “restructuring rents”), benefitting more lead firms that have plants 
in the two countries that form the FTA (e.g., LFA over LFX) (Figure 2).203 Once again, the 
key point here is that FTAs could create selective benefits among firms inside the bloc, not 
only versus outsiders.  
 
Hypothesis 2: When lead firms in a given country have also production 
stages in other countries, an FTA between the host country and one of those 
other countries could generate asymmetric restructuring rents among lead 
firms inside the FTA bloc.  
 
Liberalization—and globalization more generally—has reduced the influence and 
leverage of states over multinational lead firms and their overall steering of the economy 
                                 
203As with procurement rents, the distribution of restructuring rents is not determined simply by the firm’s home country, but also by 
factors intrinsic to each firm. For instance, if before the FTA, LFA established plant LFA-X as a way to jump over high tariffs in X, FTA 
A-X may prompt LFA to consolidate all production in A (LFA-A), or specialize each plant in different products. On the other hand, if LFA 
only produced in A (LFA-A) before the FTA, LFA may move some production stages to X once FTA A-X is implemented to profit from 
investment provisions in the FTA. 
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(Yeung et al., 2013). Any type of liberalization has distributional effects among nations but 
in North-South bilateral FTAs developed countries often impose on developing ones 
regulatory reforms on issues beyond WTO that favor their interests and those of their firms 
(Shadlen, 2005; Pekkanen et al., 2007). It is submitted here that, in turn, FTAs offer 
developing countries possibilities to gain leverage over lead firms and developed states that 
are not possible in other liberalization fora. Compared to multilateral liberalization, FTAs 
provide developing governments with more options for selective liberalization coverage 
and sequencing as well as to foster procurement and technological linkages between 
multinational lead firms and the local supply base. 
Ambiguities and flexibilities in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) 
Article XXIV and Enabling Clause, regulating coverage and sequencing of FTA 
liberalization, leave room for states to protect sensitive sectors in FTAs in ways that are not 
possible under “single undertaking” multilateral WTO liberalization.204 Since FTAs 
establish tariff levels and ROOs at the highest level of product specification, liberalization 
or protection could be targeted to narrow subsectors, potentially to specific firms. This 
creates another level of asymmetric impacts of FTAs among insiders and increases the 
leverage of governments over lead firms.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Compared to multilateral liberalization, FTAs offer 
governments more options for selective targeting and sequencing of 
liberalization or protection, which should increase their leverage over lead 
firms. 
 
                                 
204 The Doha Round also proposes to reduce high tariffs more rapidly than lower ones while in FTAs tariff peaks could be reduced 
gradually or excluded altogether.  
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It is also argued here that FTAs could be negotiated to foster sector-specific 
backward linkages between lead firms and local suppliers. Independently of whether LCRs 
were welfare-enhancing or -decreasing, some developing countries valued them greatly and 
requested from the WTO a temporary extension beyond the original 2000 deadline, 
particularly for the automotive industry. FTA preferential tariffs could induce a supply 
switching from firms in third nations to firms in FTA partners, a tariff-mediated trade 
diversion (Schiff and Winters, 2003). This Essay contends that in sectors where production 
fragmentation is prevalent, strict ROOs could have supply-switching effects that could 
resemble WTO-illegal LCRs, a ROO-mediated trade diversion.  
By establishing high levels of intra-bloc transformation, strict ROOs favor 
outsourcing from suppliers located within the FTA. If country X seeks to promote its 
domestic supply base in a given industry, it could strategically negotiate its FTA with A to 
impose strict ROOs on final goods in a highly product-specific manner. In most FTAs, 
inputs from the partner also qualify towards the “FTA area value content” established by 
ROOs (e.g., inputs from either A and/or X). A motivated government in X would negotiate 
equally stringent ROOs in subsequent FTAs with other countries (e.g., B, C, etc.). Once X 
has implemented multiple FTAs, each with its own ROOs, it is possible that the value 
content of final goods made by LFA-X —potentially with inputs from home country A—
qualifies to preferential tariffs under FTA A-X, but not under FTAs B-X or C-X. This 
should encourage LFA-X (and other firms based in X: LFX-X, LFB-X, LFC-X) to outsource 
preferentially from suppliers in X in order to qualify for all the FTAs signed by X.205 To the 
extent that strict ROOs promote linkages between lead firms and local suppliers, FTAs 
could enhance the leverage of states and suppliers over lead firms. 
 
                                 
205 As with LCRs (see footnote 198), strict ROOs promote procurement from local suppliers but not necessarily from indigenous firms. 
Of note, this research project could not find significant inverse correlation between the utilization rate of selected Thai and Malaysian 
FTAs and the restrictiveness of their ROOs (see Essay 2). 
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Hypothesis 4: A government seeking to increase local content in 
manufacturing could strategically negotiate strict ROOs in multiple FTAs to 
foster backward sourcing linkages from lead firms to local suppliers in ways 
that would resemble WTO-illegal LCRs. 
 
For developing countries, forcing or incentivizing lead firms to transfer technology to 
local suppliers becomes more difficult after firm’s establishment but, it is argued here, 
governments could use FTAs to that effect. A common feature in North-South FTAs in 
East Asia is the inclusion of cooperation provisions that go beyond government-to-
government capacity building in technical trade issues to also include assistance by firms 
from the developed partner to local firms in the developing country in highly targeted 
projects. By bundling technical cooperation into a package of reciprocal tariff concessions, 
developing states and their indigenous supply base could direct funds and know-how to 
sectors of their choice and gain leverage over lead firms.  
 
Hypothesis 5: In North-South FTAs, a developing government seeking to 
upgrade the capabilities of its local supply base could strategically 
negotiate cooperation chapters in FTAs to channel technology transfer and 
technical assistance by the partner’s lead firms to local suppliers.  
 
As in the scenario before regionalism, the main source of leverage for suppliers in 
FTA formulation derives from the rents furnished to them by the institutional environment. 
By eliminating tariffs on intermediate goods and expanding procurement options for lead 
firms across the bloc, FTAs reduce the leverage of suppliers over lead firms. But, as 
discussed above, FTAs could also be used to the benefit of suppliers by imposing 
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procurement restrictions (e.g., strict ROOs), and technical linkages (e.g., cooperation 
provisions) on lead firms. FTAs would thus increase the power of suppliers inside the trade 
area with respect to those outside. Eventually, suppliers’ preferences regarding regionalism 
would be contingent on their competitiveness. More advanced suppliers, potentially 
benefiting from increased production by lead firms, would therefore support FTAs.206 
 
4. The automotive production network in Thailand before regionalism 207 
The investment incentives introduced by the Thai government in the early 1960s fostered 
the entry of foreign automotive OEMs (mostly Japanese) that, in joint venture with local 
entrepreneurs, assembled vehicles out of completely knocked-down kits for a protected 
market. Heavy dependence on imported automotive products contributed to trade deficits, 
which prompted the government to establish LCRs and a partial ban on imports of fully-
assembled vehicles in the mid-1970s. Although secondary to trade balance considerations, 
LCRs were also introduced to increase the number of local (and indigenous) suppliers. 
LCRs also benefitted Japanese assemblers that produced more localized models than 
Western firms. Newly gained influence by suppliers and divisions among carmakers, 
allowed the government to keep increasing LCRs and postpone rationalization of an 
overcapacity industry. The departure of several Western OEMs in the 1970s allowed 
Japanese assemblers to reap all the benefits of rapid growth in domestic vehicle demand 
during the late 1980s.  
 Starting in the late 1980s, import substitution began to be coupled with export-
promotion strategies, including the strengthening of DES/DDS and export-processing 
zones. Yet, by 1995, exports accounted for less than 1.4% of total production. Unilateral 
                                 
206 In the automotive industry, where APC exports take place mainly through OEMs, market rents accrue to suppliers only indirectly. As 
FTAs facilitate procurement of high-tech inputs from more developed countries, they could potentially limit incentives for upgrading of 
the supply base in the less developed country. 
207 This section draws on secondary literature, inter alia, on Doner (1991, 2009), Abdulsomad (1999), Abbott (2004) and Niyomsilpa 
(2008) complemented with information from interviews.  
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liberalization was reinforced by commitments under AFTA and GATT’s Uruguay Round. 
Restrictions on assembled vehicle imports were lifted and tariffs reduced.  
Rapidly increasing vehicle demand in Thailand instigated a surge of investment into 
the industry, not only by established Japanese firms and Western carmakers that returned in 
the late 1990s. Thailand was favored by carmakers over other ASEAN because it had the 
largest market and supply base, but mainly due to its lack of a national car program. With 
their eyes on AFTA and WTO, American carmakers did not re-enter Thailand just to serve 
its domestic market but also to establish an export base for ASEAN and beyond. 
Nevertheless, most indigenous suppliers were not up to export standards, so this period also 
witnessed investments by first-tier foreign suppliers.  
Vehicle demand and production collapsed in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis (Figure 3). Although applied multilateral tariffs on vehicles from outside ASEAN 
were raised, Thailand maintained its international commitments to abolish LCRs and 
reduce intra-ASEAN tariffs in line with established AFTA schedules. Domestic sales 
recovered by 2004 but the crisis deeply transformed the industry (Niyomsilpa, 2008). Local 
partners in most assembly plants went bankrupt leaving their foreign counterparts in full 
equity control. Likewise, many Thai suppliers closed down or were bought up by foreign 
firms, mostly Japanese. Foreign carmakers in Thailand reacted to the Asian crisis by 
redirecting excess capacity abroad, marking Thailand’s takeoff as an automotive exporting 
country (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Production, domestic sales and exports of vehicles (passenger and commercial) in Thailand. 
Source: Thailand Automotive Institute and Thai Automotive Industry Association. 
 
 
5. The automotive production network in Thailand under regionalism 
Following the Asian crisis, the Thai government endeavoured to consolidate Thailand as 
the regional automotive hub through foreign investment and a combination of import 
substitution with export promotion. In turn, carmakers redoubled their pressure on ASEAN 
governments for the acceleration of AFTA implementation and started lobbying Thailand 
in favor of bilateral FTAs with some key partners.  
Although most international OEMs and suppliers have production facilities in 
several ASEAN countries, Thailand holds the largest and most advanced manufacturing 
operations. Production reached 2.5 million units in 2012, setting Thailand as the world’s 
ninth largest producer, the third for light commercial vehicles (pickup trucks) (Figure 3).208 
Japanese firms have traditionally dominated the Thai automotive industry. On average, 
                                 
208 Figures in this section were obtained from interviews with representatives from automotive business associations, individual firms and 
government agencies in Thailand, complemented by personal communications. In 2007, trying to create a second niche product beyond 
pickup trucks, the government launched the “eco-car project” for the export-oriented production of low-carbon emission passenger cars. 
Up to 430,000 eco-cars are projected to be produced in Thailand in 2013 (Bangkok Post, August 6, 2013). 
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over 85% of vehicles assembled in Thailand over the last decade have been Japanese 
models compared to around 12% American and only 0.5% European (Table 1 for 2008, a 
mid-year for the period under study).209 Japanese carmakers produce in Thailand a range of 
commercial vehicles and passenger cars, except larger-engine luxury models that are 
imported directly from Japan. European firms only dominate production in the niche 
segment of large-engine cars, assembled from completely knocked-down kits imported 
from Europe.  
In 2012, Thailand was the biggest automotive market in ASEAN and the third 
largest exporter in East Asia after Japan and Korea. Japanese OEMs represent over 85% of 
domestic sales and over 80% of exports (Table 1). Main export markets are Australia, other 
ASEAN countries, and the Middle East, while reverse exports to home countries, including 
to Japan, have been negligible before 2010. Toyota alone accounts for around 40% of total 
production, local sales and exports, dominance that has translated into significant influence 
in Thai policymaking with Toyota as key sponsor of several Thai FTAs (see below).210 
The supply base in Thailand is ASEAN’s largest and most developed. Despite the 
elimination of LCRs, domestic value content of Thailand-made vehicles has progressively 
increased (Techakanont, 2011; Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich, 2013; interviews). Still, 
Thailand imports more APCs than it exports, especially some key functional APCs and 
rolled steel from Japan (including for some American models) or from OEMs’ subsidiaries 
in the region. Although there are over 300 Thai-owned APC manufacturers classified as 
first-tier, the bulk of indigenous suppliers are specialized on labor-intensive body parts 
and/or lack independent capabilities in module production, design and research and 
development and require assistance from OEMs or international suppliers (interviews; 
                                 
209 Japanese influence is actually higher since for some vehicles produced by Ford and General Motors share platforms with Japanese 
carmakers (Mazda and Isuzu, respectively), therefore also depending to some extent on Japanese inputs. 
210 The large influence of Toyota in Thai automotive policy, and Thai trade and industrial policy more generally, was revealed in 
interviews with government officials and other carmakers from all nationalities. 
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Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich, 2013). Interviews revealed that while upgrading of the 
supply base is a stated policy goal, the government is not necessarily concerned about its 
ownership, and relies mainly on market forces (e.g., agglomeration of export-oriented 
foreign firms) to foster technological transfer.  
 
Table 1: Share (%) of vehicle production, domestic sales 
and exports in Thailand (2008) * 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Source: Thai Automotive Industry Association 
              * Average market share for total registered vehicles (commercial  
              and passenger cars)  
              ** Mazda and Ford have a joint venture in Thailand (Thai Auto  
              Alliance) 
              *** European carmakers hold around two thirds of sales for over  
              2500cc passenger cars, segment that represents less than 0.5% of  
              the overall market 
 
5.1. Thai FTAs 
Thailand was not only one of the first countries in East Asia to pursue bilateral FTAs, but, 
during much of the last decade, it was also one of the most active. As of August 2013, in 
addition to AFTA, Thailand has implemented five bilateral treaties and five ASEAN-
centered FTAs (see Table 1 in Essay 1), but only AFTA and the bilateral treaties with 
Australia, India and Japan are relevant to the automotive industry. 
 As the ASEAN automotive industry was fragmented along national boundaries, 
starting in the 1980s, international carmakers, particularly Japanese firms, sought to 
rationalize procurement and production scales at the regional level. To that effect, they 
  
Production 
  
Domestic 
Sales 
 
Exports 
Toyota 41.5% 43.7% 40.6% 
Mitsubishi 12.4% 3.8% 18.5% 
Isuzu 11.3% 22.1% 6.4% 
Honda 11.6% 15.0% 9.31% 
Nissan  5.2% 5.1% 5.4% 
Mazda **  
9.2% 
1.8%  
14.6% Ford ** 1.5% 
GM 7.4% 3.6% 5.17% 
Other *** 1.4% 3.4% 0.02% 
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lobbied ASEAN governments first for the liberalization of regional trade of APCs through 
“complementation sourcing programs” and later of both APCs and assembled vehicles 
through AFTA (Yoshimatsu, 2008; interviews; footnote 59).  
 The impact of AFTA during the 1990s was very limited because it left ample room 
for protectionism and its poor implementation (Ravenhill, 2008). AFTA schedules were 
accelerated after the Asian crisis, requiring all intra-ASEAN tariffs to be capped at 20% by 
2000, at 0-5% by 2003. Items could be temporarily excluded from this timeline as long as 
all manufacturing lines returned to normal track by 2003. Intra-ASEAN tariffs among the 
main ASEAN economies were eliminated in 2010 when AFTA was replaced by the 
ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) (see footnote 71). Raw materials, APCs and 
vehicles are now sourced, produced and traded within ASEAN according to a division of 
labor that results from the interplay between the corporate strategies of automotive firms 
and an inter-governmental agreement as AFTA (Table 2). As the regional automotive hub, 
Thailand has been the main beneficiary of AFTA that has played a crucial role in attracting 
investment by international carmakers and suppliers.211 Although Thailand has protected 
the automotive industry behind high multilateral tariffs, it complied with AFTA 
liberalization schedules.  
 Once automotive firms in Thailand had restructured their productive processes in the 
context of ASEAN, they started lobbying for bilateral FTAs that fitted their specific 
procurement, production and export strategies and that could therefore generate selective 
rents with respect to other firms based in Thailand. Nevertheless, these same automotive 
firms resisted multilateral reciprocation, with MFN tariffs on automotive products ranking 
among the highest in Thailand. 
 
                                 
211 During the period 2006-2010, Thailand attracted US$ 6.7 billion to its automotive and transport equipment industry, compared to US$ 
2.6 billion and US$2.3 billion into Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively (interviews; Bank of Thailand, Indonesia’s Investment 
Coordinating Board and Malaysian Investment Development Authority websites). 
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Table 2: Division of labor among OEM’s subsidiaries in ASEAN 
 
 
OEM 
 
Plants for functional APC  
 
 
Vehicle assembly plants * 
Toyota 
 
 
Thailand: diesel engines, engine parts and press parts.  
Malaysia: electronic control unit, steering system  
Indonesia: gasoline engines and pressed parts  
Vietnam: accelerators 
Philippines: transmissions, constant velocity joints 
+ Thailand: Camry, Corolla, Hilux, Yarns, Vies, Wish, 
Fortune, Pries 
++ Malaysia: Hake, Hilux, Vios, Innova, Fortuner, 
Camry 
+ Indonesia: Innova, Fortuner 
++ Vietnam: Camry, Corolla, Hiace, Innova, Vios 
++ Philippines: Innova, Vios 
Honda 
 
Thailand: pressed parts, frame panels, electrical parts, 
interior parts and engine parts 
Malaysia: dashboard assembly, bumper, drive shaft, 
constant velocity joint, manual gearbox, stamping parts 
Indonesia: in cylinder head assembly, cylinder block, 
engine valve, steering handle, automatic gearbox 
Philippines: engine fuel system, emission systems, 
engine electric parts, suspension parts, manual 
gearbox  
+ Thailand: City, Jazz, Civic, Accord, CR-V, Brio 
++ Malaysia: City, Civic, Accord, CR-V 
+ Indonesia: Jazz, CR-V, Freed (for export to ASEAN) 
++ Vietnam: Civic, CR-V (NO Export) 
++ Philippines: City (NO Export) 
 
Nissan 
 
 
Thailand: engines + Thailand: Frontier, Navara, Teana (export), Tilda, 
March (export), Almera 
++ Malaysia: Serena, Sentra, Latio, Frontier, Urban, 
Sylphy, Grand Livina, Teana, Navara, X-Trail 
+ Indonesia: Grand Livina, Livina, X-Trail, Serena, 
March, Juke 
++ Philippines: Sentra, X-Trail, Grand Livina, Frontier, 
Navara, Patrol, Urban 
Mistsubishi 
 
  
Thailand: engines 
Indonesia: engines, press parts, body parts 
Philippines: transmissions 
+ Thailand: Triton, Lancer, Lancer Ex, Pajero (export), 
Sport, Mirage (export), Canter 
++ Malaysia: Canter, Fuso 
+ Indonesia: Colt, Canter, Fuso 
++ Vietnam: Grandis, Zinger, Canter 
++ Philippines: Delica, Adventure, Lancer, Canter, 
Fuso 
Mazda  
(joint venture 
with Ford in  
Thailand) 
Thailand: transmissions  
Philippines: engine parts  
 
+ Thailand: Mazda BT-50, Mazda 2, Mazda  
++ Malaysia: Mazda 3 
++ Vietnam: Mazda 2 
Daihatsu 
(joint venture  
with Perodua in  
Malaysia) 
Malaysia: engines (Perodua) ++ Malaysia: Alza, Myvi, Viva 
+ Indonesia: Terios, Xenia, Grand Max, Luxio 
Suzuki 
 
 + Thailand: Ecocars (Swift) 
++ Malaysia: commercial vehicles 
+ Indonesia: Grand Vitara, APV, Carry, Futura, Swift, 
SX4 
Isuzu 
 
 
Thailand: diesel engines, forged parts, press molds 
Indonesia: diesel engines, casting parts 
Philippines: transmissions 
 
+ Thailand: pickups, commercial vehicles 
* Malaysia: commercial vehicles, buses, trucks 
+ Indonesia: commercial vehicles, buses, trucks 
++ Vietnam: trucks 
++ Philippines: commercial vehicles, buses 
Ford 
(joint venture 
with Ford in  
Thailand. Exited 
Malaysia in 
2008 and 
Philippines in 
2012) 
Philippines: gasoline engines + Thailand: Laser, Protégé, Focus, Fiesta, Ranger, 
Everest, EcoSport, Mazda-3, Mazda-BT50 
++ Malaysia: Ranger, Laser, Telstar, Transit, 
Econovan, Mazda BT50 
++ Vietnam: Escape, Everest, Mondeo, Ranger, 
Focus, Transit 
+ Philippines: Ranger, Lynx, Tribute, Protégé, Focus, 
Mazda3, Escape 
GM/Chevrolet 
(Exited 
Indonesia in 
2005, back in 
2013)  
Malaysia: electrical components 
 
 
+ Thailand: Optra, Blazer, Colorado, Captiva, Aveo, 
Zafira, Cruze 
+ Indonesia: Blazer (dctd) 
++ Vietnam: Aveo, Lacetti, Spark, Captiva. Vivant, 
Spark Van, Colorado 
Volvo 
 
 ++ Thailand: S60, S80, XC90 
++ Malaysia: S40,S60, S80, V50, XC90 
BMW 
 
 
 ++ Thailand: Series 3, 5 and 7 
++ Malaysia: Series 3 and 5 
++ Indonesia: Series 3 and 5 
Proton Malaysia: engines and engine parts + Malaysia: Preve, Exora 
Source: Interviews and personal communications with OEMs’ representatives complemented with data from websites and reports  
* Only main models are included. 
+  Vehicles produced for the domestic market and for exports to other ASEAN markets and beyond. Note that not all models are exported 
++ Vehicles produced exclusively (or majoritarily) for the domestic market 
   4. Essay 3 
! 195 
 Even before negotiations for the Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) started in 2002, 
Australia was already the largest market for Thailand-made vehicles that accounted for a 
quarter of all Thai exports to Australia. In contrast, high tariffs in Thailand meant that 
Australian automotive products had a small presence in the kingdom. In the final treaty, 
which went into effect in 2005, both countries agreed to fully liberalize their respective 
automotive industries by 2010.212  
 Despite that India and Thailand have both grown to be among the world’s largest 
automotive manufacturers, trade in vehicles between both countries has been almost 
negligible. Most international OEMs have plants in India, but the market is segmented 
differently than in Thailand. When negotiations for a bilateral FTA started in 2002, OEMs 
in both countries were adamantly against liberalization of bilateral trade in vehicles.213 
However, some of these OEMs lobbied for the liberalization of specific APCs. In October 
2003, an early harvest agreement was signed—the Thailand-India Early Harvest Scheme 
(TIEHS)—to liberalize a small number of tariff lines while the fully-fledged FTA is still 
being negotiated.  
  Japan offers tariff-free multilateral access to all automotive products. Therefore, 
when Japan and Thailand started negotiations for the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership 
Agreement (JTEPA) in 2004, the exclusive interest of the FTA for automotive firms was 
the extent to which Thailand was ready to liberalize its automotive industry.  
5.2. Use of selective rents and flexibilities in Thai FTAs 
Most international OEMs and suppliers have benefited from the progressive liberalization 
of the ASEAN automotive market. However, in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, Japanese 
firms—with a longer, broader, and deeper presence across ASEAN—have extracted more 
                                 
212 The automotive industries in both countries are somehow complementary with Thailand’s strength is in commercial vehicles and small 
passenger cars, while Australia’s advantage is in larger-engine cars and higher-technology APCs. 
213 Carmakers in Thailand opposed to easier access for competitively-priced Korean or Indian brands produced in India, and OEMs in 
India demanded protection from imported Thailand-made Japanese models. 
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selective rents from ASEAN complementation sourcing programs and AFTA than 
American and European firms.214 Accordingly, Japanese carmakers lobbied the strongest to 
ASEAN governments for the implementation of these trade regimes (Yoshimatsu, 2002; 
interviews). In the most successful complementation program, the ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation, 90% of the 129 projects were for the trade of automotive products, mostly 
completely knocked-down kits.215 Given Thailand’s position as the regional automotive 
hub, its government supported these programs that were actively used by OEMs and 
international suppliers in Thailand, but not by indigenous suppliers. Confirming initial 
arguments, Thailand participated in 67% of all automotive-related projects, of which 82% 
involved Japanese firms (data from the Thai Ministry of Industry; interviews). Toyota and 
Honda alone, with the most extensive network of operations in ASEAN (Table 2), 
accounted for two thirds of all automotive complementation projects. 
 Thai exports of assembled vehicles to other ASEAN countries increased after AFTA 
tariffs began to significantly decline in 2003 and have accelerated since 2010 (Table 3). In 
light of high protection of the industry in most ASEAN countries, automotive products are 
among the most traded items under AFTA. Overall Thai utilization of AFTA for exports 
has increased from less than 10% in 2001 to 35.1% in 2010, largely due to trade in 
automotive products (data from the Thai Ministry of Commerce). For instance, in 2008 (a 
mid-year for the period under study), about a third of all Thai exports using AFTA 
preferences were automotive products and out of them more than half were assembled 
vehicles for which utilization of AFTA was virtually complete (data from the Thai Ministry 
of Commerce; Kohpaiboon, 2010).  
  
                                 
214 European firms (e.g. Volvo, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Peugeot) import kits directly from Europe and supplement them with non-critical 
parts sourced in the local market. Consequently, hey use AFTA less and mostly for trade of finished vehicles. 
215 The Brand-to-Brand Complementation (1988-1995) and the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation  (1996-2003, although continued to be 
used until full AFTA implementation in 2010) programs established specific projects for APC liberalization (Yoshimatsu, 2002). Some 
firms also used these programs for trade in assembled vehicles (interviews). 
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 Interviews with international OEMs and global suppliers indicated extensive use of 
AFTA, mostly for intra-firm trade of OEM’s proprietary high-technology APCs, engines, 
transmissions, completely knocked-down kits and assembled vehicles. Because of 
confidentially issues, trade authorities in Thailand do not provide disaggregated data on 
FTA utilization at the firm level (see Essay 2). Nevertheless, considering that Japanese 
brands account for over 80% of Thai vehicle exports to ASEAN, it is safe to infer that, as in 
earlier complementation sourcing programs, Japanese OEMs (particularly, Toyota as the 
larger exporter) have benefited the most from the procurement rents granted by AFTA 
(Hypothesis 1).216  
 
     Table 3: Trade in vehicles (in US$ millions) among the main automotive 
     producing countries in ASEAN * 
     
             Source: Trade Map database (Trade Map, undated) 
             * Total exports of vehicles (commercial and passenger vehicles: codes 8701,8702, 8703,8704 under the Harmonized Commodity 
             Description and Coding System) 
 
 
 Besides tariff liberalization, OEMs have also taken advantage of AFTA to restructure 
production at the ASEAN level (Hypothesis 2). Japanese firms have profited the most from 
these restructuring rents but American OEMs have also relocated production as a result of 
AFTA (Table 2). For instance, Ford closed its assembly operations in Malaysia in 2008 and 
in the Philippines in 2012, and now serves both countries from its plants in Thailand. In  
                                 
216 Although Mitsubishi is the OEM in Thailand that exports the largest share of its production, it operates mainly in export free zones 
and makes little use of AFTA and other FTAs (interviews). 
 
 
 
2002 2012 
Exporter Exporter 
Thai Mal Indon Philipp Thai Mal Indon Philipp 
Importer Thailand - 0.9 9.9 18.9 - 107.5 476.8 25.6 
Malaysia 28.5 - 0.3 0.0 834.7 - 172.7 5.3 
Indonesia 50.5 3.1 - 4.9 1999.7 66.1 - 14.7 
Philippines 7.2 0.2 0.0 - 808.6 0.0 335.2 - 
 TOTAL 
exports 
 
86.2 
 
4.2 
 
10.2 
 
23.8 
 
3,643.0 
 
173.6 
 
984.7 
 
45.6 
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2009, in anticipation of the complete elimination of AFTA tariffs the following year, Volvo 
(is European) considered closing down its factory in Thailand and consolidate production 
in Malaysia (interviews). However, as other European carmakers, Volvo maintained 
operations in both countries despite AFTA implementation. 
 Although 85% of Thai trade in APCs with the rest of ASEAN is conducted among 
OEMs subsidiaries, large first-tier suppliers, particularly foreign firms, have also profited 
from the selective rents offered by complementation programs and AFTA (interviews). For 
instance, Japanese APC manufacturer Denso accounted for 6% of all projects under the 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation program. Field research also found that utilization of 
AFTA for APC exports by leading Thai-owned first-tier suppliers has been much lower 
than for vehicles (even lower among lower-tier suppliers), reflecting not only lower tariffs 
and preferential margins on APCs, but, more importantly, also logistical issues referred 
earlier. OEMs usually request that first-tier suppliers follow them to other ASEAN 
countries and set their plants nearby, instead of exporting their APCs from their home 
country. Nonetheless, Thai first-tier suppliers interviewed valued AFTA because it will 
potentially expand their procurement, export and restructuring options for the future.  
 While AFTA was progressively being implemented, international carmakers sought 
to integrate Australia within the Thai/ASEAN production network. At the time, the main 
carmakers in Australia were Japanese Toyota and Mitsubishi and American General Motors 
(GM) (via its subsidiary Holden) and Ford. Toyota and Mitsubishi supplemented local 
production in Australia with imports from Thailand and Japan while GM imported some 
models and APCs from Thailand and Korea (interviews). Honda, without plants in 
Australia, served demand from Thailand and Japan. However, at the time, Australia lacked 
FTAs with Japan or Korea. Japanese and American carmakers were expected to benefit 
from market rents vis-à-vis European firms, especially for Thai exports of vehicles to 
   4. Essay 3 
! 199 
Australia. European firms did not project major direct impacts from TAFTA, as Volvo and 
BMW served Australia directly from Europe, while their position in Thailand could not be 
challenged by upper segment cars produced in Australia.  
 TAFTA confirmed the initial hypotheses. The FTA has been beneficial to carmakers 
based in Thailand—particularly Toyota, and GM/Isuzu with the largest volumes—, which 
have increased production and exports of vehicles to Australia, benefitted from cheaper 
Australian higher-technology APCs (e.g., engines), and restructured their production at the 
bilateral level (Hypotheses 1 and 2) (interviews). Some firms started reorganizing 
beforehand and then lobbied for TAFTA to consolidate restructuring savings (see Essay 1). 
For instance, in the early 2000s, Toyota had transferred production of some models from 
Australia to Thailand and wanted to eliminate Australian tariffs on them. Although Toyota 
has potentially extracted more selective restructuring rents than other firms, other Japanese 
and American OEMs have also benefited. Thus, Mitsubishi closed its Australian operations 
in March 2008 and moved them to Thailand, Ford will do the same in 2016, and Honda, 
without previous presence in Australia, now supplies its market from Thailand instead of 
from Japan (interviews, Financial Times, May 23, 2013).  
 In the eight years since TAFTA was implemented, Thai vehicle exports to Australia 
have quintupled, and now account for over a third of total exports. Increased production by 
OEMs in Thailand has also benefited Thai-based suppliers. Contrary to initial expectations, 
Australian exports of APCs and vehicles to Thailand increased only modestly because of 
the changes in Thai excise duties and the repositioning of Australia within OEMs’ 
strategies. Illustrating carmakers’ original interest in TAFTA, during 2005-2011, over half 
of Thai exports to Australia under TAFTA were vehicles (see Essay 2). Likewise, and in 
line with its strong and early support for TAFTA (Essay 1), GM was the first and main 
OEM using TAFTA to import cars from Australia (interviews). 
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 As indicated in the previous section, carmakers in Thailand and India were not 
interested in the bilateral liberalization of vehicles. Instead, some firms, particularly 
Toyota, sought the TIEHS as a mean to rationalize their procurement network (interviews), 
as reflected in the final treaty that includes five automotive items, namely, transmissions 
and some engine and electrical parts. The year before TIEHS was signed, Toyota had 
established a subsidiary in India to produce transmissions for export to Thailand and 
planned to expand production of small cars in India with diesel engines sourced from 
Thailand (interviews).  
 Interviews found that the TIEHS has been utilized predominantly for intra-firm trade 
by some OEMs, mainly Toyota and Ford, and global suppliers and has provided them with 
procurement rents vis-à-vis other competing firms in Thailand. Despite that only 5 of the 84 
items included in TIEHS are automotive products, over 85% of its overall utilization in 
early years was concentrated on transmissions and engine parts, reflecting the interest (and 
influence) of Toyota in the agreement (TDRI 2006:179; interviews).  
 Compared to TAFTA or TIEHS, a bilateral FTA with Japan as JTEPA offered 
Japanese firms greater possibilities for selective market and restructuring rents with respect 
to American and European carmakers already manufacturing in Thailand.217 Japanese high-
end models (Lexus, Acura, Infiniti) sold in Thailand are imported from Japan as 
completely-built-up units and attracted an 80% import tariff, whose elimination through 
JTEPA would enhance the comparative advantage of Japanese carmakers over European 
brands that dominate the luxury segment in Thailand.218 Although Japanese OEMs 
produced a wide range of small- and mid-size cars in Thailand, Japan demanded Thai 
liberalization for all Japan-made vehicles, so as to gain flexibility in producing future 
                                 
217 Japanese OEMs sought to gain through JTEPA the same free access for APCs and vehicles offered by TAFTA as well as to avoid 
losing ground to competitors from other nations (United States, European Union, Korea) that were negotiating (or planning to) FTAs 
with Thailand or ASEAN at the time. 
218 Japanese OEMs produce these cars in Japan at more efficient scales than European OEMs do in Thailand. 
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models and, therefore, potential restructuring rents (Hypothesis 2). Contrary to TAFTA, 
where both Japanese and American carmakers benefitted, JTEPA split carmakers as 
Western firms strongly opposed Thai liberalization of vehicles from Japan.219 
Field research during 2008-2009 indicated that some OEMs, especially Toyota and 
Honda, were eager to the full implementation of JTEPA schedules to save on procurement 
costs (Hypothesis 1). As the largest sellers of passenger cars for the Thai market, ineligible 
for DES/DDS privileges, Toyota and Honda would disproportionally benefit from 
procurement rents compared to other firms based in Thailand. For instance, JTEPA offered 
limited scope for procurement rents to Isuzu that produces commercial pickup trucks with 
high-domestic content, or to Mitsubishi, which exports over two thirds of its production, 
and operates mainly from duty free zones. GM and Ford share platforms with Japanese 
firms but mostly for commercial vehicles, which reduced their dependence on Japanese 
APCs, although they would still benefit from JTEPA liberalization of Japanese steel. 
Finally, for European firms complementing completely knocked-down kits with mostly 
local APCs, liberalization of Japanese inputs would not yield significant procurement 
advantages either. For Japanese global suppliers, Thai liberalization in JTEPA could bring 
benefits from restructuring rents through rationalization of the production network. 
Meantime, for Thai-owned suppliers, liberalization of Japanese APCs and/or assembled 
vehicles would reduce demand.  
 The automotive sector became the main stumbling block during JTEPA negotiations 
(Essay 1). The Thai government resisted any liberalization of vehicles that could make 
existing investments redundant and exploited flexibilities in FTAs regarding selectivity and 
sequencing of tariff liberalization (as well as in ROOs, see below) to support the overall 
                                 
219 At the time, Japanese OEMs were not looking to realize selective rents from reverse imports because: a) Japan does not apply tariffs 
on automotive products and, b) reverse imports of vehicles from Japanese subsidiaries in ASEAN back to Japan have always been 
negligible and even declined following JTEPA implementation. As recently as 2011, Toyota denied plans to export cars from Thailand to 
Japan (Bloomberg, Sept 8, 2011). Nevertheless, some reverse exports of eco-cars from Japanese subsidiaries in Thailand have occurred 
during 2011-2013 in the aftermath of the 2011 tsunami in Japan  (Trade Map database; personal communication).  
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automotive industry (Hypothesis 3). JTEPA was eventually implemented in November 
2007 and left unchanged tariffs on cars below 3000cc, and only reduced from 80% to 60% 
by 2011 those on larger-engine cars (METI-JTEPA, undated). In contrast, the Thai 
government saw liberalization of APCs and steel as key to improve the competitiveness of 
the sector. Nevertheless, attending to local suppliers’ demands, Thailand negotiated a long 
tariff phase out for these inputs (see Table 4 in Essay 4). 
During the five years that JTEPA has been in force, and despite marginal 
liberalization and long phased out implementation, Thai imports of APCs from Japan 
(particularly engines, transmission, ignitions, pumps) have trebled (Trade Map). Field 
research could only obtain JTEPA utilization data for imports up to 2009 (see Essay 2), 
when JTEPA utilization for the import of APCs stood at 8%. This low utilization rate could 
be explained by the fact that most APCs had not been liberalized yet. Of note, in 2009, the 
utilization of DES/DDS for most APCs was around 20% and was up to 60% for diesel 
engines (data from the Thai Ministry of Finance; see also Essay 2).  
5.3. Procurement and technological linkages in Thai FTAs 
When AFTA entered into force in 1992, ROOs established a 40% regional value content 
requirement across all tariff lines in order to be eligible for the use of its preferential tariffs. 
This level of ROO restrictiveness in AFTA suited Japanese and American OEMs in 
ASEAN that during the 1990s operated under LCRs.220 As domestic value content in 
Thailand-made vehicles has progressively increased, ROOs in AFTA have not limited the 
procurement options of Japanese and American firms based in Thailand. However, most 
European, Korean and Chinese carmakers in Thailand operate at around this 40% value 
content level (interviews). 
                                 
220 ROOs in AFTA were relaxed in 2004 to allow partial cumulation and include the value of inputs with more than 20% of ASEAN 
value content into the final calculation. 
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Research for this Thesis found that the Thai government has made use, to various 
levels and with different success, of the options available in bilateral FTAs to promote 
backward linkages and technical transfer between automotive OEMs and the supply base in 
Thailand. In contrast to Malaysia, use of LCRs in Thailand was as much related to reduce 
trade deficits as to increase domestic value content. 
 TAFTA was the first FTA, and so far the only one, where Thailand has fully 
liberalized its automotive sector outside ASEAN and ASEAN-centered FTAs.221 Contrary 
to AFTA, TAFTA set product-specific ROOs. In setting the level of restrictiveness of 
ROOs for automotive items, Thailand faced a dilemma. On the one hand, it needed to use 
sufficiently strict ROOs to avoid tariff-free transhipment of vehicles via Australia and to 
promote local suppliers. However, ROOs could not be so high as to hamper the 
procurement options of Thai-based OEMs exporting to Australia, largely Japanese firms 
that depend on imported inputs from Japan. Field research interviews found that Australia 
favored ROOs based in change in tariff classification, easier to implement, while Thailand 
pushed for value content ROOs in order to promote procurement backward linkages. 
Interestingly, knowing that ROO compliance would be more difficult for other firms, 
Toyota favored a stringent 50% value content (interviews). Eventually, ROOs established 
that vehicles attain a minimum of 40% bilateral value content plus a change in tariff 
classification. At the time of TAFTA signing, Thailand was also negotiating other FTAs. 
Accordingly, and in line with the argument in Hypothesis 4, strict ROOs in TAFTA 
prompted some Australian suppliers (e.g., Futuris, PBR, FMP, SMR Automotive, MGM 
Asia Pacific) to open and expand affiliates in Thailand not only to benefit from 
agglomeration scales but also to qualify for ROOs in other Thai FTAs beyond TAFTA 
(interviews). 
                                 
221 Liberalization of the automotive industry in ASEAN-centered FTAs has been very limited. 
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 In the TIEHS, ROOs for automotive products are also stricter than in AFTA and 
require a change in tariff classification plus a minimum of 40% of Thai or Indian value 
content excluding any other ASEAN content. As in TAFTA (and also in support of the 
initial argument), some Indian suppliers set up plants in Thailand in the aftermath of the 
TIEHS.  
 In JTEPA, ROOs for automotive products are more relaxed and require either a 
minimum value content of 40% or a change in tariff classification. Interviews found that, 
during JTEPA negotiations, Thailand demanded a minimum of 20% value content 
requirement from each country, proposal that was rejected by Japan, particularly in light of 
the negative by Thailand to liberalize tariffs on vehicles. Field research also revealed that 
Toyota, with high levels of localization in both countries, favored ROOs based on value 
content requirement over change in tariff classification, preferred by Western firms, as the 
latter is easier to achieve for OEMs with lower production volumes. Although, as general 
rule, value content toward ROOs is cumulated among FTA members, legally this is not 
necessarily the case when FTAs establish product-specific ROOs (interviews). In that line, 
JTEPA also includes a note, exclusively issued for automotive products, establishing that 
the country exporting vehicles (most likely Japan as reverse imports have been negligible 
so far) would be able to use inputs from the other FTA partner, and still be considered as 
originating material toward value content. This note was incorporated in JTEPA at the 
request of the Thai government to benefit Thai-based suppliers (interviews).  
JTEPA includes a cooperation chapter that, in regard to the automotive industry, 
provides training of local suppliers on process management by Japanese experts from 
Toyota, Honda and Nissan and first-tier supplier Denso. This use of FTAs to channel 
technology assistance to the local supply base is in line with Hypothesis 5. However, it is 
my contention that Thailand did not exploit to the full extent the potentiality of cooperation 
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provisions in JTEPA (see below in Discussion). Although well received by Thai suppliers, 
the scheme was only fully spelled out in 2008, once JTEPA had entered into force, so the 
Thai government did not negotiate beforehand detailed targets or specific binding 
commitments by Japan (interviews), limiting its effectiveness.222 
 
6. The automotive production network in Malaysia before regionalism 223 
Few other sectors in Malaysia have been shaped by the policy environment as the 
automotive industry. Starting in the mid-1960s, the government promoted local assembly of 
vehicles as a mean to substitute imports and spur industrialization. Assembly operations 
were conducted by joint ventures between foreign OEMs and local ethnic-Chinese firms, 
whose output was destined exclusively for the domestic market. Production was protected 
from external competition through high tariffs and import licenses, which were 
preferentially allocated to ethnic-bumiputera/Malay firms. An early attempt by the 
government in the 1970s to introduce LCRs was frustrated by the strong resistance from 
OEMs and lack the political clout of suppliers. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
government progressively raised tariffs on imported APCs and imposed on international 
OEMs LCRs and mandatory lists of APCs to be sourced locally, in an effort to increase 
local content in Malaysia-made vehicles and to foster local APC manufacturing.  
The state-led import substitution drive initiated by Malaysia in 1981 was short-lived 
outside key strategic sectors like the automotive industry. That year, the government 
launched the National Car Project aimed not only at creating a national automotive industry 
but primarily to foster an indigenous supply base and the participation of bumiputeras in 
the sector. At the same time, foreign automotive OEMs assembling in the country had to 
                                 
222 An earlier version of the Automotive Human Resource Development Program, in place since 2005, was expanded in 2008 to be 
included in JTEPA. 
223 This section draws on secondary literature, inter alia, on Jomo (1994), Abdulsomad (1999), Abbott (2004) complemented with 
information from interviews. 
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form minority-controlled ventures with local firms, mostly government-linked companies. 
In 1983, PROTON was established as a venture with Mitsubishi to manufacture mid-size 
cars.224 Since its inception, the government protected PROTON with a range of trade 
barriers and supported it with preferential excise duties and various subsidies. Within only 
a decade, PROTON captured over 70% of the domestic market, encouraging the 
government to establish in 1993 another national carmaker, PERODUA, to manufacture 
subcompact cars in a venture with Japanese Daihatsu.225 Despite that PROTON and 
PERODUA were respectively the first and third largest OEMs in ASEAN during much of 
the 1990s, both firms remained mostly domestically-oriented, with very small export 
volumes to countries that fitted within Mitsubishi’s and Daihatsu’s interests (see below). In 
the early 1990s, GM aired plans to set its regional base in Malaysia on condition that the 
government scrap LCRs and the National Car Project; Malaysia refused and GM 
established its regional hub in Thailand.  
Introduction of LCRs and the National Car Project boosted the total number of 
suppliers and of Malaysian-owned suppliers but, by the late 1990s, only a third were 
bumiputeras. In addition, technology transfer was very limited and most local suppliers 
produced only simpler and labor-intensive APCs while functional components were 
manufactured by PROTON itself or were imported from Japan.  
 The Asian crisis depressed Malaysian vehicle production and domestic sales by 60% 
(Figure 4) but, unlike foreign OEMs in Thailand, PROTON and PERODUA did not resort 
to exports to compensate for lower local demand. In response to the crisis, Malaysia 
temporarily excluded all automotive items from AFTA liberalization schedules that had 
targeted intra-ASEAN tariffs to be capped at 5% by 2003. At the multilateral level, 
                                 
224 At first, then government-linked HICOM controlled 70% of PROTON and Mitsubishi 30%. Although listed in 1992, PROTON’s 
controlling stake was held by government-linked firms and its management has always been bumiputera. Mitsubishi sold its participation 
in 2004. Since January 2012 the majority holder has been the now private conglomerate DRB-HICOM. 
225 Initially, government-linked companies held 68% of PERODUA. It remains unlisted with 53% controlled by Malaysian capital, 
mostly government-linked companies, and 47% by Daihatsu. As national carmaker, PERODUA benefits from selected privileges but, 
unlike PROTON, its strategic direction is determined outside Malaysia by Daihatsu. 
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Malaysia raised tariffs on most automotive products and requested an extension from the 
WTO for the use of LCRs beyond the 2000 deadline, specifically for its automotive. To 
attract investment, equity restrictions were relaxed in all manufacturing sectors except in 
the automotive industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Production, domestic sales and exports of vehicles (passenger and commercial) in Malaysia. 
Source: Malaysian Automotive Association (MAA). Data on exports were calculated by the Author based on 
figures obtained from individual OEMs and includes both assembled vehicles (completely built-up) and 
vehicle kits (completely knocked down). 
 
 
7. The automotive production network in Malaysia under regionalism 
After the crisis, Malaysia continued to shield its national carmakers from competition from 
foreign automotive firms assembling in Malaysia or elsewhere in ASEAN. Malaysia 
eliminated LCRs in the automotive sector in 2004 once the waiver from the WTO had 
expired, illustrating the value Malaysia attached to LCRs to promote backward linkages. 
The National Automotive Policy, issued in 2006, also reduced multilateral tariffs on 
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assembled vehicles and completely knocked-down kits and eventually brought Malaysia in 
line with AFTA schedules (see below) (MITI, 2006).226  
 Nevertheless, Malaysia kept using its regulatory framework to protect national 
OEMs and promote higher use of local inputs in the automotive industry. Thus, tariff 
reductions on imported vehicles were accompanied by the introduction of excise duties on 
passenger cars ranging from 90% to 250%. The excise duty system escalates with engine 
size, benefiting smaller engine cars producers like PROTON and PERODUA. More 
controversially, excise duties are exempted for the share of the vehicle representing 
Malaysian content, which fosters utilization of Malaysian inputs and, once again, favors 
PROTON, whose models have over 80% of domestic content compared to the 30-40% in 
Japanese or Korean models.227  
 Automotive production recovered to pre-crisis levels by 2001, but growth has been 
slower than in Thailand (Figure 4). Since 2006, PERODUA has surpassed PROTON in 
production and domestic sales (Table 4 for 2008, a mid-year for the period under study). 
PROTON is also losing ground to Japanese models assembled in Malaysia or imported 
through AFTA.228 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
226 Revision of the National Automotive Policy in 2009 eliminated foreign equity restrictions for OEMs assembling cars outside the core 
segment of PROTON and PERODUA, namely, cars with engines exceeding 1800cc, electric and hybrid cars and commercial vehicles 
(MITI, 2009). However, field research interviews revealed that Japanese OEMs plan to maintain their joint ventures with Malaysian 
firms because of the political clout they provide. The National Automotive Policy was amended again in 2012 and its final text is 
expected to be released in late 2013. 
227 Excise duties on vehicles were introduced in 2004 and raised in 2005. The maximum excise duty was reduced to 125% in 2006 and 
105% in 2007. Although justified on the need compensate for the loss of revenue from lower tariffs, the excise system has benefitted 
national OEMs and local suppliers. Initially, PROTON and PERODUA received 50% rebate on excise duties but the system was later 
replaced by the local content-based calculation rule. Malaysian government officials maintain that the excise system is compliant with 
WTO and AFTA (interviews). Since the 1970s, Malaysia has maintained different forms of non-automatic licensing system of imported 
vehicles known as Approved Permits, which are issued by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and distributed among 
bumiputera firms. Elimination of Approved Permits has been postponed in several occasions, with their current deadline for 2020. 
228 Western and other foreign carmakers make for a small market share. European vehicles are assembled locally out of kits, imported 
from ASEAN o directly from Europe. Bumiputera conglomerate Naza assembles Kia and Peugeot models. Hyundai and Chery have 
small assembly facilities. American models are imported, since GM has no plants in Malaysia and Ford discontinued assembly in mid-
2008. 
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Table 4: Production, domestic sales and exports of  
vehicles in Malaysia by OEM (2008)* 
 
 Production  Domestic 
Sales 
Exports 
Proton 29.5% 25.5% 83.7% 
Perodua 36.0% 30.3% 13.9% 
Toyota 12.4% 18.4%  
Honda 6.0% 5.8%  
Nissan 6.6% 5.5%  
Isuzu 1.9% 0.9%  
Mitsubishi 0.1% 1.6%  
Daihatsu  1.0%            1.0%   
Naza  2.1% 2.2%  
Inokom 1.0% 1.1%  
American ** 0.1% 0.4%  
European 1.5% 1.7%  
Other 1.8% 5.6% 2.4% 
                           Source: Malaysian Automotive Association. Exports were  
                                                 calculated by the Author using data obtained from individual  
                                                 OEMs and includes both assembled vehicles and completely  
                                                 knocked-down kits. 
                 * Average market share for total registered vehicles (commercial  
                 and passenger cars)  
           ** Ford stopped assembly in Malaysia in mid-2008 
 
 
 As in Thailand, the Malaysian government has sought to couple import substitution 
with export promotion. However, production by national and foreign OEMs in Malaysia 
continues to be mostly oriented toward the domestic market (Figure 4 and Table 4). During 
2003-2009, PROTON exported on average 10% of its production  (data from Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry), while PERODUA exports stand at less than 2%. Low 
export volumes—mainly to the United Kingdom and to developing countries—are 
explained on the weak international competitiveness of national OEMs (particularly of 
PROTON), low technology transfer by their partners and, in the case of PERODUA, little 
interest by Daihatsu in creating an export-oriented brand (interviews).229  Restrictions on 
foreign participation in the automotive industry have limited investment by international 
                                 
229 Following Mitsubishi’s sale of its stake in PROTON in 2004 (see footnote 224), the company and the government have been looking 
for an international OEM partner but all efforts were frustrated by the government’s refusal to give up management control to foreigners 
(interviews). After a decade of declining sales and, for many years, of fiscal deficits, PROTON’s main option for expanding scales, and 
even for survival, is to seek markets abroad.  
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OEMs and suppliers, which has hampered the competitiveness not only of foreign affiliates 
in Malaysia but also of national carmakers. Japanese and Korean OEMs in Malaysia cater 
almost exclusively to the domestic market.  
 Many foreign first-tier suppliers are present in Malaysia but, unlike in Thailand, the 
majority of APC manufacturers are local firms. In late 2009, nearly 90% of suppliers 
served PROTON and/or PERODUA and many depend on them exclusively (interviews). 
Malaysia has succeeded in developing an indigenous supply base but low technical 
capabilities and small scales limit the competitiveness of most Malaysian suppliers, and in 
turn, that of PROTON. Nevertheless, some Malaysian suppliers (e.g., Ingress, Hi-Com Tek 
See, Sapura, Delloyd, APM) have achieved international competitiveness exporting and/or 
setting plants abroad to serve global OEMs. Given their simpler operations, the supply base 
of Japanese and Korean OEMs is much smaller. Malaysia imports APCs mainly from 
Japan, other ASEAN countries, China and India. 
7.1. Malaysian FTAs 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia opposed intra-ASEAN liberalization of automotive 
products and defended that regional ASEAN complementation programs were only 
beneficial to non-ASEAN OEMs. Consequently, its government initially hindered the 
implementation of the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation scheme (Yoshimatsu, 2002; 
interviews; see below). 
 Later, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, Malaysia excluded the entire sector from 
AFTA liberalization. In 2005, following pressures from other ASEAN members, Malaysia 
began reducing import duties on ASEAN automotive products, and topped them in 2006 at 
5% (the limit established by AFTA for 2003) before full elimination in 2010. 
 Within ASEAN, Malaysia it is a net importer of automotive products. Although 
Malaysia uses AFTA preferences to exports APCs (mostly electronic components to 
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Thailand and Indonesia), and of PROTON cars (mainly to Thailand), these are very small 
in comparison to imports of key functional APCs and assembled vehicles from ASEAN, 
mostly Japanese models from Thailand and Indonesia.  
 Malaysia was initially reluctant to enter into bilateral FTAs, but fear of exclusion 
from other FTAs prompted Malaysia to negotiate its own. As of August 2013, in addition to 
AFTA and ASEAN-centered regional FTAs, Malaysia has six bilateral FTAs in force (see 
Table 2 in Essay 1). Only AFTA and the Malaysia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
(MJEPA) are pertinent to the automotive industry. Malaysia started negotiating its FTA 
with Japan in 2003. At the time, Thailand was not yet the export base it is today and 
Malaysia sourced from Japan one third of all APCs and two thirds of all vehicles it 
imported. Although AFTA liberalization was on course, and Japanese carmakers planned to 
make Thailand their regional hub, they were still eager to liberalize the Malaysian 
automotive sector to Japanese imports (interviews). 
7.2. Use of selective rents and flexibilities in Malaysian FTAs 
The Malaysian government eventually conceded and approved projects in the ASEAN 
Industrial Cooperation complementation program and eventually participated in about half 
of all projects pertaining to the automotive sector. However, except for one project with 
PERODUA and four between Volvo subsidiaries, all other automotive-related projects with 
Malaysian participation involved Japanese OEMs that, as in Thailand, benefitted to the 
largest extent from the procurement rents offered by this scheme (data from the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry; interviews). 
 As recently as 2006, PROTON and PERODUA were pressing the government to 
delay the alignment of Malaysian tariffs on automotive products with AFTA schedules 
(interviews). Likewise, most Malaysian-owned suppliers resisted AFTA liberalization and 
counted on the government to keep protecting the sector as well as on national OEMs to 
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maintain their contracts (interviews). Field research revealed that, in 2003, the government 
had lifted informal procurement restrictions on national OEMs to source inputs from 
foreign suppliers inside or outside Malaysia. Although both national OEMs, particularly 
PROTON, signalled their commitment to indigenous suppliers’ development, they are now 
nominally free to procure APCs based exclusively on commercial criteria.230  
 AFTA has made procurement more flexible for all OEMs in Malaysia, both national 
and foreign. Malaysian imports of APCs from ASEAN have quintupled since 2004, while 
imports of vehicles have grown from just US$3.5 million to over US$1.2 billion (Trade 
Map). In 2012, 42.2% of all Malaysian imports of APCs originated in ASEAN (of which 
78.3% came from Thailand), and 27.4% came from Japan. Meanwhile, 42.5% of vehicles 
imports came from ASEAN (of which 85% from Thailand) and 42.14% from Japan. 
Importantly, and in line with my initial arguments, 75% of all vehicles imported by 
Malaysia from the rest of ASEAN during 2005-2009, even before intra-AFTA tariffs were 
fully eliminated, were of Japanese brands (interviews). Field research could not obtain 
firm-level data on the utilization of AFTA for these trade flows in automotive products. 
However, from my interviews, it would be safe to assume that Japanese OEMs in Malaysia 
have benefited from selective procurement and restructuring rents with respect to national 
OEMs (and Western carmakers) (Hypotheses 1 and 2). PERODUA has some procurement 
linkages with Daihatsu plants in Indonesia but lack the extensive network of other Japanese 
OEMs in ASEAN (Table 2).  
  Exports of automotive products from Malaysia to ASEAN have also grown although 
at a lower pace than imports. Since 2010, exports of PROTON cars to ASEAN have 
increased, but they only amount to around 1% of the market in Thailand, its major 
destination in ASEAN (interviews). The bulk of Malaysian exports of automotive products 
                                 
230 This was facilitated by full implementation of AFTA in 2010 and increasing competition among OEMs in Malaysia.  
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to ASEAN are APCs, mostly by OEMs and Japanese suppliers.  
  AFTA has also allowed foreign OEMs, but not national carmakers, to restructure 
their production strategies in Malaysia in the context ASEAN. For instance, as noted 
earlier, in 2008, in anticipation of full AFTA liberalization, Ford closed down its plant in 
Malaysia, which it now serves from Thailand. Nevertheless, this does not mean that foreign 
OEMs with presence in both countries have consolidated their production in a single 
country. For instance, at the time of field research, Toyota, BMW, and Volvo announced 
plans to start assembling some of their models in Malaysia rather than importing them from 
Thailand using AFTA (interviews). Part of the reason behind these strategic moves is found 
on the fact that local assembly of vehicles significantly reduces excise duties. But 
interviews also found that political and marketing considerations weighted heavily in their 
decision to maintain local production.231 In line with my initial arguments, although AFTA 
(and FTAs in general) could have spelt doom for the automotive sector in Malaysia, its 
government has used the regulatory framework to promote national OEMs and local 
suppliers at the expense of imported vehicles. 
As in other Japanese FTAs, the automotive sector took center stage during MJEPA 
negotiations (Essay 1). At that time, Malaysia had its automotive sector still waived from 
LCRs at WTO and excluded from AFTA schedules. Japanese carmakers and first-tier 
suppliers sought the elimination of Malaysian tariff and non-tariff barriers on assembled 
vehicles, APCs and steel.232 In addition, and more so than AFTA, MJEPA offered Japanese 
automotive firms the possibility of selective procurement and restructuring rents with 
respect to national OEMs and Malaysian subsidiaries of Western carmakers that depended 
                                 
231 If Japanese OEMs were to leave Malaysia and serve its market from Thailand, their political clout and capacity to influence 
policymaking would be considerably reduced.  
232 At the start of negotiations in December 2003, automotive and steel products jointly represented over 18% of Japanese exports to 
Malaysia for only 0.2% in the opposite direction. Since Japan has zero tariffs on automotive products, benefits from MJEPA were 
unidirectional.  
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on APCs and completely-knocked down kits from either Thailand or from their home 
country.  
PROTON imported inputs from Japan but it received tariff rebates and it was also 
moving toward virtually complete localization following the introduction of its own engine 
technology. Consequently, PROTON opposed MJEPA not only because it would increase 
imports of Japanese vehicles, but also because it would reduce procurement costs for 
competing Japanese OEMs assembling in Malaysia (interviews).233 As in Thailand, 
European carmakers opposed liberalization of vehicles, completely knocked-down kits and 
APCs from Japan that would save Japanese OEMs import tariffs as well as excise duties 
(interviews). The Malaysian Automotive Association, encompassing the interests of all 
foreign OEMs and distributors, but dominated by Japanese firms, endorsed MJEPA as an 
opportunity to start opening up the Malaysian automotive sector. 
The main competition to Malaysian-owned suppliers’ comes from ASEAN, 
particularly from Thailand, but the two associations of suppliers to PROTON and 
PERODUA opposed MJEPA not so much because it would increase procurement options 
for national OEMs, but mainly because it could reduce the market share of PROTON and 
PERODUA.234  
Eventually, Malaysia accepted to fully open its automotive sector in MJEPA but, in 
line with Hypothesis 3, it used available options in FTAs for selectivity and flexibility in 
liberalization coverage and sequencing. Tariffs on completely knocked-down kits were 
eliminated from the start and those on APCs and cars of more than 2000cc were 
progressively phased out by 2010 but liberalization for vehicles below that level, in direct 
                                 
233 At the time, PROTON had started loosing market share to Japanese OEMs and PERODUA. Field research found that PERODUA 
maintained a mixed disposition due to its higher dependence on Japanese inputs than PROTON.  
234 Suppliers in the Malaysian Automotive Component Parts Manufacturers, many less dependent on national OEMs, lobbied instead for 
a long phase-out of tariffs on APCs.  
   4. Essay 3 
! 215 
competition with national OEMs, will only be fully realized by 2015.235 Still, between the 
implementation of MJEPA in 2006 and December 2012 imports of vehicles over 2000cc 
from Japan have multiplied by more than five times, and imports of some key functional 
APCs have quadrupled. Disaggregated data on Malaysian imports under MJEPA are not 
available but interviews found that completely knocked-down kits are the main item 
imported under its preferences. Japanese OEMs but also PERODUA have been the main 
beneficiaries of this FTA, and have improved their competitiveness vis-à-vis PROTON, 
which has made less use of it. At least until late 2009, PERODUA was not only the first but 
also the largest importer of completely-knocked-down kits under MJEPA, even ahead of 
Toyota and Honda (interviews). Local and Japanese suppliers in Malaysia have made little 
or no utilization of MJEPA. 
7.3. Procurement and technological linkages in Malaysian FTAs 
The establishment of a national automotive industry in Malaysia was largely related to the 
government’s goal to develop the local supply base. In that regard, Malaysia has used strict 
ROOs in FTAs to support this objective (Hypothesis 4). For instance, the Malaysian 
government succeeded in its demands to Japan of a high ROO of 60% value content for 
vehicles in MJEPA, as compared to the 40% that applies to most other tariff lines (METI-
MJEPA, undated; MITI, undated; interviews). Such highly restrictive ROOs would limit 
OEMs in Japan (or Malaysia) from relying too heavily on imported APCs from suppliers 
elsewhere and potentially promoting backward linkages with Malaysian suppliers.236 
As part of MJEPA’s cooperation chapter, Japan offered Malaysia the Malaysia 
Japan Automotive Industries Cooperation program (MAJAICO) that provided technical 
assistance in the automotive sector (Hypothesis 5). During five years, ending in June 2011, 
                                 
235 Malaysia’s decision to open its protected automotive sector to Japan is partially explained in the context of AFTA, which allows 
Japanese models produced elsewhere in ASEAN to enter Malaysia tariff-free anyway. In such a situation, Malaysia had little option but 
to liberalize its automotive sector while trying to extract other concessions (see Essay 4).  
236 Unfortunately for Malaysia, the ASEAN-Japan FTA signed later required only 40% ASEAN-Japan value content. 
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MAJAICO implemented a number of projects, including training by Nissan’s experts of 
Malaysian APC manufacturers and PERODUA as well as business matching with Japanese 
firms. Field research found that, as in Thailand, specific projects in MAJAICO were only 
detailed at the implementation stage, once the agreement had been officially signed. 
Although Japan carried through with its commitments and participating suppliers have 
reported benefits, Malaysia could not fully exploit all possibilities in cooperation 
provisions.237 
 Interestingly, and also confirming Hypothesis 5, the 2009 revision of the National 
Automotive Policy openly stated that cooperation chapters in FTAs should be geared to 
enhance the capabilities of local suppliers and that the government should use FTAs to 
promote the integration of domestic suppliers into the supply chains of international OEMs 
(MITI, 2009).  
 
8. Discussion 
The automotive sector is one of the most regulated manufacturing industries and, 
considering the large investments involved, automotive firms are very sensitive to the 
policy environment. In the late 1980s, as ASEAN countries embarked on unilateral 
liberalization and export-orientation, foreign carmakers established in the region sought to 
reorganize their procurement at the ASEAN level and pushed governments to introduce 
APC complementation sourcing programs. Only later did they look for restructuring their 
production across the region through liberalization of assembled vehicles in AFTA. More 
recently, international OEMs and suppliers have lobbied for bilateral FTAs with countries 
outside ASEAN in order to reduce costs in their specific extra-regional procurement and 
export flows.  
                                 
237 Several projects in MAJAICO had limited success and some suppliers claimed the existence of bias in favor of suppliers that had 
technical agreements or ventures with Japanese firms or that used Japanese technology (interviews) 
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A significant body of the literature on regionalism has centered on the burden 
imposed by FTAs on firms operating in production networks (e.g., diverging and costly 
ROOs) and on developing states (e.g., loss of policy space). Less attention has been given 
to why some firms and developing states seek bilateral FTAs for reasons beyond generic 
expansion of markets or access to cheaper inputs and whether and how these actors 
maximize the possibilities presented by FTAs to capture selective advantages.  
Thailand and Malaysia protect their automotive industries at the multilateral level 
with high tariffs and, particularly in the case of Malaysia, regulatory barriers. Thailand 
liberalized investment in the sector and moved into global exports. In contrast, the low 
international competitiveness of PROTON and PERODUA and foreign OEMs in Malaysia 
have meant that the Malaysian automotive sector remains mostly domestically-oriented. 
Despite these differences in their policy environment and in outcomes, both case studies 
yield similar findings and confirm the hypotheses. Most global first-tier suppliers and 
carmakers are already established across ASEAN, including in Thailand and Malaysia. 
Still, this research found that these firms have lobbied for (and later exploited) specific 
configurations in Thai and Malaysian FTAs to create asymmetric rents that discriminate not 
only against firms outside the FTA area but also with respect to other firms that are already 
inside. At the same time, as the ultimate initiators and signatories to international 
agreements, the Thai and Malaysian governments have used FTAs to pursue their national 
interests not only vis-à-vis other states but also in relation to multinationals lead firms like 
those in the automotive production network. Lastly, local suppliers have resisted FTA 
liberalization of the automotive industry and have to rely on the institutional framework to 
derive leverage in their relation with OEMs. 
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8.1 FTAs and lead firms 
In production networks, where production is fragmented and inputs cross several borders, 
lead firms are not only interested to expand access for their final goods abroad but also to 
reduce the costs of imported inputs. During the last three decades, automotive OEMs in 
ASEAN have lobbied for liberalization for raw materials and APCs either via unilateral 
liberalization—in complementation sourcing programs or as part of export-promoting 
schemes (e.g. DES/DDS, export processing zones)—or, of late, through AFTA and 
bilateral FTAs. 
Although the automotive sector is moving toward shared inter-brand and inter-
model platforms, when compared to other industries, lower standardization and greater 
specificity of intermediate inputs in the automotive industry generates more possibilities for 
differentially exploiting procurement patterns among carmakers in FTAs. Functional APCs 
are often highly specific to OEM and model. As a result, procurement of a particular item 
by an OEM in a given country is often limited to a few suppliers, sometimes to a 
subsidiary, or to a long-term supplier back home. By liberalizing particular trade flows, a 
bilateral FTA could selectively benefit OEMs that depend on inputs from the FTA partner. 
Research for this Essay found that whenever an FTA offered possibilities for asymmetric 
rents, potential beneficiary firms pressured governments to capture them.238  
FTA liberalization of the automotive sector in East Asia has disproportionately 
favored Japanese OEMs over those of other nationalities because their longest, largest, and 
deepest presence in the region. Nevertheless, case studies showed that procurement rents 
not only (and also not necessarily) accrued to OEMs with home in one of the FTA partners, 
and that these rents are often highly firm-specific. For instance, some American firms (e.g., 
                                 
238 Given that trade authorities in Thailand and Malaysia do not provide data on FTA utilization at the firm-level and that individual firms 
interviewed for this Essay did not release information on the tariff savings afforded by FTAs as it was not available or considered 
sensitive, quantification of how procurement rents have been distributed among firms was not possible. Instead, this research had to rely 
on qualitative information from interviews with business associations, firms and government officials.  
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Ford, which shares production platforms in Thailand with Mazda) benefit from cheaper 
Japanese inputs through JTEPA, but Japanese Mitsubishi hardly uses this FTA. Meanwhile, 
given its sourcing pattern, GM in Thailand would not only profit the most from a bilateral 
FTA between Thailand and Korea (arguably, the most undesirable FTA for all other OEMs 
in Thailand), but would do it to a greater extent than it would through an FTA with the 
United States.239  
FTAs allow firms to progressively restructure their scales and production from the 
national to the bloc level while still being protected behind external tariffs and ROOs 
(Chase, 2005). It was contended here that the benefits from restructuring have been often 
asymmetrically distributed, having been capitalized mainly by firms with investments 
across the FTA bloc.240 For example, as AFTA was being implemented, most OEMs have 
restructured their supply-chains and production plants but Japanese firms, with the largest 
network, have profited the most. In anticipation of or following TAFTA, Japanese and 
American OEMs and Australian suppliers reorganized their division of labor across 
Thailand and Australia. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the case studies selected here, 
consolidation of all production at a single location within the FTA it is unlikely to be fully 
realized for several reasons. First, governments could change their regulatory framework 
rapidly, so OEMs prefer spreading risks across several countries. Second, large sunk 
investments and difficult to transfer assets in the automotive industry plus long 
implementation periods in most FTAs also mean that restructuring in response to a new 
FTA could take several years. Consequently, global OEMs and suppliers have not only 
adapted their strategies ex post-facto to the implementation of FTAs, but they often first 
developed their business plans for ASEAN, India, Australia, etc. and only later pressured 
                                 
239 The ASEAN-Korea FTA barely liberalizes the sector (Medalla, 2011). 
240 Quantification of how restructuring rents have been distributed is hindered by the impossibility to establish a direct and unequivocal 
relationship between investments made by OEMs and suppliers and the establishment of given FTA. Instead, this Essay has relied on 
qualitative evidence obtained through interviews.  
   4. Essay 3 
! 220 
governments for FTAs that support their ex-ante strategies (e.g., Toyota in TIEHS, 
Japanese OEMs in early complementation programs or in AFTA, JTEPA and MJEPA or 
GM and Toyota in TAFTA).241 Finally, my field research also found that restructuring of 
production within an FTA bloc has been dictated not only by production strategies and 
agglomeration economies but also by political sensitivities. Even though Japanese OEMs 
could now serve the Malaysian market from more efficient plants in Thailand or Japan 
using AFTA and MJEPA, respectively, Toyota and Honda are staying in Malaysia. This is 
not only related to the Malaysian regulatory system, which penalizes foreign content, or to 
average future risks but also to the marketing advantages and political clout that firms can 
only derive from their physical presence in the country. 
In sum, lead firms could seek FTAs for different objectives, some more amenable to 
selectivity than others, that allow us to distinguish at least three types of FTAs. A first 
group of FTAs aimed chiefly at expanding markets for final goods (e.g., TAFTA). 
Although there is scope to generate selective benefits from restructuring production blocks 
across the FTA area, these are lower. In a second group of FTAs, OEMs primarily 
endeavoured to extract procurement rents through liberalization—in the most firm-specific 
manner—of APCs from subsidiaries or long-term suppliers (e.g., ASEAN complementation 
programs, TIEHS, JTEPA, MJEPA). Although MJEPA and, to a very limited extent, 
JTEPA also liberalized vehicle imports, field research found that the main goal of Japanese 
OEMs in both FTAs was to save on input costs (procurement rents) and gain future 
flexibility (restructuring rents) vis-à-vis Western carmakers. Lastly, in other FTAs, both 
expanding markets and facilitating procurement have been equally important (e.g., AFTA). 
In line with my argument above, while AFTA/ATIGA does not involve foreign OEMs’ 
home countries and is a regional FTA—therefore less amenable to selective rents—, AFTA 
                                 
241 As an OEM executive indicated, “firms cannot predict policy […] nor are [they] certain that they would be able to influence it”. 
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has generated selective market and procurement rents for Japanese carmakers. In the case 
studies analyzed here, there was no room for reverse import rents for Japanese OEMs 
because Japan does not impose tariffs on automotive products and exports of vehicles from 
ASEAN back to Japan are low.  
Arguably, the same way firms outside an FTA could neutralize market rents from 
trade diversion by investing inside the bloc, procurement or restructuring rents 
asymmetrically distributed among firms within an FTA area could also be neutralized by 
the formation of other FTAs. This highlights the importance to OEMs of not only securing 
selective rents that may be available in FTAs, but also locking them in for the future. This 
was illustrated by Japan’s request to add into the JTEPA treaty the Thai commitment not to 
extend better FTA concessions in the automotive sector to other countries (see Essay 1). 
8.2 FTAs and the state 
Although globalization has reduced the power of states with respect to multinationals, 
states control the regulatory framework over the right of investment and tax and incentives 
systems. Pending of the negotiations for FTAs with the United States (in the TPP) and the 
European Union, none of the developed FTA partners of Thailand and Malaysia had 
introduced significant regulatory reforms beyond some changes in the investment regime. It 
was argued here that FTAs offer states additional sources of power over lead firms. 
Through FTAs, states could facilitate or restrict the operations of lead firms within 
production networks by selectively liberalizing or excluding specific tariff lines and by 
fostering procurement and technical linkages with local suppliers through ROOs and 
cooperation chapters.  
Empirical data showed that the Thai and Malaysian governments were well aware 
of these options in FTAs, having later on identified some of them as explicitly stated policy 
goals. To pursue their national interests and accommodate those of OEMs and suppliers 
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based in the country, both governments have made ample use of GATT/WTO flexibilities 
for liberalization coverage and sequencing, which has enhanced the leverage of the state 
over OEMs lobbying for/against liberalization (Hypothesis 3). For instance, Malaysia 
temporarily excluded its automotive sector from AFTA, Thailand’s maintained protection 
of most vehicle segments in JTEPA and both Thailand and India limited liberalization of 
the automotive sector in TIEHS to just five items. 
Thailand’s main goal for the automotive industry has been to expand export-
oriented investment and production by foreign OEMs and global suppliers, using a 
relatively liberal regulatory regime, while shielding the industry from external competition 
through high tariffs. This research found that Thailand’s early use of LCRs was intended as 
much to create backward linkages as to reduce trade deficits. Certainly, Thai policymakers 
strive to strengthen the local supply base, but they are not necessarily concerned about the 
nationality of its ownership. Increased localization in the Thai automotive industry has 
occurred mainly through the market forces of agglomeration. Meanwhile, for the Malaysian 
government, establishment of the National Car Project was largely a means to develop a 
Malaysian- (and bumiputera-) owned APC industry. Accordingly, Malaysia not only 
extended LCRs beyond the original WTO’s deadline, but still uses its domestic regulatory 
framework to increase procurement linkages with local suppliers (e.g., linking excise duties 
and tax incentives to local content). These diverging objectives have been reflected in the 
way both countries used ROOs in FTAs. Despite high content in Thailand-made vehicles, 
the Thai government has favored procurement flexibility for OEMs, and has not requested 
overly strict ROOs for the automotive sector in its bilateral FTAs. In contrast, in line with 
Hypothesis 4, Malaysia succeeded in introducing strict ROOs of 60% of value content for 
vehicles in MJEPA to foster procurement linkages.  
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However, it is equally true that, for the FTAs analyzed herein, neither government 
was entirely successful (or skillful) at exploiting some of the possibilities offered to them 
by FTAs in terms of policy tools. Enforcing and monitoring technological transfer from 
multinationals to local firms is a difficult task for most developing countries. As part of 
JTEPA and MJEPA, Japan offered training of local suppliers, but arguably, Thailand and 
Malaysia did not maximize their options during negotiations. Cooperation provisions in 
both FTAs were vaguely defined and implementation targets were only detailed in separate 
protocols once the agreements had been signed, which left no room for Thailand and 
Malaysia to link Japanese technical assistance to reciprocal concessions in market access. 
However, to the extent that FTAs establish periodic reviews, developing countries still 
maintain a bargaining chip to ensure they received the anticipated assistance. It is worth 
remarking that the possibility of using cooperation chapters in FTAs to upgrade the local 
supply base and foster its integration into international production networks has been now 
incorporated into Malaysia’s National Automotive Policy (Hypothesis 5) (MITI, 2009). 
Obviously, this is not to say that developing countries enter FTAs only for the 
above reasons. But just as they surrender some policy instruments in North-South FTAs, 
FTAs could still potentially offer them other options to regulate some of the activities of 
firms and production networks. Whether developing countries actualize these possibilities 
during negotiations is a different matter. 
8.3 FTAs and suppliers 
Although most trade in key functional APCs is accounted for by OEMs, global first-tier 
suppliers have also benefited from the procurement and restructuring rents generated by 
bilateral FTAs. In contrast, indigenous Thai and Malaysian suppliers, particularly lower-tier 
ones, not only had less political clout to influence FTA formulation, but they have also 
made little use of FTAs once implemented due to insufficient knowledge about them and/or 
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lack of administrative expertise to handle applications for their utilization. Even among 
Thai and Malaysian first-tier suppliers, utilization of bilateral FTAs has been limited 
because of the logistical reasons in the industry referred to in previous sections. Instead, 
local suppliers were more familiar with the use of DES/DDS and AFTA, which have been 
in place for long time.  
In Thailand, most benefits to suppliers from FTAs have come indirectly through the 
increased vehicle production they fostered (e.g., AFTA, TAFTA). Suppliers have not 
always consolidated their production in response to FTAs. For instance, Thai and 
Malaysian first-tier suppliers, with presence in each other’s country did not merge 
production in their home base as result of AFTA.242 Likewise, many independent Indian 
and Australian suppliers opened operations in Thailand, instead of trading APCs through 
TIEHS and TAFTA, to benefit from agglomeration economies near their OEM customers 
and to qualify for ROOs in multiple Thai FTAs.  
Many FTAs signed by the United States or the European Union restrict or prohibit 
that their partners grant DES/DDS on inputs from outside the bloc that are later 
incorporated into goods traded within the FTA. Banning DES/DDS in FTAs further 
reinforces diversion in favor of suppliers inside the bloc. No such provisions exist in any of 
the Thai or Malaysian (or East Asian) FTAs currently in force.243  
Trends in the automotive industry and their interplay with the ongoing proliferation 
of FTAs are affecting lead firm-suppliers relations in multiple, even opposing, directions. 
The industry is moving toward more relational and modular linkages between OEMs and 
first-tier suppliers. In turn, liberalization tends to foster market-driven linkages as mutually 
captive relations developed under import substitution are dissolved. Liberalization could 
                                 
242 As of April 2013, first-tier suppliers like Thai Summit (Thailand) or Ingress (Malaysia) maintain operations in other ASEAN 
countries. 
243 Interviews also revealed that elimination of DES/DDS was never requested by any party involved in FTA negotiations. This could be 
reasoned because multinationals in East Asia production networks depend on a wider geographical area for their procurement than those 
operating elsewhere.  
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also promote regional clustering of first-tier suppliers around specialized OEM plants, thus 
reinforcing asymmetric relations, especially once suppliers have sunk their investments. 
Lastly, field research indicated that most of the use of FTAs for input procurement involved 
trade among OEM subsidiaries (hierarchical relations) or between OEMs and long-term 
suppliers (captive, relational). 
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
Institutions serve and reproduce the interests of those that created them in the first place 
(North, 1990). FTAs have become arenas for cooperation and competition between and 
among firms and states providing frameworks to regulate the distribution of power within 
production networks. As far as the automotive sector is concerned, Thai and Malaysian 
FTAs have primarily served OEMs, especially Japanese firms and particularly Toyota, 
which have leveraged their power to affect FTA formulation in their favor at the expense of 
competing OEMs, local suppliers and states.  
At the state level, neither Japan nor Australia used FTAs to extract significant 
regulatory concessions from developing partners. However, if the FTAs of the United 
States and the European Union with Korea and Singapore serve as indication, future East 
Asian FTAs involving these Western powers may include demands for reforms that could 
undermine some of the policy space ASEAN states still maintain for regulating firms and 
production networks.  
Following the Asian crisis, Thailand and Malaysia deepened their integration into 
production networks as a mean to foster industrial development. FTAs could reinforce 
these efforts by increasing investment, production and exports, and by indirectly enhancing 
local technological capabilities. On the other, by reducing the cost of high-technology 
finished products and inputs imported from developed partners, FTAs may potentially lock, 
and even downgrade, indigenous firms into low value-added production. Whether the 
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impact of existing and future FTAs goes in one or the other direction would largely depend 
on the domestic and international political economies that shape FTAs negotiations. The 
ability of developing firms and nations to use some of the options available in FTAs 
described here could contribute to enhance their leverage within production networks in 
their pursue to catch up with advanced economies.  
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Essay 4 — Negotiating Protection under overlapping 
Free Trade Agreements 
 
          Dynamic Interplay between Free Trade Agreements and Investment 244 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Two decades into the most recent wave of regionalism many of its implications remain to be fully understood. 
A vast literature has explored the impacts of free trade agreements (FTAs) on investment flows, but less 
attention has been given to how existing patterns of investment alter FTA liberalization. It is contended here 
that the dynamic interplay between overlapping FTA areas and the investment sunk in them shapes 
governments’ and firms’ positions regarding further FTA liberalization. During trade negotiations, a country 
may decide to exclude a sector from FTA liberalization to prevent future FTA partners from making similar 
demands. Similar sectoral exclusion could occur when a foreign firm, holding a dominant market position in a 
host country, relinquishes liberalization demands in an FTA between host and home countries to prevent that 
its current position is eroded if the host country grants similar (or better) concessions to competing firms from 
other countries in future FTAs. Conversely, investment sunk into a country’s sensitive sector in the territory 
of partners from previous FTAs could preempt the protectionist position of that country when it subsequently 
negotiates FTAs with the investment-source countries. These arguments were tested in the negotiations on the 
liberalization of the automotive industry that Thailand and Malaysia had with Japan in their respective 
bilateral FTAs. The distinct interaction between investment and the FTAs in which these countries participate 
resulted either in entrenchment of protectionism in the sector or its liberalization across subsequent FTAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
244 Essay 4 was originally written in July 2009. Tables 1 and 2 were updated in 2013. In addition to 
its critical evaluation by Professor K. Shadlen, it also received review comments from Professor 
R.E. Baldwin (The Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland) in December 20, 2010 and and Dr. E. 
Ornelas (LSE) in March 22, 2011. 
 5 
5. Essay 4 
! 231 
Abbreviations: 
 
AFTA: ASEAN FTA 
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian nations 
FDI: Foreign direct investment 
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JTEPA: Japan-Thailand economic partnership agreement 
LCR: Local content requirement 
MAJAICO: Malaysian-Japan Automotive Industries Cooperation 
MFN: Most-favored-nation 
MJEPA: Malaysia-Japan economic partnership agreement 
ROOs: Rules of origin 
TAFTA: Thailand-Australia FTA 
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 1.  Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, the worldwide number of free trade agreements (FTAs) has been 
rapidly increasing. This wave of regionalism initially spared East Asia, which, with the sole 
exception of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) bloc, was the only 
geographical area that by the turn of the century still remained untouched by FTAs. Today, 
East Asia has become one the main focus of FTA activity, with close to 60 FTAs 
implemented since 2002.  
The impact of FTA proliferation on global trade is the subject of an unresolved 
debate between those seeing FTAs as stepping stones toward multilateral liberalization and 
those considering them rather as stumbling blocks preventing it (reviewed in Baldwin, 2005 
and Freund and Ornelas, 2010). 245 Existence of empirical evidence in support of both 
arguments (e.g., Estevadeordal et al., 2008 versus Limão, 2006; see below) indicates that 
other factors, still unaccounted for, affect the balance between protectionist and pro-
liberalization groups with respect to FTAs. 
While a large body of literature has studied the impact of FTAs on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows (e.g., Te Velde and Bezemer, 2006; Jang, 2011), less attention has 
been given to how already sunk investment affects firms’ and governments’ positions on 
FTA liberalization. It is argued here that, in the context of overlapping FTAs, these 
positions are influenced by interplays among FTAs and between FTAs and the investment 
sunk in them. Concessions granted by a country to another in an FTA inform its future FTA 
partners about that country’s ultimate bargaining positions. During FTA negotiations, that 
country may protect or exclude a sensitive sector, even from an uncompetitive partner, so 
as to prevent future FTA partners from making demands to liberalize that sector. Similar 
                                 
245 Scholars arguing that regionalism facilitates global free trade contend that, inter alia, FTAs strengthen export-oriented sectors, 
eventually leading to the multilateralization of preferential tariffs. By contrast, the other camp stresses the trade-diverting effects of FTAs 
that bolster protectionist groups and perpetuate high multilateral tariffs.  
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protection/exclusion can also occur when a foreign firm holding a dominant market 
position in the sensitive sector of the host country foregoes liberalization demands in an 
FTA between host and home countries in order to prevent the host from making similar 
concessions to other countries in future FTAs. This would entrench protectionism of 
sensitive sectors across FTAs and multilaterally, creating a stumbling block to future 
liberalization. On the other hand, the FDI sunk into previous FTA partners can constrain, or 
even preempt, the bargaining position of a country trying to protect its sensitive sector(s) in 
subsequent FTA negotiations with countries that have invested in previous FTA partners. 
This interplay between past FTAs and the FDI sunk in them can compel a country to open 
up a sensitive sector in future FTAs, thus acting as a stepping stone toward global 
liberalization. 
To test these arguments, I explored the extent of liberalization of the automotive 
sector in the FTAs signed by Thailand and Malaysia—the two most FTA-active developing 
nations in East Asia—with Japan. In many countries, the automotive sector is one of the 
most protected manufacturing industries, becoming a contentious issue during bilateral and 
multilateral trade negotiations. As global automotive production takes place largely within 
regional clusters, multinational carmakers have often been key proponents of regionalism 
(Yoshimatsu, 2002; Carrillo et al., 2004). As a group, ASEAN, led by Thailand and 
Malaysia, has consolidated itself as the world’s sixth largest automotive producer (Wad, 
2009).246 Although the sector is protected behind high multilateral tariffs in both countries, 
a more liberal policy on automotive investment in Thailand has attracted large FDI inflows, 
creating a competitive export-oriented industry heavily dominated by Japanese carmakers. 
Malaysia has instead pursued the development of state-led national automotive brands, but 
after three decades of heavy protectionism, its national carmakers suffer from weak 
                                 
246 Historically, Thailand and Malaysia have been the largest automotive producers in ASEAN but, since 2010, Indonesia has surpassed 
Malaysia (OICA database; see footnote 189 in Essay 3). 
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international competitiveness and remain overwhelmingly domestically-oriented, yet they 
face increasing competition at home from Japanese firms. In light of this scenario it was 
surprising that, when both countries negotiated their respective FTAs with Japan, Thailand 
resisted tariff reductions on vehicles, but Malaysia agreed to complete liberalization of the 
sector with Japan. Considering their market dominance and political influence in Thailand, 
why did Japanese carmakers failed to achieve liberalization of the Thai automotive sector 
in the Thailand-Japan FTA? Or, as is even more surprising, why, after years of fierce 
protectionism, did Malaysia expose its fragile national car project to Japanese automotive 
imports? (see Tables 1 and 2 in Essay 1 for the timeline of the Thailand-Japan and 
Malaysia-Japan FTAs). 
This study attempts to shed light on this puzzle through the above-mentioned 
arguments, analyzing whether and how the interaction between FDI and FTAs affected the 
preferences and positions of carmakers and governments with respect to FTA liberalization. 
A detailed process-tracing analysis of FTA formulation in Thailand and Malaysia 
confirmed the initial hypotheses.247 Thailand resisted automotive liberalization with Japan 
not only to protect existing investment, but also to prevent similar demands from other 
partners (e.g., United States, European Union, etc.) in future FTAs. Likewise, for Japanese 
carmakers based in Thailand, even more important than improving their already dominant 
position by lifting of tariffs on vehicles imported from Japan was preventing firms from 
other countries from extracting better concessions in their FTAs with Thailand, which goal 
was achieved by the inclusion in the Thailand-Japan FTA of a specific clause to that effect. 
By contrast, the FTA that Malaysia previously had with Thailand (as members of ASEAN), 
and the FDI sunk in Thailand by Japanese carmakers, was going to open Malaysia to tariff-
                                 
247 This Essay focuses in the automotive sector but draws on 212 in-depth semi-structured interviews with private sector representatives, 
government officials, academics and civil society in Thailand and Malaysia during two independent trips in 2008 and 2009 
complemented with numerous personal communications and secondary research during 2010-2012. 
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free Japanese vehicles made in Thailand starting in 2010, thus preempting Malaysia’s 
protectionist position in its bilateral FTA with Japan.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the next section outlines the 
analytical framework of the study; section three briefly reviews the automotive sector in 
Thailand and Malaysia in the context of ASEAN; sections four and five analyze the 
policymaking of Thai and Malaysian bilateral FTAs with Japan in relation to the 
automotive sector, and section six discusses main findings.  
2. Protectionism and liberalization in the presence of sunk investment across 
overlapping FTAs 
The debate on the influence of FTAs on multilateral liberalization remains unsettled. 
Theoretical and empirical studies provide supporting evidence that regionalism could either 
hinder (e.g., Levy, 1997; Panagariya, 2000; Limão, 2006) or foster multilateral 
liberalization (e.g., Ornelas, 2005a; Estevadeordal et al., 2008; Ornelas, 2008; Calvo-Pardo 
et al., 2011). One of the factors considered in the argument is the impact that previous 
liberalization—multilateral or through earlier FTAs—has on the preferences of interest 
groups in regard to further liberalization. Those who see regionalism as an obstacle to 
global free trade contend that the interest of export-oriented groups in additional 
liberalization weakens as the share of exports covered by FTAs continues expanding. At 
the same time, since FTAs can accommodate protection (or even exclusion) for sensitive 
items, over time FTA proliferation strengthens the political leverage of protectionist 
coalitions vis-à-vis exporters, which allows high tariffs in protected/excluded sectors to be 
consolidated across FTAs and into the multilateral regime. Authors who instead defend 
FTAs as positive steps toward multilateral liberalization argue, to the contrary, that by 
expanding their market size, employment and output, FTAs progressively increase the 
political influence over trade policy of exporters at the expense of import-competing 
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sectors. In addition, regionalism also reduces incentives among import-competing sectors 
to lobby for high external tariffs (rent destruction), eventually leading to the 
multilateralization of FTA preferential tariffs to countries outside the bloc.248 
Global liberalization offers greater opportunities than regionalism to expand 
economies of scale; however, under certain circumstances firms may still prefer FTA 
liberalization. For instance, producers which have: a) unexploited economies of scale 
and/or b) fragmented production across several countries could favor regionalism over 
multilateral liberalization because of FTAs’ discriminatory effects against competing firms 
outside the bloc through preferential tariffs and strict rules of origin (ROOs)249 (Milner, 
1997; Chase, 2003; Chase, 2005; Chase, 2008).  
 Firms’ and states’ preferences regarding FTA liberalization are influenced 
exogenously by the FTAs signed (or projected to sign) by other countries. FTAs generate 
“club goods” for businesses inside the bloc, while they raise relative costs for those outside. 
Excluded firms may attempt to redress this discrimination by pressing their governments to 
join the FTA (or form a new one), leading to a “domino effect” of proliferating FTAs 
(Baldwin, 1995).250 This implies that an FTA cannot guarantee that the preferential market 
access it provides to firms inside the bloc vis-à-vis outside competitors will continue into 
the future. Tariff preferences extracted from an FTA partner are subject to concession 
erosion (or even diversion) if the partner later offers similar (or better) preferences to a 
third country (Ethier, 2001; Hallaert, 2008). Although no country can prevent its FTA 
                                 
248 In addition, reductions in external tariffs following the creation of an FTA could also undermine incentives for countries outside the 
bloc to pursue multilateral liberalization (Ornelas, 2005b). 
249 ROOs determine the origin of a product—and therefore, whether or not it qualifies for FTA preferential tariffs—based on compliance 
with a minimum level of transformation within the bloc. Included in FTAs to avoid trade deflection, strict ROOs could also be used for 
protectionist purposes.  
250 Proliferation of FTAs have also been explained by “fear of exclusion” (Shadlen, 2008). 
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partners from signing other FTAs, concession erosion or diversion can be limited if the 
original FTA includes a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause (Ethier, 2001).251 
Here it is argued that preferences on FTA liberalization by a given country are 
influenced not only by the FTAs established by competing nations, but also by that 
country’s own agreements. The FTAs that a country has already signed—or could sign in 
the future—and the FDI sunk in these FTA areas alter the balance between liberalizing and 
protectionist coalitions, and constrain the position of that government in subsequent FTA 
negotiations.  
Attracting FDI is an explicit goal for developing countries’ entering FTAs. A vast 
number of academic works have explored the multiple mechanisms through which FTAs 
influence investment flows (e.g., Medvedev, 2006; Te Velde and Bezemer 2006; Jang, 
2011).252 However, less attention has been given to how existing investment alters the 
preferences and strategies of firms and governments regarding FTAs with FDI source 
countries.  
Because of its numerous spillovers, the automotive industry is one of the sectors 
governments have most often promoted for investment and/or protected. Until the 1990s it 
was common for multinational carmakers to engage in tariff-jumping FDI, setting up plants 
in multiple countries and assembling similar models for each respective domestic market. 
In most cases those factories operated at suboptimal scales and required host governments 
to maintain tariff protection and grant oligopoly rents. Increasing liberalization since the 
                                 
251 MFN refers to the principle under the World Trade Organization regime by which any member country should receive equal trade 
privileges than the MFN by the country granting the treatment. FTAs constitute one of the few exceptions to the MFN principle allowed 
by the World Trade Organization with no obligation to extend FTA preferential tariffs to countries outside the FTA bloc. Nevertheless, 
some FTAs also include MFN clauses to avoid concession erosion. 
252 For instance, many FTAs include provisions liberalizing investment regulations and/or increasing investors’ protection. Firms outside 
an FTA may neutralize trade diversion by investing and producing within the bloc. Depending on the intended goal several types of FDI 
have been distinguished of which only market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI are of interest here. Efficiency-seeking FDI is pulled in 
by location-specific advantages that enhance the competitiveness of firms processing inputs for exports. Market-seeking FDI is pulled by 
the larger market created by an FTA, which could also generate efficiency gains attracting vertical efficiency-seeking FDI. Market-
seeking FDI is also attracted to sectors protected by tariff (and non-tariff) barriers, being referred then as tariff-jumping FDI. Another 
way by which FTAs could lure FDI, especially into developing countries, is by signaling commitment to liberal economic policies 
(Ethier, 1998; Büthe and Milner, 2008). On the other hand, for producers inside a FTA area, FTA liberalization reduces the cost of 
serving the region through trade, potentially discouraging tariff-jumping FDI from other FTA partners. The latter situation is more likely 
to occur in bilateral FTAs between developed countries (Jang, 2011).  
5. Essay 4 
! 238 
1990s prompted carmakers to initiate a rationalization of procurement and production. 
Since sudden multilateral liberalization could lead to excess capacity, firms have instead 
pushed for FTAs that suit their regional strategies and allow a gradual reorganization from 
the national to the regional level while discriminating against outside competitors through 
preferential tariffs, strict ROOs and trade-related investment measures  (Milner, 1997; 
Chase 2004; Chase, 2008).253 
Consider a firm FA from developed country A with a production factory at home 
(plant FA-A), but that has also invested and produces in a protected sector of developing 
country X (plant FA-X) (tariff-jumping FDI) (Figure 1, left panel). In order to improve its 
economies of scale, firm FA would lobby the government in A for an FTA between A and 
X that gradually eliminates trade barriers in X to final and intermediate goods coming from 
A. Upon liberalization, FA may decide either to divest from its plant FA-X , and serve X 
directly from FA-A (replacing FDI with trade), or to integrate FA-X into the regional network 
through specialization (complementing FDI with trade) (Figure 1, left panel). A competing 
firm FB from country B, which also has tariff-jumping FDI in X (plant FB-X), will oppose 
liberalizing imports of final goods from A in FTA A-X since FB-X would be unable to 
compete with plants in country A operating on more efficient economies of scales. If FB-X 
procures inputs from A it may still welcome FTA liberalization by X on intermediate goods 
(but not final goods) coming from A. 
The existence of FTA A-X will prompt country B to form its own FTA with X 
(FTA B-X) as part of the classical FTA domino effect (Figure 1, left panel). In this setting, 
firms in countries A and B face a non-zero-sum game (Figure 1, right panel). Although 
each country will gain the most from an exclusive FTA with X (quadrants 2 and 3), and the 
                                 
253 The Agreement on trade-related investment measures at the World Trade organization is limited to banning local content requirements 
(LCRs), trade balancing or foreign exchange. The Agreement imposes costs on investors but provide rents for incumbents. Firms tend to 
favor FTA over multilateral liberalization for a gradual elimination trade-related investment measures that, at the same time, 
discriminates against outsiders (Chase, 2004). 
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worst scenario is not to have an FTA with X while the other does, both would still benefit 
more from the existence of two separate FTAs with X (quadrant 1) than from no FTA at all 
(quadrant 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Left panel: Firm FA from country A with production at home (FA-A) and tariff-jumping investment 
and production in X (FA-X) will favor a FTA between A and X (FTA A-X) that eliminates trade barriers in X 
while also discriminates against firms from country B. Trade diversion from FTA A-X will prompt country B 
to create its own FTA with X (FTA B-X). See text for details. Right panel: Firms from A and B face a non-
zero sum game where each gains the most from an exclusive FTA with X. Gain with respect to the initial 
situation is represented by an upward arrow (two upward arrows indicate enhanced gains) and loss by a 
downward arrow. See text for details. 
 
 The net effect of FTA liberalization on tariff-jumping FDI in X is contingent on 
multiple factors, as would also be the preferences of government and local suppliers in 
X.254 If, as discussed earlier, FA decides to divest from FA-X and serve country X from home 
country A (FA-A) upon FTA liberalization, country X will experience employment losses. In 
addition, the government in host country X will also lose unrecoverable sunk “investments” 
made in the sector in the form of forgone taxes and other incentives to foreign producers 
(FA-X, FB-X). Local firms in X supplying intermediate inputs to plant FA-X would resist 
liberalization of final products and/or intermediate inputs coming from A, but would 
                                 
254 Businesses are more likely to react in avoiding potential losses from liberalization than in securing potential gains (Baldwin, 1995). 
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benefit from FTA A-X liberalization if FA integrates FA-X into its regional network and 
expands its production toward exports.  
It is posited here that the above preferences could also be shaped by the FTAs that 
X has already signed or might sign in the future. A country may decide to protect a 
sensitive sector from FTA liberalization independently of whether or not the FTA partner is 
a competitive producer. But it may also decide to liberalize that sensitive sector to a non-
competitive partner as part of the multi-sectoral package of concessions exchanged during 
negotiations. One could safely assume the existence of some path-dependence in FTA 
formulation, in the sense that concessions granted by a country in previous FTAs signal 
future FTA partners about the boundaries around sensitive sectors. In this line, during 
negotiations for FTA A-X, country X may refuse to liberalize its sensitive sector to final 
and intermediate goods coming from A as to prevent other countries’ making equivalent 
demands in subsequent FTAs. Furthermore, if firm FA-X holds a dominant market position 
in country X, FA may favor the pre-FTA status quo of protectionism over a scenario where 
liberalization by X to country A is followed by X making similar or better concessions to 
country B in a future FTA (concession erosion or diversion, as noted earlier). In this case, 
FA itself can paradoxically relinquish (or soften) its demands for liberalization by X in FTA 
A-X (Figure 2). FA-X is more likely to forego its liberalization demands in FTA A-X if it 
can secure assurances—through the inclusion of an “MFN clause” in the FTA—that X will 
not give country B a better deal in their subsequent FTA. In either case, concession 
prevention would reduce the chance of country X granting concessions to country A in the 
given sector. The interplay between tariff-jumping FDI and the imprint of past and future 
FTAs would prompt that the sector is protected in future FTAs and in the multilateral 
regime (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2:  Country X can refuse liberalization of a sector to country A in FTA A-X as to prevent equivalent 
demands from country B in a subsequent FTA B-X. If firm FA-X has a dominant market position in X, FA 
could also potentially relinquish on its liberalization demands in FTA A-X in order to prevent creating a 
precedent for future FTAs. In either case, country X would be less inclined to grant concessions in that sector 
to country A, prompting the sector to be protected/excluded across FTAs. See text for details. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Concessions on a sensitive sector granted by a country in 
an FTA potentially signal ultimate bargaining positions. That country may 
therefore decide not to liberalize a sensitive sector in an FTA, even with a 
non-competitive FTA partner, to prevent similar demands by other countries 
in future FTAs. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: A foreign firm holding a dominant market position in a 
protected sector of the host country can potentially favor the status quo—
accepting current protectionism—and relinquish liberalization demands in 
an FTA between home and host countries, to avoid similar concessions by 
the host to other countries in subsequent FTAs, especially if the FTA 
incorporates an MFN clause.  
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Hypothesis 1c: Following the two previous hypotheses, protection or 
exclusion of a given sensitive sector in an FTA would result in the 
entrenchment of protectionism around that sector in subsequent FTAs and 
multilaterally. 
 
At trade negotiations it is impossible to know ex-ante a partner’s future comparative 
advantage. Signing a bilateral FTA opens up a country to competition not only from firms 
already established in the partner but also from those that may invest there in the future. 
Continuing with the previous setting, let us introduce an additional country, Y. Country Y 
protects a given sensitive sector at the multilateral level, but Y may have liberalized that 
sector—from the start or gradually—to country X as part of bilateral FTA X-Y if X was not 
competitive in that sector at the time of FTA negotiations. However, country Y has little or 
no leverage over investment policy in X, whose competitiveness may change, even rapidly, 
as a result of FDI from other countries (e.g., FA-X from country A). As long as products 
comply with ROOs, FA could use its production base in X (FA-X) plus FTA X-Y to tariff-
jump into Y (Figure 3).  
Country Y continues to shield its sensitive sector from imports originating in 
countries A or B—with high comparative advantage in that sector—through high MFN 
tariffs. Therefore, if Y should decide later on to negotiate a separate FTA with A, Y may 
still wish to protect the sensitive sector from A in the bilateral FTA A-Y. However, the 
FTA that Y signed previously with X (FTA X-Y) and the FDI of FA into X (FA-X) in Y’s 
sensitive sector means that FA-X’s products are already entering duty-free into Y by way of 
FTA X-Y. The concessions and protections that Y could negotiate with A are therefore 
paradoxically constrained and preempted by the FTAs that Y has itself signed in the past 
and the FDI sunk into Y’s FTA partners (Figure 3). The situation will repeat itself when Y 
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negotiates with B or any other country that has invested into X in Y’s sensitive sector. In a 
context of proliferating and overlapping FTAs, as the current scenario in East Asia, a 
country may find that the FDI sunk over time into partners of previous agreements could 
compel that country to open up a sensitive sector in future FTAs, sensitive sector that until 
then was protected multilaterally from direct imports from other countries. The iteration of 
this process would therefore act as a stepping stone toward further liberalization (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Country Y has opened up a sensitive sector to uncompetitive country X as part of FTA X-Y. If firm 
FA from country A invests into country X (FA-X) in Y’s sensitive sector, FA-X could use FTA X-Y to export 
freely to Y.  If Y later decides to sign an FTA with A, FTA X-Y and the FDI sunk by FA into X (FA-X) could 
preempt the protectionist position of Y during negotiations with A. The situation will repeat when country Y 
negotiates FTAs with other countries that have invested in X (e.g., FB-X from country B). The FDI sunk in 
partners from previous FTAs will compel Y to open up sensitive sectors in future FTAs. See text for details. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: If a country seeks to shield a sensitive sector from external 
competition, the FDI sunk into that sector in the territory of previous FTA 
partners could constrain and preempt its protectionist position when it later 
negotiates FTAs with the FDI source countries. 
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Hypothesis 2b: Following the previous hypothesis, in a context of ever 
growing and overlapping FTAs, the FDI sunk in previous FTA areas would 
prompt that country to open up its sensitive sector(s) in future FTAs and 
eventually multilaterally.  
 
3.  The Thai and Malaysian automotive sectors in the context of ASEAN 
3.1 Thailand 
Appreciation of the yen in the 1980s and high trade barriers protecting the automotive 
industry in many countries fostered the relocation of Japanese carmakers overseas, favoring 
Thailand as their preferred FDI destination in Southeast Asia largely because it lacked a 
national car program (Doner, 1991; Staples, 2008). Thailand began to unilaterally reduce 
trade and investment barriers in the automotive sector in 1991, liberalization that was 
reinforced by the signing of the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) in 1992 and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures in 1994 that 
bound Thailand to gradual intra-ASEAN liberalization and to the elimination of local 
content requirements (LCRs) by 2000, respectively. Nevertheless, high multilateral applied 
tariffs maintained the automotive industry as one of the most protected sectors in Thailand. 
Strong economic growth during the mid-1990s prompted a new surge of FDI into the Thai 
automotive sector, which was targeted by international carmakers not only as the largest 
market in ASEAN, but also as a potential regional base for exports (Abbott, 2004; Doner, 
2009). 
Many of these investment projects ran aground after domestic vehicle demand and 
production collapsed in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (see Figure 3 in 
Essay 3). The government reacted to the crisis by loosening foreign equity restrictions on 
investment but raising multilateral applied tariffs on vehicles with the vision of 
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transforming Thailand into the regional automotive hub through a combination of import 
substitution and export-oriented manufacturing by international firms. Despite the crisis, 
Thailand complied with its commitments to abolish LCRs and to progressively eliminate 
tariffs on ASEAN automotive products.  
Although vehicle production recovered by 2002 the Asian crisis represented a 
turning point in the structure and orientation of the Thai automotive industry.255 Most Thai 
firms involved in vehicle assembly went bankrupt and sold their stakes to foreign 
carmakers while many Thai-owned automotive part producers disappeared, were bought up 
by foreign firms, mostly Japanese, or downgraded to lower tiers in the supply base. 
Importantly, the crisis accelerated foreign carmakers’ plans to use Thailand as an export 
base. Since the crisis, vehicle production has grown steadily on the back of strong exports 
and Thailand is now the world’s ninth largest automotive producer and Asia’s third largest 
exporter after Japan and Korea (Trade Map and OICA databases).256 Since 2007 around 
half of Thai automotive production is exported, compared to just 2.5% before the crisis 
(Figure 3 in Essay 3). This strong export-orientation of the Thai automotive industry attests 
of the international competitiveness of assemblers and automotive parts producers 
established in the country.  
Automotive production, domestic sales and exports in Thailand are heavily 
dominated by Japanese firms that have transferred to Thailand manufacturing of all 
commercial vehicles (pickup trucks) and an array of mid-range passenger cars. For larger-
engine luxury models, Japanese firms conduct all the assembly in Japan and export them 
directly to Thailand, unlike European carmakers that assemble their high-end models in 
Thailand using kits imported from Europe. Of all vehicles manufactured in Thailand during 
                                 
255 Data for the rest of this section were obtained from the Thai Automotive Industry Association, Thailand Automotive Institute, 
Automotive Industry Club, Auto Parts Industry Club, Thai Autoparts Manufacturers Associations, Office of Industrial Economics (Thai 
Ministry of Industry) and individual carmakers and suppliers. 
256 Thai automotive production experienced declines in 2009 and 2011 as a result of the global economic crisis and floods in central 
Thailand, respectively (Figure 3 in Essay 3).  
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2004—the start of Thailand-Japan FTA negotiations—over 80% were Japanese models. 
Most of the remaining production is of American brands, with only around 1% being 
European and smaller shares for models of other origins. Over the last decade Japanese 
carmakers have accounted for over 85% of local market sales (Table 1). European firms 
only have an important presence in the niche segment of over-2500cc passenger cars. 
Vehicle exports are also dominated by Japanese makers, which accounted for over 85% of 
all units exported in 2003-2012, mainly to Australia, ASEAN and the Middle East.  
 
Table 1: Vehicle market share in Thailand by the home country of the carmaker * 
Carmaker 
Nationality 
1999-2000 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 
Japan 88.8% 89.0% 91.3% 92.3% 91.8% 88.6% 
United States 7.2% 9.1% 7.1% 5.8% 4.1% 8.4% 
European Union ** 3.1% 1.5% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 
Other  
(Korean, Chinese, 
Malaysian) 
0.9% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 2.9% 1.8% 
      Source: Thailand Automotive Institute, Thai Automotive Industry Association, Automotive Industry Club and individual assemblers 
      * Average market share for total retail vehicle sales (commercial and passenger vehicles) during the indicated period 
      ** European carmakers hold over 60% of the market in the over 2500cc passenger car segment, which represents less than 0.5% of    
       the overall market 
 
 
The supply base in Thailand is the largest and most developed in ASEAN with the 
biggest share at the first-tier level in the hands of Japanese firms. Despite the elimination of 
LCRs, domestic value content in Thailand-made vehicles has kept increasing, and although 
Thailand produces many automotive parts locally, its still imports some higher-technology 
components and steel, mainly from Japan. Japanese firms’ weight in the Thai automotive 
sector and in overall Thai FDI inflows, especially in the case of Toyota, translates into 
significant leverage in policymaking as emerged during interviews with both government 
officials and other carmakers. 
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3.2 Malaysia 
Malaysia’s economic development policy during the last four decades has been guided by 
two overarching goals: achieving developed-country status and fostering the participation 
of the ethnic-Malay/bumiputera population in the economy. In 1983, in a bid to develop 
indigenous technological automotive capabilities, the Malaysian government entered 
directly into vehicle manufacturing by launching the National Car Project and the national 
carmaker PROTON to produce mid-size cars.257 From the start the government has 
supported and protected PROTON from foreign competition—within Malaysia and from 
abroad—with a panoply of trade and regulatory measures (Abbott, 2004; Rosli and Kari, 
2008; Natsuda et al., 2013). PROTON’s share in the Malaysian market increased to 74% 
after only ten years encouraging the government to set up another firm, PERODUA, in 
1993 to manufacture subcompact cars in a venture with Japanese Daihatsu.258 By 1996, 
PROTON and PERODUA commanded a joint domestic market share of 85%. During much 
of the 1990s, PROTON and PERODUA were the first and third largest carmakers in 
ASEAN by production volume; yet, both remained primarily domestically-oriented.259  
The Asian crisis caused a sharp decline in Malaysian automotive production and 
domestic sales (see Figure 4 in Essay 3), which reignited protectionism. Malaysia requested 
and obtained from the World Trade Organization (WTO) an extension in the use of LCRs 
until 2004, exclusively for its automotive sector. More controversially, Malaysia 
unilaterally excluded its automotive sector from AFTA liberalization schedules (see 
below). It was only in 2005—later consolidated with the National Automotive Policy, 
issued in 2006—that the government accepted to progressively reduce tariffs on ASEAN-
originated vehicles and automotive parts until they were completely eliminated in 2010 as 
                                 
257 Although PROTON initially relied on technology from Japanese Mitsubishi—then a minority shareholder in the firm—its 
management has always been Malaysian bumiputera. 
258 PERODUA is also considered a national carmaker but its production strategy is controlled by Daihatsu and lacks some of the perks 
granted to PROTON. 
259 Historically, and until 2010, Malaysia represented ASEAN’s largest passenger car market and was arguably poised to have become 
the regional hub for automotive multinationals had its government not launched the National Car Project. 
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mandated by AFTA. However, these tariff reductions were accompanied by the 
introduction of a system of excise duties on vehicles that exempts Malaysian-value content, 
directly benefitting national carmakers with lower import content, especially PROTON. 
The National Automotive Policy continues to stress the need to promote PROTON and 
bumiputera participation in the sector. Malaysia has a liberal investment regime in most 
manufacturing sectors but this has remained restricted in the automotive industry. Foreign 
carmakers cannot have a controlling stake in their Malaysian subsidiaries, and must set up 
minority ventures with local firms, most often government-linked companies.260  
Vehicle production and domestic sales regained pre-crisis levels in 2001, but 
growth since then has been slow compared to Thailand (Figure 4 in Essay 3). Although 
together both national carmakers still account for over half of total production and domestic 
sales, PROTON has been losing ground not only to PERODUA but also to competitively-
priced Japanese models, both locally-assembled and imported (Table 2). Since 2003—just 
before Malaysia-Japan FTA negotiations started—Japanese brands’ market share has 
grown from 21% to around 30% (Table 2). As Malaysia started reducing AFTA tariffs on 
vehicles in 2005 (see below), imports of Japanese models assembled in ASEAN—mainly 
in Thailand and Indonesia—raised, doubling between 2005 and 2009 (interviews). 
European and American models represent 3-6% of the local market, in the case of the latter 
mainly as imports from Thailand. Vehicle exports, mostly by PROTON, have been low due 
to weak international competitiveness of national carmakers and PERODUA’s lack of 
independence in determining its own export strategy. Likewise, Japanese assemblers in 
Malaysia cater almost exclusively to the domestic market, following their principals’ 
production and sales plans. Establishment of the National Car Project boosted an 
                                 
260 The 2009 revision of the National Automotive Policy eliminated foreign equity restrictions for the assembly of cars with engines 
over1800cc, electric and hybrid cars and commercial vehicles (outside the core segment of PROTON and PERODUA). A new revision 
of the National Automotive Policy is expected for late 2013 (see footnote 226 in Essay 3). 
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indigenous automotive parts industry, although of mostly low technical capabilities. In 
contrast to Thailand, the large majority of suppliers are locally-owned and serve national 
carmakers.261  
Table 2: Vehicle market share in Malaysia among main carmakers * 
Carmaker Ownership 1999 
2000 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Proton Malaysian (National carmaker) 52.1% 36.7% 26.9% 25.0% 26.8% 27.6% 
Perodua Malaysian (National carmaker) 28.3% 27.8% 28.5% 31.8% 31.1% 33.9% 
Japanese 
carmakers 
Joint ventures with Japanese 
minority 
10.7% 21.2% 24.2% 31.2% 31.8% 27.3% 
Naza Kia ** Malaysian (Private, bumiputera) N/A 1.4% 4.8% 3.2% 1.8% 1.5% 
European 
carmakers *** 
Joint ventures with European 
minority 
N/A 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 2.4% 5.2% 
American 
carmakers 
Join venture with US minority or 
imported after mid-2008 **** 
1.2% 1.7% 1.4% 0.6% 0.5% 1.1% 
Other Korean, Chinese, Indian N/A 9.5% 12.4% 6.3% 5.6% 3.4% 
     Source: Malaysian Automotive Association 
     * Average market share for total registered vehicles (commercial and passenger vehicles) during the indicated period. Note that      
     figures for 1999-2000 do not add to 100% because information for some carmakers was not available 
     ** Naza is a Malaysian business conglomerates that locally assembles and rebadges Korean Kia cars. Since 2010 it also assembles  
     small Peugeot cars and distributes other European and American models   
     *** Include Peugeot cars assembled in Malaysia by Naza 
     **** General Motors has no plants in Malaysia and Ford stopped production in mid-2008 
 
 
Following Mitsubishi’s sale of its stake in PROTON in 2004, the national carmaker 
has seen its market share position progressively deteriorating while repeated financial 
losses started threatening its viability. The Malaysian government looked for another global 
partner that could help PROTON with technological upgrading and marketing but 
negotiations with several international carmakers failed due to the government’s refusal to 
give up managerial control to a foreign firm.262 
3.3 ASEAN FTA (AFTA) 
National and corporate interests around the automotive industry were pivotal in the 
formulation and establishment of early ASEAN functional cooperation programs and 
AFTA itself.  In the late 1980s and mid-1990s, Japanese carmakers succeeded in getting 
                                 
261 Small economies of scales limit the competitiveness of Malaysian-owned suppliers, and their high dependence on PROTON and/or 
PERODUA compromises their future if national brands’ market share continues to shrink. 
262 In January 2012, government-linked investment company, Khazanah, sold its shares in PROTON to Malaysian private holding DRB-
HICOM (New Straits Times, January 16, 2012; The Edge, January 17, 2012). 
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ASEAN governments to implement complementation schemes (e.g., Brand-to-Brand 
complementation and ASEAN Industrial Cooperation programs) that liberalized pre-
approved trade flows in intermediate goods among specific subsidiaries within the region 
(Yoshimatsu, 2002). Since these programs mostly benefitted foreign multinationals, 
Malaysia was initially loath to grant approvals, while Thailand, as the regional hub of 
international carmakers, supported them from the start.263 
 AFTA schedules established that intra-ASEAN tariffs were to be capped at 20% by 
2000 and although items could be temporarily excluded, tariffs had to be reduced to 0-5% 
by 2003 and totally eliminated by 2010. Full liberalization is delayed to 2015 for ASEAN 
less developed members Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.  As indicated earlier, 
following the Asian crisis, Malaysia transferred its automotive sector to the exclusion list 
and increased tariffs on vehicles coming from ASEAN to up to 300%. Malaysia maintained 
the sector excluded from AFTA schedules beyond the 2003 deadline and tariffs on ASEAN 
automotive products were only brought down to 20% in 2005 before there were scrapped in 
2010.  
Small margins between multilateral and AFTA tariffs in many sectors have limited 
businesses’ incentive to use AFTA (Manchin and Pelkmans, 2008; Ravenhill, 2008). 
However, since the automotive industry has been heavily protected in most ASEAN 
countries, primary data collected in this research found close to complete utilization of 
AFTA preferences for trade in automotive products (data from the Thai Ministry of 
Commerce; interviews). Elimination in 2010 of all intra-ASEAN tariffs allows carmakers, 
especially Japanese firms with a larger presence, to rationalize scales and strategies on a 
                                 
263 Eventually, Malaysia approved complementation projects in the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation scheme and automotive firms 
established in the country participated in about half of all automotive-related projects in this program. In line with Malaysia’s early 
concerns, the vast majority of projects covered trade exchanges among Japanese firms and only one involved PERODUA, none 
PROTON (data from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry; interviews). Initially projected to be phased out by 2003, the 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation program continued in use until 2010. 
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regional basis, using their largest plants in Thailand to serve demand in other ASEAN 
countries, including Malaysia.  
Japanese and Western carmakers have later become interested in integrating 
neighbouring countries (e.g., Japan itself, Australia) into their ASEAN network. To that 
effect, they have lobbied ASEAN governments—particularly in major automotive 
producers, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia—for the creation of a number of bilateral 
FTAs. However, for Malaysia, further liberalization of its automotive sector beyond AFTA, 
particularly to highly competitive automotive producing nations like Japan, could be 
ominous for PROTON and its suppliers.264 
 
4.  The automotive sector in the Thailand-Japan FTA 
Over the last decade, most ASEAN countries, with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia in 
the lead, have been actively pursuing FTAs with partners within East Asia and beyond 
(Sally, 2007; Hoadley, 2008; Sally and Sen, 2011). As of August 2013, Thailand is 
signatory to AFTA, five bilateral agreements, and five regional FTAs as a member of 
ASEAN (see Table 1 in Essay 1). The Thailand-Australia FTA, which fully liberalized the 
Thai automotive sector for the first (and so far only) time outside AFTA, merits attention 
here before the Japan-Thailand FTA is analyzed. 
 Even before the Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) was implemented in January 
2005, Australia represented the main market for Thailand-made vehicles, which accounted 
for 25% of total Thai exports to Australia. Field research for this Thesis found that pressure 
by Japanese and American carmakers on both governments was instrumental in TAFTA 
negotiations (Essay 1).265 Australia was not a direct competitor to the Thai automotive 
industry and, in fact, automotive production structures in both countries were 
                                 
264 Given significant overcapacity and increased competition at home the firm remains at a crossroads. 
265 General Motors and Toyota lobbied the Thai government to speed up the opening of negotiations for TAFTA. Automotive 
associations in Australia also lobbied for TAFTA to the Australian Parliament  (Essay 1).  
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complementary.266 Consequently, Thailand agreed to open its automotive industry fully and 
relatively rapidly to Australia. Thailand eliminated from the start all tariffs on commercial 
vehicles and large passenger cars and phased out by 2010 those on smaller cars and 
automotive parts (Table 3).267  
 
Table 3: Thai and Australian concessions in the  
automotive sector under TAFTA 
 
 Thai 
concessions 
Australian 
concessions 
Passenger cars < 3000 cc 0% by 2010 0% at entry 
Passenger cars > 3000 cc 0% at entry 0% at entry 
Commercial Vehicles 0% at entry 0% at entry 
Automotive parts 
 
     0% by 2010 0-5% at entry 
0% by 2010 
Hot- and cold-rolled steel 0% by 2015 0% at entry 
           Source: TAFTA treaty (DFAT, undated) 
 
 
As Thailand’s main foreign investor, first source of imports and key export market, 
Japan was a natural FTA partner for Thailand (Manger, 2005). Through the Japan-Thailand 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA), Thailand aimed at improving access for its 
agricultural products and attracting investment, while Japan sought to liberalize the Thai 
automotive and steel sectors and extract concessions on services.  
When JTEPA negotiations began in February 2004, Thailand had just agreed to 
fully open its automotive sector to Australia under TAFTA, and was about to start bilateral 
negotiations with the United States, the world’s largest automotive producer at the time. In 
addition, as member of ASEAN, Thailand was also party to ongoing discussions for an 
FTA with Korea and to plans for another with the European Union. Together, these 
agreements would place Thailand at the heart of a network of overlapping FTAs with most 
of the major automotive producing countries. In keeping with the initial arguments, the 
                                 
266 Thai strength in light commercial vehicles and small- and medium-size passenger cars was matched by Australia’s advantage in large-
engine vehicles and higher-technology automotive parts. 
267 On its part, Australia eliminated from the start all tariffs on vehicles and by 2010 on automotive parts.  
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imprint of previous FTAs on JTEPA negotiations became patent early on and interviews 
revealed that Japanese carmakers, as the largest investors in the Thai automotive sector, 
expected to extract in JTEPA the same preferential treatment Thailand had offered to 
Australia.268 But these interviews also found that, over all else, Japanese automotive firms 
wanted to preserve their dominant position in Thailand, avoid the erosion of any 
preferences they could eventually obtain in JTEPA, and prevent Thailand from later 
liberalizing its automotive sector with other countries, as it had done with Australia.  
An agreement in principle for JTEPA, including the contentious agricultural sector, 
was reached in March 2005 only for talks to get tangled up over the automotive sector. To 
cancel the tariff advantage enjoyed by European brands established in Thailand and that 
dominate the luxury segment, Japan requested the scrapping of Thai tariffs on vehicles of 
over 3000cc. In addition, and although they already produce small- and medium-size 
vehicles in Thailand at internationally competitive costs, Japanese carmakers also 
demanded the gradual elimination of tariffs on models below 3000cc.269 Finally, and more 
importantly, Japanese firms also wanted to improve the competitiveness of their plants in 
Thailand by liberalizing imports of higher-technology automotive parts and steel from 
Japan.  
While liberalization to Australian automotive products posed little threat to the Thai 
automotive industry, a range of Japan-made vehicles was in direct competition with those 
produced in Thailand. Also differing from TAFTA, JTEPA’s potential benefits were only 
unidirectional—affecting only Japanese exports to Thailand—, since Japan already offered 
tariff-free multilateral access to all automotive products. Field research found that Western 
                                 
268 Even the Thai Prime Minister made reference to Japanese carmakers’ demands for similar treatment than Australia (The Nation, April 
12, 2005). Also in line with our argument, although in a different sector, having made Japan some concessions on agriculture in its FTA 
with Mexico, Thailand entered JTEPA talks with high expectations for obtaining greater access for its agricultural products but soon 
found out that Japan resisted liberalization of the sector. 
269 Liberalization to imports of small- and mid-size vehicles made in Japan would give Japanese carmakers flexibility in planning for 
future platforms and technologies. 
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assemblers strongly opposed tariff reductions on vehicles imported from Japan.270 Japanese 
and Western assemblers both threatened Thailand with divestments if their interests were 
not considered. The Thai government, which had been nurturing the sector for decades, did 
not want JTEPA to make existing investments redundant or to jeopardize future inflows.271 
Research indicated that the Thai government was well aware and concerned that yielding to 
Japanese demands would cause the United States, European Union, and Korea to press for 
similar concessions in ongoing FTA negotiations (Hypothesis 1a). 
Despite their significant leverage on Thai policymaking, Japanese carmakers 
eventually obtained only limited concessions in JTEPA (Table 4). Thailand granted a very 
lengthy liberalization (over a period of up to eleven years) for Japanese automotive parts 
and steel that, in line with the initial arguments, was made conditional upon the full 
implementation of AFTA by 2010, being otherwise delayed accordingly. Thai concessions 
on vehicles were only marginal as tariffs on passenger cars below 3000cc, representing 
99.9% of the Thai automotive market, were left unchanged and those on vehicles of over 
3000cc were only reduced from 80% to 60%. JTEPA also includes a cooperation chapter 
whereby, among other programs, Japan provides skill-training for Thai automotive 
workers.272 
 
 
 
 
                                 
270 Strong resistance by Western carmakers occurred despite that, given Japanese firms’ dominance of the Thai automotive market, total 
liberalization to Japan-made vehicles was unlikely to cause drastic changes in market share distribution in Thailand. European firms also 
opposed liberalization of the Thai large-engine vehicle segment to cars produced at more efficient scales in Japan. In contrast, American 
carmakers were willing to accept some compromise on less price-sensitive larger models. For some models, American firms also 
depended on imports of automotive parts and steel from Japan. The two associations of automotive part producers in Thailand opposed 
liberalization of both vehicles and parts. See Essay 1 for details on JTEPA negotiations. 
271 In any case, given the large sunk investments involved, the automotive sector reacts slower than other industries to changes in the 
policy environment. As with market share distribution, it was therefore unlikely that full liberalization to Japanese vehicles in JTEPA 
could have led to significant divestments, at least in the short-term. 
272 The program, known as the Automotive Human Resource Development Program, extended an already existing scheme for technical 
assistance in the automotive sector. Despite limited automotive liberalization in JTEPA, until December 2009, 41.3% of all imports of 
luxury cars and 10.0% of automotive parts used JTEPA preferences (data provided by the Thai Ministry of Finance). Low utilization 
reflects long tariff phase-out periods for automotive parts and availability of other import tariff exemption schemes for parts incorporated 
into vehicles destined for exports (Essay 2). 
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Table 4: Thai concessions in the automotive sector  
under JTEPA * 
 
 Thai concessions 
Passenger cars < 3000 cc unchanged 
Passenger cars > 3000 cc 60% by 2011 
(maintained at 60%) 
Commercial Vehicles 
       < 5 tons 
       > 5 tons 
 
0 % by 2018 
20% by 2018 
Automotive parts * Most items: unchanged or 
capped to 20% at entry and 
0% by 2013 
* Sensitive items (engines 
and their parts): unchanged 
at entry and 0 % by 2015 
Hot-rolled steel 0% within quota  
0% by 2018 
                                                   Source: JTEPA treaty (METI-JTEPA, undated) 
               * Japan offers tariff-free multilateral access to all automotive products 
 
 
 
While Japanese carmakers failed to achieve the liberalization initially sought, their 
dominance in the local market meant that maintaining the status quo was not so 
unattractive scenario after all, especially since they also succeeded in preventing competing 
carmakers from other countries from gaining any better access to Thailand in future Thai 
FTAs (Hypothesis 1b). In what effectively amounts to an “MFN clause”, Japan got in 
JTEPA the compromise by Thailand not to extend any better tariff treatment to any “other 
major automotive manufacturing country in its future FTAs than that extended to Japan” 
(MOFA, 2007).  
As derived from Hypothesis 1c, exclusion of vehicles in JTEPA was followed by 
parallel exclusion in subsequent FTAs, namely ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Korea and 
ASEAN-India.273 
 
 
 
                                 
273 Negotiations on the Thailand-United States and ASEAN-European Union FTAs were eventually abandoned, although the latter is 
currently under negotiation as a bilateral Thailand-European Union FTA. From Hypothesis 1c and the MFN clause included in JTEPA, it 
would be expected that the automotive sector would be excluded in the Thailand-European Union FTA. 
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5.  The automotive sector in the Malaysia-Japan FTA 
Just a decade ago, Malaysia was not only reluctant to enter into bilateral FTAs, but it was 
also critical of those signed by Singapore and Thailand. As recently as 2001, Prime 
Minister Mahathir criticized Singapore FTAs with non-ASEAN countries for opening a 
“back door” into ASEAN (Desker, 2004). However, fearing trade diversion from the FTAs 
signed by other ASEAN members, it took Malaysia only a year to reverse that position and 
declare its interest in an FTA with Japan. As of May 2013, Malaysia has implemented six 
bilateral FTAs plus five ASEAN-centered FTAs (see Table 2 in Essay 1).274 
Japan’s main interest in MJEPA laid in eliminating tariffs on automobiles and 
steel.275 In a 2003 joint feasibility study conducted before MJEPA negotiations were 
launched, Malaysia stressed the difficulty of liberalizing its sensitive automotive sector, 
which at the time remained still excluded from AFTA liberalization schedules and enforced 
the use of LCRs (MOFA, 2003). Significantly, in the same document Japan linked MJEPA 
with AFTA, emphasizing the need for Malaysia to fulfill AFTA commitments in the 
automotive sector and beyond. Such linkage confirms my initial arguments and reflects 
Japan’s interest, and that of its firms, in exploiting the possibilities offered by overlapping 
FTAs for its regional strategy. 
 Bilateral talks began in January 2004 and although by late that year an initial 
agreement had already been reached, negotiations slowed down over automotive and steel 
products. Interviews with government officials and national and foreign carmakers in 
Malaysia indicated that, at the time, it was widely expected that Malaysia would eventually 
exclude the entire automotive sector from MJEPA. The same interviews showed that 
Japanese carmakers lobbied Malaysia for the liberalization of vehicles, automotive parts 
and steel, while PROTON and PERODUA, still seeking further delays in liberalization 
                                 
274 Malaysia has implemented FTAs with Japan, Pakistan, New Zealand, India, Chile and Australia.   
275 In 2003, before MJEPA negotiations started, automotive and steel products jointly represented over 18% of Japanese exports to 
Malaysia, with only 0.2% going in the opposite direction. 
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under AFTA, resisted opening up the sector.276 One key reason the Malaysian government 
established the National Car Project was to develop an indigenous automotive part 
manufacturing industry. Consequently, the two associations encompassing PERODUA and 
PROTON suppliers—most of them largely, some completely, dependent on the two 
national carmakers—maintained a strong protectionist position against the introduction of 
more competition for national carmakers and/or any increase in their options for procuring 
automotive parts (interviews). 
To sweeten its demands, and as part of the MJEPA cooperation chapter, Japan 
offered Malaysia technical assistance for human resource development in the automotive 
sector—the Malaysian-Japan Automotive Industries Cooperation (MAJAICO) program.277 
Even so, Malaysia remained reluctant to liberalize its iconic automotive sector, which 
persisted as the only sticking point for the conclusion of MJEPA negotiations (interviews).  
In January 2005, Malaysia eventually had to start moving its automotive sector back 
into AFTA’s liberalization schedules, slashing tariffs on vehicles from 70-300% down to 
20%, with the prospect of their eventual elimination by 2010. Starting in early 2005, 
Japanese carmakers in Malaysia—with simpler assembly operations than those of 
subsidiaries in Thailand—were thus able to import Thailand-made Japanese models at 
reduced tariffs through AFTA.  
AFTA liberalization plus Japanese carmakers’ investment in Thailand preempted 
Malaysia’s MJEPA bargaining position. Malaysia eventually gave in and, in May 2005, 
agreed to open up its automotive industry to Japan entirely and within a relatively short 
                                 
276 PROTON had broken its equity and technology tie-up with Mitsubishi in 2004 but PERODUA depended (and still does) to a larger 
extent upon Japanese inputs. The Malaysian Automotive Association—encompassing non-national carmakers—naturally supported 
liberalization with Japan as a first step toward breaking down decades of protectionism. 
277 In MAJAICO, that expanded an existing scheme, Japan provided assistance to Malaysian firms in automotive skill training, standards 
and business matching during 2006-2011.  
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time (Table 5).278 At the time of the entry into force of MJEPA in July 2006, Malaysia 
eliminated all tariffs on unassembled vehicle kits and, by 2010, on passenger cars with 
engines larger than 2000cc. Tariffs on cars below 2000 cc, at the heart of the PROTON’s 
and PERODUA’s market, will be eliminated by 2015. Equally important to Malaysia, given 
National Car Project’s goals and large local ownership of suppliers, tariffs on automotive 
parts were rapidly liberalized; they were reduced to 0-5% in 2008, and scrapped altogether 
in 2010. Tariffs on hot-rolled steel for the automotive industry received duty exemptions 
and will be brought down to zero by 2015. By eliminating all tariffs on Japan-made 
automotive products, MJEPA effectively puts Japan on the same level as other ASEAN 
members within roughly the same period. Even though Japanese carmakers could access 
Malaysia tariff-free through AFTA after 2010, MJEPA gave them additional flexibility in 
planning their production strategies.279 Of note, Malaysia did not grant Japan any other 
significant concession outside the automotive sector. 
 
Table 5:  Malaysian concessions in the automotive sector  
under MJEPA 
 
 Malaysian concessions 
Passenger cars < 2000 cc 0% by 2015 
Passenger cars 2000-3000 cc, 
trucks, buses and multi-purpose 
vehicles 
0% by 2010 
Passenger cars > 3000 cc 
 
0-5% in 2008 
0% by 2010 
Unassembled Vehicle Kits  
(complete knocked-down,  CKD) 
0% at entry 
Automotive parts 0-5% in 2008   
0% by 2010 
Hot-rolled steel Import duty exemptions  
0% by 2015 
                                                 Source: MJEPA treaty (METI-MJEPA, undated; MITI, undated)  
 
 
                                 
278 According to interviews, Malaysia’s decision to liberalize its automotive sector was taken very close to the agreed deadline for the 
conclusion of negotiations. Several interviewees indicated that Japan threatened to pull out investments in the automotive industry and 
beyond if requests for liberalization of the automotive sector were not attended.  
279 Between MJEPA’s entry into force in July 2006 and December 2012, imports from Japan of large-engine vehicles, unassembled 
vehicle kits and functional automotive parts have multiplied by more than four times despite negative economic growth during several 
quarters in this period and the fact that full liberalization of larger vehicles was only realized in July 2010. 
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With Thailand as the regional hub not only for Japanese but also American and 
European firms, Malaysia may find itself in a similar concession pre-emption quandary as 
it negotiates FTAs with the United States and the European Union.280 The FDI sunk into 
partners of previous FTAs would compel Malaysia to open its automotive sector in future 
FTAs thus acting as a stepping stone toward further liberalization. However, as additional 
evidence for the argument posited here, Malaysia was able to exclude the automotive sector 
in later FTAs with Pakistan, India and Korea (e.g. Malaysia-Pakistan, Malaysia-India, 
ASEAN-Korea and ASEAN-India FTAs) because automotive firms from these countries 
had very limited (if any) investment in Malaysia’s previous FTA partners.281  
 
5.  Discussion 
The case studies analyzed here showed how the interplay of FTAs among one another and 
with the investment sunk in them influenced positions regarding liberalization or 
protection. The preferences and policy strategies of governments and firms regarding FTAs 
are determined not only by the agreements signed by competitor countries—the classic 
“domino effect” (Baldwin, 1995)—but also by its own FTAs and the investment in them. 
The Thai and Malaysian cases also illustrate the contingent nature of the stumbling block 
versus stepping stone dilemma. The interaction between investment and FTAs may lead 
either to the liberalization of previously protected sectors or, instead, to the entrenchment of 
pockets of protectionism across FTA blocs. 
Empirical evidence in this Essay allowed us to conclude that, in the presence of 
tariff-jumping FDI, protectionism for sensitive sectors could potentially perpetuate itself 
across multiple overlapping FTAs through at least three mechanisms. One occurs when 
                                 
280 Malaysia has joined negotiations for a regional FTA that includes the United States (the Trans Pacific Partnership FTA) and is in the 
midst of talks with the European Union for a bilateral FTA.  
281 Output by Korean firms in Indonesia during 2005-2011 amounted to less than 1.0% of total production, even lower in Thailand. 
Vehicle production by Indian carmakers in ASEAN countries remains negligible. 
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sequential games of FTA negotiations between a host country and its FDI source countries 
are engulfed in collective action problems dominated by defection (quadrant four in Figure 
1, right panel). A foreign firm would oppose FTA liberalization by the host nation with any 
other except with its own home country and/or where the firm has investment and 
production stages (e.g., Japanese carmakers supported JTEPA, which was opposed by 
Western assemblers in Thailand). The eventual result is either no FTA or exclusion of the 
sector(s) in every FTA negotiated by the host with FDI source countries, even though 
investing firms would benefit more from multiple and separate bilateral FTAs than from no 
FTA at all or from the exclusion of the sector in all of FTAs (Figure 1, right panel).282 
Sectoral protection could also be preserved across overlapping FTAs by the shadow 
of existing and future FTAs. Concessions or exclusions on sensitive sectors made by a 
country in a FTA set expectations for future FTA partners. For instance, opening the Thai 
automotive sector in TAFTA created a precedent that Japan sought to replicate in JTEPA. 
A country may decide to exclude a sensitive sector from liberalization in an FTA 
independently of the partner’s competitiveness as to prevent other countries from making 
similar demands in subsequent FTAs. In refusing to liberalize its automotive sector in 
JTEPA, the Thai government wanted to protect existing investment, but also to prevent 
similar demands by the United States, the European Union or Korea, then also negotiating 
FTAs with Thailand/ASEAN.   
Lastly, protection/exclusion of a given sector across multiple FTAs could also 
emerge from firms of an FDI source country. A foreign firm with a dominant market 
position in a host country could potentially favor the status quo and relinquish demanding 
liberalization between its home and host countries to prevent other countries’ competing 
                                 
282 The precise win set depends on the market share distribution in the host country and the comparative advantage of the given foreign 
firm vis-à-vis other firms in the host country and at home. Given their dominance in Thailand, it could be argued that Japanese 
automotive firms could have extracted larger concessions in JTEPA if Western automotive firms, especially American, had had less of a 
presence in Thailand. Firms may nevertheless still favor FTA liberalization by the host to inputs coming from a country different from 
their home, if they are dependent on those inputs as illustrated by the partial support by American carmakers to the liberalization of 
automotive parts and steel from Japan in JTEPA. 
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firms from getting a similar (or better) deal in the host country’s future FTAs, especially if 
the status quo could be locked in by including an MFN clause in the FTA. Field research 
found that Japanese carmakers in Thailand actively sought to liberalize the Thai automotive 
sector, without concern about creating a precedent since the precedent already existed in 
TAFTA. But interviews also revealed that, given their overwhelming dominance in 
Thailand, their primary interest was not so much to improve their market position as to 
avoid or limit future losses. Japanese automotive firms wanted to prevent the then ongoing 
ASEAN-Korea FTA negotiations from allowing competitively-priced Korean vehicles to 
enter Thailand tariff-free.283 By including an “MFN clause-like” in JTEPA—solely for the 
automotive sector—, Japanese firms prevented that the concessions it extracted from 
Thailand, small as they were, could be exceeded by concessions Thailand might make later 
to other countries. 
Either way, protection/exclusion of a sector in an FTA through these mechanisms 
increases the chances that the FDI host country will protect/exclude the sector in 
subsequent FTAs and multilaterally. In that regard, inclusion of the automotive MFN 
clause in JTEPA will deter Thailand from granting meaningful tariff reductions in the 
automotive sector in future FTAs. 
By contrast, Malaysia’s most protected manufacturing sector was suddenly 
liberalized the first time its government negotiated a bilateral FTA, and with Japan, one of 
the world’s most competitive automotive producers. There is no question that both the 
more liberal government of current Prime Minister Najib but also of his predecessor Prime 
Minister Abdullah (2003-2009), which negotiated MJEPA, had slowly realized the 
impossibility (and costs entailed) of maintaining indefinitely the protection for PROTON 
and PERODUA. However, automotive concessions in MJEPA cannot be explained as the 
                                 
283 Korean Hyundai started a very small assembly operation in Thailand in 2007. Japanese carmakers based in Thailand also wanted to 
shield their position from concessions to the United States and the European Union in FTAs that Thailand was negotiating at the time.  
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result of cross-sectoral bargaining or as the Malaysian government’s seizing an opportunity 
to implement externally-imposed structural reforms that would otherwise have proven 
unachievable.284 Field research interviews indicated that final negotiations on the 
automotive industry occurred once talks on all other sectors have been closed and that the 
Malaysian government resisted automotive liberalization until the very end of MJEPA 
negotiations. In addition, as elaborated elsewhere in this Essay, Malaysia continued to 
shield the sector in its National Automotive Policy and in subsequent FTAs with 
automotive producing-countries that lack significant investment in ASEAN (e.g., ASEAN-
Korea, ASEAN-India and Malaysia-India). Although Malaysian government officials 
interviewed accorded MAJAICO a significant weight in the decision to liberalize the sector 
with Japan, this is little more than a face-saving exercise toward local automotive firms, 
since MAJAICO cannot compensate for potential loses resulting from liberalization.285  
The reason the Malaysian automotive sector was fully opened in MJEPA is to be 
found elsewhere. Countries may liberalize a sensitive sector in an FTA when the partner is 
not considered a competitor (e.g., Thailand to Australia in TAFTA) but also at the end of a 
long tariff phase-out period (e.g., all ASEAN countries, including Malaysia, in AFTA). The 
Malaysian case shows that FDI sunk into a given sector in partners of previous Malaysian 
FTAs (e.g., AFTA), shaped its liberalization strategy in later FTAs (e.g., MJEPA). Since 
establishment of the National Car Project, Malaysia has fiercely protected its automotive 
sector against competition within ASEAN and beyond through trade barriers and FDI 
restrictions. But, obviously, Malaysia could not control investment policy in other ASEAN 
fellow members. When Japanese and Western carmakers started steeping up their FDI in 
Thailand, and more recently in Indonesia, they gained a potential beachhead for their 
                                 
284 Malaysia considered as highly sensitive economic sectors with significant participation of the bumiputera population such as 
government procurement, many services sectors and the automotive industry itself. 
285 MAJAICO, already provided at a smaller scale before MJEPA, lasted only five years. In addition, a similar arrangement was also 
granted to Thailand despite marginal Thai concessions to Japan.  
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automotive products to enter other ASEAN countries freely once AFTA was fully 
implemented. Malaysia reinforced the protection of its automotive sector in the wake of the 
Asian crisis. However, in January 2005, seven years after Malaysia had withdrawn the 
automotive sector from AFTA liberalization and just four months before negotiations on 
MJEPA concluded, the Malaysian government could no longer maintain the sector 
excluded and eventually conceded to pressures from other ASEAN countries to start 
bringing it back into AFTA schedules. In little over a year, Malaysian tariffs on vehicles 
from other ASEAN countries were reduced from 70-300% in December 2004 to just 0-5% 
in March 2006, four months before MJEPA finally came into effect. It could be therefore 
argued that Malaysia’s liberalization of its sensitive automotive sector in MJEPA amounted 
to no more than a fait accompli. With Japanese carmakers exporting automobiles from 
Thailand to Malaysia at tariffs of 20% in 2005, 5% in 2006, and tariff-free since 2010, 
Malaysia saw her protectionist stand in MJEPA preempted. Consequently, Malaysia 
eventually accepted to extend to Japan the same level of liberalization (and at about the 
same time) as to other ASEAN countries.286  
AFTA has opened the Malaysian automotive sector to competition not only from 
carmakers established elsewhere in ASEAN at the time of AFTA creation back in 1992, but 
also to any other automotive producer that has invested in ASEAN since then, or that may 
invest in the future. With all tariffs among the main ASEAN economies now eliminated, 
Malaysia will therefore see its negotiating position constrained once again when trying to 
protect the sector in future FTAs with countries with automotive investment and production 
in ASEAN (or other FTA areas in which Malaysia participates). The interaction between 
previous FTAs and the FDI sunk in them may thus act as stepping stones toward further 
liberalization of the Malaysian automotive sector.  
                                 
286 Even though a larger presence of Western carmakers in Malaysia would have hindered collective action among non-national firms in 
support of automotive liberalization in MJEPA—as occurred in Thailand—, foreign carmakers (both Japanese and Western) in the 
Malaysian Automotive Association saw MJEPA as an opportunity to start opening up the sector. 
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At least on paper, the interaction between FDI and FTAs could also allow 
circumvention of the high tariffs on vehicles applied by Thailand at the multilateral level. 
For instance, firms with limited or no assembly presence in Thailand (e.g., Korean and 
Indian firms or Japanese luxury carmakers) could potentially take advantage of the fully 
open Thai automotive sector under AFTA and TAFTA by investing and establishing 
production in other ASEAN countries or in Australia. However, firm- and locational-
specific advantages may favor investment into Thailand itself. Historically, high 
multilateral tariffs on vehicles in Thailand have helped to maintain and increase FDI into 
the Thai automotive sector (tariff-jumping market seeking FDI), but, more recently, 
investment has also (and primarily) been attracted by the indirect rents derived from the 
agglomeration economies associated with Thailand being an automotive parts cluster and 
export-oriented hub (efficiency seeking FDI). The network of Thai FTAs and a liberal 
investment regime also contributed to attracting FDI into the Thai automotive sector. All 
these reasons would help persuade those potential firms to invest directly into Thailand 
rather than in other ASEAN countries or in Australia.  
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s early predictions about bilateral FTAs being a 
“back door” to AFTA ended up, ironically, working the other way around. Liberalization 
under AFTA constrained Malaysia’s position in its bilateral FTA with Japan, and has the 
potential to do the same in regard to future FTA partners. As ASEAN countries—and Asian 
nations more generally—keep signing into more overlapping FTAs, such situations will 
only become more frequent. 
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Appendix 
 
       Interviews with key informants in Thailand and Malaysia 
 
 
Notes  
 
Research for this Thesis has largely drawn on in-depth semi-structured interviews with key 
informants in Thailand and Malaysia. The vast majority of interviews were voice-recorded. 
Informants received assurance that their name (or any identifying information) would not 
be shown linked to their comments in any of the outputs of the project. The average 
duration of interviews was 106 minutes.  
 
In the list below, professional positions correspond to those held at the time of interview. 
When appropriate and relevant to this research, reference to a previous position is also 
included. Interviewees holding multiple positions are categorized by the position more 
relevant to the interview. 
 
1. Thailand 
 
1.1 Government  
 
Ministries and Government Agencies  
 
Mr. Winichai Chaemchaeng  
Commercial Advisor to the Minister of Commerce. Ministry of Commerce 
Former Director General, Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce 
 
Mr. Chana Kanaratanadilok 
Deputy Director General, Department of Trade Negotiations. Ministry of Commerce 
 
Mrs. Pimchanok Vonkhorporn.  
Executive Director, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Department of Trade Negotiations. 
Ministry of Commerce 
Former member of several FTA negotiation teams  
 
Mr. Duangarthit Nidhi-u-tai  
Director, Non-Tariff Measures Division. Department of Trade Negotiations. Ministry of 
Commerce 
Focal point for negotiations in Rules of Origin in Thai FTAs 
 
Dr. Narongchai Akrasanee  
Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister on Economic Affairs 
Advisor, Board of the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) 
Chairman, Export-Import Bank of Thailand  
Former Minister of Commerce (1996-1997) and Advisor to the Minister of Finance (2002-
2003) 
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Ms. Anongkasiri Kulkumthorn 
Senior Trade Officer, Bureau of ASEAN Affairs. Dept. of Trade Negotiations. Ministry of 
Commerce.  
 
Ms. Prewprae Chumrun. 
Senior Trade Officer. Bureau of Goods Negotiations. Dept. of Trade Negotiations. 
Ministry of Commerce. 
 
Mr. Thananchon Rojkittikhun  
Trade Officer, Non-Tariff Measures Division. Dept. of Trade Negotiations. Ministry of  
 
Mr. Thalerngsak Vongsamsorn  
Trade Officer, Department of Trade Negotiations. Ministry of Commerce 
Commerce 
 
Mr. Pitak Udomwichaiwat  
Director, Bureau of Trade Preferences, Dept of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce  
 
Ms. Natruja Chaikongla.  
Senior Trade Officer, Bureau of Trade Preferences, Dept. of Foreign Trade, Ministry of 
Commerce 
Focal point for consultations with business and civil society 
 
Ms. Monta Pantong 
Trade Officer, Bureau of Trade Preferences, Dept. of Foreign Trade, Ministry of 
Commerce 
 
Ms. Supavadee Chaiyanukulkitti 
Trade Officer, Bureau of Trade Preferences, Dept. of Foreign Trade, Ministry of 
Commerce 
 
Mr. Thanakrit Luangasnathip 
Trade Officer, Dept. of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce 
Mr. Cherdchai Chaivaivid 
Counsellor, Japan Desk, ASEAN Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Focal contact, JTEPA implementation review Committee 
 
Dr. Soonthorn Chaiyindeepum  
Director, Department of ASEAN Affairs. Division II. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Mr. Supark Prongthura  
Counsellor, Dept. ASEAN Affairs. Division III, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Mrs. Vilawan Mangklatanakul.  
Counsellor. Division of International Economic Policy. Department of International 
Economics. Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Former focal point on investment chapters in TAFTA and JTEPA 
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Ms. Arjaree Sriratanaban  
Second Secretary, Office of the Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Former Counsellor in the Thai team during negotiations for JTEPA 
 
Mr. Rit Syamananda. 
Section Head, Fiscal Policy Office, Bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization, Ministry 
of Finance 
 
Dr. Pich Nijsamer.  
Deputy Director, Fiscal Policy Research Institute. Ministry of Finance 
 
Dr. Apichart Prasert 
Program Director, Fiscal Policy Research Institute. Ministry of Finance 
 
Mr. Eggaluck Suwannakarn 
Researcher, Fiscal Policy Research Institute. Ministry of Finance 
 
Mr. Chutiwat Watanaphol  
Director, Customs Tariff Bureau. Customs Department. Ministry of Finance 
 
Ms. Suchaya Chinwongse 
Senior Customs Officer, Customs Department. Ministry of Finance 
 
Dr. Somchai Hamhirun 
Deputy Director General, Office of Industrial Economics, Ministry of Industry 
 
Mr. Siriruj Chulakaratana.  
Senior Expert, International Industrial Economics Bureau. Ministry of Industry 
Former Director, Division of Industrial Economics.  
 
Mr. Montol Jeamchareon  
Deputy Secretary General, Office of Agricultural Economics. Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 
 
Mr. Vinit Atisook 
Senior Policy and Plan Analyst, Office of Agricultural Economics. Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives 
 
Dr. Vichai Chokevivat 
Director, Institute for the Development Research Protection, Ministry of Public Health 
Chairman of the Board, Government Pharmaceutical Organization 
Focal point on health-related issues in FTAs, Ministry of Public Health 
 
Dr. Suchart Chongpraset 
Senior Pharmacist, Food and Drug Administration. Ministry of Public Health 
 
Dr. Sripen Tantivess 
Senior Researcher and Head of International Relations Div., Health Intervention and 
Technology Assessment Program, Ministry of Public Health 
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Dr. Pongsadhorn Pokpermdee 
Senior Expert, National Health Security Office 
Focal point on health-related issues in FTAs 
 
Mr. Songsak Limbanyen.  
Director, Investment Promotion Bureau 2 (Automotive Mining and Metal Industries) 
Board of Investment 
 
Mr. Yuthasak Kanasawat 
Director, Investment Strategy and Policy Bureau, Board of Investment. 
 
Ms. Vasana Mututanont 
Executive Director, International Affairs Bureau, Board of Investment 
 
Mr. Arkhom Termpittayapaisith 
Secretary General, National Economic and Social Development Board 
 
Public-Private Institutes 
 
Ms. Rachanida Nitipathanapirak  
Manager, Automotive Business Analysis Section. Thai Automotive Institute 
 
Ms. Aunchalee Koy 
Officer, Thai Automotive Institute 
 
Dr. Narong Warongkriengkrai  
Director, Thai-German Institute 
 
Mr. Thodsapol Laovatin 
Advanced Machining Technician, Thai-German Institute 
 
Mr. Virat Tandaechanurat  
Executive Director, Thai Textile Institute 
 
Ms Wanida Pichalai 
Director, Policy and Plan Dept., Thai Textile Institute 
 
Dr Chamchai Sirikasemlert 
Director, Technology Dept.,Thai Textile Institute 
 
Ms. Thitiporn Saengbudda 
Officer, Thai Textile Institute 
 
Foreign government and government-related organizations 
 
Mr. Jean-Jacques Bouflet 
Minister-Counsellor, Delegation of the European Commission, European Union 
 
Mr. Jun Yamada 
Minister for Economic Affairs, Japanese Embassy in Thailand 
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Mr. Hideyasu Tamura 
Representative for the Asia Pacific Region, Japan Overseas Development Corporation 
 
Mr. Ryoichi Miyazaki 
Deputy Representative, Japan Overseas Development Corporation 
 
Mr. Atsusuke Kawada  
Deputy Director, Japan External Trade Organization, Bangkok. 
 
Mr. Yoji Shibata  
Senior Advisor on FTAs, Japan External Trade Organization, Bangkok 
 
Mr. So Umezaki  
Research Fellow, Japan External Trade Organization. Bangkok Research Center.  
Research Fellow, Institute of Development Economies-Bangkok 
 
Ms. Maki Aoki-Okabe  
Visiting Research Fellow. Japan External Trade Organization, Bangkok Research Center.  
Research Fellow, Institute of Development Economies-Bangkok 
 
1.2 Private Sector 
Business Associations and Individual Firms 
 
Mr. Pramon Sutivong 
Chairman, Thai Chamber of Commerce 
Former Chairman, Toyota Motor Thailand 
 
Dr. Piyanuch Malakul Na Ayuthya  
Vice-Chairwoman, Thai Chamber of Commerce 
Director, Committee on Trade Rules and International Trade, Thai Chamber of Commerce 
 
Mr. Pornsilp Patcharintanakul  
Deputy Secretary General, Thai Chamber of Commerce 
Senior Vice-President, CP Group 
 
Mr. Dissalai Chongcharoen 
Officer, International Trade Negotiation Coordination Office, Thai Chamber of Commerce 
 
Dr. Nilsuwan Leelarasamee 
Deputy Secretary General, Federation of Thai Industries 
Chairman, Committee on Rules of Origin and Non-Tariff Barriers. Federation of Thai 
Industries 
 
Dr. Katiya Greigarn.  
Chairman, Electrical and Electronic Industry. Federation of Thai Industries 
 
Mr. Payungsak Chartsutipol Chairman 
Vice Chairman, Iron and Steel Industry Club, Federation of Thai Industries 
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Dr. Songwoot Graipaspong 
Director, Iron and Steel Industry Club, Federation of Thai Industries 
Managing Director, TC Asia Public Co. Ltd. 
 
Mr. Aroon Laowatanakul   
Vice-Chairman of the Automotive Industry Club, Federation of Thai Industries 
Chairman, Foreign Affairs Working Group. Federation of Thai Industries 
General Manager, Volvo, Thai Swedish Assembly Co., Ltd.  
 
Ms. On-Uma Monthasuwan 
Officer, Industrial Promotion and Support Department, Federation of Thai Industries 
 
Ms. Pajnapa Peamsilpakulchorn  
Consultant, World Bank, Thailand 
Former consultant at the Federation of Thai Industries Committee on FTAs  
 
Dr. Kanchana Thaichon  
Director, Joint Standing Committee for Commerce, Industry and Banking (Thai Chamber 
of Commerce, Federation of Thai Industry, Thai Bankers Association) 
 
Ms. Supawan Pornvuthikorn 
Associated VP for Foreign Affairs, Thai Automotive Industry Association 
Manager, Thailand Toyota Corporation 
 
Ms. Oranuch Boonskulsophit 
Officer, Thai Automotive Industry Association 
 
Mr. Anuwat Wangvanichakorn  
Director, Thai Auto Parts Manufacturers Association 
Director, Business Affairs, Denso International Asia Co., Ltd. 
 
Ms. Panitta Sattatammakul 
Foreign Affairs Coordinator, Thai Auto Part Manufacturers Association 
 
Ms. Jeeraporn Nimitranun 
Officer, Economic Section, Thai Auto Part Manufacturers Association 
 
Dr. Panisuan Jamnarnwej 
President, Thai Frozen Food Association 
Managing Director, Pakfood Public Co. Ltd. 
 
Mr. Paiboon Ponsuwanna 
Chairman, Thai National Shippers’ Council 
Former President, Thai Frozen Food Association (1999-2002) 
 
Mr. Nat Onsri 
President, Thai Food Processors’ Association 
Chairman, Tuna Processors Group 
General Manager, Kingfisher Co., Ltd. 
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Mr. Chaiwat Intrachatorn 
Executive Director, Thai Food Processors’ Association 
 
Ms. Supatra Rewpairoj 
Trade Manager, Thai Food Processors’ Association 
 
Mr. Phongsak Assakul 
President, Thai Textile Manufacturing Association 
Vice-Chairman, Thai Chamber of Commerce 
Chairman, AFTEX Ltd. 
 
Mr. Kamol Tantivanich 
Manager, Thai Textile Manufacturing Association 
 
Mr. Chen Namchaisiri 
Chairman, Thai Synthetic Fiber Manufacturers' Association 
President, Asia Fiber Public Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Dej Pathanasethpong  
President, Thai Textile Garment Manufacturing 
Managing Director, Thong Thai Textile Company Limited. 
 
Dr. Sasitorn Kittvoravitkul 
Deputy Secretary General, Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
Managing Director, Bio-Innova and Synchron 
 
Mr. Thunha Pungcharoenkul 
Project Manager, Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
 
Mr. Teera Chakajnarodom 
President, Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association 
 
Mr. Pornsit Sriorathaikul 
Senior Chairman, Thai Gem and Jewelry Traders Association 
 
Ms. Anchalee Kertngern 
Global Network Manager, Thai National Shippers’ Council 
 
Mr. Takeo Sakurai  
Corporate General Manager, Office of the President, Mitsubishi Motors (Thailand) Co., 
Ltd. 
 
Mrs. Pienporn Wongvitavas 
Manager, Government and Legal Affairs Department, Mitsubishi Motors Thailand, Co. 
Ltd. 
 
Mr. Khanchit Chaisupho  
Director, ASEAN Policy & Government Affairs, General Motors Thailand 
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Mr. Arnupab Tadpitakkul  
Director of Government Affairs, Auto Alliance (Ford/Mazda),  
Deputy Secretary General of Automotive Industry Club. Federation of Thai Industries 
 
Mrs. Kusuma Narupiti  
Senior Manager, Industrial Policies Dept., Tri Petch Isuzu  
Director, Automotive Industry Club, Federation of Thai Industries 
 
Mr. Theeraphat Kaosaiyanant  
Director, Industrial Policies Dept., Tri Petch Isuzu 
 
Mr. Sompong Phaoenchoke 
Managing Director, Thai Rung Union Car Public, Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Ariya Tountong  
General Manager of Siam Senater Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Ted Arunwechpipat 
Engineer, Production Engineering Dept., Nissan Powertrain Thailand, Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Hideo Takenaka 
Executive Vice-President, Hyundai Motor Thailand, Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Yongkiat Kitapanich  
Director and Executive vice-president, Somboon Advance Technology Public Co., Ltd. 
Former Director, Thai Auto Parts Manufacturers Association 
 
Mr. Worapan  Loonpae  
Business Development Manager, Somboon Advance Technology Public Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Chumpol Rangson  
Director Overseas Operations, Thai Summit Autoparts Industry, Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Jaturong Trinetra 
Project Coordinator, Thai Summit Autoparts Industry, Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Vitedmytri Lekakul 
Managing Director, Pt Indonesia Thai Summit Autoparts Industry Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Chinawut Bunnag 
Director, Thai Auto Conversion, Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Apichart Karoonkornsakul  
President, Asia Precision Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Preecha Leelawilailak  
General Manager, Costing Department, Summit Auto Seats Industry Co., Ltd. 
Member, Board of Directors, Thai Auto Part Manufacturers Association 
Member, Board of Directors, Thai Automotive Industry Association 
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Mr. Yeap Swee Chuan  
President and CEO, AAPICO Hitech Co., Ltd.   
 
Dr. Sven Koops 
Associate Director, Indirect Tax, Corporate Services, Ernst & Young  
 
Mr. Arthorn Suthisomboon 
Marketing Business Manager, Beauty Gems, Co., Ltd.  
 
Mr. Sayan Chanvipaswongse 
Chairman, EBCI Ltd. International Trade, Logistics and Management Consulting. 
 
Mr. R. J. Gurley 
Director, ASEAN Competitiveness Enhancement Project, Nathan Associates, Inc. 
 
Mr. Sarit Sanguanwongse 
Deputy Director, ASEAN Competitiveness Enhancement Project, Nathan Associates, Inc. 
 
Dr. Achara Eksaengsri 
Director, Research and Development Institute, Government Pharmaceutical Organization 
 
Foreign Business Associations and Chambers of Commerce 
 
Ms. Judy Benn  
Executive Director, American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand 
 
Mr. Tsuyoshi Inoue  
Secretary General, Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok 
 
Mr. Praab Pianskool  
Thailand Representative, US-ASEAN Business Council 
 
1.3 Academia, Think Tanks and International Organizations 
Dr. Suthiphand Chirathivat.  
Professor, Center for International Economics. Faculty of Economics. Chulalongkorn 
University  
 
Dr. Khemarat Teerasuwannajak Talerngsri.  
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics. Chulalongkorn University 
Formerly, Counselor at the Thai team during negotiations for JTEPA 
 
Dr. Somsak Tambunlertchai  
Professor, Faculty of Economics. Thammasat University 
 
Dr. Thamavit Terdudomtham 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics. Thammasat University. 
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Dr. Kriengkrai Techakanont 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University 
 
Dr. Suphat Suphachalasai 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, International Cooperation Study Centre, 
Thammasat University 
 
Dr. Kitti Prasirtsuk. 
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University 
 
Dr. Kiriya Kukolkarn 
Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University 
 
Dr. Witada Anukoonwattaka.  
Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University. 
 
Dr. Medhi Krongkaew.  
Commissioner, National Counter Corruption Commission 
Professor, Thammasat University.  
Professor, National Institute of Development Administration 
 
Dr. Sakkarin Niyomsilpa.  
Director, Research Division. International Institute of Trade and Development 
 
Ms. Sirinad Pornsiripratharn 
Researcher, FTA Research Group. Research Division. International Institute of Trade 
and Development 
 
Ms. Jittikarn Wongkampoo 
Researcher, FTA Research Group. Research Division. International Institute of Trade 
and Development 
 
Dr. Somkiat Tangkitvanich.  
Research Director, Thailand Development Research Institute. 
Advisor to Minister of Commerce on Thai FTAs 
 
Dr. Jirawat Panpiemras.  
Research Specialist, International Economics Relations Program. 
Thailand Development Research Institute 
 
Mr. Taratorn Ratananarumitsorn 
Researcher, FTA Evaluation. Science and Technology Development Program.  
Thailand Development Research Institute 
 
Mr. Nuttawut Laksanapanyakul 
Researcher, FTA Evaluation. Science and Technology Development Program. 
Thailand Development Research Institute 
 
Mr. Edouard Ereno Blanchet 
Consultant, World Bank, Thailand 
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Dr. Fukunari Kimura 287 
Chief Economist, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia 
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Keio University 
 
Dr. Masahiro Kawai 288 
Dean and Chief Executive Officer, Asian Development Bank Institute 
 
Dr. Toshiro Nishizawa 
Senior Advisor, International Research Office, Corporate Planning Dept. Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation 
 
1.4 Civil society 
 
Mr. Buntoon Sethasirote 
Member, FTA Watch 
Executive Director, Good Governance for Social Development and the Environment 
Foundation 
 
Mr. Jacques-Chai Chomthongdi 
Member, FTA Watch 
Director, Focus on the Global South, Thailand 
 
 
2. Malaysia 
2.1 Government  
Ministries and Government Agencies  
 
Mr. Ravidran P.  
Senior Director, ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry 
 
Mr. J. Jayasiri  
Senior Director, FTA Policy And Negotiations Coordination, Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry 
Former member of MJEPA negotiation team 
 
Mr. G. Alagasan  
Senior Director, Investment Policy and Trade Facilitation, Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry 
 
Mr. Norazman Ayob  
Special Officer to the Secretary General, Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
 
                                 
287 Interviewed in Bangkok while attending the conference “The Future of Economic Integration in Asia” organized by the Faculty of 
Economics at Thammasat University and Japan Bank for International Cooperation, November 20-21, 2008. 
288 As in footnote 287. 
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Mr. Nik Rahmat Nik Taib  
Senior Director, Sectoral Policy and Industry Services, Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry 
 
Ms. Noor Wahida Noordin 
Director, Sectoral Policy I, Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
 
Mr. Gan Mui Huei 
Senior Principal Assistant Director, Sectoral Policy II, Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry 
 
Mr. Mohd Radhi Abd. Razak 
Director, Sectoral Policy II, Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
 
Mr. Azmir Musyabri Abdul Mutallib 
Principal Assistant Director, Sectoral Policy II, Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry 
 
Ms. Wong Pek Cheng 
Trade Officer, Trade Cooperation and Industry Coordination Section, Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry 
 
Ms. Jamilah Haji binti Hassan 
Trade Officer, Trade Cooperation and Industry Coordination Section, Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry 
 
Dr. Sandra Kumar (died on February 25, 2010) 
Deputy Director, Transport and Metal Industries, Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority 
 
Ms. Jasbir Kaur  
Senior Deputy Director, Electronics Industries Division, Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority 
 
Ms Aizah Abdullah  
Deputy Director, Electronics Industries Division, Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority 
 
Mr Jeyasigan Nair  
Senior Deputy Director. International Cooperation Division, Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority  
 
Dr. Wong Lai Sum 
Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 
 
Mr. Prakas Nair 
Director, Americas Section, International Network and Trade Promotion Div., Malaysia 
External Trade Development Corporation 
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Mr. Mohd. Mustafa Abdul Aziz 
Director, East Asia/ASEAN Section, International Network and Trade Promotion Div., 
Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 
 
Government-linked companies 
 
Ms. Wan Kathina Nawawi 
Senior vice-President, Research and Investment Strategy, Khazanah Nasional Bhd. 
 
Ms. Aidonna Jan Ayub 
Officer, Khazanah Nasional Bhd. 
 
 
Foreign government and government-related organizations 
 
Ms. Emi Teshima  
Director, Research and Information Service, Japan External Trade Organization, Kuala 
Lumpur 
 
Mr. Shuji Nishimura  
Trade and Investment Advisor, Japan External Trade Organization, Kuala Lumpur 
 
Mr. Antonio Garcia-Rebollar  
Counsellor, Economic and Commercial Office, Embassy of Spain 
 
1.2 Private Sector 
Business Associations and Individual Firms 
 
Mr. Paul Wang 
Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 
 
Datuk Supperamaniam Manickam,  
Advisor, WTO/FTA Negotiations, Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 
 
Ms. Shamini Sakthinathan 
Assistant Manager, Policy Unit, Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 
 
Mr. Wan Joon Lian 
Assistant Manager, Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 
 
Mr. Nur Hafizah Sulaiman 
Executive, Policy Unit, Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 
 
Mr. Lee Keng Bin 
Chairman, ASEAN Affairs Committee, The Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry and Malaysia 
Chairman, ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
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Mr. Yong Chee Soon 
Assistant Executive Secretary, The Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry and Malaysia 
 
Mr. Rajini Ramlan 
General Manager/Senior Researcher, Malay Chamber of Commerce Malaysia 
 
Mr. Noorzee Bin Othman 
Officer, Malay Chamber of Commerce Malaysia 
 
Dato’ Mamat Salleh 
Chief Executive, Malaysian Palm Oil Association 
 
Mr. Balu a/l Nambiappan 
Head, Trade Development Unit, Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
 
Mr. Andrew Hong 
Chief Executive Officer, Malaysian Textile Manufacturer Association 
 
Dato’ Y.H. Tan 
Deputy President, Malaysian Textile Manufacturers Association 
Director, Pen Apparel Sdn. Bdn. 
 
Mr. S.C. Chan  
Manager, Malaysian Plastics Manufacturers Association 
 
Datuk Aishah Shaikh Ahmad  
President, Malaysian Automotive Association 
 
Mr. Goh Cheng Meng 
Secretary General, Malaysian Automotive Association 
 
Ms. Eliza Goh 
Vice President, Policy and Regulations, Malaysian Automotive Association 
Senior Manager, Marketing and Intelligence Department, Tan Chong Motors  
 
Ms. Chew Swee Leng  
Chief Executive Officer, Malaysian Iron and Steel Industry Federation 
 
YBhg Datuk Dr. Wan Mohamed Wan Embong 
President, PROTON Vendors Association 
Managing Director, WSA Group of Companies 
 
Mr. Theodore Wong Kit Choy  
Honorary Secretary, PERODUA Vendors Club 
General Manager, Administration, Sales and Marketing, Sumitomo Electric Sintered 
Components Sdn. Bhd. 
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Mr. Peter Lim Yoke Cheong 
President, Malaysian Automotive Components Parts Manufacturers 
Vice-Chairman, Automotive Federation of Malaysia 
Group of General Manager, United Industries Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr Syed Faisal Syed Abd Rahman  
Senior Manager, Corporate Planning Office, PROTON Holdings Bhd. 
 
Mr Shairulnizam Zuall Cobley  
Senior Manager, Corporate Planning Office, PROTON Holdings Bhd. 
 
Mr. Abidullah Mohd Omar  
Deputy General Manager, Corporate Planning Department PERODUA Manufacturing Sdn. 
Bhd. 
 
Mr. Mohd Mazwan Mohd Safwan  
Manager, Government & Industrial Affairs, UMW Toyota Motor Sdn Bhd, 
 
Mr. Halami Hussain  
Executive Advisor, Corporate and Government Affairs, Naza Kia Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Datuk Kamrulzaman Darus 
Director of Manufacturing, Naza Automotive Manufacturing Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Dato’ Frank Steinleitner  
Director, FS Consulting Sdn. Bhd.  
Advisor to PROTON and Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
Former CEO & President, Mercedes Group Malaysia,  
 
Mr. Thomas Lim Teck Ling 
Executive Director, Proreka Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr. Leong Chok Hong 
General Manager, Business Development, Proreka Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr. Raymond Sim Mou Hooi 
Senior Manager, Research and Development, Proreka Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr. Kazuo Iwasaki 
Director, Proreka Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr. Jeffrey Chu Yoon Kong 
Plant Manager, Proreka Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr. Mohammad Ruslan Mispan  
Senior General Manager, Sapura Industrial 
 
Mr Mohd Faridh Dol  
General Manager, Sapura Industrial 
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Mr. Mohd Daud Abdullah  
Executive Director, PATCO Malaysia Bhd. 
 
Mr. Aslan Hazdi Bin Ahmad 
Managing Director, PATCO Malaysia Berhad 
 
Mr. Mohd Sorihan Mohamad  
Managing Director, Ingress Autoventures Thailand Co., Ltd. 
 
Mr. Nik Mohd Zaim  
General Manager, Ingress Corporation Bhd. 
 
Mr. Mohd Mazlan Abd Malek  
Manager, Ingress Corporation Bhd. 
 
Mr. Mansuriatus Shahrir  
Head of Legal, Secretarial & Corporate Planning, Ingress Corporation Bhd. 
 
Mr. Tee Boon Keat 
Executive Director, Delloyd Ventures Bhd. 
 
Mr. Radzaif Mohamed  
Chief Operations Officer, Hicom Teck See Manufacturing Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr. Terence Soo Thean Hin  
Chief Financial Officer, Hicom Teck See Manufacturing Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Ms. Adlina Ilyasak  
Manager, Purchasing & Shipping, Hicom Teck See Manufacturing Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Ms Shuhaida Nun  
Manager, Injection Moulding, Hicom Teck See Manufacturing Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Mr Mohd Faizal B. Sarkawi 
Engineer, Quality Control Dept. Hicom Teck See Manufacturing Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
 
Dr. Ling Ngat Chin 
Director, Advisory Services, Ernst & Young 
 
 
Foreign Business Associations and Chambers of Commerce 
 
Ms. Fui K. Soong 
Executive Director, American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce 
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1.3 Academia, Think Tanks and International Organizations 
Dr. Mohd Rosli Bin Mohamad  
Associate Professor, Dept. of Development Studies. Faculty of Economics and 
Administration, University of Malaya. 
 
Dr. Rokiah Alavi 
Associate Professor, Dept. of Economics and Management, International Islamic 
University 
 
Dr. Mohamed Ariff.  
Executive Director, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research 
 
Prof. Tham Siew Yean  
Director, Institute of Malaysian and International Studies. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
 
Dato' Dr. Mahani Zainal Abidin (died on June 22, 2013) 
Director General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
 
Mr. Terence Too Yang-Yau 
Analyst, Institute of Strategic and International Studies  
 
Datuk Mohamed Ariff 
Executive Director, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research 
 
1.4 Civil society 
Mr. Charles Santiago 
Member of the Parliament of Malaysia, Democratic Action Party 
Member, Monitoring Sustainability of Globalisation Malaysia 
Asia Researcher, FTA Project, Transnational Institute 
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